ORION, Asset Management Plan 2014 2024

Asset
Management
Plan
A 10-year management plan for
Orion’s electricity network from
1 April 2014 to 31 March 2024
Front cover: A team from Connetics installs 11,000 volt and 400 volt cables into a supply kiosk located in one of the new
subdivisions being developed throughout the region. These developments are in response to the increase in demand
driven by the population flight and shift since the earthquakes. In the next five years Orion is investing over $350m
on new assets to restore network resilience and to manage this customer growth.
3
Welcome to Orion’s 10-year network asset management plan (AMP), which details how we plan to
extend, maintain and reinforce our electricity distribution network over the next decade.
Our AMP is central to our day-to-day operations, and is a comprehensive, practical resource that
captures the valuable insights and experience of our highly-skilled employees.
Our risk management strategies have proven themselves during and following the recent earthquakes
and we will continue to invest prudently for the future of our community.
Key issues discussed in the plan include:

 our approach to restore the resilience of our eastern Christchurch network
 our measures to mitigate and prevent major electricity outages
 our proactive approach to ensuring public, contractor and employee safety
 our continued investment in new technology to better understand, control and monitor the
condition and capability of our network.
We hope you find this report informative and we welcome your comments on it or any other aspect of
Orion’s performance. Comments can be emailed to john.langham@oriongroup.co.nz.
Rob Jamieson
CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
Orion New Zealand Limited 10 year Asset Management Plan – From 1 April 2014
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Liability disclaimer
This Asset Management Plan (AMP) has been prepared and publicly disclosed in accordance with the Electricity Distribution
Information Disclosure Determination 2012.
Some of the information and statements contained in this AMP are comprised of, or are based on, assumptions, estimates,
forecasts, predictions and projections made by Orion New Zealand Limited (Orion). In addition, some of the information and
statements are based on actions that Orion currently intends to take in the future. Circumstances will change, assumptions and
estimates may prove to be wrong, events may not occur as forecasted, predicted or projected, and Orion may at a later date
decide to take different actions to those it currently intends to take.
Except for any statutory liability which cannot be excluded, Orion will not be liable, whether in contract, tort (including
negligence), equity or otherwise, to compensate or indemnify any person for any loss, injury or damage arising directly or
indirectly from any person using, or relying on any content of, this AMP.
When considering the content of this AMP, persons should take appropriate expert advice in relation to their own circumstances
and must rely solely on their own judgement and expert advice obtained.
5
Contents
1 Summary 9
2 Background and objectives 35
2.1 Purpose of our AMP 37
2.2 Business plans and goals 37
2.3 Stakeholders 40
2.4 Management responsibilities 42
2.5 Assumptions 45
2.6 Asset management drivers 48
2.7 Asset management process 50
2.8 Systems and information 54
2.9 Development of systems and processes 60
3 Service levels 61
3.1 Introduction to service levels 63
3.2 Consumer consultation 64
3.3 Service level measures 66
3.4 Service level targets 72
4 Lifecycle asset management 75

4.1 Network overview 77
4.2 Network justification 83
4.3 Asset management approach 85
4.4 Substations 87
4.5 - 4.8 Overhead lines 66,33,11,0.4kV 92
4.9 - 4.12 Underground cables 66,33,11,0.4kV 107
4.13 Communication cables 122
4.14 Circuit breakers 124
4.15 Switchgear - high and low voltage 131
4.16 Power transformers and regulators 137
4.17 Distribution transformers 141
4.18 Generators 144
4.19 Protection systems 146
4.20 Communications 149
4.21 Load management systems 153
4.22 Distribution management systems 157
4.23 Information systems - Corporate 160
4.24 Information systems - Asset management 163
4.25 Metering 166
4.26 Network property 168
4.27 Corporate property 172
4.28 Vehicles 175
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Contents (continued)
5 Network development 177

5.1 Introduction 179
5.2 Network architecture 180
5.3 Planning criteria 182
5.4 Energy, demand and growth 190
5.5 Network gap analysis 209
5.6 Network development proposals 212
6 Risk management 249

6.2 Governance and operational business risks 255
6.3 Safety 258
6.4 Environmental management 259
6.5 Network risk analysis 261
6.6 Interdependence 262
6.7 Natural disaster 264
6.8 Asset failure 267
6.9 Mitigation measures 269
7 Financial 275
7.1 Financial forecasts 277
7.2 Changes from our previous forecasts 286
8 Evaluation of performance 287

8.2 Review of consumer service 289
8.3 Efficiency 293
8.4 Works 298
8.5 Safety 299
8.6 Environment 299
8.7 Legislation 299
8.8 Improvement initiatives 300
8.9 Gap analysis 306
Appendices 309
A Disclosure schedules 11 - 13 311
B Cross reference table 340
C Glossary of terms 341
D Certificate of compliance 344
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List of figures
Figure Title Page Figure Title Page

Summary 4-16a Power transformers - age profile 138
2-2a Interaction of plans and processes 12 4-17a Distribution transformers - age profile 142
1-1b Asset management structure 13 4-19a Protection systems - health index profile 147
1-3a Orion’s network area 18 4-19b Protection systems - age profile 147
5-4b Overall maximum demand trends on our network 22 4-20a Radio communication network repeater sites 149
5-4e Rural summer maximum demand (MW) 23 4-21a Ripple injection system control diagram 153
8-2a Orion network SAIDI FY92 - Current Year 30 4-22a SCADA remote terminal units (RTU) - age profile 158
Background and objectives 4-26a Substation buildings (owned by Orion) - age profile 170
2-2a Interaction of plans and processes 39 4-26b Kiosks - age profile 171
2-4a Asset management structure 42 Network development
2-6a Optimal cost versus quality principle 48 5-2 Transpower system in Orion's network area 180
2-7a Asset management system 50 5-3 Peak demand capping 187
2-7b Process to introduce new equipment 52 5-4a Orion network annual energy trends 191
2-7c Process for routine asset inspection and maintenance 52 5-4b Overall maximum demand trends on the Orion network 192
2-7d Process for performance measurement 53 5-4c System load factor 193
2-7e Process for network development 53 5-4d Christchurch urban area network – load duration curves 194
2-8a Management systems and information flows 55 5-4e Central Plains Water scheme stages 195
Service levels 5-4f Rural summer maximum demand (MW) 195
3-3a Orion SAIDI – five year trend and 10 year target 66 5-4g Rural winter maximum demand (MW) graph 196
3-3b Orion SAIFI – five year trend and 10 year target 67 5-4h Take-up of industrial land 197
3-3c Unplanned interruptions - % restored in under 3hrs 67 5-4i GXPs – Maximum demand versus firm capacity 200
Lifecycle asset management 5-4j Urban 66/33 zone substations – max demand v capacity 201
4-1a 66,33kV and 11kV subtransmission – Urban area 78 5-4k Urban 11kV zone substations – max demand v capacity 201
4-1b 66kV and 33kV subtransmission network – Rural area 79 5-4l Zone subs – urban (CY-1 max demand as % of capacity) 203
4-1c Network voltage level/asset relationships 80 5-4m Rural zone substations – max demand v firm capacity 204
4-3a Condition score conversion - CBRM to ComCom 12a 86 5-4n Zone subs – rural (max demand as a % of firm capacity) 206
4-5a 66kV Subtransmission – Urban area 93 5-4o 66kV, 33kV and 11kV zone substation utilisation 207
4-5b 66kV Subtransmission – Rural area 93 5-4p Zone substation 11kV feeder cable utilisation graph 208
4-5c 66kV Overhead lines – asset failures/100km 94 5-4q Distribution transformer utilisation graph 208
4-5d 66kV Overhead poles and towers – age profile 94 5-6a Transpower core grid and spur assets in Orion’s area 214
4-6a 33kV Subtransmission network 97 5-6b Urban subtrans 66kV – existing and proposed (Diagram) 218
4-6b 33kV Overhead lines – asset failures/100km 98 5-6c Urban subtrans 33kV – existing and proposed (Diagram) 218
4-6c 33kV Overhead line poles - age profile 98 5-6d Urban subtrans 66,33kV – existing and proposed (Map) 219
4-7a 11kV Overhead lines – asset failures/100km 100 5-6e Rural subtrans 66kV – existing and proposed (Diagram) 228
4-7b 11kV Overhead line poles – age profile 101 5-6f Rural subtrans 33kV – existing and proposed (Diagram) 228
4-8a 400V Overhead line poles – age profile 105 5-6g Rural subtrans 66,33kV – existing and future (Map) 229
4-9a 66kV Subtransmission – Christchurch urban area 107 Risk management
4-9b 66kV Underground cables – asset failures/100km 109 6-1a The three components of risk 251
4-9c 66kV Underground cables – age profile 109 6-1b Key risk responsibilities 251
4-10a 33kV Subtransmission – Christchurch urban area 111 6-1c Orion risk acceptability matrix 252
4-10b 33kV Underground cables – asset failures/100km 112 6-1d Orion risk acceptability chart 252
4-10c 33kV Subtransmission – Lincoln and Springston area 112 6-4a Environmental management documentation 259
4-10d 33kV Underground cables – age profile 113 6-4b Environmental management process 260
4-11a 11kV Underground cables – asset failures/100km 115 Evaluation of performance
4-11b 11kV Underground cables – age profile 117 8-2a SAIDI - Orion network FY92-Current year 290
4-12a 400V Underground cables – age profile 120 8-2b SAIFI - Orion network FY92-Current year 291
4-13a Communication cables – age profile 122 8-2c Least reliable rural feeders CY-5 to CY (SAIDI) 291
4-14a Circuit breakers - health index profile 127 8-2d Cause of interruptions CY-15 to CY 292
4-14b Circuit breakers 33 and 66kV - age profile 127 8-3a Capex per annum per MWh supplied to consumers 293
4-14c Circuit breakers 11kV - age profile 127 8-3b Opex per annum per MWh supplied to consumers 293
4-15a Switchgear 11kV - health index profile 134 8-3c Opex per annum per ICP 293
4-15b Ringmain units 11kV - age profile 134 8-9a AMMAT scores relative to PAS-55 compliance 306
4-15c Line ABI 11kV and 33kV - age profile 134
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List of tables
Table Title Page Table Title Page

Summary 5-5b Orion security gaps 211
3-4a Service descriptions, targets and measures for CY+1 17 5-6a Spur assets, indicative cost to purchase 215
1-3a Orion’s electricity network asset quantities 18 5-6b Affected Transpower new investment agreements 215
1-6a Summary of forecast network expenditure 27 5-6c Major GXP projects 215
8-2a Orion network actual reliability results 29 5-6d Major urban projects 217
8-2b Targets and results for CY – Network power quality 31 5-6e Major rural projects 226
8-3a,b,c Efficiency results for CY and 5 year average 31 5-6f 11kV urban reinforcement projects 240
8-5a Personal safety – performance results 32 5-6g 11kV rural reinforcement projects 244
Service levels 5-6h DSM value for network development alternatives 248
3-4a Service descriptions, targets and measures for CY 72 Risk management
3-4b Service descriptions, targets and measures for future 73 6-5a Primary risk for major assets 261
Lifecycle asset management 6-5b Possible cause of contaminant discharge and risks 261
4-1a Orion’s electricity network asset quantities 77 6-6a Interdependence of lifelines (1 week after earthquake) 262
4-4a Zone substation equipment schedule 89 6-6b GXP – Liquefaction potential and related damage 263
4-4b Distribution substation types 91 6-7a Orion – Liquefaction potential and related damage 265
4-5a 66kV tower line circuits 92 Financial
4-6a Standard 33kV conductors 97 7-1.1 Opex budgets - network 277
4-7a Standard 11kV conductors 100 7-1.2 Opex budgets - non network 278
4-8a Standard 400V conductors 104 7-1.3 Capex budgets - network 278
4-9a 66kV cable circuits 108 7-1.4 Capex budgets - non network 278
4-10a 33kV cable circuit listing 113 7-1.5 Capital contributions income 278
4-11a 11kV feeder cable circuit listing 116 7-1.6 Major GXP projects 279
4-14a Circuit breaker quantities 125 7-1.7 Urban reinforcement budgets 279
4-14b Circuit breaker ratings 126 7-1.8 Rural and total reinforcement budgets 280
4-14c Line circuit breaker ratings 126 7-1.9 Replacement budgets 281
4-14d Circuit breaker average age (years) 126 7-1.10 Urban major project budgets 282
4-14e Switchgear inspection and maintenance schedule 128 7-1.11 Rural major project budgets 283
4-15a Switchgear quantities 132 7-1.12 Transpower spur assets, indicative cost to purchase 284
4-16a Power transformer quantities 137 7-1.13 Transpower new investment agreement buyouts 285
4-16b Regulator quantities 137 7-1.14 Transpower new investment agreement charges 285
4-17a Distribution transformer quantities 141 Evaluation of performance
4-18a Generator listing 144 8-2a Orion network reliability for CY and 5 year average 289
4-19a Relay types in Orion’s network 146 8-2b Service targets and results for network power quality 292
4-26a Distribution kiosk quantities 169 8-3a Capacity utilisation results for CY and 5 year average 294
4-28a Vehicle quantities 176 8-3b Load factor results for CY and 5 year average 294
Network development 8-3c Loss results for Current Year and 5 year average 294
5-3a Distribution network supply security standard 183 8-3d Network loss contributors 294
5-3b Standard network capacities 185 8-3e Transformer loss values 295
5-4a Fletcher EQC response to restoring heating 198 8-3f Underground cable versus overhead line comparison 295
5-4b GXP substations – load forecasts (MVA) 200 8-4a Project completion status 298
5-4c Urban 66 and 33kV zone sub – load forecasts (MVA) 202 8-5a Personal safety – performance results 299
5-4d Urban 11kV zone substations – load forecasts (MVA) 202 8-6a Environmental responsibility – performance results 299
5-4e Rural 66 and 33kV zone sub – load forecasts (MVA) 205 8-8b Installation of GFN – reliability savings 303
5-5a Transpower GXP security gaps 210
Summary 9
Summary 1
1.1 Background and objectives 11
1.1.1 Purpose of our AMP 11
1.1.2 Business plans and goals 12
1.1.3 Stakeholders 12
1.1.4 Management responsibilities 13
1.1.5 Assumptions 13
1.1.6 Asset management drivers 14
1.1.7 Asset management process 14
1.1.8 Systems and information 15
1.1.9 Development of systems and processes 15
1.2 Service levels 16

1.2.1 Introduction 16
1.2.2 Consumer consultation 16
1.2.3 Service level measures 16
1.2.4 Service level targets 17
1.3 Lifecycle asset management 18

1.3.1 Asset description 18
1.3.2 Network justification 19
1.3.3 Asset management approach 19
1.3.4 Substations 19
1.4 Network development 20

1.4.2 Network architecture 20
1.4.3 Planning criteria 20
1.4.4 Energy, demand and growth 21
1.4.5 Network gap analysis 23
1.4.6 Network development proposals 24
1.5 Risk management 25

1.5.2 Governance and operational business risks 25
1.5.3 Safety 25
1.5.4 Environmental management 25
1.5.5 Impact of natural events 25
1.5.6 Asset failure 26

1.6.1 Opex and Capex network budgets 27
1.6.2 Changes from previous forecasts 27
Continued overleaf
Orion New Zealand Limited 10 year Asset Management Plan – From 1 April 2014 SECTION 1
10 Summary
1
1.7 Evaluation of performance 29
1.7.2 Consumer service 29
1.7.3 Efficiency 31
1.7.4 Works expenditure in FY13 31
1.7.5 Safety 32
1.7.6 Environment 32
1.7.7 Improvement initiatives 32
1.7.8 Gap analysis 33
List of figures and tables in this section

Figure Title Page Table Title Page
2-2a Interaction of plans and processes 12 3-4a Service descriptions, targets and measures for CY+1 17
1-1b Asset management structure 13 1-3a Orion’s electricity network asset quantities 18
1-3a Orion’s network area 18 1-6a Summary of forecast network expenditure 27

5-4b Overall maximum demand trends 22 8-2a Orion network actual reliability results 29
5-4e Rural summer maximum demand (MW) 23 8-2b Targets and results for CY – Network power quality 31
8-2a Orion network SAIDI FY92 - CY 30 8-3abc Efficiency results for CY and 5 year average 31
8-5a Personal safety – performance results 32
SECTION 1 Orion New Zealand Limited 10 year Asset Management Plan – From 1 April 2014
Summary 11
1.1 Background and objectives

1.1.1 Purpose of our AMP
Our AMP documents the asset management practices we use as part of an optimised lifecycle management strategy
for our electricity assets.
The overall objective of our AMP is:
To provide, maintain and operate Orion’s electricity distribution network while meeting agreed
levels of service, quality, safety and profitability.
This AMP looks ahead for the 10 years from 1 April 2014.
The main focus of this AMP is on the first three to five years – for this period, most of our significant planned projects
have been identified. Beyond this period, analysis is more indicative. Based on long term trends and, depending on
consumer demand growth, it is likely that new projects will arise and some planned projects could be eliminated in
the latter half of the 10 year period of the plan.
We update and publish our 10-year AMP just prior to the start of each financial year (April).
We created our first AMP in 1994 and we have since developed our plan to comprehensively meet the requirements of
the Electricity Distribution Information Disclosure Determination 2012. These requirements include:
 a summary of the plan
 background and objectives
 target service levels
 details of assets covered, lifecycle management plans
 load forecasts, development and maintenance plans
 risk management, including policies, assessment and mitigation
 performance measurement, evaluation and improvement initiatives.
As the format of our AMP does not completely follow the order as suggested in the regulatory disclosure
determination, a cross reference table to the relevant sections of our AMP is shown in Appendix B.
Our AMP goes beyond regulatory requirements. We use it on a day-to-day basis and we aim to demonstrate
responsible stewardship of our network assets — in the long term interests of our consumers, shareholders,
electricity retailers, government agencies, contractors, electricity end users, financial institutions and the general
public.
In this AMP, we aim to optimise the lifecycle costs for each network asset group (including creation, operation,
maintenance, renewal and disposal) to meet agreed service levels and future demand. Each year we aim to improve
our AMP to take advantage of new information and changing technology. These innovations help us to maintain our
ranking as one of the most resilient, reliable and efficient electricity networks in the country.
Our AMP does not cover how we derive and apply our network pricing. This information is available on our website;
oriongroup.co.nz.
12 Summary
1.1.2 Business plans and goals

Our activities are guided by what we call our ‘mission’, that consists of a purpose statement, a vision statement for
the future state of the company and a set of company values as detailed below. Necessary competencies to achieve
this mission include; asset management, stakeholder communication, risk management and network pricing. This
AMP is consistent with, and is an important part of, our mission.
Our AMP is a key component of our planning process that combines management, financial and technical practices
to ensure that the level of service required by consumers is provided by us at the lowest long term cost.
The major outcome we seek to achieve from our AMP is a 10 year capital investment and maintenance forecast
characterised by:
 steady investment in the urban network to meet regional growth and recovery from the 2010/2011 Canterbury
earthquakes
 continued investment in rural areas to meet strong residential growth in the rural towns and dairy farming loads
between the Selwyn and Rakaia rivers
 a steady overall increase in capital expenditure in the longer term to replace assets installed in the high
electricity growth years of the 1960s. The forecast cost of this replacement may change if we adopt future
monitoring and risk assessment strategies across all asset classes
 relatively constant investment in new connections and extensions to the network. This forecast is based on
overall modest growth with pockets of higher growth in specific areas
 the additional cost of complying with regulations
 material and contractor cost increases that affect our construction costs.
Other plans that make up our annual business planning process are:
 statement of intent
 business plan
 financial forecasts.
The following figure shows how our business plans and processes interact with each other.
Figure 2-2a Interaction of plans and processes
Shareholders consulted Statement of intent

Consumer consultation
on the draft SOI (SOI)
Business plan Financial forecasts 10 year network AMP
Board approves the statement of intent, business plan, financial forecasts and the
AMP, prior to the start of each financial year (1 April)
1.1.3 Stakeholders
Our key stakeholders are:
 shareholders – Christchurch City Council Holdings Limited and Selwyn Investment Holdings Limited
 retailers, contracted customers and consumers
 employees
 Transpower
 government agencies
 Contractors and suppliers
 financial institutions.
We have identified our key stakeholder interests through various forums and have instigated practices to
accommodate these interests. If a conflict between stakeholder interests is identified then we will adopt an
appropriate conflict resolution process to suit the issue and stakeholder concerns.
Stakeholder/consumer research is covered further in section 3 – Service levels.
Summary 13
1.1.4 Management responsibilities

We utilise a competitive contracting model – contractors design, construct, connect and maintain our distribution
network. Consultants assist in areas where we do not maintain specific expertise. Our network is managed and
operated from our Christchurch office at 565 Wairakei Rd.
Orion’s directors are appointed by the shareholders to govern and direct Orion’s activities. The board of directors is
the overall and final body responsible for all decision-making within the company.
Our governance/management structure is as follows:
Figure 1-1b Asset management structure
Orion board of directors
Chief executive
Corporate Infrastructure Commercial Information Human Communications

services solutions resources and engagement
Staff = 10 Staff = 130 Staff = 9 Staff = 15 Staff = 2 Staff = 2
Consultants and contractors
Note: staff numbers include trainees, part-timers and temps.
1.1.5 Assumptions
Significant assumptions
This AMP assumes that we will continue to restore the resilience and reliability of our network following the
Canterbury earthquakes. We also assume no major changes in the regulatory framework, asset base through
merger, changes of ownership and/or requirements of stakeholders. We forecast increased levels of expenditure for
earthquake repairs over the next few years and the acquisition of local Transpower spur assets.
Sources of uncertainty
Potential uncertainties in our key assumptions include; Regulation, our ownership and CPP proposals, the city rebuild
and consumer demand.
Cost inflation
The key assumptions on which our cost projections are forecast are largely disused in section 7.1 where all dollars
are in FY15 terms and no allowance has been made for CPI adjustments, changes in foreign exchanges rates, or local
rates. Refer to appendices for the expenditure schedules in nominal (inflation-adjusted) terms.
Differences between our forecast and our actual outcomes

Factors that may lead to material differences include:
 Regulatory requirements may change
 our ownership may change
 changes in demand or generation and the level of network resilience/reliability
 major equipment failure and/or a major natural disaster
 input costs and rates influencing project economics
 changes to industry standards
 requirements for us to facilitate the rollout of a third party communications overhead network.
14 Summary
1.1.6 Asset management drivers

Investment principle
When we extend, replace, maintain and operate our network we consider the balance between cost and the quality of
supply. The optimum point of investment in the network is achieved when the value of further expenditure would
exceed the value of benefits to our consumers. We seek to achieve this optimal point by applying economic analysis
during the development and review of our asset management standards, specifications and procedures. We also
encourage optimal outcomes by submitting our views during the consultation phase of national rules and regulations.
Business drivers
Our top priority is the efficient and effective management of our electricity network. We aim to provide customers
with a high level of service, a reliable and secure supply and competitive prices. We also aim to provide our
shareholders with an attractive risk adjusted return on their investment.
The business drivers which define the need, priority and scope for improved asset management practices at Orion
can be summarised as safety, customer service, environmental responsibility, economic efficiency and legislation.
1.1.7 Asset management process

We undertake lifecycle management and asset maintenance planning using whole of life cost analysis, reliability
centered maintenance (RCM), condition-based maintenance (CBM) and risk management techniques. The
techniques are based on performance and reliability targets. The high level targets are discussed in section 3.
We engaged EA Technology Limited (see Glossary) to develop Condition Based Risk Management (CBRM) models for
the majority of our network assets. These models use the results from our condition monitoring programmes and
will underpin the economic justification for our expenditure forecasts. We are currently integrating this practice into
our business processes and have used the CBRM models to develop a number of our asset replacement
programmes.
Planning priorities
Recent changes in regulations and industry codes of practice have highlighted the need to mitigate safety risks for
the public, employees and contractors. Therefore we continue to:
 remove at-risk equipment
 increase security around substations and equipment
 tighten controls on equipment access.
In recent years we focused on meeting the growth needs of the community while ensuring appropriate reliability and
security. Network security is always compromised during times when capital or maintenance works are carried out.
To mitigate risk associated with reduced security during these periods of change we:
 endeavour to plan work methods and contingencies to minimise any impact on the network
 use programmes that allow for contingency events
 programme works in a manner that provides consistent work for the skilled resources available
 are proactive in the development and retention of skilled resources for the future.
Construction standards and working practices

In order to manage the safety, cost, efficiency and quality aspects of our network we seek to standardise design and
work practices. To achieve this we have a set of design standards and drawings that are available to approved
designers/contractors. Normally we only accept designs that conform to these standards.
A comprehensive set of specifications and procedures for performing different activities on our network has also
been developed. These specifications are intended for authorised contractors who construct and maintain our
network.
We also seek to standardise the equipment used to construct components of our network. To this end, a set of
specifications detailing accepted performance criteria for significant equipment has been developed.
To ensure the wide variety of equipment on our network is operated safely with minimum impact on our consumers,
we have developed an operating instruction for each different type of equipment on our network. We add to these
when any new equipment is introduced. See Figure 2-7b – Process to introduce new equipment.
We process these ‘controlled documents’ using our in-house document control process. A restricted-access area on
our website is used to make documents and drawings accessible to approved contractors and designers.
Summary 15
Introduction of new equipment types

New equipment is reviewed to carefully establish any benefits that it may provide. Introduction is carried out to a plan
to ensure that the equipment meets our technical requirements and provides cost benefits. It must be able to be
maintained and operated to provide safe, cost effective utilisation to support our supply security requirements.
1.1.8 Systems and information

Our management systems are used to document the existing asset components of our network and provide access to
the data for all aspects of developing, maintaining and operating our business. The various systems and information
flows between them are shown in Figure 2-8a. Our main applications are:
1. Microsoft office network 13. interruption statistics

2. geographic information (GIS) 14. load management
3. asset register (EMS WASP) 15. incident management
4. works management system 16. valuation model
5. connections-related service requests 17. pricing model
6. connections register 18. Orion’s Mco billing system
7. financial management information system (FMIS) 19. network asset loading history
8. network monitoring system (SCADA) 20. power system modelling
9. network management system (NMS) 21. cable databases
10. outage management system (OMS) 22. transformer oil analysis
11. outage reporting 23. document control
12. livening and demolition management 24. Orion website
Asset data
The majority of our primary asset information is held in our asset register, GIS system and cable databases. We hold
information about our network equipment from GXP connections down to individual LV poles with a high level of
accuracy. The data has improved over time due to various inspections and projects since we introduced our GIS
system and asset register.
Details of current data, compliance inspections and maintenance regimes for each asset group are shown in section 4
– Lifecycle asset management – (relevant asset) – Standards and asset data.
1.1.9 Development of systems and processes

Network management system
A major upgrade of our Network Management system (SCADA, NMS and OMS) was completed in FY14. In parallel
with this we have implemented a companion Historian and migrated much of our historic network asset loading
information into it. Once fully implemented it will provide a continuous historic record of trends for a wide variety of
monitored network values.
Document management system

Microsoft Sharepoint has been implemented and is being progressively rolled out across the business. The initial
focus is to improve the management of “Office” documents and scanned images, but over time it will become used for
a wide variety of information sharing features as well as providing framework for a replacement Intranet. Migration
of documents from the historic file share into the new system has started and will be progressively rolled out across
the business during 2013/14.
Condition based risk management model

We have engaged EA Technology Ltd to develop condition based risk management (CBRM) models for the majority of
our network assets. We are currently integrating the use of these models into our business processes to develop our
replacement programmes. The models have been used this year in the development of the replacement plans for our
high voltage circuit breakers, high voltage and low voltage switchgear and protection systems. Over the next few
years it is our intention to streamline the processes for updating our condition information and to underpin the
replacement expenditure for our other network assets by using the CBRM models.
16 Summary
1.2 Service levels

1.2.1 Introduction
This section of our plan outlines the performance levels required from our electricity network and management
team. It deals with consumer-related service requirements and other requirements relating to our asset
management drivers as defined in section 2.6. Those drivers are:
 customer service
 safety
 environmental responsibility
 investment principles
 economic efficiency
 legislation.
The key to the successful management of Orion’s assets is to meet the expectations of our consumers and other
stakeholders. This is consistent with our ‘mission’ and statement of intent (SOI) as detailed in section 2.2. Our SOI
contains specific service level targets for reliability (SAIDI, SAIFI) and other aspects of our business, some of which
are outside the scope of this AMP.
Our service level targets are based on a balance of:
 consumer and stakeholder consultation
 safety considerations
 regulatory requirements
 international best practice
 past practice.
1.2.2 Consumer consultation

Consumers are some of our key stakeholders. We recognise that their individual expectations will differ and we
endeavour to ensure that, as far as practicable, all are satisfied with the level of service we provide in the long term
and that no one party is unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged.
Consultation with our consumers has shown that they expect a reliable and secure supply of electricity. Historically,
our customers have wanted no reduction in service. Since the earthquakes our consultation has shown that
customers want a return to near pre-earthquake levels of resilience and reliability.
To determine their requirements with regard to the level of service that we provide, we have undertaken the following
methods of consultation:
 involve consumers in setting our security of supply standard
 undertake consumer surveys
 engage with consumers via retailers
 obtain direct consumer feedback
 consult consumers on selected major projects.
In setting our service level targets we believe we have achieved an appropriate balance between legislative,
regulatory and stakeholder requirements and consumer expectations.
1.2.3 Service level measures

All of our consultation methods show that, almost without exception, a reliable supply of power at a reasonable price
is our consumers’ greatest requirement of us. We measure our performance against this primary consumer
requirement in a number of ways.
Other service measures such as efficiency, safety, environmental and legislative compliance reflect a range of
performance measures that we monitor. Our performance in these areas often provides advance notice about where
Orion’s performance is heading prior to any change being noticed in our primary reliability targets.
For some of these other service measures we have not set a specific target value. In those cases we explain our
position as to why we believe doing so would be counter productive.
Summary 17
1.2.4 Service level targets

Our primary network reliability service level targets for SAIDI and SAIFI have been established in anticipation that the
FY11 earthquakes will have had an adverse impact on our network reliability that may take some years to work
through. Even though major emergency repairs are finished, there is still much work ahead of us to build strength
back into our network. Significant infrastructure rebuilding activity in the city will also likely see an increase in
damage and disturbance of our network assets. We expect it will take up to five years to restore it to near pre-
earthquake reliability levels.
Normally our combined rural and urban network performs better than the average for New Zealand EDBs.
All our targets for the current year are shown in the following table.
Table 3-4a Service descriptions , targets and measures for FY15
Service class Service description FY15 target Performance measure Measurement procedure
Network SAIDI- System average < 133 Orion network– average minutes lost per Tracking of all interruptions on our
interruption duration index consumer per annum for all interruptions network (process audited annually).
reliability (planned and unplanned). Orion network Statistics exclude low voltage (400V)
only, interruptions and interruptions
<1minute in duration.
SAIFI- System average < 1.7 Orion network- average number of times Interruptions on Transpower’s
a consumer’s supply is interrupted per system are not included.
interruption frequency index
annum for all interruptions (planned and
unplanned). Orion network only,
Network Unplanned interruptions restored > 60% % of total number of unplanned

within 3 hours interruptions where the last consumer is
restoration restored in three hours or less. Orion
network only,
Network Delivering reasonable levels of To meet our Any gaps identified against our security Reviewed in section 5.5
network security security standard.
capacity
standard
Power Steady state level of voltage < 70 Voltage complaints (proven). Tracking of all enquiries.
quality
Level of harmonics or distortion <4 Harmonics (wave form) complaints (proven). Checks performed using a harmonic
analyser.
Safety Safety of employees and Zero Number of lost time accidents. Accident/incident reports.
contractors
Safety of public Zero Number of accidents involving members of Accident/incident reports.

the public (excluding car v pole accidents).
Environment SF6 gas lost < 1% loss Gas lost expressed as a % of the total Set out in Orion Procedure
contained in our network equipment. NW70.10.01.
Oil spilt Zero spills Oil spills not contained. Set out in Orion Procedure
NW70.10.02.
Economic Capex per annum per MWh of Perform better Capital expenditure on Orion’s network per Derived from disclosed statistical
electricity supplied than NZ MWh of electricity delivered over our data.
efficiency network from Transpower GXPs to
average
consumers.
Opex per annum per MWh of Perform better Operating expenditure on Orion’s network
electricity supplied than NZ per MWh of electricity delivered over our
network from Transpower GXPs to
average
consumers.
Opex per annum per year-end Perform better Operating expenditure per annum on
number of ICPs than NZ Orion’s network per year-end ICPs. (ICPs
more or less equate to consumers on
average
Orion’s network).
Capacity utilisation ratio No target set– Maximum demand on network divided by

see section 3.3.8 distribution transformer capacity.
Load factor No target set– Average load on network divided by the

see section 3.3.8 maximum load experienced in a given year.
Losses No target set– The % of energy lost between the points of

see section 3.3.8 injection (mainly Transpower GXPs) and the
point of off-take (consumer connections).
18 Summary
1.3 Lifecycle asset management

1.3.1 Network overview
Asset description
We own and operate the electricity distribution network in central Canterbury. Our network is both rural and urban
and covers 8,000 square kilometres across central Canterbury between the Waimakariri and Rakaia rivers and from
the Canterbury coast to Arthur’s Pass. Consumer densities range from five consumers per km to 26.
Figure 1-3a Orion’s network area
Table 1-3a Orion’s electricity network asset quantities
Category Description 31 March 2013
Subtransmission lines/cables (km) 66kV and 33kV 580
Distribution lines/cables (km) 11kV 5,587

400V 4,738
Zone substations 66kV 21
33kV 22
11kV 9
Distribution substations Buildings 478
Ground mounted 4,215
Pole mounted 6,279
Consumer connections 189,254
Urban network description

Our urban network consists of both 66kV and 33kV subtransmission (see Figure 4-1a). Our urban 66kV system
supplies zone substations in and around Christchurch city and is supplied from Transpower 66kV GXPs at Addington,
Bromley, Islington and Middleton. Our urban 33kV system supplies zone substations in the west of Christchurch and is
supplied from Transpower’s Islington 33kV GXP. Several other zone substations in the urban area take supply at 11kV.
The urban zone substations supply a network of ‘primary’ 11kV cables connected to network substations. These
network substations in turn supply the distribution substations on a secondary 11kV cable network. The 400V system
to which most of our consumers are connected is supplied from these distribution substations. The reasons for the
structure of our network are discussed in section 4.2.
Rural network description

Our rural network also consists of both a 66kV and a 33kV subtransmission system (see Figure 4-1b) that supplies zone
substations from Transpower’s Hororata, Islington and Kimberley GXPs.
The rural 11kV distribution system primarily consists of 11kV overhead radial feeders from our rural zone substations
and three small Transpower GXPs (see Figure 5-2) at Coleridge, Castle Hill and Arthur’s Pass.
Summary 19
Canterbury earthquakes
While the earthquakes and large aftershocks of 2011/12 caused extensive damage throughout the region, our
investment in a programme to increase the resiliency of our infrastructure was a major factor in limiting the amount of
damage to our network. As the rebuild of the region gets underway we will continue to use these principles and
lessons learnt to bring the network back to pre-earthquake levels of resilience and reliability. Our key priorities are:
 work with the community to meet their needs as they rebuild
 integrate and react to the changing requirements of the network
 restore the resilience and reliability of our network by around 2019.
Large consumers
The Canterbury area and business sectors are largely service and/or agricultural based. This is reflected in the mix of
approximately 325 major business customers connected to our network with loads ranging from 0.3MW to 11MW. The
largest single load in this category is less than 2% of our total maximum demand.
Currently we have 17 consumers that have an anytime maximum demand of greater than 2MVA. Each of these major
consumers is charged on a ‘major customer connection’ delivery charge basis.
Generally our operating regimes and asset management practices do not specifically provide enhanced levels of
service for these consumers.
1.3.2 Network justification

The first electricity distribution systems in Christchurch were a mix of underground cable and overhead lines
originating from the Government’s Addington substation. Additional 11kV grid connection points evolved at Bromley
and Papanui, providing quite large capacity at high fault levels. A comprehensive underground cable network based on
electrical districts then grew from these three main grid connection points. This network served the city until the rapid
development period of the 1960s, when demand grew by 7% per year. Zone substations (66/11kV) were then built to
meet the increased demand. Those substations are the backbone of the present urban system.
The earliest rural electricity distribution networks in Orion’s area were based on 3.3kV and 6.6kV systems supplied
from connection points off the Coleridge transmission lines, mainly at Hororata and Addington. These systems were
simple radial lines, subsequently up-rated to 11kV to meet increasing demand. Load growth required the introduction
of 33kV subtransmission in the mid 1960s. The 33kV was used to supply an increasing number of ‘zone’ substations,
usually consisting of a 7.5MVA transformer with 11kV radial feeders interconnected to adjacent substations.
1.3.3 Asset management approach

Generally assets are not replaced on age alone, but are kept in service until their continued maintenance is
uneconomic or until they pose a safety, environmental or reliability risk. Reliability performance is measured and used
to identify areas where further maintenance is needed to improve our delivery service or where maintenance may be
reduced without affecting service levels.
We develop our maintenance and replacement programmes and use a competitive tender process to contract out all
works.
1.3.4 Substations
A ‘substation’ encompasses buildings, switchgear, transformers, protection and control equipment used for the
transformation and distribution of electricity. Our network structure has three identified levels of substations – zone,
network and distribution (see Figure 4-1c).
A zone substation is a building substation usually with a high voltage structure that has been identified as a zone
substation because of its importance in our network. Orion has 52 zone substations and, in general, they include a site
where one of the following takes place: voltage transformation of 66 or 33kV to 11kV, two or more incoming 11kV
feeders from a Transpower GXP are redistributed or a ripple injection plant is installed.
The network substations are in our primary 11kV network, all within the Christchurch urban area (see section 4.2.2 for
a description of the primary/secondary network). They contain at least one 11kV circuit breaker per connected primary
cable and one or more circuit breakers for radial distribution feeders.
A distribution substation can take the form of any of the types shown in Table 4-4b. They take supply at 11kV from
either a zone substation, a network substation or from another distribution substation. In respect of the building
substations, in many situations a consumer will own the building that houses our equipment.
20 Summary
1.4 Network development

1.4.1 Introduction
Developing our network to meet future demand growth requires significant capital expenditure – this development is
coming under increasing scrutiny. We note that a focus on energy and financial efficiency, and new non-network
solutions (e.g. photovoltaic and solar hot-water panels) to meet energy demand, highlight longer term investment
risks.
Before spending capital on our network, we consider a number of options including those available in demand side
management and distributed generation.
The amount we spend on our network is influenced by existing and forecast consumer demand for electricity and the
number of new consumer connections to our network. Other significant demands on capital include:
 earthquake recovery costs
 meeting safety and environmental compliance requirements with existing ageing equipment
 meeting and maintaining our security of supply standard
 meeting our reliability of supply targets.
The growth rate in overall maximum network system demand (measured in megawatts) traditionally drives our capital
investment. Maximum demand is strongly influenced in the short term by climatic variations (specifically the severity
of our winter conditions). In the medium term our maximum system demand is influenced by growth factors such as
underlying population trends, growth in commercial/industrial output, and changes in land use in the rural sector.
Our maximum demand forecast has been updated to include the population forecast for Christchurch using the Land
Use Recovery Plan (LURP) prepared for CERA by Environment Canterbury. However it is still too soon to establish
population forecasts with confidence. It is also difficult to forecast the return of commercial load in central
Christchurch.
We have developed a long term strategic plan for our 66kV urban subtransmission system based on developing
increased resilience following the Canterbury earthquakes. This is based on closed-ring network topology so as
failure of any single route will not interrupt supply to a zone substation. Cables will be sized to give sufficient inter-
GXP capacity to provide full support in the loss of either Islington or Bromley 66kV supply. This design is being applied
to the replacement and upgrade of the 66kV subtransmission network in the north east of Christchurch.
1.4.2 Network architecture

Our network is supplied from nine GXP substations – four in the Christchurch urban area, two on the rural plains and
three remote GXPs at Arthur’s Pass, Coleridge and Castle Hill. The three remote GXPs have a single transformer and
a much lower throughput of energy. With the exception of Hororata and Kimberley, all the GXPs peak in winter.
Approximately 65% of our consumers depend on the Islington GXP 220/66kV interconnection made up of two
200/266MVA transformers and one 250/310MVA transformer.
We have 15 urban 66/11kV zone substations, six urban 33/11kV zone substations and eight 11kV zone substations.
This plan envisages up to three (and one conversion from 33kV to 66kV) new urban zone substations in the period until
2024. However the number, size, and location of these will depend on the magnitude and geographic distribution of
actual load growth in the intervening period.
We have eight rural 66/11kV zone substations and fourteen rural 33/11kV zone substations. This plan envisages up to
five new zone substations and the conversion of up to five zone substations from 33kV to 66kV in the period until 2024.
This plan also makes provision for new substations to connect distributed generation at three locations. However the
number, size, and location of these will depend on the magnitude and geographic distribution of actual load growth in
the intervening period.
1.4.3 Planning criteria

The first stage of planning a distribution network is to ensure that existing network loads are monitored and tested
against existing network capacity. The capacity test involves checking adequacy during contingencies defined in our
Security Standard and also predefined utilisation thresholds.
When network inadequacy is identified, the process of developing solutions begins. Each potential solution is
assessed for compliance with our design standards including safety compliance, capacity adequacy, quality, reliability,
security of supply and economic consequences.
We monitor loads on our major zone substation 11kV feeder cables at half hour intervals. This information is used to
prepare an annual reinforcement programme for our network. Reinforcements recommended in this plan are
generally based on winter loading for the Christchurch urban area and on summer loading for the rural area.
Summary 21
When a capacity or security gap is identified on the network it is necessary to consider different capacity options as
solutions. For example, a constrained 11kV feeder can be relieved by installing an additional 11kV feeder to the area.
But if the zone substation supplying the area is near full capacity then it may be more cost effective to bring forward
the new zone substation investment and avoid the 11kV feeder expense altogether. We discuss our approach to
increased capacity in our documents NW70.60.16 - Network Architecture Review: Subtransmission, NW70.60.06 -
Urban 11kV Network Architecture Review, and NW70.50.05 - Network design and overview.
Prioritisation of network solution projects for capacity and constraints is a relatively complex process that involves
multiple factors that are both external and internal to Orion.
The primary factors to be considered when prioritising projects, in decreasing order of significance, are:
 coordination with NZ Transport Authority and local authority civil projects
 satisfying individual or collective consumer expectations
 managing contractor resource constraints
 coordination with Transpower
 our asset replacement programme
 our asset maintenance programme.
When the network becomes constrained it is not always necessary to relieve that constraint by investing in new zone
substations, 11kV feeders and 400V reinforcement. Before implementing network investment solutions, we consider
the following alternatives:
 demand side management
 distributed generation
 uneconomic connections.
For further detail on the potential of consumer DSM initiatives to defer or avoid investment, see section 5.6.12.
1.4.4 Energy, demand and growth

To effectively plan the future of our network, we need to estimate the size and location of future loads. Long-term
growth in energy consumption has shown a consistent trend until the major earthquakes of FY11. This trend
provides a first estimate of load growth. However any load forecasting is an approximation. There is some
uncertainty due to the drop in peak demand and energy consumption from a population decrease (particularly in the
east of the city), timing of the commercial rebuild in central Christchurch and increased electricity use for space
heating in homes with damaged insulation and removal of solid fuel burners in damaged houses.
Energy and demand growth is a function of many inputs. Network development is driven by growth in peak demand
(not energy); therefore we focus on demand growth rather than energy. At a national level, it is reasonably easy to
forecast population growth but when broken down to regional level the accuracy is less reliable but still useful in
predicting future demand growth.
Our DSM strategies discussed in section 5.3.5 impact on our peak load forecast. Our network peak demand forecast
assumes that 2MW of distributed generation (DG) will be added to our network each year. This is commensurate
with growth in DG over the last five years. Because it is difficult to predict the location of new DG, we have not
attempted to apply the growth in DG to the zone substation load forecasts. Instead we encourage DG in constrained
areas on our network by publishing the area specific network deferral value of DSM initiatives (see section 5.6.12).
Energy throughput (GWh)

Network energy throughput for FY13 was 3,165GWh (including export from distributed generation of about 4GWh), up
3% on the previous year.
The 25-year history suggests an averaged steady growth rate of about 1.8% each year. For the five years prior to the
FY11 earthquakes, energy growth was lower than the long term average at 1.4%. Environment Canterbury’s CAP has
had only a modest impact on energy use and the economic downturn and closure of several major customers had led
to a slowing in energy growth prior to the earthquakes.
We have observed a step change in energy demand as a result of the FY11 earthquakes. While there has been some
recovery, demolition work in the CBD and planned demolition in the east is significantly affecting volumes in those
areas. Longer term, we expect the new business and residential buildings will be more energy efficient than the
older buildings they replace, and the CERA Central City Recovery plan also implies fewer, much smaller
rebuilds. Energy volumes have started trending up again since April/May 2012 but the medium term view is very
uncertain. The 2013 winter was particularly mild which lowered usage for FY14. Figure 5-4a shows the projections
of short and long term pre-quake growth rates.
22 Summary
Maximum demand (MW)

Maximum demand is the major driver of investment in our network. This measure is very volatile and varies by up to
10% depending on winter weather. Since demand peaks during the winter, we can record the peak for FY14.
Our network maximum half hour demand, based on load through the Transpower GXPs, for FY14 was 596MW (the peak
that occurred on 20 June 2013), up 19MW from the previous year.
Forecasting peak demand at the moment has its challenges (on top of the earthquakes) including uncertainties with the
global economy and unprecedented applications for embedded generation. Excluding earthquake effects, the long and
short term trends suggest future on-going maximum demand growth rate of around 1% per annum. Historic and
forecast network demand is shown in Figure 5-4b.
Figure 5-4b Overall maximum demand trends on the Orion network
Demand (MW)
750
Measured system demand
Linear projection of system demand: using 10 years of pre-quake history (0.9% p.a.)
700 Historical trend of system demand
Forecast system demand: excluding electric vehicles
Forecast system demand: with extreme cold snap
650 Forecast system demand
600
550
500
450
400
FY85 FY90 FY95 FY00 FY05 FY10 FY15 FY20
Load duration
With constantly changing load on our network, the peak demands that determine network capacity generally only occur
for very short periods in the year. Demand side management (DSM) has been successful in flattening the load curve in
recent years. Control of the dominant winter maximum demand depends heavily on suitable price signals, and
consumers’ response to them. If this is to continue to be effective then it is important that electricity retailers continue
to support DSM initiatives. Of particular importance is the promotion of night-rate tariffs and load control via the on-
going installation and maintenance of ripple receivers
The Transpower grid requires sufficient capacity to meet load during extreme weather conditions that may last for only
a few hours. Generation at peak times can help to delay the need for increases in Transpower’s network capacity. This
generation may need to operate for only a few hours over the largest peak demand times, as required to avoid
Transpower’s network constraints. Generation may also be used to reduce Transpower’s charges. If used for this
purpose, longer hours of operation might be needed, especially to avoid reductions in water heating service levels.
Rural load growth

In contrast to our urban area, growth rates for our summer peaking rural areas have been high over the last 10 years.
Since FY02, consumer applications to connect new load to our rural network have been reasonably consistent.
However, the yearly variations in weather and in particular low summer rainfall resulted in an increase of 12MW and
7MW respectively across Hororata and Springston GXPs during the summers of FY08 and FY04. This demonstrates how
variable peak loads can be, and how weather dependent they are – a dry summer on the Canterbury Plains causes an
increase in peak demand as irrigation is required simultaneously across a large area.
The Central Plains Water Scheme (CPW) reached the required subscription threshold late in 2013, and in March 2014
awarded contracts to commence stage 1 supplying 20,000Ha between Rakaia and Hororata rivers, inland from SH1.
Summary 23
Restrictions due to ground water availability and nutrient loads indicate there will be reduced irrigation load growth
other than related to this scheme. Increased surface water irrigation within the scheme however will allow irrigation
load growth between the scheme and the coast due to greater ground water recharge.
The following graph shows recent summer load growth in our rural area. A new GXP was constructed at Kimberley
during FY13 to provide for growth at Fonterra’s new milk processing plant near Darfield. This GXP will also support
new CPW load.
Figure 5-4f Rural summer maximum demand (MW)
Demand (MW)
200
180 Measured total rural summer demand

Projected total rural summer demand: using 5 years history (1.8% p.a.)
160 Forecast total rural summer demand
140
120
100
80
60
FY03 FY05 FY07 FY09 FY11 FY13 FY15 FY17 FY19 FY21 FY23
Approximately 50% of the forecast increase in rural peak demand over the next 10 years is due to the increase in milk
processing capability. The new Fonterra plant has added 11MVA already.
Rural winter load growth has been steady at just over 3% per annum over the last 10 years. The FY11 peak is due to a
significant August snowstorm. The recent Urban Development Strategy (UDS) indicates that significant growth is
expected to continue around Rolleston and Lincoln townships. We forecast winter rural load growth to average
approximately 4% per year over the next 10 years.
Load growth forecasting

Our network feeds both high density urban loads and diverse rural loads. Growth in electricity consumption can occur
from an increase in population and also the introduction of new end use applications.
As stated in section 5.4.1, we estimate that future demand growth will average 1.6% (9MW) per annum over the next
10 years, with some one-off additional business increases such as milk processing plants in the next few years.
Significant volatility can be expected in actual maximum demands. Capital investment plans will be modified each
year in accordance with load growth that has actually been observed.
The network development projects listed in this ten year plan seek to ensure that capacity and security of supply can
be maintained for the growth rates described above. Actual growth rates are monitored on an annual basis and any
change would be reflected in next year’s development plan.
1.4.5 Network gap analysis

On an annual basis, our network planning group updates contingency plans for all valid subtransmission (220kV, 66kV,
33kV) and 11kV contingencies. In some cases the Security Standard criteria for ‘no interruption’ or ‘restoration time’
of load cannot be economically met.
In general, network security gaps fall into one or more of the following categories:
 solution is currently uneconomic and an economic solution is not anticipated in the foreseeable future
 solution is currently uneconomic but is expected to become economic as load grows in the area under study
24 Summary
 local solution is uneconomic but network expansion in adjacent areas is expected to provide a security
improvement in the future
 solution requires co-ordination with Transpower’s asset replacement programme and/or is subject to
Transpower/Commerce Commission approval.
The economic analysis for each network gap determines the value of lost load (VOLL) when a defined contingency
occurs and then utilises probability theory to determine the annual VOLL.
The network gaps identified in the tables in section 5.5 arise because the cost of reinforcing the network to the
performance level identified in our Security Standard would be economically prohibitive.
1.4.6 Network development proposals

The network development projects proposed in this AMP are driven mainly by the need to meet the capacity and
security requirements of load growth. Where economic, project solutions have been designed to meet our security of
supply standard requirements.
This ensures that our network configuration and capacity is constructed in a consistent way and the impact on our
reliability of supply service levels will be predictable. It should be noted that reliability of supply service levels are a
function of many inputs and, while network configuration and capacity is a major input, it is not the only one.
Project solutions also need to consider our safety, power quality, environmental and efficiency targets.
Urban 66kV subtransmission review

In the last five years we have met growth within our urban network without the need to invest significantly in the
urban subtransmission network. The capacity of our pre-earthquake 66kV subtransmission network in the north of
Christchurch City was not sufficient to supply any proposed new zone substation. Permanent damage sustained
from the earthquake has been further reduced capacity. We will need to invest significantly to replace capacity in the
east and meet the electrical needs of northern Christchurch consumers.
A reconsideration of the Christchurch subtransmission network was carried out in FY12. This review is described in
our Network Architecture Review: Subtransmission (NW70.60.16).
Transpower spur assets

Transpower owns a number of 66kV, 33kV and 11kV assets in our network area (see Figure 5-6a). Many of these
assets deliver electricity solely to our network. We call these assets ‘spur assets’ to Transpower’s grid and they
fundamentally serve the purpose of local distribution rather than national transmission.
Although the spur asset purchases included in this AMP reflect the most likely outcome, they are subject to Orion
and Transpower board approval.
Summary 25
1.5 Risk management

1.5.1 Introduction
Our risk management process is based on the risk management standard AS/NZS 31000. The acceptability of risk is
determined on the basis of likelihood and consequences of the event associated with the risk occurring. The
evaluated ranking of these two factors is used to establish the priority for managing the risk.
We have aligned our Civil Defence responsibilities using the ‘four R’s’ approach to resilience planning—reduction,
readiness, response and recovery.
External consultants have advised on our risk assessment processes, and our network was part of an ‘engineering
lifelines’ study into the potential impact of natural disasters on Christchurch city. After the earthquakes in FY11 we
commissioned Kestrel Group to carry out an independent review of how we performed. Kestrel’s review endorsed
our approach to prior planning and prior risk mitigation measures, our preparedness and our emergency response.
We take into consideration Kestrel’s report and recommendations as part of our on-going asset management and
planning.
1.5.2 Governance and operational business risks

Governance risk management is the responsibility of the Orion board. To manage this obligation the board approves
our annual statement of intent, our annual business plan and our asset management plans.
Operational business risk management is the responsibility of the CEO but is overseen by the Orion board. Key
operational risks are delegated to business group managers. Some risks are common to all business groups but
generally key risks are directly managed by the group with the greatest exposure.
We have assessed our greatest risks as safety, legislative compliance, network performance, commercial
management, reputation, environment and human resources.
1.5.3 Safety
We are committed to providing a safe, reliable network and a safe, healthy work environment—we take all practicable
steps to minimise risk to the community, our staff and the environment. We control hazards through training,
guidelines and standards. Potential hazards, in particular electrical hazards, are also considered when new network
installations are being designed and constructed.
With long life networks there is inevitably a number of legacy assets that do not meet improved operational or safety
standards. When we become aware of assets or safety issues that do not meet modern expectations, we prioritise
mitigation measures to reduce the risk to both the general public and our workers. These actions may include full
replacement over time or may include strategies to reduce risk until replacement can be achieved.
We are committed to consultation and co-operation between management and employees. Maintaining a safe healthy
work environment benefits everyone and is achieved through co-operative effort. We focus on line managers taking
responsibility for themselves and their staff to manage hazards which may be present in their work areas. We have
introduced risk based hazard assessment to our staff.
Since almost all work associated with our network is carried out by contractors, we have developed registers of
specific known hazards along with recommended actions to control hazards. Contractors must have their own
documented health and safety management systems.
We monitor concerns about health and electrical fields and run community education courses teaching children to
stay safe around electricity. We also run an on-going advertising campaign to promote public safety around our
network. We recently won the ‘Excellence in Health and Safety’ award at the Deloitte Energy Excellence Awards 2012
for our safety performance during the earthquake recovery.
1.5.4 Environmental management

We follow a policy of environmental sustainability, initiate energy efficiency programmes and work to optimise
electrical losses on our network. Our environmental sustainability policy covers protection of the biosphere,
sustainable use of natural resources, reduction/disposal of waste, wise use of energy, risk reduction, restoration of
environment, disclosure, commitment of management resources, stakeholder consultation, assessment and annual
audit. We instigated oil spill management systems several years ago and have managed any significant spills since.
1.5.5 Impact of natural events

Earthquakes create the most significant risk of impact on our network, since both likelihood and consequence are
currently rated as high and long equipment replacement times are a major consideration. We are having another
26 Summary
look at our earthquake risks in the light of what we now know after the earthquakes in FY11. The earthquakes have
given us new data that we are now considering.
We continue to invest significant time and money to ensure we can respond well to natural events such as storms
and earthquakes. Orion is a founding member of the steering committee of the Canterbury engineering lifelines
group. The purpose of this group is to increase the resilience of Canterbury’s infrastructure and to assist lifeline
utilities to participate in all phases of civil defence emergency management.
During the mid-1990s our network was part of an ‘engineering lifelines’ study into how natural disasters would affect
Christchurch. The study concluded that electricity supply would be essential for almost all service authorities after a
natural disaster, with most service authorities’ head offices located in the central city area.
Since this study we have made the following improvements:
 spent $13m to secure power supply to the central city via a second point of supply
 strengthened power supply to the port, airport and main communications sites
 spent $4.5m on earthquake strengthening for bridges, cable supports and buildings. All of our zone substations
and all major 33kV and 66kV cables now meet the seismic structural standard
 undertaken regular risk assessment and response studies to ensure we are well prepared for any disaster.
We have also reviewed how susceptible Transpower's GXPs are to liquefaction. Our reviews show that Addington
and Bromley GXPs could be subject to differential settlement in an earthquake – this may affect our 66kV feeder
cable terminations. Due to differing soil types, settlement should not occur at both GXPs during a single event.
1.5.6 Asset failure

We assess all of our key assets based on known past performance. We also use partial discharge detection
technology to manage the risk of premature asset failure. Two major asset classes present the biggest risk – our
66kV cable subtransmission network and our major zone substation transformers:
 The 66kV cable network’s main identified failure risks are thermo-mechanical buckling of the cores within the
joints of the oil-filled cables. We instigated a joint replacement programme that has prioritised the joints most at
risk. This programme to replace these joints was completed in FY10.
 Comprehensive half-life maintenance of all major zone substation transformers is also being carried out. This
programme was coordinated with our 66kV joint replacement programme.
We check insulators on overhead lines with a ‘corona’ camera. This technology can detect excessive discharge on
line insulators not normally detectable by other means. It is used to locate faults and assess the general condition
of insulators.
Risk of ripple plant failure, which could result in loss of network peak load control, is addressed through system
spares. Our decision to replace the existing 66kV injection system with multiple independent 11kV plants has
significantly reduced risk as plants can provide back-up to each other.
Our distribution management system (DMS) with its integrated SCADA module is a key tool for monitoring and
operating our assets in real time. It is also the primary source of control for our ripple plants. In addition to
warranty and maintenance agreements that provide software and systems support, the system is made fault tolerant
through the use of backup hardware and communications routing. Multiple identical servers are configured at
independent sites with databases mirrored between them. In the event that any of these servers fail, the DMS will
continue to operate.
Administration building
In early to mid 2010 we reviewed our administration building in Manchester St. We found that the building did not
meet the requirements of a Level 4 ‘lifelines’ standard. In August 2010 the Orion board gave it’s ‘in principal’
approval for us to construct a new purpose-built building which would satisfy our lifeline requirements.
Initially our administration building performed well in the 4 September and Boxing Day earthquakes in 2010,
suffering only minor damage. However in the February 2011 earthquake the damage was so extensive that we had to
evacuate the building immediately. We occupied a circa 1930 building on our Armagh site until the end of May 2013.
Our earlier planning had already located a suitable alternative site at the airport end of Wairakei Rd (No.565). This
site was purchased, and a Level 4 “lifelines” (IL4) compliant building was constructed and ready for occupation in
June 2013.
Summary 27
1.6 Financial forecasts

1.6.1 Opex and Capex network budgets
A summary of our forecast expenditure is shown in the table below.
Table 1-6a Summary of forecast network expenditure – $000
Budget FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24
Opex - Network 29,245 30,885 27,170 26,870 26,755 26,670 26,525 26,680 26,640 26,680
Capex - Network 83,725 106,415 70,670 60,625 46,370 76,580 46,890 44,960 49,120 39,430
1.6.2 Changes from previous forecasts

Changes described in these budgets are referenced to our last published AMP (for the period from 1 April 2013 to 31
March 2023). All forecasts are now in FY14 dollar terms (previously in FY13 dollar terms).
Opex budgets - Network

Details of our maintenance plans are described by asset type in section 4 – Lifecycle asset management.
Our maintenance forecasts are generally consistent with last year’s forecasts.
Capex budgets - Network
ASSET REPLACEMENT
Our replacement plans are described by asset type in section 4 – Lifecycle asset management. In real terms our
overall projections for replacement have reduced slightly over the forecast period.
CONSUMER CONNECTIONS AND NETWORK EXTENSIONS
Our load demand forecasts are detailed in section 5 – Network development. Our network extensions and consumer
connection cost forecasts are based on our current and forecast business and residential growth forecasts. In
general, demand growth has continued to be slow while decisions are finalised regarding earthquake affected land in
the east of the city. Over the next few years we expect connection growth to be high as proposed subdivisions become
available to meet the requirements of people relocated from the east, and development begins in the CBD.
UNDERGROUND CONVERSIONS
Underground conversions are carried out within our network region, predominantly with road works, at the direction
of Selwyn District Council, Christchurch City Council and/or the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA). Costs
associated with these works can vary depending on council or roading authority demands. Currently the Christchurch
City Council has indicated they will not be carrying out undergrounding within the next four years. Selwyn District
Council is continuing with its on-going programme. NZTA projects have currently provided works that have
compensated for the reduction by CCC. We estimate that activity will decrease after the major ‘Roads of National
Significance (RONS)’ Programme is completed by NZTA over the next few years.
REINFORCEMENT
Our reinforcement forecasts have remained steady, at approximately $4.5m per annum, and we expect activity to
remain at this level for the foreseeable future. Our reinforcement forecasts are in section 5 – Network development.
MAJOR PROJECTS
Our major projects have a long term focus and are mainly strategic in nature. The AMP major project list and our
plans for the proposed configuration of our network does not normally change significantly each year but the timing
of projects will often change to reflect the actual rate of load growth.
Our last AMP captured the impact of the earthquakes and hence the configuration and timing of our recovery for the
northern city subtransmission network remains largely unchanged. There is a subtle change to the installation of
Waimakiriri zone substation which reduces costs by approximately $2m in FY15. Also we have delayed the Rawhiti to
Marshland link ($12.8m) to FY16 to better manage workflows. All other urban major projects are largely unchanged
but some adjustments to budgets occur as a result of inflation and project refinements.
28 Summary
In the rural area we have delayed approximately $5m of capital expenditure from FY15 to FY16 including the
upgrades at Hororata and Porter Heights skifield. The Railway Rd 11kV substation (Westland Milk) was delayed
from FY14 to FY17 ($2.7m). There are further project delays later in the 10 year period including Southbridge
(approximately $3.5m from FY18 to FY21) and the Creyke substation and line works (approximately $7m from FY18
to FY20). There are other minor changes in the 10 year period.
Summary 29
1.7 Evaluation of performance

1.7.1 Introduction
This section reviews our performance against the stated targets in our previous AMP. These targets may be actual
target values as stated in section 3 or a declaration to carry out a particular maintenance or risk reduction function.
We discuss whether or not a budget was met and offer explanations for any variances. This section also outlines
some current and future initiatives along with a gap analysis.
1.7.2 Consumer service

Reliability
As shown in the table below our SAIDI and SAIFI results for FY13 exceeded our targets.
Even though major emergency repairs are finished, there is still much work ahead of us to build strength back into
our network. Significant infrastructure rebuilding activity in the city will also likely see an increase in damage and
disturbance of our network assets. We expect it will take up to five years to restore it to near pre-earthquake
reliability levels.
Table 8-2a Orion network actual reliability results for FY13 and five year average
Category FY13 target FY13 result FY09-FY13 average
SAIDI <59.7 93.8 852
SAIFI <0.78 0.97 1.5
CAIDI <90 97 332
Unplanned interruptions restored within 3 hours (%) >60 66.2 61
Faults/100 circuit-km all voltages <11.0 13.1 13.1
Faults/100 circuit-km 66kV <2.0 2.1 2.4
In FY13 59% of consumers who experienced an unplanned interruption had their power supply restored within one
hour, and 89% were restored within three hours. In regular consumer surveys of urban and rural consumers,
approximately 95% of urban and 80% of rural consumers express satisfaction with the reliability of their power
supply.
It is important to note that one-off factors such as bad weather and earthquakes can heavily influence the results in
any one year and that the long term average trend is more important and better reflects the reliability of our long life
assets. As can be seen in the following graph, there have been three years where heavy snow storms have caused
major damage to our network. These years can been seen as FY93, FY03 and FY07.
The most recent major storm (prior to end of FY13) in FY07 resulted in the loss of some 19 million consumer
minutes and earthquakes in FY11 caused the loss of 718 million minutes.
30 Summary
Figure 8-2a Orion network SAIDI FY92 - FY13
Average number of minutes a consumer is without power per year (SAIDI)

4,200
4,000
3,800
3,600
3,400
3,200
3,000
2,800
2,600
2,400
2,200
2,000
1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
-
Total SAIDI Rural Urban
Summary 31
Power quality
Our main objective in relation to power quality issues is to identify and resolve consumer quality of supply enquiries.
This is achieved by fitting test instruments close to the point where ownership changes between Orion’s network and
the consumer’s electrical installation.
Data gathered from the test instruments is analysed against the New Zealand Electricity Regulations 1997. By applying
key regulations (Voltage, Frequency, Quality of Supply and Harmonics) we are able to determine which quality
problems originate within our network.
Our network has performed well in terms of voltage and quality. A number of voltage complaints are received every
year but the problem is found to be in our network in only approximately 30% of complaints.
Table 8-2b Service level targets and results for FY13 – Network power quality
Performance Measurement
Category Measure Target Achieved FY13
indicator procedure
Voltage complaints Non compliances

<70 40 Tracking of all enquiries
(proven) per annum
Power quality
Harmonics (wave form) Non compliances Checks performed using
<2 0
complaints (proven) per annum a harmonic analyser
1.7.3 Efficiency
We use several measures, as stated in the table below, to gauge our effectiveness at running an efficient network. We
have achieved our outcomes by following good industry practice with sound network investment and design principles.
Capacity utilisation measures the utilisation of transformers in our network. It is calculated as the maximum demand
experienced on the network divided by the distribution transformer capacity on the network. See section 3.3.8 for
reasoning behind not setting a specific target for capacity utilisation.
Table 8-3a,b,c Efficiency results for FY13 and 5 year average FY09-FY13
Category Target Achieved FY13 Achieved 5 year average
Capacity utilisation (%) No target set 29 32

Load factor (%) No target set 61.0 60.6
Losses (%) No target set <5 estimated <5 estimated
Annual load factor is calculated as the average load that passes through a network divided by the maximum load
experienced in a given year. We always seek to optimise load factor as this indicates better utilisation of capacity in our
network. Load factor has trended upwards over the last 15 years by just over 0.7% per annum. See section 5.4.1 for
our load factor forecasts.
Electrical losses are contained by choosing and maintaining appropriate transmission and distribution voltages and
through using appropriate conductor sizes that suit our load density. We purchase transformers using an industry
standard evaluation formula that means we often spend more to purchase lower loss transformers, rather than
purchasing cheaper higher loss transformers. Overall, losses do not have much impact on the design and operation of
our network because other factors tend to dominate. See section 8.3.3 for our reasoning behind not setting a specific
target for losses.
1.7.4 Works expenditure in FY13

The previous AMP figures shown here are from our AMP for the period 1 April 2012 to 31 March 2022.
Maintenance
Our maintenance costs for FY13 were $19.6m, compared with our budget forecast of $23.1m. The under-expenditure
was largely due to deferred works due to the uncertain requirements around earthquake recovery third-party works
and constrained resources.
Capex
CONSUMER CONNECTIONS AND EXTENSIONS

Our consumer connection and extension costs for FY13 were $6.6m, compared with our previous budget forecast of
32 Summary
$9.6m. The under-expenditure was largely due to a slower recovery from the earthquakes than expected.
REINFORCEMENT
Our reinforcement costs for FY13 were $4m, compared with our previous budget forecast of $4.3m.
UNDERGROUND CONVERSION
Our underground conversion costs for FY13 were $3.3m, compared with our previous budget forecast of $2.3m.
This expenditure is dependent on project timing associated with the needs of the Roading Authority and works
undertaken by the Christchurch City Council and the NZ Transport Agency (NZTA).
The over-expenditure is due to NZTA having undertaken a significant ‘Roads of National Significance’ construction
programme requiring undergrounding works.
MAJOR PROJECTS
Major project costs for FY13 were $22.6m, compared with our previous budget forecast of $19.6m ($15.7m Major
Projects plus $3.9m Spur assets). The over-expenditure was largely due to the Kimberley GXP and substation
works which were not included in our previous AMP.
REPLACEMENT
Our replacement costs for FY13 were $10.1m, compared with our previous budget forecast of $22.6m. The under-
expenditure reflects the variable and unpredictable nature of our work as we recover from the earthquakes. The
difference is largely due to the following factors:
 allowance for replacement of earthquake impaired cables not required in the period
 less distribution transformer replacement due to lower energy demand
 deferred works associated with control systems
 switchgear replacement deferred due to our architecture review, network access issues and decisions in regard
of disestablished earthquake zones.
1.7.5 Safety
We report all employee injury incidents in our Human Resources database. We separately collect similar statistical
incident data from our contractors. These contractor statistics, our own statistical data and our incident
investigations, enable us to provide staff and contractors with indicators of potential harm.
Table 8-5a Personal safety – performance results
Key asset management Performance Measurement

Measure Target Achieved FY13
driver indicator procedure
Injuries to staff 0 2
Number of “lost-time” Accident/incident
Personal safety Injuries to our contractors 0 9
injury accidents reports
Injuries to public 0 0
1.7.6 Environment
All our service providers are required to adhere to our environmental management manual and procedures.
No significant environmental incidents occurred on our network in FY13.
1.7.7 Improvement initiatives

Subtransmission network
We have identified the need for improvements in security and performance in our upper (higher voltage) network
since this asset affects the largest number of consumers. Some of the initiatives taken on this asset are as follows:
UNDERGROUND
 thermal engineering checks to determine/confirm the current rating of cables
 specific trench backfill to provide the required thermal and mechanical support
 replace the 66kV oil-filled cable joints and 33kV oil-filled cables.
Summary 33
OVERHEAD
 replaced insulators, install vibration dampers and re-rate conductors for 750C operating temperature
 applied dynamic ratings
 assessed condition of tower foundations and repaired where required.
SUBSTATIONS
 installed a 66kV bus zone scheme at Bromley.
TRANSPOWER GXPS
 increased reliability at Addington GXP by splitting the 66kV bus
 major alterations at Islington GXP to increase capacity and alter vector grouping along with replacing half of the
33kV outdoor switchgear with indoor equipment
 rearranged existing 11kV supplies at Addington GXP, to increase security
Distribution network
Over the past 22 years our rural reliability performance has improved by a factor of approximately two. During this
period the 11kV overhead line fault rate has decreased from approximately 25 faults per 100km per year to around 12.
The main reasons for this are that we have completed major maintenance projects and improved tree control. In
addition, live-line work practices have reduced planned outages, while more line circuit breakers have been installed.
Feeders have been shortened as new zone substations are built, which has also provided performance improvements.
We are currently engaged in a programme to install ground fault neutralisers (GFN) at rural zone substations. This
has the potential to significantly improve network reliability. The potential to cost effectively improve reliability using
more traditional methods is fairly limited. A GFN and associated equipment can reduce the residual earth-fault
current close to zero during earth-faults and thereby make it safe to leave the distribution network alive with
permanent earth-faults while the faults are located and isolated.
We have also instigated initiatives to reduce problems with switchgear, primary transformers and terminations.
Power quality project

As part of a three year project to install 30 power quality instruments, 10 power quality instruments were installed at
various locations within our distribution network. These instruments collect power quality trend data plus triggered
transient event information.
The PQView power quality analysis package was also purchased to archive data and provide an analysis tool.
Preliminary analysis of data collected to date discovered the very high harmonic levels on the network supplied from
Hororata GXP. These findings have assisted Transpower to analyse the effect of transposing 220kV lines as part of a
project to reduce voltage imbalance.
We also use the power quality instruments and PQView to discover and monitor the increasing harmonic distortion
caused by everyday domestic consumer electronic equipment.
Emergency stock
Our emergency stock holdings valued at approximately $4m have been reviewed by looking at the reliability statistics
of each asset, and systematically identifying the need for components that make up that asset. It was necessary to set
a reasonable level of risk to ensure that we balanced the need for carrying emergency supplies with the cost of
holding these items. For the overhead line asset we set this level at about a one-in-50 year event. As risk assessment
of individual items is further refined some items may be released or additional critical items will be held.
1.7.8 Gap analysis

Asset management processes
Orion engaged EA Technology Ltd to undertake an independent review of our asset management systems and
processes in accordance with the requirements of the Commerce Commission’s Asset Management Maturity
Assessment Tool (AMMAT). This tool assesses a selection of asset management capabilities and provides an
assessment against the requirements of BSI PAS-55 Optimised Management of Physical Assets.
Their review found we are fully compliant with the requirements in a number of important, high impact areas, notably
asset management strategy, asset management plans and outsourcing. However, there are a number of areas
identified by the review where our documentation does not fully demonstrate that our asset management systems and
processes fully meet the requirements of PAS-55.
The primary reason for the discrepancy observed in the scores presented is that the PAS-55 assessment criteria used
34 Summary
for this review require that asset management systems and processes be formally documented as a means of
ensuring consistency and to enable effective audit. In order to achieve a fully compliant score it is in most cases
necessary to provide documentary evidence showing the required process and how it is being complied with.
Reliability
Our network has improved over the 22 years that we have compiled detailed reliability statistics. These statistics
indicate that most interruptions in the rural area are due to trees on lines, vehicles hitting poles and equipment
failure to a lesser extent. Over the years we have made considerable effort to control tree growth (where the Tree
Regulations allow) and instigate various maintenance programmes on our rural 11kV lines. A project to install
reflectors on roadside poles to reduce the incidence of vehicles hitting poles has also been completed.
Our plant failure statistics show that as loads increase in parts of our network, we have to work harder to keep
aging equipment performing satisfactorily. We now use a UV corona imaging camera in a move that utilises the
latest technology in an effort to identify potential problems before they cause an interruption.
We have also completed a project to shorten the interrupted portions of our feeders by installing additional line
circuit breakers. Line circuit breakers are relocated to more appropriate locations as the network is altered and
currently total 51 in our rural network.
Security Standard
Our Security Standard provides a useful benchmark to identify areas on our network that may not currently receive
the high level of security that the majority of our network has. Any gaps against our Security Standard are
discussed in section 5.5 – Network gap analysis.
Background and objectives 35

2.1 Purpose of our AMP 37
2.2 Business plans and goals 37
2.2.1 Relationship of our AMP to our ‘mission’ 37
2.2.2 Relationship of our AMP to our SOI and business plans 38
2.3 Stakeholders 40
2.4 Management responsibilities 42
2.4.1 Asset management structure 42
2.4.2 Board and executive governance 43
2.4.3 Corporate services 43
2.4.4 Infrastructure management 43
2.4.5 Commercial 44
2.4.6 Information solutions 44
2.4.7 Human resources 44
2.4.8 Communications and engagement 44
2.4.9 Consultants and contractors 44
2.5 Assumptions 45
2.5.1 Significant assumptions 45
2.5.2 Changes to our existing business 46
2.5.3 Sources of uncertainty 46
2.5.4 Cost inflation 46
2.5.5 Potential differences between our forecast and actual outcomes 46
2.5.6 Information sources 47
2.6 Asset management drivers 48

2.6.1 Investment principle 48
2.6.2 Business drivers 48
2.7 Asset management process 50

2.7.2 Planning priorities 51
2.7.3 Construction standards and working practices 51
2.7.4 Introduction of new equipment types 52
2.7.5 Routine asset inspection and maintenance 52
2.7.6 Performance measurement 53
2.7.7 Network development 53
2.8 Systems and information 54

2.8.1 Systems 54
2.8.2 Asset data 59
2.9 Development of systems and processes 60

2.9.1 Short term developments 60
36 Background and objectives

2-2a Interaction of plans and processes 39
2-4a Asset management structure 42
2-6a Optimal cost versus quality principle 48
2-7a Asset management system 50
2-7b Process to introduce new equipment 52
2-7c Process for routine asset inspection and maintenance 52
2-7d Process for performance measurement 53

2-7e Process for network development 53
2-8a Management systems and information flows 55
2.1 Purpose of our AMP

Our AMP documents the asset management practices we use as part of an optimised lifecycle management strategy
for our electricity assets. This means the overall objective of our AMP is:
To provide, maintain and operate Orion’s electricity network while meeting agreed levels of
service, quality, safety and profitability.
This AMP looks ahead for the 10 years from 1 April 2014.
The main focus of this AMP is on the first three to five years – for this period, most of our significant planned projects
have been identified. Beyond this period, analysis is more indicative. Based on
long term trends and, depending on consumer demand growth, it is likely that new projects will arise and some
planned projects in this plan could be eliminated in the latter half of the 10 year period of the plan.
We update and publish our 10-year AMP just prior to the start of each financial year (April).
We created our first AMP in 1994 and we have since developed our plan to comprehensively meet the requirements of
the Electricity Distribution Information Disclosure Determination 2012. These requirements include:
 a summary of the plan
 background and objectives
 target service levels
 details of assets covered, lifecycle management plans
 load forecasts, development and maintenance plans
 risk management, including policies, assessment and mitigation
 performance measurement, evaluation and improvement initiatives.
As the format of our AMP does not completely follow the order as suggested in the regulatory disclosure
requirements a cross reference table to the relevant sections of our AMP is shown in Appendix B.
Our AMP goes beyond regulatory requirements. We use our AMP on a day-to-day basis and we aim to demonstrate
responsible stewardship of our network assets — in the long term interests of our consumers, shareholders,
electricity retailers, government agencies, contractors, electricity end users, financial institutions and the general
public.
In this AMP, we aim to optimise the lifecycle costs for each network asset group (including creation, operation,
maintenance, renewal and disposal) to meet agreed service levels and future demand. Each year we aim to improve
our AMP to take advantage of new information and changing technology. These innovations help us to maintain our
ranking as one of the most resilient, reliable and efficient electricity networks in the country.
Our AMP does not cover how we derive and apply our network pricing. This information is available on our website;
oriongroup.co.nz.
2.2 Business plans and goals

2.2.1 Relationship of our AMP to our ‘mission’
Our activities are guided by what we call our ‘mission’, that consists of a purpose statement, a vision statement for
the future state of the company and a set of company values as detailed below. Necessary competencies to achieve
this mission include; asset management, stakeholder communication, risk management and network pricing. This
AMP is consistent with, and is an important part of, our mission.
We now detail the three key elements of our mission.
Our purpose
We consistently deliver a safe, secure and cost-effective supply of electricity to our customers.
Our vision
We will:
 provide excellent customer service
 foster strong stakeholder relationships
 lead collaboration across the electricity industry to benefit all New Zealanders
 apply technology and demand side management to benefit our customers
 excel in leadership and management
 attract, develop and retain the very best people
 protect and create value for our shareholders and customers.
Our values:
2.2.2 Relationship of our AMP to our SOI and business plans

Our AMP is a key component of our business planning process that combines management, financial and technical
practices to ensure that the level of service required by consumers is provided by us at the lowest long term cost.
Other key documents that are part of our annual business planning process are:
We will Meaning
Value We build and maintain positive relationships with our internal and external stakeholders (our employees,
relationships customers, shareholders, suppliers, contractors, regulators, community organisations etc.)
Be trustworthy We demonstrate honesty, sound judgement, understanding and empathy. We earn the trust and respect of
our community
Be proactive We create opportunities and promptly respond to challenges with initiative. We empower our employees to
be accountable and focus on results
Maintain a long Decisions we make must not compromise the achievement of our purpose
term focus
Be effective and We strive for competence, effective planning and execution, consistency in application and efficiency
efficient
Be innovative We maintain a learning environment. We explore and adopt ideas that create value
Value safety and We provide a safe and healthy work environment to protect ourselves, other people and property
wellbeing
Value our natural We are mindful of our impact on the natural environment and seek ways to minimise our effects
environment
1. Statement of intent (SOI): In accordance with section 39 of the Energy Companies Act, we submit a draft SOI to
our shareholders prior to each financial year. After carefully considering any comments/suggestions on the
draft SOI from our shareholders, the Orion board approves our final SOI. Our final approved SOI is then sent to
our shareholders and placed on our website.
Our SOI sets out our overall strategic/corporate objectives, intentions and financial/performance targets for the
next three financial years.
Section 36 of the Act stipulates that our principal objective shall be to operate as a successful business.
We state in our SOI that in order to achieve this outcome we seek to:
 achieve our objectives, both commercial and non-commercial, as specified in our SOI
 be a good employer
 exhibit a sense of social and environmental responsibility by having regard to the interests of the community
in which we operate
 conduct our affairs in accordance with sound business practice.
Our SOI states that “our top priority is the efficient and effective management of our electricity network. We aim
to provide customers with a safe, resilient and efficient electricity service and competitive prices” . These two
sentences drive the philosophies and practices inherent in our AMP—in particular our aim to provide the level of
service required by consumers at the lowest long term cost.
We also aim to provide our shareholders with an attractive risk adjusted return on their investment.
Section 37 of the Energy Companies Act specifies that “all decisions relating to the operation of an energy
company shall be made pursuant to the authority of the directorship of the company in accordance with the
statement of corporate intent”. It is therefore important that the scope of our activities, as defined in our SOI,
includes the ownership and operation of our local electricity distribution network. This is achieved in our SOI -
where we state that our activities are to plan, construct and maintain a reliable and secure electricity
distribution network in the Christchurch/central Canterbury region.
Our SOI also states that we will:
 provide efficient processes that support competition among electricity retailers and generators
 seek investment/acquisition opportunities in the infrastructure and energy sectors
 manage, grow and, if appropriate, realise our other subsidiary and associate company interests.
Our AMP is consistent with the goals of our SOI although not all of our SOI is relevant to our AMP.
Our other planning documents all seek to achieve the aims of our SOI.
Our SOI has a number of specific targets each year related to:
 network reliability
 environmental performance
 community and employment
 financial performance.
The network reliability targets (SAIDI/SAIFI) in our SOI are consistent with our AMP targets.
The environmental performance targets in our SOI are outside the scope of our AMP. However, some of these
targets can impact on our AMP. For example a recent SOI target to incorporate the cost of carbon into network
investment decisions is now embedded in our network management practices (see section 2.6.2 of this AMP).
The community and employment targets in our SOI are consistent with the scope of our AMP. However, some
of our SOI targets are outside the scope of our AMP. For example our SOI targets related to zero lost-time
accidents and our on-going engineering trainee programme.
The financial targets in our SOI are for our company and group as a whole and are therefore considered
outside the scope of our AMP.
2. Business plan: Our company strategies and business targets, consistent with our approved SOI. Our AMP is
one part of our plan and we also have other strategies and targets that are unrelated to our electricity
distribution network. Our business plan is not a public document.
3. Financial forecasts: Our financial forecasts and targets, and our forecast funding requirements.
The following Figure 2-2a shows how our business plans and processes interact with each other.
Figure 2-2a Interaction of plans and processes
Shareholders consulted Statement of intent

Consumer consultation
on the draft SOI (SOI)
Business plan Financial forecasts 10 year network AMP
Board approves the SOI, business plan, financial forecasts and the AMP, prior to the
start of each financial year (1 April)
2.3 Stakeholders
Our key stakeholders are:
 shareholders: Christchurch City Council Holdings Limited and Selwyn Investment Holdings Limited
 retailers, contracted customers and consumers
 employees
 Transpower
 government agencies
 contractors and suppliers
 financial institutions.
We have identified our key stakeholder interests through the following forums:
 consumer surveys, meetings and informal discussions
 major customer forums and industry seminars
 reviews of major events (storms)
 quality of supply studies
 employee satisfaction surveys
 specific project consultations
 supplier technical assessment meetings
 contract performance reviews
 consultation papers and submissions.
The interests of our key stakeholders can be summarised as:

 Shareholders:
i. a fair return on investment commensurate with the risk of that investment
ii. efficiency
iii. long term value
iv. prudent financial management and planning
v. security of supply.
 Retailers, contracted customers and consumers:
i. a reliable electricity supply
ii. value for money
iii. efficient fault restoration with good communication during events
iv. consistency with the Commerce Act Part 4A purpose to “provide services at a quality that reflects
consumer demands”.
 Employees:
i. a safe work environment
ii. clear direction, responsibilities and accountability
iii. job satisfaction.
 Transpower:
i. load forecasts
ii. security of supply
iii. technical connection issues
iv. new investment.
 Government agencies:
i. economic efficiency
ii. compliance.
 Contractors and suppliers:
i. fair access to business
ii. consistent terms
iii. clear specifications
iv. clear information to assist efficient resource planning

v. support.
 Financial institutions:
i. prudent financial management and planning
ii. capacity to repay debts as they fall due
iii. timely and accurate information
iv. transparent key forecast assumptions
v. access to senior management.
We accommodate these stakeholder interests in our asset management practices through:

 load forecasting
 security of supply standards
 safety plans, auditing and compliance programmes
 coherent network planning, standards and procedures
 clear contracts with counterparties
 risk management
 use of professional judgments and experience
 key resource management principles (e.g. managing a sustainable pool of competent network contractors)
 use of independent experts
 prudent financial management and planning.
We manage any conflicting stakeholder interests by:

 considering the needs of stakeholders as part of our high level planning
 a balance between the cost of non-supply and the investment to provide the security desired
 cost/benefit analysis
 our principal objective under the Energies Company Act being to operate "...as a successful business".
If a conflict between stakeholder interests is identified then we adopt an appropriate conflict resolution process to
suit the issue and stakeholder concerns. Our consumers sometimes have different network resilience and/or
reliability needs. Consumers do not always agree on the standards that they prefer and the price they are willing to
pay for our service.
We aim for levels of network resilience and reliability that meets our overall consumers’ views as best we can.
Each year, our newly revised AMP is made publicly available free of charge (including on our website) within a week
of it being approved by our board. We welcome comments and suggestions on our AMP from stakeholders and
interested parties at any time.
Consumer research is covered further in section 3 – Service levels.
2.4 Management responsibilities

2.4.1 Asset management structure
Our network is managed and operated from our Christchurch office at 565 Wairakei Rd. Our governance/
management structure is as follows:
Figure 2-4a Asset management structure
Financial planning and treasury

Insurance and Tax compliance
Corporate services Governance support—board and shareholders
Staff = 10 Management support
Financial and management accounting
Payroll and Vehicle fleet management
Lifecycle Management
Asset Management Plan (Lifecycle planning)
Asset information/location/performance
Contract management Staff = 19
Strategic Planning
Long term planning
Embedded technologies, DSM and new business initiatives
Transpower new investment co-ordination Staff = 3
Safety and Risk

Public and contractor safety
Risk management systems Staff = 3
Infrastructure
Orion board of directors
Staff = 130 Engineering Support

Infrastructure engineering and technical support
Chief executive
Consultants and contractors

Technical interface with Information Solutions
New technology assessment Staff = 14
Operations
Network operation and access
Customer contact Staff = 50
Network Asset Management

Customer connections
Construction, maintenance/renewal
Property management Staff = 41
Electricity retailers and major consumers

Network delivery contracts and pricing
Commercial Retailer and major customer invoicing
Staff = 9 Interface with economic regulators
Transpower contracts
Information systems
Information solutions PC support
Staff = 15 Control systems
HR strategy development & implementation

Human resources HR advice and support
Staff = 2 Employment related compliance
Communications and
Internal and external communications
engagement
Public engagement
Staff = 2
2.4.2 Board and executive governance

Orion’s directors are appointed by its shareholders to govern and direct Orion’s activities. The board of directors is
the overall and final body responsible for all decision-making within the company.
The Orion board is responsible for the direction and control of the company including commercial performance,
business plans, policies, budgets and compliance with the law. The board reviews and approves our revised 10 year
AMP prior to the start of each financial year (1 April).
The Board also formally reviews and approves our key company policies each year, including our a delegated
authorities policy document, which includes specified management spending authorities. Anything significant
outside of this policy is put before the board as required.
Each corporate manager is responsible for gaining board approval for their own budget and for then operating
within their budget.
The board usually meets monthly and receives formal updates from management of compliance and performance
against targets.
We summarise the main responsibilities of each of our corporate groups below.
2.4.3 Corporate services

Our corporate services group is responsible for supporting the other corporate groups in areas such as:
 financial planning and treasury management
 insurance
 debtors and creditors
 financial and management accounting—including financial management information systems (FMIS)
 tax compliance
 reporting to the board and shareholders, including regulatory and statutory requirements
 payroll
 fleet management.
2.4.4 Infrastructure management

We maintain in-house technical and administrative competence within our infrastructure group to:
 keep the public and our staff/contractors safe
 manage safety and environmental compliance systems
 manage risk to our assets as well as operational and environmental risk
 manage and develop asset and network policies along with design and construction standards
 scope network extension and maintenance work and prepare budgets
 manage projects/contracts and interact with contractors
 maintain strategic asset records and reliability statistics
 manage and monitor the network
 manage corporate property
 assess new technologies
 monitor asset emergency spares and supply systems
 analyse and forecast load, asset capability monitoring and contingency planning etc.
 interface with Transpower over technical connection issues and national grid capacity
 investigate the potential and impact of embedded generation
2.4.5 Commercial
Orion’s commercial group is responsible for:
 pricing, billing and contracts with retailers
 relationships with economic regulators (such as the Electricity Authority and Commerce Commission)
 compliance with the industry rule-book
 commercial contracts with Transpower

 advice to retailers and major customers
2.4.6 Information solutions

Orion’s information solutions group is responsible for:
 procurement, delivery and management of our information systems infrastructure
 the provision, support and enhancement of information systems that support our business processes
 managing our control systems.
2.4.7 Human resources

Orion’s human resources function is responsible for:
 human resource strategy development & implementation
 human resource advice and support
 employment-related compliance.
2.4.8 Communications and engagement

Orion’s Communications and Engagement function is responsible for:
 communications planning and implementation
 consultation and engagement on substantial projects
 managing Orion’s brand.
2.4.9 Consultants and contractors

We have a number of consultants and contractors that work with us to meet our asset management objectives.
They do not have direct network management responsibilities but operate on a fixed scope and/or period contract
to meet the specific needs of the work/project requirements.
It’s our responsibility to identify our capital works and maintenance programmes as detailed in sections 4 and 5
of this AMP and subsequently approved in an annual budget. We then specify the work to be done by competent
and appropriate consultants and contractors.
All network maintenance and construction work (where possible and appropriate) is competitively tendered to
selected contractors. The contract works are processed and managed by the Infrastructure management group.
The scope of out-sourced works to consultants and contractors can be outlined as:
Consultants
 expert advice
 detailed design.
Field services
 emergency response services
 spares and major plant services
 some specialist asset inspections and non-invasive/non-destruction testing
 maintenance of existing network infrastructure
 installation and replacement of new or existing network infrastructure.
2.5 Assumptions
2.5.1 Significant assumptions
Business structure and management drivers
This AMP assumes that we will continue to restore the resilience and reliability of our network, following the
Canterbury earthquakes. We also assume no major changes in the regulatory framework, asset base through
merger, changes of ownership and/or requirements of stakeholders. We forecast increased levels of expenditure for
earthquake repairs over the next few years and the acquisition of local Transpower spur assets.
Service level targets

We have based our service level targets on consumers’ views about the quality of service that they prefer. Extensive
consultation over many years tells us that consumers want us to deliver network resilience and reliability and keep
prices down. To meet this expectation we look for the right balance between costs for consumers and network
investment.
Any spur assets purchased or newly developed distribution assets are expected to perform well. We continue to
assess the condition of assets that may have been damaged by the earthquakes. We are focused on returning the
reliability of our network to pre-earthquake levels over the next 5-10 years.
We aim to continue to improve our network service over time. We expect continued incremental improvement as a
result of our on-going routine network maintenance, asset replacement and network development practices.
For some projects, we expect more than incremental improvement. These projects include:
 our recently-installed network management system, part of a distributed management system, to provide better
business service (sections 2.8.1 and 4.22),
 the installation of Ground Fault Neutralizers to improve rural network safety and reliability (sections 4.19 and
5.6.7) and
 improved physical security and barriers around our equipment in public places (section 4.15.5).
Lifecycle management of our assets

We have assumed no significant purchase/sale of network assets or forced disconnection of uneconomic supplies)
other than those discussed in the development of our network (section 5).
The planned maintenance and replacement of our assets is largely condition and risk based. This assumes prudent
risk management practises associated with good industry practise to achieve the outcomes in line with our targeted
service levels. Our risk assessments are based on the context of no significant changes to design standards,
regulatory obligations and also our other business drivers and assumptions discussed in this section.
Network development
Section 5 of this AMP outlines projects that will ensure that our network will continue to meet our consumer’s
expectations of supply, including earthquake recovery in the northeast and increased capacity in areas of growth
We assume that the structure of our network pricing will remain substantially unchanged. Our network pricing aims
to promote active participation from consumers (for example, many of our major customers respond to our price
signals and reduce their demand when our network is running at peak demand). We have assumed this participation
will continue and envisage that new technology such as electric vehicles and solar panels will not make a material
difference in the 10 year time frame.
Similarly with embedded generation, we have seen connection of relatively small amounts of generation (small in
scale) into our network. This has had a small impact on our network and we have assumed no larger scale generation
connections. We have assumed that industry rules will ensure that generation connections will not be subsidised by
other industry participants (including us) or consumers.
Risk management
The assumptions regarding management of risk are largely discussed in section 6. Although we have planned for
processes and resources to ensure business continuity as a result of a major event or equipment failure, we have not
included the actual consequences of a forecast/hypothetical major event in our AMP forecasts.
2.5.2 Changes to our existing business

No changes are proposed to the existing business of Orion. All forecasts in this AMP have been prepared consistent
with the existing Orion business ownership and structure.
2.5.3 Sources of uncertainty

Potential uncertainties in our key assumptions include:
 Regulation. Future changes to regulation are unlikely to reduce our targeted service levels and are likely to
continue the pressure for ensuring cost effective delivery of network services. We believe that the structure of
our network pricing and our management processes encourage the economic development of the network and
the chances of adverse significant changes in the regulatory framework in this regard are low.
 Our CPP proposals. In February 2013, we submitted our customised price-quality path (CPP) proposals to the
Commerce Commission. In late November 2013, the Commission released its decisions on our proposals.
Further consideration of these decisions and other new information will be undertaken before our next AMP.
 The city’s rebuild. The pace of the CBD and ‘red zone’ recovery is influenced by The Crown, CERA/ CCDU and local
roading authorities. It’s also influenced by private developers. There is uncertainty regarding the timing of some
key recovery projects.
 Our ownership. We assess that the level of uncertainty related to our ownership is relatively low.
 Consumer demand. Significant changes in consumer demand are unlikely because most changes in consumer
demand require investment. Our experience is that stable price signals are needed to ensure consumers’
willingness to invest in changes. Although electricity retailers have invested in ‘smart meter’ technologies, we
believe that the likelihood of significant changes in consumer demand is low to medium over the 10 year AMP
period.
 Our forecast for demand growth is in the order of 1%-2% per year. The impact of significant changes to this
forecast has minimal affect on our ability to undertake works. We estimate that we would need to see annual
load growth in the order of 5% for use to encounter significant short-medium term resourcing issues. We rate
the impact of this uncertainty as low.
2.5.4 Cost inflation

The key assumptions for our cost forecasts are discussed in section 7.1 where all dollars are in FY15 terms and no
allowance has been made for CPI adjustments, changes in foreign exchanges rates, or local labour, plant and material
market rate changes. Refer to appendices for the expenditure schedules in nominal (inflation-adjusted) terms.
2.5.5 Potential differences between our forecast and actual outcomes

Factors that may lead to material differences include:
 Regulatory requirements may change.
 Our ownership may change, leading to new management drivers. For example, this could lead to reduced
spending and higher levels of risk.
 Customer demand may change and/or the requirement for network resilience/reliability could change. This could
be driven by economic and/or technology changes. This could lead to different levels of network investment.
 Changes in demand and/or connection growth could lead us to change the timing of our network projects.
 One or more large energy consumers/generators may connect to our network requiring specific network
development projects.
 Major equipment failure and/or a major natural disaster may impact on our network requiring significant
response and recovery work. This may delay some planned projects during the period until the network is fully
restored.
 Input costs and exchange rates and the cost of borrowing may vary influencing the economics associated with
some projects. If higher costs are anticipated, some projects may be abandoned, delayed or substituted.
 Changes to industry standards, inspection equipment technologies and understanding of equipment failure
mechanisms may lead to changing asset service specifications.
 Requirements for us to facilitate the rollout of a third party communications network on our overhead network
could lead to substantial make ready work ensuring the network is capable of meeting required regulatory and
safety standards. The could lead to resource issues and short-medium term increases in labour costs.
2.5.6 Information sources

Our business structure and management drivers
Our management drivers are primarily driven directly from our statement of intent, and company mission and vision
statements. These are summarised in section 2.2.
Our service levels

Our understanding of our stakeholders is largely sourced through consultation processes. Stakeholders include
shareholders, electricity retailers and contracted customers and consumers, employees, Transpower, government
agencies, contractors and suppliers and financial institutions. The primary sources of information include:
 consumer surveys, meetings and informal discussions
 major customer forums and industry seminars
 quality of supply studies
 employee satisfaction surveys
 specific project consultations
 supplier technical assessment meetings
 consultation papers and submissions.
Lifecycle management of our assets

We have experienced management, engineers and practitioners some of whom are actively involved in industry
standards groups and working parties, technical forums and seminars. This helps us to make prudent judgements
associated with new equipment, practises and processes that benefit the operation and development of our network.
Network Development
The basis and sources of information that underpin our forecasts for growth are discussed fully in section 5.4.
Risk Management
The development of our risk management processes is based on our ability to understand and assess practical
solutions to identified risks. The principle sources of information involved in this process include:
 industry incident notifications
 Orion incident reporting
 participation in Industry Safety Strategy group
 participation in national and local CDEM lifeline activities
 specific asset class condition and risk assessments
 business continuity plans.
Financial
We base the updating of our cost estimates on recently completed project costs, and where appropriate utilise CPI and
Primary Producer Indices.
2.6 Asset management drivers

2.6.1 Investment principle
When we extend, replace, maintain and operate our network we consider the balance between cost and the quality of
supply provided. The optimum point of investment in the network is achieved when the value of further expenditure
would have exceeded the value of benefits to our consumers. This concept is illustrated in the following Figure 2-6a.
Orion return, maintenance, operat ing and overhead cost s
Optimal
Figure 2-6aConsumer costionversus
int errupt quality
and incident costs principle
Tot al cost s
Increasing annual costs
Optimal point
Improving
Improv ingreliability,
reliability ,safety and
saf ety regulatory
and compliance
regulatory compliance
Orionreturn,
Orion return,maintenance,
maintenance, operating
operat andoverhead
ing and overheadcost
costs
s
Consumerint
Consumer interruption andincident
errupt ion and incidentcosts
costs
Tot al cost
Total s
costs
Put simply, we need to find the right balance between cost and the quality of our electricity delivery service. We seek
to achieve this optimal point by economic analysis when we develop and review our asset management practices.
To achieve optimal outcomes, we also commit significant resources to participate actively in the consultation phase of
national rules and regulations. It is important that rules and regulations that affect our industry are well-informed,
principled and practical.
The speed at which new asset and systems technologies become available has increased in the last decade. We
welcome these new initiatives and are committed to keeping up-to-date with technological advancements.
InImprov
line with our ‘optimal
ing reliability , saf ety point’ approach
and regulatory above, we introduce new technology only when it results in an economic
compliance
balance of cost and network performance. We then modify our standards and specifications to include the initiative.
More detail on technology initiatives is discussed in context within the various sections of our AMP.
2.6.2 Business drivers

Our top priority is the efficient and effective management of our electricity network. We aim to provide consumers
with a high level of service, a reliable and secure supply and competitive prices. We also aim to provide our
shareholders with an attractive risk adjusted return on their investment.
The main business drivers which define the need, priority and scope for improved asset management practices within
Orion are summarised below:
Safety
We are committed to meeting our safety obligations. We will:
 adopt appropriate safety standards for the creation of new assets
 specify works to maintain assets in a safe condition
 operate and work safely with documented procedures
 develop appropriate risk management practices.
Like all companies we are subject to the general provisions of the Health and Safety in Employment Act, which has far
-reaching impacts. Other specific safety requirements are found in the Electricity Act, the Electricity Safety
Regulations, Fire Services Act and the Building Act.
We also continue to run an advertising campaign to inform the public about how to stay safe around electricity.
Customer service
Consumers require electricity to be delivered safely, reliably, efficiently and economically. We use asset
management techniques and good industry practice to satisfy these requirements and we seek to:
 identify and satisfy consumer requirements
 improve understanding of service level options, measures and associated costs.
Environmental responsibility
We aim to be environmentally responsible. Legislation such as the Resource Management Act 1991 and our own
environmental sustainability policy guide our activities.
Our major identified responsibilities are our duty:
 to avoid discharge of any contaminants into the environment
 to avoid unreasonable noise
 to avoid, remedy or mitigate any adverse effect on the environment.
We also aim to minimise our environmental impact by incorporating the cost of carbon into our network
purchasing decisions. Approximately 77% of our carbon footprint is due to electrical losses in our network. We
have now included specific carbon costs to the cost of electrical losses into our investment process.
Underground conversion projects are an asset enhancement driven partly by our concern for the visual
environment.
Economic efficiency
We aim to ensure that the financial returns on our network investment are appropriate. Our asset management
practices support economic efficiency as they:
 provide a basis to monitor asset performance and utilisation
 enable asset managers to plan and prioritise maintenance, renewal and growth expenditure
 quantify risk, and minimise high impact failures
 extend the life of assets and optimise the trade-off between maintenance and replacement
 tender all work to competent contractors and thus ensure the best price for specific works
 conduct an economic cost benefit analysis on all major projects
 optimise distribution network losses and network utilisation (load factor).
Legislation
Our aim is to achieve material compliance with all relevant legislation, regulations and codes of practice that relate
to how we manage our electricity distribution network, including:
 Electricity Act  Local Government Act

 Electricity Amendment Act  Resource Management Act
 Electricity Reform Act  Building Act
 Electricity Industry Act  Health and Safety in Employment Act
 Electricity Regulations  Health and Safety in Employment Regulations
 Electricity (Hazards from Trees) Regulations  Public Bodies Contract Act
 Civil Defence Emergency Management Act  Public Works Act
 NZ Electrical Codes of Practice  Electricity Distribution Information Disclosure
Determination
2.7 Asset management process

2.7.1 Introduction
We undertake lifecycle management and asset maintenance planning using whole of life cost analysis, reliability-
centred maintenance, condition based maintenance and risk management techniques. The techniques are based on
performance and reliability targets. The high level targets are discussed in section 3. Our overall asset
management process is as follows:
Figure 2-7a Asset management system
Organisational strategic plan
Performance
Management review
Asset management strategy
assessment
and
improvement
Asset management objectives
New methods
Asset management plan and
technologies
Implementation
Reliability-centred maintenance
Our network management philosophy is reliability-centred and based on retaining asset function. To do this we ask
the following questions:
 what is the functional requirement of this asset?
 what is it that may fail and prevent this function?
 what can we do to retain the asset function?
Cost and benefit are considered and the results are monitored to gauge the effectiveness of any significant changes.
This works well for overhead line assets that have a higher failure rate, providing sufficient information to make
meaningful decisions. However, when applying reliability-centred maintenance to assets with much lower failure
rates, such as switchgear, information has to be obtained from a wide range of equipment before we decide on cost-
effective actions.
Condition based risk management

Condition based maintenance is an extension of reliability-centred maintenance. Where appropriate, maintenance
is performed based on the condition of the asset and the consequence of its failure (see 6.1), rather than on the
traditional time-based approach.
We have engaged EA Technology Limited to develop condition based risk management (CBRM) models for the
majority of our network assets. These models utilise asset information, engineering knowledge and experience to
define, justify and target asset renewal. They provide a proven and industry accepted means of determining the
optimum balance between on-going renewal and Capex forecasts. We are currently integrating this practice into
our business processes and have used the CBRM models to develop a number of our replacement programmes.
The CBRM models calculate the health index (HI) and probability of failure (PoF) of each individual asset. This
effectively gives the asset a ranking which can be used to help prioritise replacement strategies. Note, the models
utilise some averaging/generalising of asset information to calculate the asset ranking so it is still up to the asset
managers to prioritise the replacement schedule.
We are still in the process of collating and refining information on the condition of our earthquake damaged assets
and fully integrating the CBRM process into our business.
2.7.2 Planning priorities

Recent changes in regulations and industry codes of practice have highlighted the need to mitigate safety risks for
the public, employees and contractors. Therefore we:
 continue to remove or modify high-risk equipment
 increase security around substations and equipment
 tighten controls on equipment access.
In recent years we have focused our ability to meet the growth needs of the community while ensuring appropriate
reliability and security. Network security is always compromised during times of change when capital or
maintenance works are carried out.
To mitigate risk associated with reduced security during these periods of change we:
 endeavour to plan work methods and contingencies to minimise any impact on the network
 use programmes that allow for contingency events
 programme works in a manner that provides consistent work for the skilled resources available
 are proactive in the development and retention of skilled resources for the future.
2.7.3 Construction standards and working practices

Design standards
In order to manage the safety, cost, efficiency and quality aspects of our network we seek to standardise network
design and work practices. To achieve this consistency we have developed design standards and drawings that are
available to approved designers/contractors. Normally we only accept designs that conform to these standards.
However, this should not be construed as a desire on our part to limit innovation. Design proposals that differ from
normal are considered if they offer significant economic, environmental and operational advantages.
Technical specifications
These specifications are intended for authorised contractors working on the construction and maintenance of our
network and refer to the relevant codes of practice and industry standards as appropriate. Specifications are listed
in section 4 against the asset group they relate to.
Equipment specifications
We also seek to standardise equipment used to construct components of our network. To this end we have
developed specifications that detail accepted performance criteria for significant equipment in our network. Usually
new equipment must conform to these specifications. However, this should not be construed as a desire on our part
to limit innovation. Equipment that differs from normal is considered if it offers significant economic, environmental
and operational advantages. See following section 2.7.4 – Process to introduce new equipment.
Asset management reports
We have a report for each of the asset groups set out in section 4. They detail the criteria and asset management
practices we use to obtain effective performance and acceptable levels of service from our assets. The CBRM
results and the maintenance/replacement budgets for the asset group are detailed here.
Equipment operating instructions
To ensure the wide variety of equipment on our network is operated safely with minimum impact on our consumers,
we have developed operating instructions that cover each different type of equipment on our network. We create a
new operating instruction each time any new equipment is introduced. See following section 2.6.4 – Process to
introduce new equipment.
Operating standards
To ensure our network is operated safely we have developed standards that cover such topics as the release of
network equipment, commissioning procedures, system restoration, worker training and access permit control.
Document control process
To ensure that all these documents and drawings are maintained as accurately as possible, each is ’owned’ by one
person who is responsible for any modifications to it. Our Data Manager is responsible for processing these
controlled documents using a process set out in our document control standard.
Email and a restricted-access area on our website are used to make documents and drawings accessible to
approved contractors and designers.
2.7.4 Introduction of new equipment types

New equipment types are reviewed to carefully establish any benefits they may provide. Introduction is carried
out to a plan to ensure that the equipment meets our technical requirements and provides cost benefits. It must
be able to be maintained and operated to provide safe, cost effective utilisation to support our supply security
requirements.
Figure 2-7b Process to introduce new equipment
Requirement for new equipment type to be installed
Industry equipment
Staff review Orion’s standards Equipment specification
standards
Tender/award contract
Documentation and
Equipment supplied
training/familiarisation
Installation on network
Commissioning of new Orion’s equipment

equipment operating standards
2.7.5 Routine asset inspection and maintenance

The main function of our routine asset inspection and maintenance process is to ensure that optimal levels of
asset performance allow us to meet our service level objectives.
Figure 2-7c Process for routine asset inspection and maintenance
Establish requirements
Review lifecycle
management plans and Performance monitoring
regulatory compliance
Specify work scopes
Implement maintenance/
inspection work
Review inspection/test
Process/remedy any defects
results
2.7.6 Performance measurement

The main function of our performance measurement process is to maintain levels of network performance. This
allows us to set optimal asset/network management standards to meet customer and regulatory requirements.
We currently collect network performance data and rigorously review all network outages logged in our control
centre. This process is independently audited on an annual basis and has been automated with the introduction of
our network management system that utilises SCADA information and a real-time network model.
SAIDI and SAIFI figures are monitored and reported on a monthly basis to allow appropriate management of the
network. A more detailed formal documented review of network performance is undertaken on an annual basis.
Figure 2-7d Process for performance measurement
Establish/review
measures, set targets
Implement monitoring/
Collect fault data
measurement techniques
Analyse maintenance/
Analyse failure modes
inspection reports
Process for network

Review performance
development
Asset inspections and Review standards/asset

maintenance management policies
2.7.7 Network development

The main function of our network development process is to meet the capacity and security requirements of load
growth. See section 5.6 for a description of network development at Orion.
Figure 2-7e Process for network development
Forecast load
Process for performance

Establish network constraints
measurement
Develop solution options
Transpower
Stakeholder consultation
Consumers
(if appropriate)
Regulator
Proposed projects reported in

AMP
Implement projects
Report project completion

status in AMP
2.8 Systems and information

2.8.1 Systems
Our management systems are used to document the existing asset components of our network and provide access to
data to develop, maintain and operate our business. The various systems and information flows between them are
shown in Figure 2-8a on the following page. A description of the function of the main systems is detailed below:
1. Orion desktops
It is our policy to standardise and simplify our computing environment as much as possible. We deliver a single
model of desktop and laptop configured with standard images, one version of Microsoft’s operating system for
network clients and one for servers and a single set of desktop productivity tools (Microsoft Office).
2. Geographic asset information

Our geographic information system (GIS) records our network assets according to their location and electrical
connectivity. It interfaces with our other main information systems such as substation asset attribute data stored in
our asset register.
Orion’s GIS is accessible to all our staff for use at all times. Modified information deemed more “fit for purpose” is
available to several external parties via a secure web site. Access by external parties is governed by Orion’s business
rules via a signed “Terms of Use” document.
Access to our GIS can be from any location at any time using various applications. In the case of field access, GIS
datasets may be stored directly on a laptop device. This is a reliable way of accessing information when internet
website access is unavailable. In another case we have provided GIS data to an external party to be ‘layered” with
other utility information.
Information stored in our GIS includes:
 land-base
 aerial photography
 detailed plant locations for both cable and overhead systems
 a model of our electricity network from the Transpower GXPs to the consumer connection
 conductor size and age.
See section 4 for more specific detail of information held on each asset group.
Our GIS mapping staff update and maintain the GIS data. Data integrity checks between our asset register and the GIS
are automatically run every week.
Systems are in place to facilitate and manage GIS business development in-house.
3. Asset register
Our asset register provides a central resource management application for holding details of key asset types. The
assets covered include all our major equipment. Schedules extracted from this database are used for preventative
maintenance contracts and network valuation purposes.
Information held in our asset register includes details of:
 substation land (title/tenure etc.)
 transformers
 high voltage switchgear and ancillary equipment
 test/inspection results for site earths, poles and underground distribution assets
 transformer maximum demand readings
 protection relays
 substation inspection/maintenance rounds
 poles and attached circuits
 valuation schedule codes and modern equivalent asset (MEA) class
 field SCADA and communication system
 links to documentation and photographs.
See section 4 for more specific detail of information held on each asset group.
Figure 2-8a Management systems and information flows
Orion’s Industry Reconciliation Manager

MCo billing system  Reconciliation inform ation
Retailers and
 Invoices major customers
 Historical billing Key
 Half hour data
 Metering inform ation
Industry registry Orion system/process
 Connections and statistics or business group
$
Outside party
Consumer connections
Pricing model Connections register Financial system
 Connection enquiry
  Consum er statistics  Livening/disconnection  Budgets, invoice paym ents
 Connection billing info  Contributions $$$  Com pensation payouts
Zone subs
 Operation
 Security
Call logging and despatch Works/contract management database

 Consum er “no power” calls,  Contractor details  Audit results
com plaints and queries.  Contract specifications  Contract m anagem ent
SCADA Asset suppliers
 Load data/Load peak info  Invoice paym ent approval  As-builts/test results
 Invoices, specifications
 Asset status/Alarm s  Incident investigation
 Pricing period notices
Incident
Retailers management Asset register
Geographic Information  Asset profiles and
 Com plaints
 Service com plaints  Network configuration m ovem ents Designer/consultant
 Outage info Infrastructure
 Com pensation claim s  Asset profiles  Asset schedules  Project designs
Load  Injuries/close calls  Plant location m aps  Test results  Studies/investigations  Asset lifecycle plans
management  Consum er num bers  Condition Based Risk
 Connections/GXP Managem ent Model
 Financial forecasts
 Project scopes
 Asset specifications
Background and objectives
Public  Failure m ode reports

Network management  Plant location requests Orion website  Stock inventories
Network  Program m ed outages  Outage notification
Contractors (Restricted area)  Engineering drawings
 Com plaints/com pensation  Tenders  Controlled docum ents,
loading  24/7 operation  Invoices
 Progress invoices specifications and drawings.
data  Network configuration Via Or ion web site  Disclosed data
Cable database  Outage requests &
 Interruption details  General inform ation notification  Incident investigation
 ICP status  High voltage cables
 Outage inform ation  Test results
 Pilot cables
 Load m anagem ent  Construction as-builts
 Network stock inventories
 Transform er oil test results
 Maintenance reports
Document control
 Engineering drawings
 Design standards
Load Interruption records  Specifications
forecasting  SAIDI, SAIFI statistics Elec & Gas Complaints Comm  Policies and plans
 Com plaint conciliation
Valuation model (ODV) Transformer oil analyst
 Asset costing for pricing  Oil condition trends
Territorial Commerce Commission

authorities  Regulatory disclosures, thresholds and lim its
 Population growth
forecasts
Strategic planning
 Asset m anagem ent drivers
 Target levels of service
Power system model  Future requirem ents
Stakeholders
(PSS/SINCAL)  Consultation results
 Financial forecasts
55
4. Works management system

All types of works activity are managed using a purpose-built application. Integration with our financial system
allows a work order to be raised directly in the Works management system.
Information held in works management includes:
 contractor/tendering details
 contract specifications and drawings
 management of consumer connection requests
 auditing outcomes
 contract management documentation
 financial tracking
 job as-built documentation.
5. Connections-related service requests

A web-based application accessed from our website allows contractors and the public to lodge a request for a
variety of connections-related services including a request for a new connection, a request for livening, and various
similar services. It is integrated with the Works management system and is designed to help with the anticipated
volume of connection requests associated with the earthquake rebuild.
6. Connections register
Our connections register holds details of all installation control points (ICP) on our electrical network. This is linked
with the industry registry. Links with our GIS systems enable accurate derivation of GXP information by ICP and the
association of ICP with an interruption. Interruptions are now routinely traced within PowerOn (for the high voltage
network) and the GIS (for the low voltage network) using the in-built connectivity model. Accurate information about
the number of customers and interruption duration are recorded and posted overnight to the Electricity Authority’s
registry.
7. Financial management information system (FMIS)

Our FMIS delivers our core accounting functions. Our core FMIS is ‘Microsoft Navision’, and it includes the following
main systems—general ledger, debtors, creditors, job costing, fixed assets and tax registers. Detailed network
asset information is not held in the FMIS but is held in other network systems described in this section.
There is an interface between the Works management system and the financial system to link project activities to
jobs.
8. Network monitoring system (SCADA)

The electricity distribution system is monitored and controlled in real time by the SCADA system. Apart from three
small rural substations, SCADA is installed at all zone substations and line circuit breakers. We are also
progressively installing SCADA at network substations throughout the urban area as old switchgear is replaced.
See section 4.21 for more detail.
Systems have been built to retrieve half hour network feeder loading data from the SCADA historical storage system
on a weekly basis. This data is then analysed to derive and maintain maximum demands for all feeders monitored
by the SCADA system. Loading data is also archived for analysis in the future.
9. Network management system (NMS)

The NMS is a real-time software model of our high voltage distribution network. It allows interaction in real time
with indication and control devices to provide better information on network configuration. This significantly
improves our ability to decide on how to respond to network outages (especially big events such as storms) and
manage planned maintenance outages to minimise the impact on consumers. The system also allows us to
automate some functions, therefore improving response times. Information will be available to inform non-
operational parties about events and their impact on our consumers.
10. Outage management system (OMS)

The OMS is the third component (along with the SCADA and NMS functions) of a comprehensive “Smart” Distribution
Management System that underpins much of our operational activity. Outages are inferred from SCADA ‘trippings’
or from consumer call patterns and are tracked through their lifecycle. Key performance statistics are
automatically calculated and an audit trail of HV switching activity is logged. The previous call-taking application
has been decommissioned.
Integrated into the NMS and OMS is a mobile extension which delivers switching instructions to field operators in
real time, and returns the actions they have taken. It also delivers fault jobs to field workers and tracks the progress
of the job as it is worked on. Jobs requiring further work by an emergency contractor are automatically dispatched to
the contractors’ administration centre. Contractors enter completion information directly into a web-based
application, and the job details automatically flow through into the works database.
11. Outage reporting

A web-based application is used to display details of planned, current and past outages both internally and to the
public via the Internet. Currently this is updated manually, but is about to be replaced by a version that extracts its
information directly out of the PowerOn OMS. This will allow accurate real-time reporting of customer numbers
affected by an outage. We are also planning a web-based real-time Outages map to be available internally and to the
public. The existing applications for reporting planned and unplanned outages will be dismantled.
12. Livening and demolition management

The previous generic call-taking function is now used just to manage demolitions. Jobs are dispatched to handheld
devices in the field and demolition details returned electronically. At present this process is no longer integrated with
other systems. A previously used handheld-based system for managing the livening of both temporary and
permanent supply has been converted to a web-based application and is used by our livening agents to pick up
authorized work and return livening details.
Over the next year we intend a major streamlining of these processes to reduce the needed back-office intervention
and to provide seamless integration with our Works management system.
13. Interruption statistics
An automated posting of outage statistics out of the PowerOn OMS and into our regulatory reporting database is under
construction. This tracks each switching step associated with an outage. After checking, the data will be summarized
along with cause and location in an Microsoft Access-based interruptions register. Reports from this register provide
all relevant statistical information to calculate our network reliability statistics (such as SAIDI and SAIFI ) and analyse
individual feeder and asset performance. The current more manually intensive process will become redundant.
14. Load Management

A high-availability Load Management system is used to perform load shedding to reduce the magnitude of our peak
load and to respond to Transpower constraints. This system is aging and a replacement strategy is being developed.
We also run an “umbrella” Load Management system that co-ordinates the load management systems of each of the
seven distributors in Transpower’s Upper South Island region. This co-operative venture provides a number of
significant benefits both to Transpower and to each of the participating distributors.
15. Incident management

We have implemented an incident recording system extension to our externally hosted Payroll system. This will allow
staff-related incidents and injuries to be captured alongside other staff information. We continue to use in-house
designed databases for managing non-staff related incidents (e.g. incidents affecting our network) and customer
complaints. Incident information can be added progressively and all relevant documents can be stored electronically.
Incidents can be graphed by type for reporting purposes.
16. Valuation model

The purpose of the valuation model is to determine the regulatory optimised deprival value (ODV) of our electricity
network assets. The valuation follows the methodology prescribed in the Commerce Commission’s ODV Handbook.
Some key valuation handbook data is held against assets in our asset register (WASP) and GIS, and additions and
removals of assets from the network are captured in our works management system. This raw data is extracted and
imported into a purpose-built valuation model developed using desktop application tools.
17. Pricing model

We maintain a financial pricing model that supports our derivation of delivery charges. We assign connections to
several connection categories (depending on size and load characteristics) and use the model to allocate assets and
costs to each category. We then establish a set of cost-reflective prices to collect the allocated costs. Asset, asset
valuation and loading information are key inputs to a purpose-built pricing model developed using desktop application
tools.
18. Orion’s Mco billing system

We have contracted Mco, a leading data services and market place support company, to provide our delivery billing
system. The system receives connection and loading information, calculates delivery charges and produces our
monthly invoices to electricity retailers and directly contracted major customers.
19. Network asset loading history

A database of well over 100 million half-hour loading values is available for trend analysis at a wide range of
monitoring points in our network. The database also includes Transpower grid injection point load history and major
customer load history. Several tens of thousands of new data point observations are being added daily.
20. Power system modeling software

An integral part of planning for existing and future power-system alterations is the ability to analyse and simulate its’
impact off-line using computer power-flow simulation. We use a power-flow simulation software package called
PSS/Sincal, and have the ability to model our network from the Transpower connection points down to the customer
LV terminals if required. An automated interface developed in-house is used to enable power-flow models to be
systematically created for PSS/Sincal. These models are created by utilising spatial data from our GIS, and linkages
to conductor information in our as-laid cables database and customer information in our connection database
records.
Because of harmonic problems encountered on the network supplied from Hororata GXP, we have also purchased
the PSS/SINCAL harmonics module to allow us to model the network harmonics.
We are studying the feasibility of implementing the online power flow analysis package as part of our new network
management system.
21. Cable databases

Separate Microsoft Access databases are used to hold information on 66, 33 and 11kV underground cables and
pilot/communication cables. Cable lengths, joint and termination details are held and linked to our GIS by a unique
cable reference number.
22. Transformer oil analyst

Transformer oil analysis (TOA) software provides a centralised database for new and past oil test results for all
primary transformers. TOA provides dissolved gas diagnostics, the trending of key oil performance indicators and
reporting capabilities. Reports from the TOA software are reviewed annually for all primary transformers .
23. Document control

Our engineering drawings and standard documents are controlled using a custom built system. This system is used
to process the release of CAD drawings to outsourced contractors and return them as “as-built” drawings at the
completion of works contracts. Standards and policies maintained in-house are also controlled using this system.
Standard drawings and documents are then posted directly on our ‘restricted’ website and the relevant contractors/
designers are advised via an automated email process.
24. Orion website

Our website has two distinct areas. One part which is open to the general public and another that is restricted to
those parties that have a business requirement to use our drawings and specifications.
OPEN WEBSITE
Our open website is used to convey information to our customers and others. Some of the subjects covered are:
 load management, with near real-time network loadings, peak pricing periods and hot water control
 pricing
 publications, disclosures and media releases
 unscheduled interruptions, advised to street level
 planned shutdowns – each retailer is advised of customers that will be affected
 public safety and tree information.
RESTRICTED WEBSITE
The restricted section of our website is an area where we can place information but maintain some control over who
we share it with. It is generally used to give network designers, construction contractors and equipment suppliers
access to our:
 annual work plan
 standard drawings
 plant location maps
 design standards
 construction specifications
 equipment specifications
 operating standards.
The level of access into our restricted area is controlled by using a unique login and password. This enables us to
determine that what is available to each login is consistent with the type of relationship we have with them.
2.8.2 Asset data

The majority of our primary asset information is held in our asset register, GIS system and cable databases. We
hold information about our network equipment from GXP connections down to individual LV poles with a high level
of accuracy. The data has improved over time due to various inspections and projects since we introduced our GIS
system and asset register.
Requirements to improve information have been driven by improved asset management plans, regulatory
compliance and better risk identification and management. This has ensured that we have the ability to locate,
identify and confirm ownership of assets through our records.
Although there will inevitably be some minor errors and improved information will always be required, we believe
that our information for the majority of the network is accurate. Some information for older assets installed more
than 25 years ago has been estimated based on best available data. Examples of this include:
 the conductor age for some lines older than circa 1990
 timber poles that went into service prior to the use of identification discs
 older air break switches and cut-out fuses.
Refinement of data is an ongoing process. Compliance inspections and maintenance regimes are the main source
from which to confirm or update data. As we replace aging assets with new assets over time all estimated data will
be superseded.
Currently the only area identified where information needs to be improved is associated with determining accurate
connection assets of individual LV consumers. This information is not easily accessible as it requires manual
searches through archived information. The requirement for this information is not deemed high priority and
information will be sourced associated with other inspection programmes over the next five years.
Details of current data, compliance inspections and maintenance regimes for each asset group are shown in
section 4 – Lifecycle asset management – (relevant asset) – Standards and asset data.
2.9 Development of systems and processes

2.9.1 Short term developments
Network management system
A major upgrade of our Network Management system (SCADA, NMS and OMS) was completed in FY14. In parallel
with this we have implemented a companion Historian and migrated much of our historic network asset loading
information into it. Once fully implemented it will provide a continuous historic record of trends for a wide variety of
monitored network values.

Microsoft Sharepoint has been implemented and is being progressively rolled out across the business. The initial
focus is to improve the management of “Office” documents and scanned images, but over time it will become used
for a wide variety of information sharing features as well as providing framework for a replacement Intranet.
Migration of documents from the historic file share into the new system has started and will be progressively rolled
out across the business during 2013/14.
Condition based risk management model

We have engaged EA Technology Ltd to develop condition based risk management (CBRM) models for the majority of
our network assets. We are currently integrating the use of these models into our business processes to develop
our replacement programmes. The models have been used this year in the development of the replacement plans
for our high voltage circuit breakers, high voltage and low voltage switchgear and protection systems. Over the next
few years it is our intention to streamline the processes for updating our condition information and to underpin the
replacement expenditure for our other network assets by using the CBRM models.
Service levels 61
Service levels 3
3.1 Introduction to service levels 63
3.2 Consumer consultation 64
3.3 Service level measures 66

3.3.1 Network reliability 66
3.3.2 Network restoration 67
3.3.3 Network capacity 68
3.3.4 Power quality 68
3.3.5 Safety 69
3.3.6 Customer service 69
3.3.7 Environmental 69
3.3.8 Efficiency 70
3.4 Service level targets 72

3.4.1 Targets for current year 72
3.4.2 Targets for future years 73
62 Service levels

3-3a Orion SAIDI – five year trend and 10 year target 66 3-4a Service descriptions, targets and measures for CY 72
3-3b Orion SAIFI – five year trend and 10 year target 67 3-4b Service descriptions, targets and measures for future 73
3-3c Unplanned interruptions - % restored in under 3hrs 67
Service levels 63
3.1 Introduction to service levels

This section of our plan outlines the performance levels required from our electricity network and management
team. It deals with consumer-related service requirements and other requirements relating to our asset
management drivers as defined in section 2.6. Those drivers are:
 customer service
 safety
 environmental responsibility
 investment principles
 efficiency
 legislation.
The key to successful management of our assets is to meet the expectations of our consumers and other
stakeholders. This is consistent with our ‘mission’ and statement of intent (SOI) as detailed in section 2.2. Our SOI
contains specific service level targets for reliability (SAIDI, SAIFI) and other aspects of our business, some of which
are outside the scope of our AMP.
Our service level targets are based on a balance of:
 consumer and stakeholder consultation
 safety considerations
 regulatory requirements
 international best practice
 past practice.
We endeavour to provide a level of service that meets the expectations of our consumers’ in the long term. We also
recognise the differing requirements of consumers and endeavour to ensure that, as far as practicable, all
consumers are satisfied with the level of service we provide and that no one party is unfairly advantaged or
disadvantaged.
Keeping abreast of changing consumer expectations is fundamental to optimal asset investment and asset
management practices. To determine consumer expectations with regard to the level of service that we provide, we
utilise five main methods of consultation. We detail information on these consultation methods in section 3.2.
In summary, we:
 involve consumers in setting our security of supply standard
 undertake consumer surveys
 engage with consumers via retailers
 obtain direct consumer feedback
 consult consumers on selected major projects.
In setting our service level targets we believe we have achieved an appropriate balance between legislative,
regulatory and stakeholder requirements and consumer expectations.
For a review of service level performance against our targets, see section 8 – Evaluation of performance.
64 Service levels
3.2 Consumer consultation

Consumers are some of our key stakeholders. We recognise that their individual expectations will differ and we
endeavour to ensure that, as far as practicable, all are satisfied with the level of service we provide in the long term
and that no one party is unfairly advantaged or disadvantaged.
Consultation with our consumers has shown that they expect a reliable and secure supply of electricity. Historically,
our customers have wanted no reduction in service. Post-quakes, our consultation has shown that customers want a
return to pre-quake levels of resilience and reliability.
To determine their requirements with regard to the level of service that we provide, we have undertaken the following
methods of consultation:
Direct consumer engagement

All of our major customers are invited to at least two seminars a year. At these seminars we take the opportunity to
explain the quality of our delivery service and our pricing strategy. Our CEO and key members of our senior
management team attend the seminars to answer any questions from major customers.
We meet with our shareholders and consumer groups to discuss the quality and price of supply we provide. Feedback
is also received from consumers through our contact centre and distribution services connection group.
Given the impact of the earthquake and our pending customised price- quality path application to the Commerce
Commission, in late 2012 we wanted to ask consumers whether they still wanted pre-earthquake levels of reliability
and resilience. We used multiple approaches to inform consumers and other stakeholders about our proposed pricing
and network reliability targets and invited feedback. These approaches included:
 stakeholder briefings including a PowerPoint presentation
 a media briefing
 phone briefings with other stakeholders
 information packs sent to stakeholders and other interested parties
 extensive newspaper advertising
 a seminar for our major customers, supplemented with letters and information packs
 information packs sent to local community boards and public libraries
 radio and television interviews
 relevant information included on our website
 Twitter updates
 a public information day.
The feedback we received showed good support for our proposal to restore the network to pre earthquake levels,
spread the cost of doing so over time and recover costs from consumers. Some submitters suggested that the costs
should be met by a range of parties, such as our Council shareholders and the Government.
Consumer surveys
Over the last 10 years six consumer surveys have been undertaken by Orion.
 Research into the strengthening of relationships with landowners

We undertook a survey in February 2003 which involved phone interviews with a random sample of 30 rural
landowners who had had contact with us during the previous year. The results indicated the majority of rural
landowners were satisfied with the quality of our products and services. Of those who were dissatisfied in some
way, a ratio of two to one landowners preferred an increase in reliability to a decrease.
 Network reliability consumer survey

We commissioned independent researchers in February 2004 to conduct a telephone survey with approximately
1,000 households in the Christchurch area. This survey indicated that 92% of respondents were satisfied with the
current reliability of their power supply while 87% considered rapid restoration of power important.
 Urban and rural network reliability consumer survey 2005

We commissioned an independent research company in December 2005 to survey a random sample of 400 rural
and 400 urban households in the Orion network area. This survey indicated that 94% of urban respondents were
satisfied with the current reliability of their power supply while 88% considered rapid restoration of power
important. Of rural respondents, 85% were satisfied with the current reliability of their power supply while 83%
considered rapid restoration of power important. Of those surveyed, 99% of urban respondents and 98% of rural
respondents were not prepared to pay more for improved supply reliability.
Service levels 65
 Snow storm survey

We commissioned an independent research company in July 2006 to survey a random sample of over 400 rural
consumers. This survey focussed on consumer attitudes and opinions to our response to the severe snow storm
in June 2006. The survey captured both consumers that lost power (245 respondents) and those that did not lose
power (170 respondents) during the storm. Unsurprisingly, the overall level of satisfaction with reliability of rural
power supply fell slightly in this survey from what it had been in late 2005. Of the survey respondents, 76% were
satisfied with the reliability of their power supply compared to 85% in 2005.
 Rural consumer reaction to paying for greater reliability

In June 2007 we commissioned an independent research company to survey a random sample of 400 rural
residential consumers. The focus of this survey was to gauge if consumers were willing to pay more for
increased reliability. The increase in reliability would be gained by reducing outages, due to both momentary and
permanent faults, through introducing the Ground Fault Neutraliser (GFN) technology at substations where the
majority of the medium voltage network is still overhead. The survey indicated 68% of our residential rural
consumers would be willing to pay an extra $1 per month on their electricity bill for a “20% reduction in the
number of lengthy power cuts and, hopefully, the complete elimination of momentary one or two second
interruptions” (this was the expected performance gain from the installation of GFNs). Those consumers not
willing to pay the extra $1 were more likely to be older (60+), have smaller electricity bills (less than $150 per
month) and fewer lengthy power interruptions in the last six months (one or none) than those willing to pay. If the
cost of new technology was reduced to 50c extra per month on their electricity bill then an additional 6% of
residential rural consumers (a total of 74% of consumers) would be willing to pay for improved reliability.
 Post-earthquake pricing and reliability

In late 2012 we invited our consumers to complete an online survey about our proposed post-quake pricing and
reliability. The survey results showed good support for our proposal to the Commerce Commission to restore our
network to pre earthquake levels, spread the cost of doing so over time and recover costs from consumers. Some
submitters suggested that the costs should be met by a range of parties, such as our Council shareholders and
the Government.
Consumer engagement with retailers

On a daily basis, electricity retailers represent the consumers connected to our network, so we rely, in part, on
retailers to let us know how consumers feel about the price and quality of our network service. In late 2012 some
retailers provided direct feedback about our proposed post-quake pricing and reliability targets. Based on our
dealings with retailers, we are not aware of any systemic concerns with the level of reliability we propose to provide.
Consumer consultation over major projects

We consult with various parties ranging from local councils to business and residential groups about selected major
projects that we undertake. This consultation includes discussion about the benefits and costs of specific projects.
66 Service levels
3.3 Service level measures

This section details the measures used to monitor our performance as an asset management business.
All of our consultation methods show that, almost without exception, a reliable supply of power at a reasonable price is
our consumers’ greatest requirement of us. We measure our performance against this primary consumer
requirement in a number of ways.
Other service measures such as efficiency, safety, environmental and legislative compliance reflect a range of
performance measures that we monitor. Our performance in these areas often provides advance notice about where
Orion’s performance is heading prior to any change being noticed in our primary reliability targets.
For some of these other service measures we have not set a specific target value. In those cases we explain our
position as to why we believe doing so would be counter productive.
All our targets are set out in a table in section 3.4.
Our performance against the targets shown in this section are in section 8 - Evaluation of Performance.
3.3.1 Network reliability

Network reliability is measured by the quantity and duration of interruptions to the supply of electricity to our
consumers. Our goal is to ensure that our reliability performance meets our regulatory requirements and our
consumers’ expectations as ascertained by the means discussed in the previous section.
Both these measures consider both planned and unplanned interruptions of a duration longer than one minute on our
subtransmission and high voltage distribution system. Low voltage interruptions and those that originate in
Transpower’s transmission system are not included.
Planned interruptions to carry out work on our network accounted for approximately 34% of our SAIDI minutes and
14% of our SAIFI in FY10.
Our primary network reliability measures can be explained as follows:
 SAIDI, or system average interruption duration index, measures the average number of minutes per annum that a
consumer is without electricity.
 SAIFI, or system average interruption frequency index, measures the average number of times per annum that a
consumer is without electricity.
All of our consultation methods show that a reliable supply of power at a reasonable price is our consumers’ greatest
requirement of us.
Extreme environmental events can have a major impact on an electricity network’s reliability. When considering
reliability it is therefore more meaningful to look at the long term trend in an electricity network’s reliability, rather
than look at the figures for any one year. The trend of our network reliability measures (SAIDI, SAIFI and faults/100km
of circuit) since the early 1990s shows that our network reliability has improved.
Figure 3-3a Orion SAIDI – five year trend and 10 year target
SAIDI - Minutes lost per consumer

500
* FY11 Actual SAIDI = 3,815 (Earthquake) See Figure 8-2a
450
400
Minutes lost per consumer
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23
SAIDI Target
Service levels 67
Figure 3-3b Orion SAIFI – five year trend and 10 year target
SAIFI - Interruptions per consumer

4.0
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
SAIFI Target
However, it is not realistic to expect that we can continue to improve our network reliability every year as there comes a
point where the added costs outweigh the added benefits, particularly in a predominately overhead rural network. For
example, a major improvement in rural reliability would require a large capital investment and a correspondingly large
increase in line charges.
Consumers have indicated across our various consultation methods that they are generally satisfied with our present
level of network reliability and that they have concerns re prices increasing. In practical terms this means that we do
not believe our consumers wish to see increasing levels of reliability beyond current levels if it means higher prices.
Another network reliability target we use is ‘faults/100km’ of network. We set our target after reviewing international
reliability data. This measure is how each asset class has performed rather than the impact on our consumers. We
have decided not to set faults/100km targets until our post-earthquake network condition becomes clearer.
3.3.2 Network restoration

Consumer consultation has told us that if a power failure does occur, then rapid restoration of power is the most
important concern . Surveys show that 83% to 90% of consumers consider this important following a power failure.
Consequently our consumer focused measure is the percentage of unplanned interruptions restored within three hours.
Consumers across our various consultation methods say they are generally satisfied with our present level of service
and that they are concerned about increased electricity prices. In practical terms this means that we do not believe our
consumers wish to see increased levels of service beyond current levels if this would mean higher prices.
Figure 3-3c Unplanned interruptions - % restored in less than three hours
%
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
% unplanned interruptions restored in less than 3 hours
Target = more than 60%
68 Service levels
We have engaged an emergency contractor to manage our distribution asset spares and provide adequate response to
any event on our network. Reasonable response times to effect a repair have been established and enshrined in a
contract between us and our emergency contractor.
Our percentage of unplanned interruptions restored within three hours is based on providing a reasonable level of
service at a reasonable cost.
3.3.3 Network capacity

Orion has a security standard that was developed in consultation with external advisors and adopted in 1998. It is
based on the United Kingdom’s P2/6 which is the regulated standard for distribution supply security in the UK.
Security of supply is the ability of a network to meet the demand for electricity in certain circumstances when
electrical equipment fails. Note that security of supply differs from reliability. Reliability is a measure of how the
network performs and is measured in terms of things such as the number of times supply to consumers is
interrupted.
During 2007 we reviewed our security standard to ensure it takes into account consumer preferences for the quality
and price of service that we provide . As a result of our review and consumer consultation, our security standard has
been improved to better reflect the current needs of our consumers. Our revised security standard may result in
slightly lower reliability for our outer-urban consumers but will also reduce the need for future price rises.
These kinds of trade-offs between price and electricity supply reliability are a constant focus for us. Generally, the
more we spend, the more reliable our community’s electricity supply becomes. However, the trade-off is that the
more we spend the higher our prices become, as we need to recover our costs. We are committed to seeking our
consumers’ views on the price/quality trade-off and we want to ensure that our network investment decisions reflect
consumer preferences.
The demand group thresholds in our security of supply standard tend to err on the side of caution and generally
provide a level of security that is slightly above the requirements of the average consumer connection. Our analysis
has also shown that it is appropriate to provide a slightly higher level of network security for the Christchurch CBD.
This approach ensures that consumers who place a high value on security of supply are reasonably represented in
areas where a mix of consumer types exists.
Our security standard is detailed along with proposed improvement work in section 5 – Network development.
3.3.4 Power quality

Power quality is defined by a group of performance attributes of the electricity power supply. Two of the most
common and important power quality attributes that are mostly under our control are:
 the steady state level of voltage supplied to consumers
 the level of harmonics or distortion of voltage of the power supply.
The reason why these attributes are only ‘mostly’ under our control is because the power quality that is supplied to us
by Transpower (and to it by the generators) provides a baseline level of performance that we can only pass on to
consumers. We contract with Transpower to provide a suitable level of power quality performance at the GXPs.
We have undertaken a three year project to install power quality measurement equipment at selected sites
throughout our distribution network. The aim is to undertake a long term survey to determine the power quality
performance of our distribution network and how it changes over time. The measurement sites chosen represent the
average and worst performing parts of our network over a variety of consumer types.
Steady state voltage

The range of steady state voltage supplied to consumers is mandated by regulation, as 230 volts ± 6%. We design and
operate our network to meet this requirement. However, despite our efforts and usually due to unanticipated changes
in consumer loads, some consumers will experience voltages outside these limits for some period of time. When a
complaint is made, we will investigate. If the complaint is proven (i.e. the investigation shows that the non-complying
voltage or harmonic originated in our network) we will upgrade our network to rectify the problem.
The level at which we have set our target for steady state voltage non-compliance (proven) is a pragmatic consumer-
focused ratio of no more than one case per 2,500 consumers per year.
Service levels 69
Harmonics/distortion
The allowable level of harmonics or distortion of the power supply provided to consumers is also covered by
regulation. In most cases the consumers themselves have distorted their power supply, for example, by the use of
electronic equipment. We provide an initial investigation service to measure the levels of harmonics or distortion and
will determine whether other consumers are affected. If others are affected, we will require that the offending
consumer rectify the problem. If no other consumers are affected, we will suggest suitable consultants who can offer
a solution to the problems, but will leave the consumer to rectify at their cost.
We use harmonic allocation methods defined in joint International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)/Australian/New
Zealand standards to determine acceptable consumer levels of harmonic injection. These allow each consumer to
inject a certain acceptable amount of harmonic distortion depending on the strength of the power supply at their
premises.
The level at which we have set our target for proven harmonics/distortion complaints is no more than one per 50,000
consumers per year. This target is based on historical Orion data and international data.
3.3.5 Safety
Operating and maintaining an electrical network involves hazardous situations that cannot be eliminated entirely. We
are committed to consultation and co-operation between management and employees to provide a safe reliable
network and a healthy work environment – we take all practical steps to minimise the risk of harm to the public, our
contractors and staff. Maintaining a safe healthy work environment benefits everyone and is achieved through co-
operative effort.
Our objectives are to:
 provide safe plant and systems to ensure worker and public safety
 ensure compliance with legislative requirements and current industry standards
 provide safety information, instruction, training and supervision to employees and contractors
 provide support and assistance to employees
 set annual goals and objectives, and review the effectiveness of policies and procedures
 take all practicable steps to identify and then either eliminate, isolate or minimise hazards.
Further information on these objectives is available in our statement of intent and our performance against them is
detailed in our annual report.
Our target of zero accidents is the only prudent target we could have for this measure.
3.3.6 Customer service

Consumers consider it important to get a quick response from us following an interruption to their electricity supply,
and to get accurate information on when it will be restored. Of the 3% of urban consumers and 20% of rural
consumers who try to contact us following a power cut, around 75% state that it is important to get through quickly if
they call. In relation to the ability to call Orion, we operate a 24/7 contact centre from our head office.
We aim to answer calls promptly and typically 92% of calls to our contact centre are answered within 20 seconds, with
an average wait time of about 11 seconds. However, our focus in call management is not on call answering times, or
call duration, but rather providing information quickly, accurately and politely.
We are currently investigating alternative means to measure consumer satisfaction in this area of service. This may
include further surveys or call backs to consumers who have had recent contact with us. We hope that in the future
we will be able to develop a numerical target around satisfaction with our contact centre.
3.3.7 Environmental
We are committed to being environmentally responsible. This fits within our principal objective, which is to operate as
a successful business and be financially sustainable. We have established a number of environmental sustainability
policies that are published on our website. These policies are reviewed annually. Further information on each of
these policies is available in our statement of intent which is also on our website.
The environmental measures related to the operation of our network are:
 the amount of SF6 gas lost into the atmosphere (as a percentage of the total volume in use on our network)
 the number of oil spills that are not contained by our oil containment facilities or mitigation procedures.
70 Service levels
Our target for loss to the atmosphere of the insulating gas SF6 is based on a percentage of the total volume of the
gas in use on our network. The level is set by an undertaking we have signed with the Ministry of the Environment to
comply with the “Memorandum of Understanding relating to Management of Emissions of Sulphur Hexafluoride
(SF6) to the Atmosphere”. In addition to this we have a policy not to purchase equipment containing SF6 gas if a
technically and economically acceptable alternative exists.
In respect to oil spills, we operate oil containment facilities and have implemented oil spill mitigation procedures
and training. Our target of zero uncontained oil spills is the only prudent target we could have for this measure.
In FY08 we undertook a study, in conjunction with international consulting firm MWH, to map our key impact on the
environment and identify where we can improve our environmental performance. This ‘mapping’ exercise was very
wide ranging and went beyond the factors normally considered in carbon footprint exercises.
As a result of MWH’s report we identified the following activities to focus on (five have been accomplished and the
others are on-going; date completed shown in brackets):
 incorporate the cost of carbon into our network investment decisions (June 2009)
 assess the feasibility and desirability of becoming carbon neutral (September 2009)
 work with Community Energy Action to insulate at least 500 low income homes in Christchurch (March 2010)
 undertake a safety and efficiency driving course for all Orion and Connetics employees who regularly drive
operational vehicles (March 2011)
 consider the potential to replace operational vehicles with more fuel efficient models. Then work with other
contractors servicing the Orion network to encourage them to run their vehicle fleet as efficiently as possible
(March 2011)
 continue to undertake and encourage demand side management (on-going)
 reduce and where practical eliminate the installation of new network cables containing lead (on-going)
 continue our support for and sponsorship of CEA (on-going)
 support the Christchurch City Council’s sustainable energy strategy (on-going).
Other aspects of our operations that support our environmental commitment are that we:
 facilitate the easy connection of renewable low-carbon generation (for example wind power) to our network
 signal load peaks in our network pricing to encourage the efficient use of our network
 maintain and operate an efficient water cylinder load control system so that significant loads can be shifted away
from peak times to less expensive off peak times – at minimal inconvenience to customers
 are looking at possible wind generation sites in our network area.
3.3.8 Efficiency
Economic efficiency
Economic efficiency reflects the level of asset investment required to provide network services to consumers, and
the operational costs associated with operating, maintaining and managing the assets.
We have adopted the following measures of economic efficiency:
 capital expenditure per annum per MWh of electricity supplied to consumers
 operating expenditure per annum per MWh of electricity supplied to consumers
 operating expenditure per annum per year end number of ICPs (connection points).
Our target is to perform better than the New Zealand industry average.
Capacity utilisation ratio

This ratio measures the utilisation of transformers installed on our network. It is calculated as the maximum
demand experienced on the network divided by the distribution transformer capacity on the network.
Our management process aims to ensure maximum economic efficiency by ensuring good design and lifecycle
management practices. If we specifically target levels of capacity utilisation, there could be an incentive to design
inefficiently, for example to install long lengths of low voltage distribution or uneconomically replace transformers
early in their lifecycle due to shifts in area load profiles.
Although we monitor this ratio, we do not have a specific target.
Service levels 71
Load factor
The measure of annual load factor is calculated as the average load that passes through a network divided by the
maximum load experienced in a given year.
We always seek to optimise load factor as this indicates better utilisation of capacity in the network.
Although we do not have a specific target, our load factor forecasts are shown in section 5.4.1.
Energy loss
All electricity networks have energy losses caused mainly by heating of lines, cables and transformers. Electrical
losses are natural phenomena that cannot be avoided completely and consequently retailers have to purchase more
energy than is delivered to their consumers.
Electrical losses are the difference between energy volumes entering our network (mainly at Transpower GXPs) and
the energy volumes leaving our network at consumer connections. We estimate that these losses are around 5%
with a margin of error of +/- 1 percentage point. Significant deviations from this value exist in some parts of our
network, for example, when we compare urban areas against rural areas.
When considering losses in network design and asset purchase, we do not aim for a target percentage of loss.
Instead the lifetime annual cost of losses is converted to a net present capital value which can be added to the
capital value of the asset concerned. We implement the least cost overall (asset cost + capitalised loss cost)
solution. This approach provides the optimal economic level of losses.
See section 8.3.4 for a more detailed evaluation of our approach to network losses.
72 Service levels
3.4 Service level targets

This section describes our targets set inline with Orion’s asset management strategy for all the measures discussed
in the previous section 3.3.
It is expected to be some time before the performance of our network achieves pre-earthquake reliability. This is due
to the damage to the network and the increased infrastructure activity expected in Christchurch for the foreseeable
future. Accordingly, we have set network reliability targets which better reflect what we can realistically achieve.
Our targets for the current year and future years are shown in the following tables.
3.4.1 Targets for current year
Table 3-4a Service descriptions, targets and measures for (FY15)
Service class Service measure FY15 target Performance measure Measurement procedure
Network SAIDI - System average < 133 Orion network– average minutes lost per Tracking of all interruptions to our
interruption duration index consumer per annum for all interruptions network (process audited annually).
reliability (planned and unplanned). Orion network All 400V faults and HV faults <1min
only. in duration are excluded.
No DPP limits applied.
SAIFI - System average < 1.8 Orion network- average number of times a
interruption frequency index consumer’s supply is interrupted per annum
for all interruptions (planned and
unplanned). Orion network only,
No DPP limits applied.
Network Unplanned interruptions restored > 60% % of total number of unplanned interruptions
within 3 hours where the last consumer is restored in three
restoration hours or less. Orion network only,
Network Delivering reasonable levels of To meet our Any gaps identified against our security Reviewed in section 5.5
network security security standard
capacity
standard
Power Steady state level of voltage < 70 Voltage complaints (proven) Tracking of all enquiries
quality
Level of harmonics or distortion <4 Harmonics (wave form) complaints (proven) Checks performed using an
harmonic analyser
Safety Safety of employees and Zero Number of lost time accidents Accident/incident reports
contractors
Safety of public Zero Number of accidents involving members of Accident/incident reports

the public (excluding car v pole accidents)
Environment SF6 gas lost < 1% loss Gas lost expressed as a % of the total Set out in Orion Procedure
contained in our network equipment NW70.10.01
Oil spilt Zero spills Oil spills not contained Set out in Orion Procedure
NW70.10.02
Economic Capex per annum per MWh of Perform better Capital expenditure on Orion’s network per Derived from disclosed statistical
electricity supplied than NZ average MWh of electricity delivered over our data
efficiency network from Transpower GXPs to
consumers
Opex per annum per MWh of Perform better Operating expenditure on Orion’s network
electricity supplied than NZ average per MWh of electricity delivered over our
network from Transpower GXPs to
consumers
Opex per annum per year-end Perform better Operating expenditure per annum on Orion’s
number of ICPs than NZ average network per year-end ICPs. (ICPs more or
less equate to consumers on Orion’s
network)
Capacity utilisation ratio No target set– Maximum demand on network divided by

see section 3.3.8 distribution transformer capacity
Load factor No target set– Average load on network divided by the

see section 3.3.8 maximum load experienced in a given year
Losses No target set– The % of energy lost between the points of

see section 3.3.8 injection (mainly Transpower GXPs) and the
point of off-take (consumer connections).
Service levels 73
3.4.2 Targets for future years
Table 3-4b Service descriptions, targets and measures for future years
Service class Service measure FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24
SAIDI- System average interruption duration index 121 117 105 94 86 76 70 63 63

Network
reliability SAIFI- System average interruption frequency index 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.8
Faults per 100km of HV circuit n/a < 11
Faults per 100km of 66kV circuit n/a <2
Faults per 100km of 33kV circuit n/a <4
Faults per 100km of 11kV circuit n/a < 12
Network Unplanned interruptions restored within three hours >60%

restoration
Capacity Delivering reasonable levels of network security To meet our security standard
Power quality Steady state level of voltage < 70
Level of harmonics or distortion <4
Safety Safety of employees and contractors Zero
Safety of public Zero
Customer
Prompt response to enquiries
service
Environment SF6 gas lost <1% loss
Oil spilt Zero spills
Economic Capex per annum per MWh of electricity supplied Perform better than NZ average
efficiency
Opex per annum per MWh of electricity supplied Perform better than NZ average
Opex per annum per year-end number of ICPs Perform better than NZ average
Capacity utilisation ratio No target set–see 3.3.8
Load factor No target set– see 3.3.8
Losses No target set– see 3.3.8
74 Service levels
75
Lifecycle asset management 4

4.1 Network overview 77
4.2 Network justification 83
4.3 Asset management approach 85
4.4 Substations 87
4.5 Overhead lines – 66kV 92
4.8 Overhead lines – 400V 104
4.9 Underground cables – 66kV 107
4.12 Underground cables – 400V 119
4.13 Communication cables 122
4.14 Circuit breakers – high voltage 124
4.15 Switchgear – high and low voltage 131
4.16 Power transformers and regulators 137
4.17 Distribution transformers 141
4.18 Generators 144
4.19 Protection systems 146
4.20 Communications 149
4.21 Load management systems 153
4.22 Distribution management systems 157
4.23 Information systems - corporate 160
4.24 Information systems - asset management 163
4.25 Metering 166
4.26 Network property 168
4.27 Corporate property 172
4.28 Vehicles 175
76 Lifecycle asset management

4-1a 66,33kV and 11kV subtransmission – Urban area 78 4-1a Orion’s electricity network asset quantities 77
4-1b 66kV and 33kV subtransmission network – Rural area 79 4-4a Zone substation equipment schedule 89
4-1c Network voltage level/asset relationships 80 4-4b Distribution substation types 91
4-3a Condition score conversion - CBRM to ComCom 12a 86 4-5a 66kV tower line circuits 92
4-5a 66kV Subtransmission – Urban area 93 4-6a Standard 33kV conductors 97
4-5b 66kV Subtransmission – Rural area 93 4-7a Standard 11kV conductors 100
4-5c 66kV Overhead lines – asset failures/100km 94 4-8a Standard 400V conductors 104
4-5d 66kV Overhead poles and towers – age profile 94 4-9a 66kV cable circuits 108
4-6a 33kV Subtransmission network 97 4-10a 33kV cable circuit listing 113
4-6b 33kV Overhead lines – asset failures/100km 98 4-11a 11kV feeder cable circuit listing 116
4-6c 33kV Overhead line poles - age profile 98 4-14a Circuit breaker quantities 125
4-7a 11kV Overhead lines – asset failures/100km 100 4-14b Circuit breaker ratings 126
4-7b 11kV Overhead line poles – age profile 101 4-14c Line circuit breaker ratings 126
4-8a 400V Overhead line poles – age profile 105 4-14d Circuit breaker average age (years) 126
4-9a 66kV Subtransmission – Christchurch urban area 107 4-14e Switchgear inspection and maintenance schedule 128
4-9b 66kV Underground cables – asset failures/100km 109 4-15a Switchgear quantities 132
4-9c 66kV Underground cables – age profile 109 4-16a Power transformer quantities 137
4-10a 33kV Subtransmission – Christchurch urban area 111 4-16b Regulator quantities 137
4-10b 33kV Underground cables – asset failures/100km 112 4-17a Distribution transformer quantities 141
4-10c 33kV Subtransmission – Lincoln and Springston area 112 4-18a Generator listing 144
4-10d 33kV Underground cables – age profile 113 4-19a Relay types in Orion’s network 146
4-11a 11kV Underground cables – asset failures/100km 115 4-26a Distribution kiosk quantities 168
4-11b 11kV Underground cables – age profile 117 4-28a Vehicle quantities 175
4-12a 400V Underground cables – age profile 120
4-13a Communication cables – age profile 122
4-14a Circuit breakers - health index profile 127
4-14b Circuit breakers 33 and 66kV - age profile 127
4-14c Circuit breakers 11kV - age profile 127
4-15a Switchgear 11kV - health index profile 134
4-15b Ringmain units 11kV - age profile 134
4-15c Line ABI 11kV and 33kV - age profile 134
4-16a Power transformers - age profile 138
4-17a Distribution transformers - age profile 142
4-19a Protection systems - health index profile 147
4-19b Protection systems - age profile 147
4-20a Radio communication network repeater sites 149
4-21a Ripple injection system control diagram 153
4-22a SCADA remote terminal units (RTU) - age profile 158
4-26a Substation buildings (owned by Orion) - age profile 170
4-26b Kiosks - age profile 171
Lifecycle asset management – Asset description 77
4.1 Network overview

4.1.1 Asset description
We own and operate the electricity distribution network in central Canterbury. Our network covers 8,000 square
kilometres across central Canterbury between the Waimakariri and Rakaia rivers and from the Canterbury coast to
Arthur’s Pass. Consumer densities range from five consumers per km in rural areas to 26 in urban areas.
Approximately 88% of our consumers are located in the urban area of Christchurch with 12% in the rural area.
Urban
Our urban network consists of both a 66kV and a 33kV subtransmission system. Our urban 66kV system supplies 16
zone substations in and around Christchurch city and is supplied from Transpower 66kV GXPs at Addington, Bromley,
Islington and Middleton. Our urban 33kV system supplies another six zone substations in the western part of
Christchurch and is supplied from Transpower’s Islington 33kV GXP. Both systems consist of overhead line and
cable in the quantities shown in the table. A further six zone substations in the urban area take supply from
Transpower 11kV GXPs and one (Ilam) is supplied from two dedicated 66/11kV transformers at our Hawthornden
zone substation. Another two (Grimseys Winters and Bishopdale) are now fed from our Papanui zone substation.
The urban zone substations supply a network of ‘primary’ 11kV cables connected to 225 network substations. These
network substations in turn supply some 4,000 distribution substations on a secondary 11kV cable network. The low
voltage (400V) system to which most of our consumers are connected is supplied from these distribution substations.
The reasons for the structure of our network are further discussed in section 4.2.
Rural
Our rural network also consists of both a 66kV and a 33kV subtransmission system that supplies 21 zone substations
from the Transpower Hororata, Springston and Kimberley GXPs. The rural distribution system primarily consists of
11kV overhead radial feeders from our rural zone substations and three small Transpower GXPs at Coleridge, Castle
Hill and Arthur’s Pass.
Table 4-1a Orion’s electricity network asset quantities
Category Description 31 March 2013 31 March 2012

Total network Lines and cables (km) 14,983 14,904
Zone substations 52 52
Distribution substations 10,747 10,744
Overhead lines (km) 66kV 191 155

33kV 306 303
11kV 3,221 3,237
400V 2,077 2,109
Street lighting 935 940
Underground cables (km) 66kV 49 49
33kV 34 33
11kV 2,366 2,417
400V 2,661 2,589
Street lighting 2,079 1,996
Communication 1,063 1,076
Total cables 8,252 8,160
Zone substations 66kV 21 21

33kV 22 22
11kV 9 9
Building (network) 225 239
Distribution substations
Building (distribution) 253 268
Ground mounted 4,215 4,100
Pole mounted 6,279 6,271
Embedded generation Greater than1MW 10 Consumer-owned sites 10 Consumer-owned sites
Major business consumers Loads between 0.3 MW and 11MW 325 320
78
Substation key Circuit key

Transpower overhead line
66kV underground cable
Transpower GXP
Orion 66kV zone substation 11kV underground cable
66kV overhead line
SECTION 4
Orion 33kV zone substation
33kV overhead line
Orion 11kV zone substation
2 Number of circuits, if more than 1
(work in progress)
66kV overhead line (temporary)
GRIMSEYS-WINTERS
BISHOPDALE 2
3
HAREWOOD 2
2
PAPANUI 2
3
2 RAWHITI
c
3 M FADDENS
HAWTHORNDEN DALLINGTON
3
2
2 ILAM
KNOX
FENDALTON PAGES KEARNEYS
2
2
ARMAGH
3
4 2
3
2
OXFORD-TUAM BROMLEY
ISLINGTON
2
To Weedons ZS 2
2
2 ADDINGTON
MOFFETT 2
2
3
2
FOSTER MONTREAL
SOCKBURN 2
2
LANCASTER
3
HORNBY MIDDLETON PORTMAN
2
3
2
MILTON
SHANDS
2
Lifecycle asset management – Asset description
2 SPREYDON
Figure 4-1a 66kV, 33kV and 11kV subtransmission network – Christchurch urban area
BARNETT PARK
HEATHCOTE
2
2
HOON HAY
2
2
HALSWELL
2
PREBBLETON
To Springston /
Rolleston ZS
2
To Springston ZS To Lincoln ZS
Transpower 66kV overhead line
ANNAT Transpower GXP
66kV overhead line
Orion 66/33/11kV zone substn 33kV overhead line
Orion 66/11kV zone substation 2 Number of circuits, if more than 1
Orion 33/11kV zone substation
KIMBERLEY
DARFIELD
HORORATA HIGHFIELD WEEDONS
2
LARCOMB
GREENDALE PREBBLET ON
2
ROLLESTON
TE PIRITA
LINCOLN DIAMOND HARBOUR
SPRINGSTON
BANKSIDE
TEDDINGTON
BROOKSIDE
DUNSANDEL
KILLINCHY
MOTUKARARA
DUVAUCHELLE
Lifecycle asset management – Asset description
LITTLE RIVER
HILLS
Figure 4-1b 66kV and 33kV subtransmission network – Orion’s Canterbury rural network area
79
80 Lifecycle asset management – Asset description
Figure 4-1c Network voltage level/asset relationships
National grid
Transpower GXPs 66kV 66kV 33kV 33kV 11kV

See figure 5-2
Subtransmission
Switching
station
R
Primary
switchgear
Orion zone 11kV
66 66 33 33
substations 11 11 11 11
See section 4.4.1
Secondary
switchgear
11kV distribution
Orion network
substations
See section 4.4.2
11kV
consumer
Factory
Orion
distribution 11 11
substations .4 .4
Low voltage (400V)
See section 4.4.3
Distribution
cabinet
400V cable 400V cable
Consumers
KEY
Circuit breakers (see section 4.14)
400V fuse switches (see section 4.15)
33 11 Major power transformer to 11kV (see section 4.16)
11 .4 Distribution transformer to 400V (see section 4.17)
R Ripple injection plant (see section 4.21)
Lifecycle asset management – Asset description 81
4.1.2 Canterbury earthquakes

While the earthquakes and large aftershocks of 2011/12 caused extensive damage throughout the region, our prior
investment in a programme to increase the resiliency of our infrastructure was a major factor in limiting the amount
of damage to our network. As the rebuild of the region gets underway we will continue to use these principles and
lessons learnt to bring the network back to pre-earthquake levels of resilience and reliability.
Our key priorities are:
 work with the community to meet their needs as they rebuild
 integrate and react to the changing requirements of the network
 restore the resilience and reliability of our network by around 2019.
The on-going impact on our asset management practices is discussed in the individual asset sections. Specifically,
these assets are cables and substation buildings detailed in sections 4.9 to 4.12 and 4.24.
4.1.3 Large consumers

The Canterbury area and business sectors are largely service and/or agricultural based. This is reflected in the mix
of approximately 325 major business customers connected to our network with loads ranging from 0.3MW to 11MW.
The largest single load in this category is less than 2% of our total maximum demand.
Currently we have 17 consumers that have an anytime maximum demand of greater than 2MVA. These consumers
are represented in the following activities:
 food processing 6
 industrial 3
 hospital 2
 university 2
 airport/seaport 2
 shopping mall 2
Each of these major consumers is charged on a ‘major customer connection’ delivery charge basis. We individually
discuss their security and reliability of supply requirements in relation to our normal network performance levels at
the time of connection or upgrade. Generally our operating regimes and asset management practices do not
specifically provide enhanced levels of service for these consumers.
We run six monthly seminars to update our major consumers and provide them with a forum for open discussion.
Typically we discuss asset management priorities, enhancement projects and current industry issues. We explain
and promote pricing options (demand side management, power quality etc.).
If major consumers require enhanced network performance, we work with them to achieve their requirements by
either enhanced connection or on-site generation options. Our delivery pricing allows charges for dedicated
equipment for enhanced supply to be made, or incentives to run embedded generation if it benefits our network.
Many major customers run generators in response to our pricing signals and we have specific arrangements to run
generators at approximately 40 connections at other times when it is beneficial for our delivery service (see section
5.3.5 for details of our DSM initiatives). Connected generation at consumer sites can vary from just a few kilowatts to
as much as 2.5MW. We have 20 connections with more than 1MVA installed capacity.
Although there are issues to be co-ordinated when sites with generation are established, there is minimal impact on
the operation and asset management of the local area networks. Most of these sites have installed generators for
security reasons and running of the generators generally only reduces or off-sets their established load
requirements. A small number of sites have the ability to export surplus energy into the network with metering and
protection systems appropriately installed. The largest net energy export into the Orion network is 1.2MW .
As part of obligations under the Civil Defence and Emergency Management Act we have on-going discussions with
life-line services such as the hospitals, seaport and airport to ensure appropriate levels of service are provided for in
our future planning.
Two rural milk processing plants have a significant impact on our network operations or asset management
priorities. The Synlait plant located at Dunsandel was commissioned during 2008. Its load including the predicted
expansion was significant in the context of our rural network design in that area. The installation required a new
zone substation at Dunsandel providing enhanced security. Similarly, the Fonterra plant commissioned during 2012
also required a new zone substation (Kimberley) to provide enhanced security. This has required us to revisit
82 Lifecycle asset management – Asset description
proposed current and future rural network design in Darfield and the surrounding area. Both connections are part
of a ‘large capacity connection’ category to accurately reflect the cost of supply to this type of connection. The on-
going delivery charges reflect an appropriate return on the assets needed to supply electricity to these consumers.
Agricultural irrigators are one consumer group that significantly impacts on the operation and asset management
of our network in the rural area. Irrigation growth over the last 15-20 years has required substantial reinforcement
of our network. In discussions with this consumer group, we were able to determine that as a group they could
endure a slightly reduced level of security of supply. To reduce our investment in the rural network, we were able
to offer an appropriate pricing scheme for irrigation connections that allows us to control their irrigation use during
network emergencies. For further details refer to section 5.3.5
Irrigation connections are also impacting on our rural network power quality. We have observed excessive
harmonic levels generated by non-linear control devices (variable speed drives) associated with the irrigation
pumps. This has lead to us undertake a power quality monitoring project (refer section 8.8.4) and also introduce
new requirements for limiting harmonics generated from new connections.
Lifecycle asset management – Network justification 83
4.2 Network justification

4.2.1 Introduction
Our electricity network serves high-density urban areas, medium density rural countryside and remote rural
locations. Approximately 88% of our consumers are located in the urban area of Christchurch with the remaining
12% in the rural portion of our network.
The first electricity consumer in Christchurch was connected in 1903. In 1912 11kV was adopted as the primary
distribution voltage. Construction of the Coleridge power station around 1918 significantly shaped the initial
network, with the introduction of low cost hydropower and a 66kV transmission system that is still in service today.
In the early 1920s, development in rural areas was based on overhead power lines serving rural communities in very
diverse geographical locations such as Banks Peninsula, the Canterbury plains and the high country of Canterbury.
4.2.2 Urban system design

The first electricity distribution systems in Christchurch were a mix of underground cable and overhead lines
originating from the Government’s Addington substation. Additional 11kV grid connection points evolved at Bromley
and Papanui, providing quite large capacity at high fault levels. A comprehensive underground cable network based
on electrical districts then grew from these three main grid connection points.
This network served the city until the rapid development period of the 1960s, when demand grew by 7% per year.
66/11kV zone substations were then built to meet the increased demand. Those substations are the backbone of the
present urban system.
The original 11kV distribution system, supplied by a small number of large grid connection points, led to the design
philosophy of a primary 11kV cable network, capable of handling relatively large amounts of power (at high fault
levels) over long distances around the city. Local 11kV distribution circuits of smaller size cables were laid to supply
substations that convert the voltage to 230/400 volts for consumer use. 66/11kV transformers were then introduced
to allow even greater power density to be serviced, while fault levels could be controlled through suitable choice of
transformer impedance. This evolutionary process has resulted in a network of primary ‘closed’ rings of 11kV
distribution cables which connect network substations to major zone substations. From each network substation,
radial 11kV cables provide an interconnected 11kV secondary distribution network which services ground-mounted
distribution kiosk substations around the city.
This is a very secure system – most network substations have at least two sources of supply. Each section of the
primary network is individually protected using a ‘unit protection’ system that automatically isolates a faulty section
of cable by simultaneously operating circuit breakers at both ends.
Network substations are strategically located at load centres, with typically 7MVA maximum loading, and at larger
point loads, such as major customer connections. They usually contain four or more 11kV indoor circuit breakers,
and may also include a local distribution (400 volt) substation. Therefore, faulty 11kV cables usually only cause
interruptions to distribution substations connected to the secondary network, and so are limited to about seven times
300kVA of load, supplying approximately 400 consumer connections.
The interconnected nature of the secondary network means that supply can be switched, allowing restoration of
power to most consumers within a relatively short time. Interconnection at the low voltage (400V) network level is
also generally available, and enables us to restore power supply quickly when local distribution substations
(transformers or switchgear) are damaged by faults. This high degree of network interconnection allows us to carry
out routine maintenance and repair faults with minimal disruption to consumer supply – it contributes significantly to
our overall system reliability performance.
Our urban system, although based on 66/11kV zone substations, does not have an extensive conventional high
voltage subtransmission system, as is found in other New Zealand cities (for example, 110 and 33kV in Auckland and
33kV in Wellington and Dunedin). Instead, relatively short, duplicated 66kV oil-filled feeder cables directly connect to
transformers without switching facilities. However, as described above, the primary 11kV network has a high degree
of interconnection.
During the 1990s and subsequent decade we saw continued load growth and New Zealand/worldwide system
blackout events. We reviewed our network risks and introduced security standards. This resulted in changes to our
network design philosophies which meant increased investment in interconnected 66kV sub-transmission, zone
substation capacity and increased distribution cable capacity (size of cables). We also saw a reduced need to invest
in 11kV sub-transmission and associated network substations.
84 Lifecycle asset management – Network justification
Also during the last decade we have seen reliability, load management (DSM) and embedded generation requiring us
to operate our distribution network smarter and more intelligently (prior to the term SMART GRID being coined).
This has required us to ensure that new equipment introduced to our network allows us to, and will continue to
allow us to, implement more sophisticated remote operated and automated systems.
4.2.3 Rural system design

The earliest rural electricity distribution networks in Orion’s area were based on 3.3kV and 6.6kV systems supplied
from connection points off the Coleridge transmission lines, mainly at Hororata and Addington. These systems were
simple radial lines, and were up-rated to 11kV over time to service increasing demand.
Load growth required the introduction of 33kV subtransmission in the mid 1960s. The 33kV was used to supply an
increasing number of ‘zone’ substations, usually consisting of a 7.5MVA transformer with 11kV radial feeders
interconnected to adjacent substations. Subtransmission of 33kV was always needed to get power to Duvauchelle in
Banks Peninsula, because of the long distance from the GXP at Motukarara.
This 33kV subtransmission/11kV distribution system was eventually extended over most of the rural area, and into
the western fringes of Christchurch city, including the international airport.
The ‘urban’ part of this otherwise largely rural network evolved into a high load density area, with strong growth and
higher reliability requirements. Therefore, the system is now 20MVA firm capacity with two transformers per
substation design, 11kV distribution feeders and a paralleled 33kV cable/line subtransmission network.
Overhead radial 11kV feeders have gradually been replaced with underground 11kV cables on this urban 33/11kV
network. A small number of larger ‘closed’ rings have been introduced in areas of high load concentration to
provide improved reliability for major industrial consumers.
In recent years, very high growth in irrigation loads has meant the rural 33kV subtransmission system has
approached its design capacity, especially at Hororata and Springston GXPs. We decided the most economical
reinforcement method was to build additional 66/11kV zone substations equipped with 7.5/10MVA transformers
within the existing 11kV distribution network, while retaining (and converting to 66kV over time) the existing 33/11kV
zone substations and 33kV lines. This methodology retains our existing network investment while shortening 11kV
feeder lengths, resulting in improved system reliability.
As growth continues in the rural townships, and specific larger consumers are connected, single transformer
substations become unsuitable to meet future demand. Our rural network design now incorporates dual
transformer substations with firm capacity of 10MVA (Lincoln and Rolleston) with new substations around Rolleston
and its developing industrial park, supported by dual transformer substations with a firm capacity of 23MVA, similar
to our western urban network.
Lifecycle asset management – Format of asset sections 85
4.3 Asset management approach

4.3.1 Asset management process
We undertake lifecycle management and asset maintenance planning using whole of life cost analysis, reliability
centred maintenance (RCM), condition based maintenance and risk management techniques. These techniques are
used to improve our performance to enable us to meet out network reliability limits.
Generally assets are not replaced on age alone, but are kept in service until their continued maintenance is
uneconomic or until they pose a safety, environmental or reliability risk. Reliability performance is measured and
used to identify areas where further maintenance is needed to improve our delivery service or where maintenance
may be reduced without affecting service levels.
We develop our maintenance and replacement programmes in-house and use a competitive tender process to
contract out all works.
4.3.2 Management planning

Our asset management planning process involves the creation of:
 Maintenance Plan
We maintain our network assets to ensure:
i. the safety of the public, contractors and our staff is maintained
ii. a reliable, cost effective electricity for our consumers
iii. we prevent premature deterioration or failure of the network.
We have specific maintenance programmes for each of our asset classed however all works roughly fall into
the following categories:
i. Scheduled Maintenance – work carried out to a predetermined schedule and allocated budget
ii. Non-scheduled Maintenance – work that must be performed outside the predetermined schedule, but
does not constitute emergency work
iii. Emergency Maintenance – work that must be carried out on a portion of the network that requires
immediate repair.
 Replacement Plan
Traditionally asset replacement programmes were based on the age of assets. We identified very early on that
this was not the most effective approach and have been using other factors such as condition and risk to safety,
reliability and performance to help develop our replacement programmes. We have adopted a condition based
risk management (CBRM) approach for the replacement of our network assets. This framework utilises asset
information, engineering knowledge and experience to define, justify and target asset replacements.
4.3.3 Format of asset sections

The following sections (4.5 to 4.28) describe Orion’s existing assets by category. All references to years such as
FY10, are to be taken as the financial year ending that year i.e. 31 March 2010. For each category the asset and its
management approach are discussed under the following headings:
Asset description
A brief description giving an idea of the type, function and location of each asset group.
Asset capacity/performance
Design capacity and utilisation with any constraints, failure modes and deterioration specific to this asset.
Note: The definition of asset failure as shown in the graph of failures per 100km for an asset is any interruption to
supply caused by a plant failure. This excludes being damaged by a third party or environmental event.
86 Lifecycle asset management – Format of asset sections
Asset condition
A summary of the asset’s current condition including an age profile and health index profile.
The health index scoring is different to that set out in Schedule 12a of the information disclosure requirements.
The table below shows the method used to convert our CBRM scores to those required in Schedule 12a.
Figure 4-3a Condition score conversion table - CBRM to Commerce Commission schedule 12a
Probability
Health Schedule 12a
Condition HI Range Remnant Life of Definition
Index Terms
Failure
Unknown Grade unknown Condition unknown or not yet assessed
10
10 + End of serviceable life, immediate intervention
Bad At EOL (< 5yrs) High Grade 1
(9 - 10) required
Material deterioration but asset condition still

(8 - 9)
Poor 5 - 10 yrs Medium Grade 2 within serviceable life parameters. Intervention
(7 - 8)
likely to be required within 12 months.
(6 - 7)
Deterioration requires assessment and ongoing
Fair 10 - 20 yrs Low (5 - 6) Grade 3
monitoring
(4 - 5)
(3 - 4)
(2 - 3)
Good 20yrs + Very Low Grade 4 Good or as new condition
(1 - 2)
0 (0 - 1)
Design standards and asset data

A list of design standards and technical specifications pertaining to the asset. These may be industry standards or
our own standards.
Also discusses asset data completeness, improvement sources and the system where the data is held (see section
2 for systems used at Orion).
Maintenance plan
The ongoing day to day work plans required to keep the asset serviceable and prevent premature deterioration or
failure.
Replacement plan
These are major work plans that do not increase the asset’s design capacity but restore, replace or renew an
existing asset to its original capacity.
Creation/acquisition plan
This is capital work that creates a new asset or improves an existing asset beyond its existing capacity.
Disposal plan
This is any of the activities associated with disposal of a decommissioned asset.
Lifecycle asset management – Substations 87
4.4 Substations
A ‘substation’ encompasses buildings, switchgear, transformers, protection and control equipment used for the
transformation and distribution of electricity. Our network structure has three identified levels of substations – zone,
network and distribution (see figure 4-1c). The lifecycle asset management plans for assets making up a substation
are discussed in the relevant parts of section 4. A substation is not described as an asset in its own right.
4.4.1 Zone substations

A zone substation is a building substation usually with a high voltage structure that has been identified as a zone
substation because of its importance in our network. Orion has 52 zone substations and, in general, they include a
site where one of the following takes place: voltage transformation of 66 or 33kV to 11kV, two or more incoming 11kV
feeders from a Transpower GXP are redistributed or a ripple injection plant is installed. Zone substations are
inspected every two months and given an infra-red scan every two years.
66/11kV zone substations

We have 23 66/11kV zone substations. Fifteen of them are in the Christchurch urban area. Twelve of the urban
substations have an exposed bus structure. The largest structures are at Bromley, Heathcote and Papanui. The
Armagh, Dallington and McFaddens structures are inside a building.
Construction dates for the urban structures are:
 Heathcote 1968  Armagh 2001  Dallington 2013

 Papanui 1968  Hawthornden 2004  Bromley
 Halswell 1974  Middleton 2008
 Barnett Park 1981  Rawhiti 2011
 Lancaster 2000  McFaddens 2012
Most of the urban zone substations are supplied by two cables connected to a pair of 66/11kV transformers. Each
cable and associated transformer has an emergency rating equivalent to the full load of the zone substation
(traditionally 40 MVA) and can maintain supply should the other cable or transformer fail. The rating of the
transformer and cable are currently limited by the thermal capacity of the 66kV cables. The transformers supply
11kV switchgear housed in two, three or four fire and explosion resistant rooms. This switchgear may supply up to 20
feeder cables and can be sectioned using bus-couplers between the rooms.
The eight rural 66/11kV zone substations at Brookside, Dunsandel, Killinchy, Larcomb, Kimberley, Greendale, Te
Pirita and Weedons are supplied by overhead lines and have 7.5/10 or 11.5/23MVA transformers. All have outdoor
structures. The indoor 11kV switchgear may supply up to five feeder cables.
Four other substations at Annat, Bankside, Little River and Highfield have 66kV structures but are currently
operating at 33kV. See section 5.6.7 for details of the projects to convert them to operate at 66kV.
Armagh zone substation, with its

neon ‘Nebula Orion’ artwork,
contains an ‘outdoor’ 66kV structure.
88 Lifecycle asset management – Substations
33/11kV zone substations

Orion has 20 33/11kV zone substations, mainly in the Canterbury rural area and on the western fringe of Christchurch
city. Most have some form of outdoor structure and bus-work. We are replacing outdoor 33kV switchgear with an
indoor type, negating the need for outdoor structures. Capacity of these substations is split into three groups as
follows:
1. Larger urban substations have two independent dual rated transformers. These have separate supplies, with
each transformer and supply rated to carry the full substation load. The 11kV switchgear may supply up to 11
feeder cables and is housed in two or more switch-rooms linked by a bus-coupler.
2. Smaller urban and larger rural substations have a pair of single rated transformers of 7.5MVA.
3. Smaller rural substations have one single rated transformer of 7.5 or 2.5MVA. Single transformer zone
substations (largely in rural areas) rely on back-up capacity from adjacent single transformer substations to
provide firm capacity.
11kV zone substations

We have nine of these substations, all in the Christchurch city urban area. They are directly supplied by either three
or four radial 11kV cables and do not have supply transformers. The cables have usually been laid along the same
route and have sufficient capacity to supply the full zone substation load. The 11kV switchgear may supply up to 12
feeder cables and is housed in either two or three switch-rooms linked by bus-couplers.
None of the 11kV zone substations have any form of outdoor structure or bus-work.
Larcomb 66kV rural zone

substation commissioned
April 2009.
Table 4-4a Zone substation equipment schedule
Circuit breakers Power transformers

Zone substations
66kV 33kV 11kV 66/33kV 66/11kV 33/11kV Rating (MVA)1
2
Annat 1 4 1 2.5
Armagh 5 33 2 20/40
Bankside 12 5 1 7.5/10
Barnett Park 12 1 11.5/23
Bishopdale 18
Bromley 11 24 3 30/37
Brookside 3 10 1 7.5/10
Dallington 3 26 2 20/40
Darfield 1 6 1 7.5
Diamond Harbour 3 4 1 7.5
Dunsandel 4 10 2 7.5/10
Duvauchelle 5 9 2 7.5
Fendalton 20 2 20/40
Foster 20
Greendale 1 6 1 7.5/10
Grimseys Winters 18
Halswell 8 11 2 11.5/23
Harewood 2 9 2 7.5
Hawthornden 28 4 20/40 x2 and 11.5/23 x2
Heathcote 8 26 2 20/40
Highfield 12 6 1 7.5
Hills Rd 1 5 1 7.5
Hoon Hay 26 2 20/40
Hornby 10 11 2 10/20
Hororata 3 5 1 7.5
Ilam 13
Killinchy 3 6 1 7.5/10
Kimberley 3 11 2 11.5/23
Knox 21
Lancaster 3 24 2 20/40
Larcomb 3 9 2 11.5/23
Lincoln 3 9 2 7.5
Little River 2 3 1 2.5
McFaddens 5 24 2 20/40
Middleton 2 19 2 20/40
Milton 23 2 20/40
Moffett St 3 14 2 11.5/23
Montreal 18
Motukarara 6 6 2 2.5 and 7.5
NOTES:
Oxford-Tuam 24 2 20/40  Dual rated transformers
Pages Kearneys 16 have been installed with a
Papanui 10 36 4 30/36 x2 and 20/24 x2 design nominal rating/
emergency rating.
Portman 18
 Currently operating at 33kV.
Prebbleton 2 8 1 11.5/23
Rawhiti 3 16 2 20/40
Rolleston 2 9 2 7.5
Shands Rd 4 12 2 11.5/23
Sockburn 18 3 10/20 x2 and 11.5/23 x1
Spreydon 18
Springston 6 14 6 2 1 60/70 x2 and 7.5 x1
Te Pirita 1 6 1 7.5/10
Teddington 1 3 1 2.5
Weedons 3 9 2 11.5/23
Total in service 88 62 751 2 48 30
90 Lifecycle asset management – Substations
4.4.2 Network substations

There are 225 network substations in our primary 11kV network, all within the Christchurch urban area (see section
4.2.2 for a description of the primary/secondary network). They contain at least one 11kV circuit breaker per connected
primary cable and one or more circuit breakers for radial distribution feeders. They may also contain secondary 11kV
switchgear, one or more distribution transformers and an 800A or 1500A 400V panel with fuse assemblies using high
rupturing current (HRC) links for local distribution.
Network substations have historically been installed whenever the load on radial feeders exceeded the design limit of
cable capacity and when primary cables with adequate spare capacity were available nearby. The original policy was
that no radial secondary loads were to be supplied from zone substations and all such loads were to be supplied from
network substations. In recent years this policy has been modified so that if suitable spare switchgear is available at a
zone substation, and it is more economical to do so, secondary cables may be laid from the zone substation to reinforce
overloaded cables. This avoids the need for additional network substations (only two built in the last 10 years).
A network substation design

from the late 1930s.
Due to changes in the location of load during their lifetime, network substations may become under-utilised. In these
cases, and when it is economical to do so, the primary cables supplying the substation may be through-jointed and the
secondary load transferred to other feeders and the network substation decommissioned.
Network substations are inspected every six months. This involves a complete visual component inspection and the
reading of any transformer loading maximum demand indicators (MDIs). Any minor maintenance is also done at this
time and any larger maintenance work is reported back to the relevant asset manager.
Network substation refurbished as a

standalone building after being part of
a larger consumer building that was
demolished due to earthquake
damage.
4.4.3 Distribution substations

A distribution substation can take the form of any of the types shown in the following table. They take supply at 11kV
from either a zone substation, a network substation or from another distribution substation. In respect of the building
substations, in many situations a consumer will own the building that houses our electrical equipment.
The types of substation that make up the total 10,750 substations in this asset category are shown in the following
table.
Table 4-4b Distribution substation types
Type No. Description
Building 253 These are similar to network substations in all aspects except for their status in the network. The
substations vary in size and construction and 75% of the actual buildings are privately owned. All
usually contain at least one transformer, with an 11kV 250MVA Magnefix switch unit (MSU) and 400V
distribution panel containing fuse assemblies using high rupturing current (HRC) links.
Kiosk 2,932 Full kiosks vary in size and construction but all usually contain a transformer, up to 500kVA, with an
11kV 250MVA Magnefix switch unit (MSU) and a 400V distribution panel containing fuse assemblies
using HRC (high rupturing current) links.
Outdoor 587 These vary in configuration, but usually consist of a half-kiosk with 11kV switchgear and a 400V local
distribution panel as per a full kiosk. An outdoor transformer is mounted on a concrete pad at the rear
or to the side of the kiosk. This design allows the installation of a transformer up to 1000kVA.
Pole 6,280 Mainly single pole substations, usually with 11kV fusing and a transformer up to 200kVA.
Some are a 2-pole structure (less than 10) and may have a transformer of up to 300kVA installed.
Pad transformer 696 These are transformer only, mounted on a concrete pad and supplied by high voltage cable from
switchgear/fuse at another site. Transformers are uncovered except for approximately 33 that are
enclosed in a polythene or fibreglass cover.
We inspect our distribution substations every six months with the exception of single-pole mounted substations. This
inspection is a complete visual inspection of all the components and the reading of any transformer loading maximum
demand indicators (MDIs). Minor maintenance is also done at this time and any larger maintenance work is reported
back to the asset manager responsible.
Substation earthing
A risk based approach has been taken for the inspecting and testing of our site earths. In general, earth systems in
our rural area are subject to deterioration because of highly resistive soils, stony sub-layers of earth and corroded
earthing systems. Between 2,000 and 2,600 sites are tested in any year and those sites requiring repairs are
scheduled for remedial work in the following year.
A newly developed kiosk with precast

concrete sides that is designed to be
embedded into a hillside.
92 Lifecycle asset management – Overhead lines – subtransmission 66kV
4.5 Overhead lines – subtransmission 66kV

Tower lines
Our 66kV subtransmission tower lines consist of 62km of double circuit. These tower lines provide important security
to the Christchurch city subtransmission network by providing limited alternative connection between Transpower’s
Islington and Bromley GXPs.
In 2014 we purchased Transpower’s Islington - Springston tower line. Refer to section 5.6.4 for further information
regarding Orion’s purchase of Transpower spur assets.
Table 4-5a 66kV tower line circuits
Circuit Kilometres Towers Poles Circuits
Bromley-Heathcote 4.2 22 2
Halswell-Heathcote 10.4 34 6* 2
Notes:
Heathcote-Barnett Park 4.1 19 2**
* These poles replaced towers
Islington-Halswell 7.8 35 2
relocated to allow land
Islington-Hawthornden 4.7 31 2 subdivision to proceed.
Islington-Papanui A 8.9 57 2 ** One of these circuits is
Islington-Papanui B 8.9 57 2 operating at 11kV.
Islington-Springston 13 44 2
Total 62 299 6 16
Pole lines
Our 66kV subtransmission pole lines consist of 104km of single circuit on mainly timber poles. The lines run from
Transpower’s Hororata, and Islington GXPs to our 66/11kV zone substations Te Pirita, Springston, Dunsandel,
Killinchy, Greendale, Brookside Larcomb and Weedons (see Figure 4-5b on following page).
Due to damage to 66kV cables out of Bromley, eight kilometres of temporary pole line has been built from Bromley to
Dallington and from Bromley to Rawhiti. The line to Rawhiti is via the now decommissioned Brighton substation and
was built in the days immediately following the February 2011 earthquake to allow a temporary transformer at
Brighton to function. This was then continued on to Rawhiti once a site had been acquired.
These lines have consent for three years and are in the process of being replaced by new underground cables (see
Figure 4-5a on following page).
Lifecycle asset management – Overhead lines – subtransmission 66kV 93
Figure 4-5a Subtransmission 66kV network – Christchurch urban area
Transpower GXP 66kV Underground - double

66kV Underground - single
Orion 66kV Substation 2 66kV Overhead - multiple circuit
66kV Overhead - single circuit
66kV Overhead - Temporary
66kV Underground - Work in progress
3 PAPANUI RAWHITI
MCFADDENS
DALLINGTON
HAWTHORNDEN
2
FENDALTON
3
ARMAGH
ISLINGTON
OXFORD-TUAM
ADDINGTON
BROMLEY
To Weedons MIDDLETON
2
LANCASTER
2
MIDDLETON
MILTON
2
To Springston
2
HOON HAY HEATHCOTE
2
BARNETT
2
PARK
PREBBLETON 2 2
HALSWELL
Figure 4-5b Subtransmission 66kV – central Canterbury rural area overhead lines
Kaiapoi
Sheffield
Waim
akar
iri River
66kV Overhead - multiple circuit
Glentunnel
Darfield
Coalgate
Kirwee
Christchurch urban area
Glenroy ISLINGTON
HORORATA WEEDONS
2
LARCOMB
Prebbleton
Lyttelton
Rolleston
TE PIRITA GREENDALE
2
SPRINGSTON Lincoln
Dunsandel Diamond Harbour
Tai Tapu
Teddington
DUNSANDEL
BROOKSIDE
KILLINCHY Motukarara
Rakaia
Leeston
Little River
Lake Ellesmere
KEY
Southbridge Lake Forsyth

Transpower GXP Birdlings Flat
Orion 66/11kV zone substation
Orion 66/33/11kV zone substation
Orion 66kV overhead line
2 Orion 66kV overhead - multiple circuit
Rakaia Huts
4.5.2 Asset capacity/performance

The conductors used for the urban tower line circuits are ‘Wolf’ and ‘Zebra’.
The dual circuit Islington-Bromley is rated 494 amps per circuit at 750C. The Islington-Hawthornden and Heathcote-
Barnett Park circuits are rated at 424 amps at 600C. The Islington-Papanui circuits are rated 1,248 amps at 500C.
The conductors in this circuit are in a bundled configuration with two Zebra conductors per phase. This is reflected in
the rating.
The conductor for the rural circuits is ‘Dog’. The single circuit is rated 355 amps at 700C. The Islington-Springston
circuits are rated at 531 amps at 750C.
Figure 4-5c Overhead lines 66kV – asset failures/100km
10
0
4.5.3 Asset condition

The overall condition of the steel towers is good. Assessments of tower corrosion are being undertaken and a
prioritised programme of tower painting will be implemented. Tower signs and anti-climbing barriers were
upgraded in 2006 to provide better security.
The tower foundations are a mixture of concrete footings and grillage. Our investigations have indicated that the
worst corrosion on buried foundation steel is between 300 and 600mm below ground level, with little or no corrosion
below that point. A refurbishment programme to extend the life expectancy of steel tower legs/foundations has seen
most of the grillage foundations completed. The remaining sites have access issues but we anticipate completing
them in the next few years.
Figure 4-5d Overhead 66kV poles and towers – age profile
800 Poles
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
Pre FY48 FY53 FY58 FY63 FY68 FY73 FY78 FY83 FY88 FY93 FY98 FY03 FY08 FY13
FY44
Total Towers Poles
4.5.4 Standards and asset data

Standards and specifications
Asset management report:
 NW70.00.26 - Overhead lines - subtransmission
Design standards developed and in use for this asset are:

 NW70.51.01 – Overhead line design standard.
Technical specifications covering the construction and ongoing maintenance of this asset group are:
 NW72.21.03 – Retightening of components
 NW72.21.05 – Tower painting
 NW72.21.11 – Overhead line inspection and assessment
 NW72.21.10 – Thermographic survey of high voltage lines
 NW72.21.18 – Standard construction drawing set – overhead lines
 NW72.21.19 – Tower foundation inspection
 NW72.24.01 – Vegetation work adjacent to overhead lines.
Equipment specifications covering the construction and supply of specific components of this asset group are:
 NW74.23.08 – Poles – hardwood
 NW74.23.17 – Conductor – overhead lines
 NW74.23.19 – Cross-arms.
Asset data
Data currently held in our information systems for this asset group includes:
 location (GPS)
 pole identification numbers
 tower/pole age and type
 conductor size, age and phasing (the age of some conductors is estimated)
 tower/pole and fittings condition assessments
 construction and as built drawings for renewals and extensions.
Data improvement is ongoing. Updated data generally comes from the routine compliance inspections listed in the
following maintenance plan as well as specific inspections carried out as required. All inspections are used to
further our knowledge of the condition of the asset and the fittings/attachments.
4.5.5 Maintenance plan

The condition of this asset is monitored by:
 visual inspection including a check for clearance violations in the urban area
 corona/thermal imaging scans every two years
 lifting inspection of tower suspension assemblies
 tower foundation inspections/refurbishment in corrosive soil zones
 paint and steelwork condition assessment.
The maintenance work planned is as follows:
 suspension hardware assemblies will be assessed for corrosion damage
 tower foundation refurbishment continues
 live-line retightening of pole line components.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Subtransmission overhead
lines.
4.5.6 Replacement plan

There are plans to convert some sections of overhead line to underground 66kV cables to accommodate new
subdivisions.
Our pole replacement programme is based on our condition assessment survey.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 - Replacement budgets: 66kV overhead lines.
4.5.7 Creation/acquisition plan

For a list of projects containing this asset see section 5.6 – Network development proposals.
4.5.8 Disposal plan

We have no plans to dispose of any of the 66kV overhead line asset.
4.6 Overhead lines – subtransmission 33kV

The 33kV subtransmission overhead system consists of 306km circuit length of lines that take supply from
Transpower’s Islington, and Hororata 33kV GXPs to form a network of interconnecting lines in the rural area of central
Canterbury, Banks Peninsula and into the western edge of Christchurch city. These lines are built using timber and
concrete poles, some of which also carry 11kV distribution lines.
Figure 4-6a Subtransmission 33kV network
KEY HAREWOOD
Transpower GXP
Orion 33/11kV substation
Orion 66/33/11kV substation

Orion 33kV underground cable
Note: Several of the rural circuits contain small sections of

Springfield cable. For more detail see maps in sections 4.1 and 4.10. ISLINGTON
ANNAT
MOFFETT
SOCKBURN
Sheffield HORNBY
Waim
akar River
iri
Glentunnel SHANDS
Coalgate Christchurch urban area
Kirwee
Glenroy To Springston
DARFIELD
& Rolleston
ISLINGTON
HORORATA HIGHFIELD SHANDS Prebbleton
PREBBLETON Lyttelton PREBBLETON

ROLLESTON
To Lincoln
LINCOLN
BANKSIDE DIAMOND HARBOUR
Dunsandel Tai Tapu
SPRINGSTON TEDDINGTON
Rakaia MOTUKARARA LITTLE RIVER

Leeston DUVAUCHELLE
Lake Ellesmere
HILLS
Ra
(Te Waihora)
Lake Forsyth
ka
Akaroa
Southbridge (Waiwera)
ia
Birdlings Flat
Ri
ve
r
Rakaia Huts

The standard conductors in our 33kV network are shown in the table below. (Ratings are based on 20 oC ambient and
30oC conductor rise.)
Table 4-6a Standard 33kV conductors
Conductor
Rating (Amps) Conductor (Copper) Rating (Amps)
(Aluminium)
Jaguar ACSR 412 19/0.083 HD 265
Dog ACSR 277
Sparrow ACSR 140
Most of the 33/11kV zone substations have an alternative 33kV supply, except Hills Rd, Bankside, Highfield and Annat.
Retightening hardware and hotspot repairs made soon after infra-red scans have proved beneficial and improved the
security of these lines. New ‘distribution ties’ have been installed on exposed areas of Banks Peninsula in an effort
to reduce the incidence of broken binders.
Figure 4-6b Overhead lines 33kV – asset failures/100km
10
0

Old green glass insulators (pilkington type) on lines in the Lincoln and Springston areas are nearing the end of their
life. Samples of these insulators with crab feet type cracks have been taken for closer inspection. We are replacing
these insulators in conjunction with other works.
Older (non-type tested) concrete and hardwood poles may be replaced in conjunction with the insulators identified
above.
Figure 4-6c Overhead lines 33kV poles - age profile
1000 Poles
800
600
400
200
0
FY44

 NW70.00.26 - Overhead lines - subtransmission
 NW70.51.01 – Overhead line design.
Technical specifications covering the construction and ongoing maintenance of this asset are:
 NW72.21.01 – Overhead line work

 NW72.21.18 – Standard construction drawing set – overhead
 NW72.21.11 – Overhead line Inspection and Assessment
 NW72.24.01 – Tree cutting adjacent to lines.
Asset data
 location (GPS)
 pole age and type
 pole condition assessments
further our knowledge of the asset condition and the fittings/attachments on our poles.

The condition of this asset is monitored by:
 pole inspections/assessments (the same as for 11kV poles)
 complete visual inspection and thermographic scan every two years.
Maintenance work planned is as follows:
 to cut trees (in conjunction with 11kV lines)
 UV corona imaging scan of older insulators
 retightening hardware
 other work that results from inspections.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Subtransmission overhead
lines.

Due to reliability issues we are replacing green glass insulators in conjunction with other works.
Poles, crossarms and insulators are replaced as required.

For planned projects containing this asset see section 5.6 – Network development proposals.
4.6.8 Disposal plan

These assets are disposed of as part of the reconstruction costs.
100 Lifecycle asset management – Overhead lines – distribution 11kV
4.7 Overhead lines – distribution 11kV

Our 11kV distribution overhead system is 3,221km circuit length of lines in the rural area of central Canterbury, Banks
Peninsula and outer areas of Christchurch city. Supply is taken from zone substations as feeder lines which form a
network to supply distribution transformers. These lines are built using approximately 50,000 timber and concrete
poles, some of which also support subtransmission and 400V conductors. The 11kV system includes 11kV lines on
private property that serve individual consumers.
Single wire earth return (SWER) lines on Banks Peninsula total 103km circuit length in 10 separate systems. These
lines supply power to remote areas, and at times are exposed to severe weather conditions.
Our 11kV lines are supplied from the zone substations shown on the 66kV and 33kV subtransmission network maps in
the previous sections. Supply is also taken directly at 11kV from the GXPs at Coleridge, Castle Hill and Arthur’s Pass.

The standard 11kV conductors are listed in the table below. Ratings are based on 200C ambient and 300C conductor
rise. To improve the performance of smaller conductors, we are using smooth body Flounder ACSR conductor more in
the rural areas when new conductor is required. The use of Flounder conductor should reduce breakages in lines
exposed to snow and high winds.
Table 4-7a Standard 11kV conductors
Conductor (Aluminium) Rating (Amps)
Dog ACSR 277
Mink ACSR 204
Flounder ASCR 107
Squirrel ASCR 106
There have been issues in the past with bi-metallic joints corroding on our 11kV overhead network. These joints are
being replaced in conjunction with our re-tightening programme or when they are found during other scheduled
works.
The Port of Lyttelton depends on a secure power supply and could be critical to Christchurch after any natural
disaster. A double circuit line is the only supply to the Port. The status of this line has been raised to that of the
subtransmission system. This means a higher level of maintenance and more regular inspections are undertaken
than for other 11kV lines. The poles were replaced in 1999 and the phasing has been aligned with our standard.
Increased clearances now allow maintenance on this line to be performed with the line alive, causing no interruption in
supply to Lyttelton. These lines suffered no damage during the 2010/2011 earthquakes.
Figure 4-7a Overhead lines 11kV – asset failures/100km
10
0
Lifecycle asset management – Overhead lines – distribution 11kV 101
The 2003 tree regulations introduced a notice regime that defines responsibilities for problem trees. This has
brought significant extra costs for us to meet, but gradual improvement in reliability statistics is expected.
In the 4 September 2010 earthquake we had a small number of poles fail, with the majority of failures attributed to
pole foundations succumbing to liquefaction or land subsidence. The robustness of our overhead line network can in
some part be attributed to our targeted strengthening programme instigated after the June 2006 snow storm.

The condition of our main feeder lines is good. Rebuilding, now based on a condition assessment, is confined to
smaller sections of main line and spur lines. Some concrete poles, mainly in the Lincoln, Springston, Rolleston and
Weedons areas, are reaching the end of their life expectancy. These poles are McKendry-type cast concrete with a
3kN top loading.
Figure 4-7b Overhead lines 11kV poles – age profile
Poles
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
FY44
Conductor replacement based on a condition assessment and/or performance issues is carried out during
rebuilding. If the existing conductors are steel or 7/064Cu they are replaced with aluminum.
We are retightening older lines where cross-arms have been damaged by loose equipment and insulators are
leaning over. This type of maintenance is ongoing and will extend to newer lines where treated softwood timber
poles and treated hardwood cross-arms have been used.

 NW70.00.27 - Overhead lines - 11kV
 NW70.51.01 – Overhead line design standard
 NW70.51.02 – Overhead line design manual
 NW70.51.03 – Overhead line design – worked examples.
 NW74.23.06 – Poles – softwood
102 Lifecycle asset management – Overhead lines – distribution 11kV

 NW74.23.10 – Insulators – high voltage
 NW74.23.19 – Cross-arms
 NW74.23.20 – Earthing equipment and application.
Asset data
 location (GPS)
 pole and fittings condition assessments
following maintenance plan, as well as specific inspections carried out as required. All inspections are used to

The condition of our 11kV overhead lines is monitored, following the guidelines of NZCEP 34, by:
 a visual inspection at least every five years
 UV corona imaging inspection carried out every two years
 a thermal imaging scan (selected areas as required)
 an inspection of poles within the Christchurch urban area
 an inspection of poles in the rural area.

 to cut trees (in conjunction with 33kV lines)
 to re-tighten components
 do other work that results from inspections.
Work to re-tighten components to reduce wear and fatigue is ongoing. The visual inspection and pole data capture
project is now complete. This data will be used to manage pole condition monitoring by visual inspection and
thermographic survey.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: 11kV overhead lines.
Earthing
We take a risk based approach to inspection and testing of site earths. Urban areas have good bonding between
earths. Therefore we concentrate earthing maintenance in the rural area. Earthing in these areas is subject to
deterioration because of highly resistive soils, stony sub-layers of earth and corroded earthing systems. Between
1,200 and 1,500 sites are tested in any one year and those requiring repairs are identified and scheduled for repair in
the following year.

Our replacement programme is based on asset condition as determined by our inspection regime.
We continue to replace any two pole platform substations with a single pole substation, or a kiosk if the line is likely
to be removed. This is done to satisfy issues of safety and seismic risk.
Lifecycle asset management – Overhead lines – distribution 11kV 103

We now only build 11kV lines in our rural area as they are prohibited in urban areas by planning requirements.
Additional 11kV lines are constructed as a result of the following:
 reinforcement plans (refer to section 5.6 – Network development proposals)
 new connections and subdivision developments.
4.7.8 Disposal plan

We dispose of lines to meet consumer requirements or to implement city/district council underground conversion
projects.
In the September 2010 earthquake overhead lines were

affected by lateral land movement along the fault slip.
The lines were either compressed causing them to sag,
or stretched straining poles, connections and insulators.
104 Lifecycle asset management – Overhead lines – distribution 400V
4.8 Overhead lines – distribution 400V

Our 400V distribution overhead system is 3,012km circuit length of lines, mainly within the Christchurch urban
area. This length includes 935km of street lighting circuit. These 400V lines are constructed using timber and
concrete poles.
The urban 400V network is a multiple earthed neutral system operating at 400 volts between phases and 230 volts
to earth. In the city the network can be interconnected with adjacent substations by installing ties at various
normally open points.
Lines on private property

Owners are responsible for the safety of lines that they own. We provide a maintenance service to our consumers
for lines that they own, and the cost of this service forms part of our line charge.

The standard 400V polyvinyl-chloride (PVC) covered conductors are itemised in the table below. Ratings are based
on 20oC ambient and 30oC conductor rise.
Table 4-8a Standard 400V conductors
Conductor Rating Conductor Rating

(Aluminium) (Amps) (Copper) (Amps)
Weke AAC 299 37/0.083 HD 395
Rango AAC 221 19/0.083 HD 265
Namu AAC 114 19/0.064 HD 195
7/0.083 HD 144
7/0.064 HD 106

An assessment of the design of our 400V poles has indicated that, in some cases, the pole foundation strength is
inadequate for the loading. This has been determined using the requirements of the adopted standard NZS 4203 –
General Structural Design and Design Loadings for Buildings. Standards are now in place for installing all new
poles.
During 2001 and 2002 a telecommunications company installed a network in a large portion of the Christchurch
urban area. This required a major inspection and assessment programme to determine if our existing poles were
capable of supporting the communication infrastructure. As a result of this analysis, we replaced approximately
4,300 poles.
Timber poles are used extensively for all new/replacement work. The life expectancy of these poles is 35 to 55
years. Improved treatment procedures mean that we expect poles will last longer than this in future. Poles in
more exposed areas such as Banks Peninsula and Arthur’s Pass may need to be replaced at 30 to 35 year intervals
due to harsh environmental conditions (high winds and heavier snow/rainfall).
The 400V network conductors are predominantly PVC covered, but in some older areas triple braid (TB), that has
poor insulation properties, is still in use. Conductors with this type of insulation are replaced during scheduled
pole replacement work.
The age profile of our 400V poles is shown in the following figure.
Lifecycle asset management – Overhead lines – distribution 400V 105
Figure 4-8a Overhead lines 400V poles – age profile
Poles
10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
-
FY44

 NW70.00.25 - Overhead lines - 400V
 NW70.51.01 – Overhead line design standard
 NW70.51.02 – Overhead line design manual.
 NW74.23.06 – Poles – softwood
Asset data
 location (GPS)
 pole identification numbers (urban poles not physically labelled)
 conductor size and age (the age of some conductors is estimated)
 pole and fittings condition assessments
106 Lifecycle asset management – Overhead lines – distribution 400V

Maintenance is primarily based on a periodic pole inspection cycle. See section 4.7.5 Overhead line – 11kV, for pole
inspections/assessments details.
We continue to focus on clearing trees from 400V lines to comply with the Tree Regulations.
Other maintenance work is on an as-required basis.
Requests from lighting authorities to install various outreach street lighting arms on existing poles requires some
poles to be changed to meet the additional load.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: 400V overhead lines.

The condition of our overhead lines is generally good. Our pole replacement programme is derived from a condition
assessment survey. This is an on-going process and any poles deemed not satisfactory are replaced.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 - Replacement budgets: 400V overhead lines.

We now only create 400V distribution lines in our rural area as they are prohibited in urban areas by city/district plan
requirements. They are generally constructed in response to consumer connection requirements only.
4.8.8 Disposal plan

We dispose of overhead lines to meet consumer requirements or to implement city/district councils underground
conversion projects.
Liquefaction during the earthquakes lowered some

400V overhead lines as the poles were vibrated into
the ground.
Lifecycle asset management – Underground cables – subtransmission 66kV 107
4.9 Underground cables – subtransmission 66kV

Our subtransmission 66kV cable asset is 54km of circuit length of underground cable. Traditionally, pairs of radial
66kV 3-core aluminum, oil filled, aluminum sheathed cables were installed to supply most of our 66/11kV zone
substations. In 2000-2002, a 3x1core copper, XLPE cable was installed from Transpower’s Bromley GXP to Lancaster
and Armagh zone substations. This cable provides additional system security to the Christchurch CBD.
There is 40km of circuit length of aluminum cable in our network. Each cable has an emergency rating equivalent to
the full load of the zone substation (nominally 40MVA). These cables have an outer cover of semi-conducting plastic
sheath over the aluminum. They are installed either encased in weak mix concrete with cross-sectional dimensions
of 600mm wide by 300mm high, and capped by a 50mm layer of hard concrete dyed red or supported on a reinforced
concrete strip footing. For each zone substation the two cables have been laid in a common trench spaced 300mm
apart at a minimum depth of 750mm.
The 7.2km of 1,600mm2 3x1core copper XLPE cable has a continuous rating of 160MVA. This rating allows for the
contingency of a loss of supply at the Addington GXP, and enables the Christchurch CBD and surrounding areas to be
supplied from the Bromley GXP. The single core cables have been installed in a weak mix of thermally stabilised
concrete and capped with a 50mm layer of stronger concrete that has been dyed red. Two fibre optic cables have
been installed with the 66kV cables, one of which is strapped to the 66kV cable to facilitate monitoring of thermal
performance. The second fibre optic cable is part of the cable protection system.
Additionally, short lengths of 66kV single core cable are located within the zone substations to link primary
equipment. These cables are shown in the circuit listing, along with the main cables.
As a result of the Canterbury earthquakes we undertook a review of how our subtransmission cables have been
installed. One of the key findings was that while we had good current carrying capacity between zone substations the
fact we had dual circuits in the same trench meant we experienced common mode failures due to lateral spread. To
mitigate this we will look to use route diversity for future installations. Refer to section 5.6.3 For subtransmission
architecture review.
Figure 4-9a Subtransmission 66kV – Christchurch urban area
Transpower GXP 66kV Underground - double circuit

66kV Underground - single circuit
Orion 66kV Substation 2 66kV Overhead - multiple circuit
66kV Overhead - Temporary
66kV Underground - Work in progress
PAPANUI RAWHITI
3
MCFADDENS
DALLINGTON
HAWTHORNDEN
2
FENDALTON
3
ARMAGH
ISLINGTON
OXFORD-TUAM
ADDINGTON
BROMLEY
To Weedons MIDDLETON
2
LANCASTER
2
MIDDLETON
MILTON
2
To Springston
2
HOON HAY HEATHCOTE

2
BARNETT
2
PARK
PREBBLETON 2 2
HALSWELL
108 Lifecycle asset management – Underground cables – subtransmission 66kV
Table 4-9a 66kV cable circuits
Install Cable type/ Rating (A)*

Cable circuit Size Length (m)
year manufacturer summer/winter
Addington 66-Armagh No.1 1981 3c Oil (Pirelli) 300 Al 343/370 4,280

Addington 126-Armagh No.2 1981 3c Oil (Pirelli) 300 Al 343/370 4,416
Addington 66-Fendalton T1 1978 3c Oil (Hitachi) 300 Al 345/393 2,464
Addington 176A-Fendalton T2 1978 3c Oil (Hitachi) 300 Al 345/393 2,345
Addington 46-Milton T1 1979 3c Oil (Hitachi) 300 Al 330/384 3,990
Addington 176B-Milton T2 1979 3c Oil (Hitachi) 300 Al 330/384 4,089
Addington-Oxford Tuam T1 1975 3c Oil (Dainichi) 0.45 Al 330/350 2,661
Addington-Oxford Tuam T2 1975 3c Oil (Dainichi) 0.45 Al 330/350 2,562
Bromley-Lancaster 2000 3x1c XLPE (Olex) 1600 Cu 1400/1400 4,884
Bromley-Dallington 2014 3x1c XLPE (Olex) 1600 Cu WIP
Bromley-Rawhiti 2014 3x1c XLPE (Olex) 1600 Cu WIP
Dallington-McFaddens 2013 3x1c XLPE (Olex) 1000 Cu 1050/1050 5,410
Halswell 196-Hoon Hay T1 1969 3c Oil (AEI) 0.45 Al 289/356 2,644
Halswell 136-Hoon Hay T2 1969 3c Oil (AEI) 0.45 Al 289/356 2,647
Middleton GXP-Middleton T1 2008 3x1c XLPE 300 Cu 375
Middleton GXP-Middleton T2 2008 3x1c XLPE 300 Cu 365
Papanui 136-McFaddens T1 1972 3c Oil (Dainichi) 0.45 Al 348/396 4,163
Papanui 206-McFaddens T2 1972 3c Oil (Dainichi) 0.45 Al 348/396 4,091
Barnett Park 1987 3 core Oil 300 Al 330/350 120
Lancaster-Armagh 2002 3x1c XLPE (Olex) 1600 Cu 1400/1400 2,363
Armagh (T1/T2) 2001 3x1c XLPE (Olex) 300 Cu 75
Heathcote (T2) 1968 3x1c PCCAS 0.25 Cu 12
* Ratings are single cable contingency, that is second parallel cable is out of service (assumes that condition of
cables and joints are capable of design rating).

The 66kV underground cables are predominantly 300mm2Al (paper insulated, oil filled and aluminum sheathed) with
a nominal rating of 425A or 48.5MVA @850C. The Bromley-Lancaster-Armagh cable, is a 1,600mm2 Cu XLPE lead
sheathed cable with a design rating of 1400A or 160MVA @90oC. The McFaddens-Dallington cable is a 1000mm2 Cu
XLPE Aluminum sheathed cable with a design rating of 1050A or 120MVA @90oC
Failure modes have predominately been related to the terminations and third party damage. We are proactively
addressing these issues.
Oil filled cables are particularly vulnerable to damage from:
 unrelated work, for example other services trenching
 differential ground settlement that can occur as a result of poorly compacted fill material or naturally soft ground
for example organic clays and peat
 movement as a result of an earthquake (as observed during the 2010/2011 earthquakes).
The cable routes have been assessed to ascertain the vulnerability of the cables to a seismic event.

Our 66kV cables have a low average age, with the oldest cables being laid in 1967. The cables to date have been
operated conservatively and therefore not been subject to electrical aging mechanisms. We monitor the cables to
ensure the integrity of the mechanical protection of the cables is maintained.
During the recent earthquakes there was significant ground movement in areas around the Avon River where our
Figure 4-9b Underground cables 66kV – asset failures/100km
10
0
Asset failures/100km
Brighton and Dallington 66kV cables traversed. An inspection was carried out on the Dallington cables after the
September 2010 earthquake and while there was some minor damage the cables were returned to service with a
lower load rating. The M6.3 earthquake in February 2011 caused further significant damage to these cables and
other 66kV cables in our urban network. The cables to Brighton (now Rawhiti) and Dallington zone substations could
not be made serviceable and have been replaced by temporary 66kV overhead lines.
We are currently developing plans to repair, replace or diversify our assets in these areas. Additional cable
reinforcement projects are underway. Refer section 5.6.6 for details of these projects.
All the joints that indicated excessive movement of conductors have now been replaced. We continue to inspect the
joints that have shown no signs of damage or buckling as part of an ongoing maintenance plan. These joints have
been assessed as being a low risk of failure due to thermal expansion/movement of conductors.
Figure 4-9c Underground cables 66kV – age profile
Kilometres
25
20
15
10
0
Pre FY52 FY57 FY62 FY67 FY72 FY77 FY82 FY87 FY92 FY97 FY02 FY07 FY12
FY48

Cables are installed to manufacturers’ specifications and to specific design on a case-by-case basis by suitably
qualified engineering consultants. Any design includes thermal modelling of soil and ground conditions for the cable
to achieve the required level of service.

 NW70.00.32 - Underground cables - 66kV
 NW74.23.30 – Cable - Subtransmission - 66kV - 300mm2 Cu XLPE
 NW74.23.31 – Cable - Subtransmission - 66kV - 1600mm2 Cu XLPE.
Risks associated with alternative standards include operating cables at temperatures above the recommended
levels. This could reduce the service life of the cables concerned.
Asset data
 location (GIS)
 circuit ratings
 sheath test results
 cable type, size and age
 joint age, type and condition
 seismic risk assessments and profile drawings of cable routes.
further our knowledge of the condition of the asset.

The condition of our 66kV underground cables is monitored by:
 an annual inspection and sheath test of all cables with any planned repairs completed the next year
 alarms fitted to give early warning of low oil pressure and oil level via the SCADA system. Immediate
investigation and rectification of the problem follows any oil alarm. To give better monitoring and analysis we
install pressure transducers at the ends of cables in conjunction with joint upgrading
 continuous temperature monitoring at a potential ‘hot spot’ on the Addington-Armagh T1 cable – this also
reports via the SCADA system
 other cables are currently being identified for further monitoring work.
The following maintenance work is planned:
 ensure contractors with suitable skills are available for oil filled cable jointing
 review the thermal properties of backfill material where tests indicate that the cable’s rating is compromised
 continue inspecting joints for signs of thermal-mechanical damage.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Subtransmission underground
cables.

We do not have any 66kV cable replacement programmed in the next 10 years.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 – Replacement budgets - 66kV underground cables.

Cables are laid in the city to conform with the requirements of the Christchurch city plan.
For details of projects to reinforce our 66kV cable network see section 5.6 – Network development proposals.
4.9.8 Disposal plan

In 2010 an assessment of the Bromley-Portman 66kV cable showed that it was no longer economically feasible to
use this cable as an 11kV incomer to Portman zone substation. As a result it was removed from service.
In 2011 the Bromley-Dallington 66kV cables (laid 1967) were damaged beyond repair during the earthquakes. As a
result they were removed from service.
4.10 Underground cables – subtransmission 33kV

Our subtransmission 33kV cable asset is 34km of circuit length of underground cable, buried directly in the ground. It
is mostly situated in the western part of Christchurch city, with sections of cable in Rolleston, Lincoln, Prebbleton and
Springston, and is made up approximately as follows:
 PILCA 5km installed 1978-1988
 XLPE 29km installed 1992-2013
Figure 4-10a Subtransmission 33kV – Christchurch urban area
Transpower GXP 33kV Underground

33kV Substation
HAREWOOD
ISLINGTON
MOFFETT SOCKBURN
HORNBY
SHANDS
To Springston Prebbleton
& Rolleston
PREBBLETON
To Lincoln
In recent years there has been an increasing amount of 33kV overhead line replaced by underground cables as land
has been developed and road controlling authorities have requested removal for road upgrades.
We have completed a programme to replace our oil filled cables with XLPE cables. Given the relatively short lengths
involved this was a cost effective way to address the risk of joint failure in our oil filled cables.
The cable sizes are as shown in the circuit listing (on the following page) and are solid insulation with a nominal
rating of 425A or 24MVA.
In 2006 we had an outdoor termination fail and termination/joint oil leaks in our oil-filled cables (now replaced with
XLPE). Our XLPE cable failures were due to incorrect installation practices. This has been addressed with new
standard joint/termination kits and jointer training. Spare joints and terminations are held as a contingency against
cable failure.
We are pro-active with contractors and council staff to maintain awareness of the location of subtransmission cables.
Figure 4-10b Underground cables 33kV – asset failures/100km

10
0
Figure 4-10c Subtransmission – Lincoln and Springston area

XP
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Orion 66/33/11kV 33kV Underground

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Table 4-10a 33kV cable circuit listing
Cable circuit Length (m) Type Size Winter rating (A)

Islington 2102 - Harewood 234. 690 XLPE 300 Al 475*
Islington 1036 - Moffett 334 172 Paper lead .3 Cu 313
Islington 2092 - Moffett 344 136 Paper lead /XLPE 300Al/.3 Cu 313
Islington 936 - Sockburn T1 2,019 XLPE 300Al 475*
Islington 2062 - Sockburn T2 3,513 XLPE 300Al/630Cu 372
Islington 976 - Sockburn T3 3,486 XLPE 300Al 319
Islington 886 - Harewood 224 3,485 PILCA /XLPE 300Al 319
Islington 966 - Hornby 572-582 1,848 XLPE 300Al 306*
Islington 2072 - Hornby 532-542 1,852 XLPE 300Al 338*
Springston 1206 - Shands 436 67 PILCA 300Al 365*
Hornby 502-512 - Shands 454 830 PILCA/XLPE 300Al 365*
Hornby 562-572–Prebbleton 4832 3,499 XLPE 300Al 365*
Prebbleton 4842 - Lincoln 3434 781 XLPE 300Al 365*
Hororata 1226 - Hororata 924 95 PILCA .3Al 280*
Hororata 1206 - Annat 1106/Kimberley 4926 65 PILCA .3Al 280*
Springston 1206 - Rolleston 3234 2,945 XLPE 300Al 475*
Springston 1146 - Springston 3554 74 PILCA .3Al 280*
Springston 1186 - Springston 3544 80 PILCA 185Cu 355*
Springston 1176 - Motukarara 3612/3622 3,764 XLPE 300Al
Springston 1196 - Larcomb 4736 371 PILCA 185Cu 355*
Springston 1226 - Lincoln 3432 177 XLPE 300Al
Springston 3532 - Motukarara 3632/3642 154 PILCA/XLPE 300Al/185Cu 355*
Motukarara 3642/3652 - Little River 3812 79 XLPE 300Al
Motukarara 3602/3612 - Teddington 3704 105 XLPE 300Al
Springston 1166 - Brookside 3114 172 XLPE 300Al 475*
Islington 1026 - Hornby 512-522 1,836 XLPE 300Al
Islington 2082 - Shands 444 20 XLPE 150Cu
Hornby zone substation 151 XLPE 300Al/630Cu
Motukarara zone substation 70 XLPE 300Al
Duvauchelle zone substation 50 XLPE 300Al
Lincoln zone substation 62 XLPE 300Al
Shands zone substation 12 XLPE 300Al
Prebbleton zone substation 19 XLPE 300Al
Note: Some of these circuits may have an overhead line component that will affect overall circuit rating.
*Nominal rating – investigation to determine full rating to be completed.

These cables are in good condition and, to date, no sheath faults have occurred.
Figure 4-10d Underground cables 33kV – age profile
Kilometres
25
20
15
10
0
FY44

We install 33kV cables in compliance with manufacturers’ specifications and industry standards to suit the ground
conditions where they are located.
 NW70.52.01 – Underground cable design.
 NW72.21.01 – Cable testing
 NW72.22.01 – Cable installation and maintenance
 NW72.22.02 – Excavation, backfilling and restoration of surfaces
 NW71.12.03 – Cabling and network asset recording.
Equipment standards:
 NW74.23.14 – Subtransmission cable 33kV
Asset data
 location (GIS)
 circuit ratings
 sheath test results
 joint age, type and condition
 route profile drawings for some cables.
following maintenance plan as well as specific inspections carried out as required. All inspections are used to further
our knowledge of asset condition.

The condition of this asset is monitored by an inspection and sheath test, where practicable, every year.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Subtransmission UG cables.

We have replaced the 33kV oil-filled cables due to issues with joints similar to the those on the 66kV oil-filled cables.
With 33kV cables it was more cost effective to replace the entire oil-filled cable rather than upgrade the joints.
Any further cable installations will be carried out as a major project or as part of overhead to underground conversion
works driven by the local authority. We have no plans to replace any of the existing cables in the next 10 years.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 - Replacement budgets: 33kV underground cables.

33kV cables are laid in the city to conform to the requirements of the Christchurch city plan.
For a list of projects containing this asset, see section 5.6 – Network development proposals.
4.10.8 Disposal plan

We have no plans to dispose of any other 33kV cable assets.
Lifecycle asset management – Underground cables – 11kV 115
4.11 Underground cables – 11kV

Our 11kV cable network is 2,366km of circuit length of underground cable and is largely concentrated in the urban
area of Christchurch (approximately 90% of total length).
These cables are classed as subtransmission (feeder and primary) and distribution (secondary) cables as follows:
 feeder cables that supply our 11kV zone substations (see the table on the following page)
 primary cables which supply network substations from zone substations
 secondary cables which supply distribution substations from network substations.
The reason for having these classes is largely historical and is explained further in section 4.2.2 – Asset justification.
The 11kV cable is predominantly of the paper lead variety with an expected life of 70 years.

The September 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes caused a number of 11kV cable faults. They were mainly
confined to areas subjected to large lateral movement of the ground in Brighton, Dallington and Avondale. These
areas contain approximately 90km of cable.
The majority of cables that failed were PILCA type having been installed for an average of 40-50 years. Some of these
cables had multiple faults. The failure modes were either joints (typically older pitch filled types) being pulled apart or
significant movement of the cables causing failure of the cables’ outer sheath and subsequently the paper insulation.
Figure 4-11a Underground cables 11kV – asset failures/100km
10
0
GXP 11kV feeder system

These cables mainly supply our 11kV zone substations. The rating of each cable has been assessed based on the
thermal resistivity of the cable bedding material. These assessments have shown the present loading requirements of
the substations do not exceed the cable capability. We manage the development and operation of the network to
ensure the cable ratings are not exceeded during contingency events.
Primary 11kV system

This system is designed to be run in single or multiple closed rings. Each ring usually starts at a zone substation bus
and includes one or more network substations before returning via a different route to the starting zone substation.
To provide additional 11kV tie capacity, primary circuits may also be provided in some cases to alternative zone
substations. A primary ring consists of dedicated runs of cable between a zone substation bus and a network
substation or between network substations. Each end of a primary cable is protected with a circuit breaker using
differential protection. No distribution substation load is supplied directly from the primary cable system. The
primary system is designed to be loaded up to the point where, in the event of a single cable fault contingency, no
primary cables will become overloaded and no loss of supply will result. The standard conductor is 300mm 2 Al/0.25in2
Cu PILC giving each circuit a rating of 365A or 7MVA. As per the 2006 11kV architecture review findings, the primary
11kV system will be changed over time. As assets come up for replacement, the associated network will be converted
to a secondary system and therefore peak loads will tend to be around 50% of the cable capacity.
116 Lifecycle asset management – Underground cables – 11kV
Table 4-11a 11kV feeder cable circuit listing
Rating (A)**
Cable circuit Install year Type Size Length (m)
summer/winter
Addington 1/2688-Foster 12 (2 cables) 1950/93 PILCA 0.5 Al and 300 Al 700* 160
Addington 1/2722-Foster 6 (2 cables) 1993 PILCA 2x 300 Al 700* 160
Addington 1/2802-Foster 19 (2 cables) 1950/93 PILCA 0.3 Cu and 300 Al 700* 150
Addington 2/10/Foster 4-Knox 13 1965/2001 PILCA 0.5 Cu and 400 Cu 273/324** 2,960
Addington 2/3-Knox 3 1965 PILCA 0.5 Cu 273/324** 3,185
Addington 2/11-Knox 17 1965 PILCA 0.5 Cu 273/324** 3,175
Addington 2/4-Spreydon 15 1964 PILCA 0.5 Cu 282/338** 2,955
Addington 1/2782-Montreal 10 1963/2000 PILCA 0.5 Cu and 400 Cu 306/334** 2,500
Addington 1/2822-Montreal 15 1963/2000 PILCA 0.5 Cu and 400 Cu 306/334** 2,500
Addington 1/2642-Montreal 4 1963/94 PILCA 0.5 Cu 306/334** 2,500
Bromley 5-Pages Kearneys 4 1966/73 PILCA 0.5 Cu 375/466 1,560
Bromley 6-Pages Kearneys 10 1966 PILCA 0.5 Cu 375/466 1,560
Bromley 7-Pages Kearneys 16 1966 PILCA 0.5 Cu 375/466 1,560
Hawthornden 31-Ilam 2 2005 XLPE 400 Cu 220* 2849
Hawthornden 32-Ilam 14 2005 XLPE 400 Cu 220* 2849
* Nominal rating - investigation to determine full rating to be completed.

** Rating when one cable is out of service.
*** Rating when one circuit is out of service.
Overhead line 11kV cable termination with

surge arrestors fitted
Lifecycle asset management – Underground cables – 11kV 117
Secondary 11kV system

This system consists of radial feeders, most of which are supplied from network substations, however, as we
transition our 11kV system to the new architecture, more 11kV feeders will be supplied directly from the zone
substation bus. Depending on the area and load supplied, secondary feeders have nominal ratings ranging between
2 and 7MVA. Secondary feeders are loaded to the extent that, in the event of a single fault contingency, it should be
possible to split the faulty feeder so that the healthy portions can be supplied from adjacent feeders without
overloading those feeders. Historically this would mean that, under normal circumstances, any individual feeder
should not be loaded above 70% of cable rating. The new architecture requires that the size of the11kV feeders is
sufficient to provide the full load of adjacent feeders.
The age of the cables making up this asset covers a wide range. The cable failure modes are monitored to ensure
the high reliability of cables. To date the majority of failure modes have included:
 third party damage
 damage of cable during installation or other disturbance
 failure of terminations.
To manage these issues the following actions are taken:

 proactive promotion to contractors of cable maps and locating services
 free training (including a DVD) on working safely around cables, including reading cable location maps
 extensive safety advertising in the media
 inspection of contractors during the laying of cables
 ultrasonic and partial discharge monitoring of terminations in zone and network substations
 new cables installed with an orange coloured sheath to allow easier identification.

The condition of these cables is largely assessed by monitoring any failures. Condition testing of a sample of varying
cable types and ages has been undertaken using the partial discharge mapping technique. A limited amount of
partial discharge was noticeable in a few joints. However, there were no major areas of concern. This indicates that
cables are in good condition.
We anticipate that cables that have been subjected to stresses caused by the earthquakes will have higher failure
rates in the next few years as compromised cable sheaths and insulation develop faults. A programme has been
developed to test 11kV (and other) cables in areas that were subjected to significant earthquake damage to
determine whether maintenance or replacement is required.
Figure 4-11b Underground cables 11kV – age profile
Kilometres
500
400
300
200
100
0
FY44
118 Lifecycle asset management – Underground cables – 11kV


Technical specifications:
 NW71.12.03 – Cabling and network asset recording
 NW72.22.02 – Excavation, backfilling and restoration of surfaces.
 NW74.23.04 – Distribution cable 11kV
Asset data
 location (GIS)
 circuit ratings
 joint age and type
Data improvement is ongoing but there are limited opportunities to improve what we already know about this asset
group. We closely monitor the cause of any failures to see if any trends develop with a particular cable/joint type.

We have programmes in place to address identified failure modes of cables. These failure modes have been
predominately related to the terminations where an inspection and replacement programme has been implemented.
We will undertake an on-going testing programme on 11kV cables identified within the areas that were subjected to
significant earthquake damage.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: 11kV underground cables.

Approximately 4% of our 11kV cables are installed in areas subjected to significant earthquake damage. We need to
replace some 11kV cables within these areas and will identify the cables to be replaced after more in-depth testing.
We expect replacement of these cables will occur over the next five to ten years.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 - Replacement budgets: 11kV underground cables.

Additional 11kV cables are installed as a result of the following:
 reinforcement plans (refer to section 5.6 – Network development proposals)
 conversion from overhead to underground as directed by Christchurch City and Selwyn District Councils
 developments as a result of new connections and subdivisions.

We have no plans to dispose of any of this asset, other than minor disposal associated with changes and
rearrangements in the network. No decision has been made as to the fate of assets in the ‘red zone’.
Lifecycle asset management – Underground cables – distribution 400V 119
4.12 Underground cables – distribution 400V

Our 400V cable network is 2,661km of circuit length and is largely concentrated in the urban area of Christchurch.
The earlier cables are of paper/lead construction. PVC insulation was introduced in 1966 to replace some paper/lead
cables. XLPE insulation was introduced in 1974, mainly because it has better thermal properties than PVC.
We have some 5,700 distribution cabinets installed on our 400V cable network. Sufficient cabinets are needed to
allow the system to be reconfigured (that is, each radial feeder must be capable of supplying or being supplied from
the feeder adjacent to it) in the event of component failure or other requirements. Distribution cabinets are all above
ground. Older ones are generally steel and the later ones are a PVC cover on a steel frame.
We have approximately 34,000 distribution boxes in our 400V cable network. These are generally installed on
alternate boundaries on both sides of the street. Several types of distribution box are in service. All are above
ground. The majority are a PVC cover on a steel base frame, although some older types are concrete and steel.
Street-lighting cables are also included in this asset group. The street-lighting cable network consists of 2,079km
circuit length of underground cable and is largely concentrated in the urban area of Christchurch. Approximately
60% of this cable is included as a fifth core in the 400V distribution cables.

Many system configurations are used for 400V cable distribution, depending on the area to be supplied, but generally
it is a two-sided system with cables on both sides of the street. These cables are fed from a kiosk distribution
substation via multiple feeders, each with a rating of around 250A. The cables are buried directly in the ground.
Jointing methods have been changed to improve performance.
The earthquakes in FY11 caused a number of 400V cable faults. They were mainly confined to areas subjected to
large lateral movement of the ground in Brighton, Dallington and Avondale.
To date the majority of failure modes have included:
 third party damage
 damage of cable during installation or other disturbance causing premature failure.
To manage these issues the following actions are taken:
 proactive promotion to contractors of cable maps and locating services
 free training on working safely around cables, including map reading and a DVD
 extensive safety advertising in the media
 inspection of contractors during the laying of cables
 new cable is now required to be installed with an orange coloured sheath to allow easier identification.

Cable laying has been performed to a good standard and we are not exposed to any great extent from external
damage or faulty joints.
We anticipate cables that have been subjected to earthquake stress will have higher failure rates as faults develop in
sheaths and insulation. A programme has been developed to run over the next few years to test the 400V and other
cables in areas that were subjected to significant earthquake damage to determine whether maintenance or
replacement is required.
The above-ground distribution boxes are in reasonable condition. We inspect them every five years, with any defects
remedied in a subsequent contract.
120 Lifecycle asset management – Underground cables – distribution 400V
Figure 4-12a Underground cables 400V – age profile
Kilometres
500
400
300
200
100
0
FY44

 NW70.00.29 - LV underground cables and hardware

Technical specifications:
 NW72.22.02 – Excavation, backfilling and restoration of surfaces
 NW72.22.03 – Distribution enclosure installation
 NW72.21.12 – Network inspection.
 NW74.23.11 – Distribution cable LV
Asset data
 location (GIS)
 distribution box types/condition.
further our knowledge of the condition of the part of the asset that is above ground. We also closely monitor the
cause of any failures to see if trends develop with a particular cable/joint type.
Lifecycle asset management – Underground cables – distribution 400V 121

The condition of this asset is monitored through:
 an above ground five-yearly visual inspection programme of the asset and its terminations.
 insulation is being upgraded on cables connected to the overhead system, where insulation is identified as
degraded due to the effects of ultra violet light
 to remedy safety issues old cast iron cable termination boxes with heat shrink are being replaced.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: 400V underground cables.

We have made an allowance for 400V cables that may need replacement due to damage caused by the earthquakes.
We also plan to upgrade our existing distribution cabinets to a safer and more secure design, see section 6.2 – Risk
management-safety.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 - Replacement budgets: 400V underground cables.

We will install additional 400V cables as a result of the following:
 conversion of reticulation from overhead to underground as directed by the city and district councils
 developments as a result of new connections and subdivisions.

We have no plans to dispose of any of this asset, other than minor disposals associated with changes and
rearrangements in the network.
No decision has been made as to the fate of assets in the ‘red zone’.
122 Lifecycle asset management – Communication cables
4.13 Communication cables

Our 1,063km of communication cables are predominantly located in Christchurch. Most are armoured construction.
They are laid to most building substations and are used for SCADA, telephone, data services, ripple control, metering
and many other purposes in addition to their original function of providing unit (pilot wire) protection communications.
The distribution network in the urban area is predominantly underground cable made up of primary and secondary
11kV systems. The primary system is operated in closed rings with the secondary system operated radially from
network substations on the primary system. Because of the low electrical impedance of cables at 11kV, there is very
little variation in fault level throughout the distribution network and thus little opportunity for application of inverse-
time based protection co-ordination. To obtain protection co-ordination in the 11kV network it has thus been
necessary to use differential or unit protection on all but the last radial sections of the network.
The most common and effective differential protection uses common twisted-pair communication cables for end-to-
end measurement of electrical parameters on the protected section of cable. Therefore as new lengths of primary
network cable are laid, a communication cable is laid with the electrical power cable. In general it is uneconomic to
lay single pair communication cables, as required only for the unit protection, and thus multi-pair cables are installed.
It is not possible to use a dedicated communications provider’s network for unit protection. The unit protection signal
levels are incompatible with normal commercial communications and, in addition, it is not possible to obtain the very
high reliability levels provided by a dedicated end-to-end cable laid with the power cable.

The standard cables laid are 0.9mm2 Cu. These are reasonably heavy cables in communication terms, but this large
conductor size is required for the unit protection communications over longer cable routes.
Two separate types of optical-fibre cable, each containing multiple fibres have been laid with new 66kV cables, multi-
mode for cable temperature measurement and single mode for communications purposes. The protection equipment
for the 66kV cables use single mode fibres.
The common failure point for these cables is the joints. Epoxy filled joints do not stop the ingress of moisture.

These communication cables are in very good condition, with the steel wire armoured variety being the most robust.
Some older unarmoured cables of the 2core/2pair type are prone to failure. Where condition is proven to be poor,
these cables are replaced or bypassed when additional power cables are installed during system reinforcement.
Other options include the use of radio communication channels or the use of dedicated communication providers for
services other than power system protection.
Figure 4-13a Communication cables – age profile
Kilometres
500
400
300
200
100
0
FY44
Lifecycle asset management – Communication cables 123

 NW70.00.28 - Underground cables - communication
 NW72.22.02 – Excavation, backfilling and restoration of surfaces.
 NW74.23.11 – Distribution cable LV
Asset data
 location (GIS)
 distribution box types/condition
 database of the cables and their connections.
further our knowledge of the condition of the part of the asset which is above ground. We also closely monitor the
cause of any failures to see if any trends develop with a particular cable/joint type.
The communication cables form a critical part of our network control system. Therefore we locate a duplicate copy
of all control cable connection details at our mapping center.

The condition of this asset is monitored by a test of the unit protection system every four years, this includes the
most important of these cables. The remaining cables are generally monitored by the services using them, such as
SCADA and unit protection. Communication error rates are tracked and recorded by SCADA.
Maintenance work is carried out to repair cables as required when faults occur.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Communication cables.

An allowance has been identified for cable replacement where repair is shown to be costly.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 - Replacement budgets: Communication cables.

New cables are installed as required to form part of new sections of the 11kV primary distribution system. Optical
fibre cables are installed as part of any new 66kV or 33kV cable installation.

We have no plans to dispose of any part of this asset, other than minor disposal associated with changes and
rearrangements in the network.
124 Lifecycle asset management – high voltage circuit breakers
4.14 High voltage circuit breakers

Circuit breakers are installed to provide safe interruption of both fault and load currents during power system faults.
They are strategically placed in the network for line/cable, local transformer and ripple plant protection.
66kV circuit breakers

66kV circuit breakers are installed at zone substations
predominately in outdoor switchyards. The exceptions
being Armagh, Dallington and McFaddens zone
substations where the ‘outdoor’ circuit breakers have
been installed indoors in specially designed buildings (see
photo in section 4.4.1).
The majority of our 66kV circuit breakers use SF6 gas as
the interruption medium.
33kV circuit breakers

A mix of outdoor and indoor 33kV circuit breakers are
installed in the 33kV zone substations.
Those installed pre-circa 2001 are mainly outdoor

minimum oil interruption type (shown top left). We are
now moving from outdoor to indoor switchgear. This has
the advantage of improved security and public safety.
The newer circuit breakers at Duvauchelle, Hornby

(shown lower left) , Lincoln, Motukarara and Prebbleton
zone substations are an indoor metal-clad vacuum
interruption type.
Lifecycle asset management – high voltage circuit breakers 125
11kV substation circuit breakers

These substation circuit breakers are installed
indoors and used for the protection of primary
equipment and the distribution network. The older
units use oil or SF6 gas as an interruption medium,
while those installed post 1992 are a vacuum
interruption type. 11kV circuit breakers are used
throughout the entire rural and urban networks.
Those shown (left) are the vacuum type used in our
11kV switchgear replacement programme.
11kV line circuit breakers (Pole mounted)

Overhead line circuit breakers are pole mounted
and have a reclose capability. They are installed in
selected locations to improve feeder reliability by
isolating a portion of the overall substation feeder.
Here the circuit breaker is shown with its
associated SCADA control and UHF
communication equipment mounted below the
circuit breaker.
Table 4-14a Circuit breakers in service
66kV 66kV 33kV 33kV

Location 11kV
outdoor indoor outdoor indoor
Zone substation 75 13 36 26 751
Network substation 1,026
Distribution substation 52
Overhead line 51
126 Lifecycle asset management – high voltage circuit breakers

Substation circuit breakers
The rating requirements of circuit breakers are determined by the local load of the network. As a result load
current and fault current interruption capabilities vary for circuit breakers of a given operating voltage.
Table 4-14b Circuit breaker ratings
Circuit breaker voltage Current rating Fault rating
66kV 1,200A-2,500A 21.9kA-31.5kA
33kV 400A-1,600A 6kA-29kA
11kV 200A-2,500A 2kA-26.5kA
The overall performance of circuit breakers is satisfactory. Isolated cases of common mode faults have occurred in some
of the older circuit breakers.
The 33kV and 11kV indoor switchgear units are securely fixed to concrete floors. The auxiliary and voltage transformers
are strapped to the switchgear frames and spare circuit breakers are also restrained. These precautions proved to be
very effective in the 2010/2011 earthquakes.
Pole mounted 11kV line circuit breakers

Although line circuit breakers are performing satisfactorily, we have encountered problems with the electronic protection
and control equipment on the older switches. Suitable alternatives to these units have been investigated and are now
being installed in the network as part of the replacement project.
Table 4-14c Line circuit breaker ratings
Type Current rating Fault rating
11kV older 3 phase 400A 6kA
11kV newer 3 phase 630A 12.5kA
11kV SWER single phase 200A 3kA

All circuit breakers at zone substations are in satisfactory working condition. New methods of condition monitoring have
enabled us to detect defects at an early stage. Older minimum-oil type units are approximately 50 years old and insulation
levels are slowly deteriorating.
Table 4-14d Circuit breaker average age (years)
Circuit breaker
66kV 33kV 11kV
interruption type
Oil 37 32 39
Vacuum n/a 5 9
Gas (SF6) 6 n/a 22
All 9 17 28
In FY11 EA Technology Ltd was engaged to develop a condition based risk management (CBRM) model for our high voltage
circuit breakers. This model utilises asset information, engineering knowledge and experience to define, justify and target
asset renewal. It provides a proven and industry accepted means of determining the optimum balance between on-going
renewal and Capex forecasts.
Lifecycle asset management - high voltage circuit breakers 127
The CBRM model calculates the health index and probability of failure of each individual circuit breaker. This
effectively gives the circuit breaker a ranking which is used when determining the replacement strategy. Note that
while the model calculates the asset ranking it is still up to the engineer to prioritise the replacement schedule.
The results of this process have shown that the overall condition of our circuit breakers is very good and we are on
target with our replacement programme. The following graphs show the health index profile and age profile of our
protection assets.
Figure 4-14a Circuit breakers - health index profile
700
Good
600
Fair
500 Poor
400
300
200
100
0
(0-1) (1-2) (2-3) (3-4) (4-5) (5-6) (6-7) (7-8) (8-9) (9-10) (10+) No
Category Result
Figure 4-14b Circuit breakers 33 and 66kV - age profile
50
40
30
20
10
0
FY44
Total Gas Vacuum Oil
Figure 4-14c Circuit breakers 11kV - age profile
500
400
300
200
100
0
FY44
Total Gas Vacuum Oil
Orion New Zealand Limited 10 year Asset Management Plan - From 1 April 2014 SECTION 4
128 Lifecycle asset management - high voltage circuit breakers

 NW70.00.33 - Circuit breakers
 NW70.53.01 – Substation design
 NW70.57.01 – Protection design
 NW70.59.01 – Earthing design.
 NW72.23.03 – Zone substation inspection
 NW72.23.07 – Zone substation maintenance
 NW72.23.15 – Oil circuit breaker servicing after operation under fault conditions.
 NW74.23.23 – Switchgear - 400V indoor
 NW74.23.25 – Circuit breaker - 66kV
 NW74.23.28 – Circuit breaker - 33kV indoor.
Operator instructions, developed in-house, are used for each different type of circuit breaker in our network.
Asset data
 location (GIS and asset register)
 type and serial numbers
 age
 circuit diagrams
 test results
 movement history
further our knowledge of the asset condition.

Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Switchgear (this includes
switchgear and circuit breakers).
All circuit breakers are visually inspected for oil leaks and general condition. Major invasive maintenance is carried
out at regular intervals as shown in the following table.
Table 4-14e Switchgear inspection and maintenance schedule
Inspection Major maintenance

Switchgear location frequency frequency
(months) (years)
Zone substation 2 4
Network substation 6 8
Distribution substation 6 8
Outdoor ground mounted 6 4
Outdoor pole mounted circuit breaker 12 8
Outdoor pole mounted air break isolator -

24
Load-break and motorised types
SECTION 4 Orion New Zealand Limited 10 year Asset Management Plan - From 1 April 2014
Lifecycle asset management - high voltage circuit breakers 129
As part of this maintenance we:

 inspect
 clean and lubricate
 repair or replace contacts, insulators and mechanisms
 profile the tripping function
 service or replace the oil
 thermal image outdoor equipment to identify hotspots
 monitor partial discharge as follows:
With the age spread of the switchgear, additional testing has been introduced to detect breakdown in the
insulation at an early stage. This means that targeted remedial work can be undertaken without disruption to
consumers.
This is achieved by partial discharge non-invasive locating and monitoring. This technology provides
excellent results and has revealed potential problems at an early stage. Partial discharge checks are carried
out at different intervals depending on the age and location of the switchgear:
Zone substations
 location testing – this is done at six-monthly intervals on circuit breakers over 40 years old and annually
on the balance
 monitoring – is a system that is set up to continuously monitor any transient earth voltage signals. For
circuit breakers more than 40 years old, it is installed on site for seven days annually. Circuit breakers
less than 40 years old are monitored for three days every four years.
Network substations
 location testing – this is done annually on circuit breakers over 30 years old and every two years on the
balance
 monitoring – for circuit breakers more than 40 years old, it is installed on site for three days every four
years.
Line circuit breakers

 The line circuit breakers have a regular maintenance procedure carried out every eight years. The
exterior and control relay are inspected annually. Our SCADA provides initial indication of problems.

Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 – Replacement budgets: Switchgear (this includes
All circuit breakers have been reviewed based on a number of factors:
 safety
 performance
 condition
 maintenance issues
 operation
 logistical support
 working environment
 age.
Safety issues are given priority to ensure protection of the public, employees and contractors. Performance and
asset condition are considered on an individual basis and are used to develop the replacement programme. The
criticality and location, i.e. zone or network substation, is also considered and factored into the programme.
Older circuit breakers are normally replaced with a modern equivalent, however in some cases they are replaced
with a high voltage switch if it is deemed suitable. The replacement programme is regularly reviewed to take into
account the changing requirements of the network.
130 Lifecycle asset management - high voltage circuit breakers
Batteries
A four-year cycle of stand-by battery replacement is carried out in tandem with our switchgear inspections.
Alkaline batteries previously used have been replaced with sealed lead-acid batteries with a five-year design life.
Significant savings can be achieved over the previous situation where the existing alkaline batteries were
maintained at a high per unit cost. Replacement lead-acid batteries can be purchased for a fraction of the previous
cost.

The decision to install additional circuit breakers is generally driven by consumer demand.
For a list of projects containing this asset see section 5.6 - Network development proposals.

Circuit breakers are disposed of as part of the replacement costs.
Lifecycle asset management - Switchgear high voltage and low voltage 131
4.15 Switchgear-high and low voltage

Magnefix ring-main unit

These switches are independent manually operated, quick-
make, quick-break design with all live parts fully enclosed in
cast resin. Each phase is switched separately or three phases
are operated simultaneously with a three phase bridge. These
switches are the predominant type installed in our 11kV cable
distribution network. They are mainly installed in distribution
kiosks and as secondary switchgear in network substations.
They range in configuration from a two cable unit to a five cable
unit, making a total of over 10,000 individual outlets in our
network.
Ring-main unit (RMU)

These units are arc-contained, fully enclosed metal-clad 11kV
switchgear. They combine both load-break switches and
vacuum circuit breakers. With the addition of electronic
protection relays they can be fully automated. They are usually
installed in kiosks or as secondary switchgear in zone and
network substations. They are three or four panel units.
Oil switch, fused and non-fused

These switches were installed in our 11kV cable distribution
network as secondary switchgear in network and distribution
building substations. They were installed before low
maintenance oil-free Magnefix ring-main units were proven.
We no longer install these switches.
Some of the installations have locally designed bus connections
that are below our current standards. Incidents and difficulties
in arranging outages to carry out servicing have occurred,
therefore we are gradually replacing these switches with ring-
main units.
Air break isolator (ABI)

11kV and 33kV line ABIs are pole mounted in our rural overhead
network. The substation 66kV and 33kV ABIs are used as
isolation points in the substation structures and are mounted on
support posts or hang from an overhead gantry.
A few 11kV ABIs in remote areas have been automated by
installing a power-actuator to allow remote operation for fault
clearing. This speeds up the isolation of the faulty sections of
the network.
132 Lifecycle asset management - Switchgear high voltage and low voltage
Sectionaliser
11kV sectionalisers are pole mounted, oil filled and
installed to perform a similar function to the remotely
controlled ABIs. The operation is automated, with the
sectionaliser opening after detecting a pre-set
number of unsuccessful attempts to re-liven by an
upstream circuit breaker.
Sectionalisers are not remotely monitored.
Low voltage switch

Installed generally in distribution substations, these
switches form the primary connection between
11kV/400V transformers and the 400V distribution
network, giving isolation points and fusing capability
using high rupturing current (HRC) links. All new
installations are of the DIN type (shown left).
The majority of existing older panels (approximately
3,000) are an exposed-bus (skeleton) and V-type fuse
design. As accidental contact is a risk with these
designs, we have a programme to replace them with
the modern DIN type.
Table 4-15a Switchgear quantities
Device type Quantity
66kV Substation air break isolator 115
33kV Substation air break isolator 71
33kV Line air break isolator 19
11kV Xiria ring-main vacuum switch/VCB 24
11kV Magnefix ring-main unit 3,924
11kV Oil switch 90
11kV Line air break isolator 962
11kV Sectionaliser 4

An MSU is a manually operated quick-make, quick-break switch design rated at 400A. Any failure is usually due to
secondary factors such as a cable termination failure.
Xiria ring-main unit

These units combine both 630A load-break switches and 400A or 200A vacuum circuit breakers. Any failures in these
units are usually due to secondary factors such as cable terminations.
Oil switch
Oil switches are manually operated. They have caused some problems over the years due to oil leaks and jammed
operating mechanisms.

A standard existing ABI installed on our rural network (33 and 11kV) is rated at 400A. Load-breaks have been
installed on a number of isolators in key locations to increase the current rating to 600A. All new ABIs are 600A with
load-break. The substation ABIs are unable to break circuit load current.
The performance of our ABIs is generally good, although isolators that have not operated for a long time have a
tendency to seize up. Loose terminations and contacts can also cause problems on older ABIs.
Sectionaliser
Sectionalisers installed on the network are rated at 200A continuous, 9kA fault. As they age, they are unreliable in
their operation.
Low voltage switch

The standard rating of the low voltage DIN switches is 630A, with panel busbar ratings of 800A or 1500A installed to
meet distribution substation and feeder capacities.
The older ‘skeleton’ type panels and switches have good electrical performance, however, the exposed busbars
create safety issues.
Some issues have become apparent with DIN type switches. These have generally been related to
overheating created by the quality of connection and installation. Overheating is a more significant issue for DIN
switches than for other switches, due to their enclosed construction.

The condition of Magnefix units within the network is very good.
Xiria ring-main unit

The condition of the Xiria ring-main units within the network is very good.
Oil switch
Oil switches are maintained in good operational condition. Any with problematic operating mechanisms can be
replaced with a ring-main unit.

The condition of our line ABIs on the network is generally good. However, the older types are reaching the end of
their economic life.
Sectionaliser
The condition of some sectionalisers is deteriorating, and a detailed assessment is being carried out on all units. A
few have reached the point where replacement is the most economic option.
Low voltage switch

The low voltage panels and switches are generally in good condition.
CBRM model
In 2011 EA Technology Ltd was engaged to develop a condition based risk management (CBRM) model for our HV and
LV switchgear. This model utilises asset information, engineering knowledge and experience to define, justify and
target asset renewal. It provides a proven and industry accepted means of determining the optimum balance
between on-going renewal and Capex forecasts.
The CBRM model calculates the health index and probability of failure of each individual switch. This effectively gives
the switchgear a ranking which is used when determining the replacement strategy. Note that while the model
calculates the asset ranking it is still up to the engineer to prioritise the replacement schedule.
The results of this process have shown that the overall condition of our switchgear is very good and we are on target
with our replacement programme. The following graphs show the health index profile and age profile of our
switchgear assets.
Figure 4-15a Switchgear 11kV - health index profile
1400
Good
1200
Fair
1000 Poor
800
600
400
200
0
(0-1) (1-2) (2-3) (3-4) (4-5) (5-6) (6-7) (7-8) (8-9) (9-10) (10+) No
Category Result
Figure 4-15b Ringmain units 11kV - age profile
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
0
FY44
Total Magnefix/Xiria Oil
Figure 4-15c Line ABI 11kV and 33kV - age profile
300
250
200
150
100
50
0
FY44
Total Loadbreak Standard

 NW70.00.24 - Switchgear HV and LV

 NW70.51.01 - Overhead line design
 NW70.52.01 - Underground cable design
 NW72.21.04 – 11kV Air break isolator maintenance
 NW72.23.04 — Network substation inspection
 NW72.23.06 — Network substation maintenance.
We have developed operator instructions for each of the different types and models of switchgear installed in our
network.
Asset data
 type
 serial numbers (except for older ABIs)
 age (estimated for older ABIs)
 test results
 movement history (except for ABIs)

Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Switchgear (this includes
Ring-main units
11kV ring-main units are virtually maintenance free, with the exception of minor dusting from time-to-time. The
exceptions are those units in close proximity to the sea. They are maintained every four years.
Oil switch
Oil switches in indoor situations are maintained as part of the programme of work (four or eight yearly) for the
substation in which they are installed.

A check on the operation of standard ABIs is included when a line retighten contract is carried out each year. Other
maintenance work is on an as-required basis.
Sectionaliser
Sectionalisers are maintained every eight years, with an annual external inspection.
Low voltage switchgear

We have an inspection regime for panels and switches. Substation low voltage panels are inspected every six
months. Other switches are inspected on a five yearly basis. We are over halfway through a four-year programme to
install safety screens over the exposed live busbars and switches.

Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 – Replacement budgets: Switchgear (this includes
Ring-main units
There are no current programmes to replace these switches.
Oil switch
Most of these switches are nearing the end of their useful lives, and are progressively being replaced with ring-main
units.

A programme to replace older ABIs commenced in FY06, and will run through to FY20. The replacement switches
have polymer insulators and corrosion resistant bearings that will not seize. They do not have operating handles and
are instead operated by a hot-stick. This makes them more secure, and removes the need for earthing.
Sectionaliser
We plan to replace all of the sectionalisers. Based on operational and economic criteria line circuit breakers are
being installed in their place. There are only three left in service.
Low voltage switchgear

We plan to upgrade all exposed skeleton panels with DIN type disconnects.

We plan to install additional switchgear during projects that improve the reliability of the network, and in works to
satisfy consumer demand.

These assets are disposed of as part of replacement costs.
Lifecycle asset management – Power transformers and regulators 137
4.16 Power transformers and regulators

Transformer
Power transformers are installed at zone
substations to transform subtransmission voltages
of 66 and 33kV to a distribution voltage of 11kV. The
majority are fitted with on-load tapchangers and
electronic management systems to maintain the
required delivery voltage on the network.
The larger 40MVA transformers weigh approximately
45 tonnes. The smaller 10MVA transformers weigh
approximately 30 tonnes. The cooling radiators are
both integral with the main tank and stand-alone.
All our transformer mounting arrangements have
been upgraded to current seismic standards, and all
transformers have had a bund constructed to contain
any oil spill that could occur.
Table 4-16a Power transformer Table 4-16b
quantities Regulator quantities
(includes emergency spares) (includes emergency spares)
Rating MVA 66kV 33kV Rating MVA 11kV

30/36 2 20 3
20/40 25 4 12
20/24 2 1 2
11.5/23 7 7 0.75 2
10/20 4 0.65 1
7.5/10 6 1
7.5 17
2.5 4
Total 43 33 Total 20
Line voltage regulator

Regulators are installed at various locations to
perform two different functions:
 provide capacity (via voltage regulation) for
security against the loss of a zone substation
 provide automatic voltage regulation on fixed tap
transformers.
We use a wide range of ratings, from 650kVA to
20MVA, to cater for different load densities within
our network. All regulators are oil filled, with
automatic voltage control by an on-load tap-changer
or induction. The installation designs allow for quick
removal and re-installation.
138 Lifecycle asset management – Power transformers and regulators

Power transformers in our network are capable of operating continuously at their rated capacity, or at a higher rating
for short periods, depending on the ambient air temperature. Detailed data records of electrical loading on the
transformers are compiled via the SCADA system. This data is analysed regularly.
Two distinct peak load periods affect the urban and rural networks at different times. The rural peak load occurs in
summer, predominately due to irrigation. With increased development of residential subdivisions to the south and
south west of the city, winter load in the rural area is increasing. However, when compared to the peak summer load,
this increase is relatively low. The peak load period for the urban network occurs in winter.
Our transformers suffered virtually no damage in the earthquakes. Our work to upgrade the transformer mountings
has proven to be very effective. While some oil surge-protection units operated, our restoration times were very quick.

Transformers
Oil and winding insulation condition significantly impact on how a transformer performs. Through a variety of
assessments, including visual inspection, insulation testing and other condition-monitoring techniques, we have
determined the useful life expectancy of each transformer. These techniques have shown that in general the power
transformers are in good condition and should achieve the industry nominal life expectancy.
Figure 4-16a Power transformers - age profile
20
15
10
0
FY44
Total 66kV 33kV
Tap-changer mal-operation has historically caused the most significant failures in transformers. As a result, a
proactive tap-changer maintenance/refurbishment programme has been implemented.
The two transformers at Brighton zone substation were submerged in water as a consequence of liquefaction during
the February 2011 earthquake. The transformers were removed from service and a half-life refurbishment was carried
out. By bringing forward this planned maintenance by two years we were able to save them from permanent damage.
Once the refurbishment was completed they were returned to service at our new Rawhiti zone substation (built after
the earthquake to replace Brighton). We relocated a 23MVA transformer from Hawthornden zone substation to
Brighton to maintain the electricity supply to the eastern suburbs while this work was undertaken.
A condition assessment and subsequent review of the single phase transformers at Papanui (recently purchased from
Transpower) found that the condition of these transformers does not meet our current standard. Refer to 4.16.6 for
replacement plan.
Voltage regulators
The three regulators at Heathcote are an older design. The first two were refurbished before going into service with
Orion and are working satisfactorily. In FY10 a third regulator was installed to provide security for the Lyttelton
supply.
Lifecycle asset management – Power transformers and regulators 139

 NW70.00.23 - Power transformers

 NW72.23.25 – Power transformer servicing
 NW72.23.01 – Mineral insulating oil maintenance
 NW72.23.03 – Zone substation inspection
 NW72.23.07 – Zone substation maintenance.
 NW74.23.07 – Major power transformer 7.5/10MVA 66/11kV
 NW74.23.15 – Voltage regulator 11kV
 NW74.23.16 – Major power transformer 11.5/23MVA 66/11kV
 NW74.23.22 – Major power transformer 2.5MVA 33/11kV
 NW74.23.24 – Major power transformer 20/40MVA 66/11kV.
Engineering drawings, as well as electrical drawings, are held for all transformers and related components.
Asset data
 type and serial numbers (transformer and tap-changer)
 age
 circuit diagrams/maintenance history
 test results/oil analysis results
 movement history.
our knowledge of the asset condition.

Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Transformers (this includes
distribution transformers).
Transformers
Transformers are inspected every two months and tested regularly, with corrective action when required. Tests include
a four-yearly test of the winding insulation, and annual oil tests for breakdown, moisture, acidity and dissolved gas
analysis.
The oil in on-load tap-changers is reconditioned annually. Invasive maintenance is done every four years as part of the
zone substation maintenance cycle. Introduction of electronic devices has improved the monitoring and control of
transformer equipment. Therefore, it is now possible to analyse the trending of transformer operating parameters and
mitigate any issues as they occur, rather than picking them up during cyclic maintenance.
140 Lifecycle asset management – Power transformers and regulators
Voltage regulators
Voltage regulators installed at the zone substations are included in the annual and four-yearly tap-changer
maintenance programmes. The new 4MVA regulators are included in a separate section of the distribution
maintenance round and are serviced on an eight-yearly cycle.

As a result of the condition assessment carried out on the Papanui transformers we have decided to replace the
single phase units with two 20/40MVA three phase units. This work will be coordinated to take place once
Waimakiriri zone substation has been commissioned. This zone substation is required to take some of the load off
Papanui substation.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 – Replacement budgets: Transformers (this includes
distribution transformers).
Tap-changers
A project to replace unreliable tap-changers with vacuum units on some older 33/11kV transformers was completed
in FY13.

For projects containing this asset group see section 5.6 - Network development proposals.

The transformer at Springston zone substation will be removed from service and disposed of in the next few years.
The Papanui units will be disposed of as part of the replacement works.
Lifecycle asset management – Distribution transformers 141
4.17 Distribution transformers

Distribution transformers are installed on our network to transform the voltage to a suitable level for consumer
connections. They have a ratio of 11000/400V, and range in capacity from 5kVA to 1,500kVA.
Sizes up to 200kVA can be installed in the overhead system on a single pole. The larger sizes are only ground-
mounted, either outdoors or inside a building/kiosk.
Table 4-17a Distribution transformer quantities owned by Orion (in-service)
Rating kVA 5 7.5 10 15 25 30 50 75 100 150 200 300 500 750 1000 1250 1500 Total
Quantity 57 297 182 1,452 365 1,928 1,147 174 702 154 1,491 1,650 765 273 152 3 9 10,828
Typical 300kVA transformer (Circa 1980).

Transformer utilisation is measured as the ratio of maximum demand in kVA to installed nameplate rating. For
individual transformers, this ratio typically ranges from below 30% to above 130%.
The measure of overall distribution transformer utilisation required for disclosure is the ratio of the total system
demand to total distribution transformer capacity. This has fallen slowly over the last 20+ years to its present value
of approximately 29%.
Small pole-mounted transformers usually serve only a small number of consumers. Capacities are normally only
reviewed when significant new load is connected. Utilisation factors are typically low.
Larger transformers are fitted with thermal maximum-demand meters which are read twice-yearly. Measured
utilisation factors range up to about 140%. For typical cyclic loads, we have determined that maximum demands of
about 130% of rated continuous ratings are acceptable, before upgrading action is required.
When distribution transformer maximum demand exceeds 130% of nameplate rating, a larger transformer is
installed or load transferred to another substation if available. Where substation utilisation is low (<50% with no load
growth predicted), the transformer will be changed or removed when this can be economically justified.

Our larger ground-mounted distribution transformers are in good condition and are inspected on site every six
months. The condition of the pole-mounted transformers varies depending on their age and location. They are only
maintained, if this is considered appropriate, when removed from service for other reasons.
There are 10 single-phase banks of transformers over 50 years of age. Manufactured between 1937 and 1950, they
have iron losses that are four to six times; and copper losses that are two to three times that of a modern
transformer. Most have a high oil acidity, indicating that they are nearing the end of their lives.
142 Lifecycle asset management – Distribution transformers
Figure 4-17a Distribution transformers - age profile
1500
1250
1000
750
500
250
0
FY44

 NW70.00.40. - Distribution transformers

 NW70.53.01 – Substation design.
 NW72.23.16 – Transformer installation
 NW72.23.02 – Transformer maintenance (distribution).
 NW74.23.05 – Transformer - distribution 200-1000kVA.
Asset data
 age and rating
 test results
 movement and maintenance history
 maximum demand load records.
The actual substation where they are located is unknown for some 550 transformers, although this number is
steadily reducing as works are undertaken that identify specific transformers.

With the exception of the network substation transformers, distribution transformers are normally maintained when
they are removed from the network for loading reasons or substation works. Their condition is then assessed on a
lifetime costs basis and we decide, prior to any maintenance, whether it would be more economic to replace them. If
we decide to maintain them they will be improved to a state where it can be expected the transformer will give at
Lifecycle asset management – Distribution transformers 143
least another 15 to 20 years service without maintenance.

Some on-site maintenance is carried out on transformers which are readily accessible from the ground. This work
mainly relates to those within building substations that require maintenance as identified during inspection
programmes.
Remaining single-phase transformer banks are to receive minimal maintenance to extend their usable life until
replaced.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Transformers (this includes
power transformers).

Transformers taken out of the network due to capacity changes or faults are replaced where repair or maintenance
proves uneconomic. An allowance has been made in the replacement budget to cover this.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 – Replacement budgets: Transformers (this includes
power transformers).

For a list of projects that contain this asset group see section 5.6 - Network development proposals.

We dispose of transformers when they reach the end of their economic life, as detailed in the maintenance plan.
144 Lifecycle asset management – Generators
4.18 Generators
Diesel generators provide a mobile source of energy to enable Orion to keep the power on or provide power quickly
in the short term until our network is able to be restored. We have various generators which are used for different
applications; mobile truck-based for use during planned work and faults, fixed for load lopping and mains failure
and skid-mounted for isolated emergency response.
We have 18 medium to large diesel generators. Ten of these are 550kVA generators that can be strategically placed
throughout our urban network. They are used for emergency backup and can be switched on-line in a short time
frame if there is a loss of supply. Three of them have synchronisation gear fitted.
Along with these generators we also have three truck mounted units of 375, 400 and 440kVA (mobile) and one
110kVA trailer mounted generator, which are used to restore supply at a distribution level during a fault or planned
work. The truck mounted units are all fitted with synchronisation gear. We have a further 550kVA unit attached to
our main office building with synchronisation gear, two 2,500kVA 11kV generators with synchronisation gear and a
30kVA without synchronisation gear.
To maintain a fuel supply for the generators we own six diesel tanks, with capacities ranging from 2,900 to 16,155
litres, and a 1,500 litre trailer mounted tank. All the diesel tanks are new and are bunded or double skinned.
Table 4-18a Generator listing
Description Generator kVA Generator kW

Mobile (truck-mounted) 440 352
Mobile (trailer-mounted) 110 88
Transportable (400V) 550 x 10 440 x 10
Static (11,000V) 2,500 x 2 2000 x 2
Wairakei Rd administration building 550 440
Armagh hot-site 30 24
Total generating capacity 12,405 9,924

All generators are operated within their nameplate ratings.
A number of our generators were used to supply electricity to the worst affected areas in the eastern suburbs
immediately after the February 2011 earthquake. These units were run continuously until our network was
repaired. During this time they performed well.

All generators are checked, tested and maintained in good operational condition.
Most of our generator fleet is relatively new. Because they need to be ready for emergency use they are tested and
maintained on a regular basis. As a result all of our generators and diesel tanks are in good operational condition.

 NW70.00.39 - Generators
Contingency plans:
 NW20.40.02 - Contingency plan for emergency generators.
Lifecycle asset management – Generators 145
Orion standards:
 NW21.03.04 - Emergency supply generator (criteria for use).
Operator instructions:
 NW72.13.97 – Standby generator truck – 350kVA
 NW72.13.113 – Static generator set - 2,500kVA.
 NW72.13.114 – Standby generator trailer – 110kVA
 NW72.13.115 – Building generator – 550kVA
Scheduled maintenance for our generator fleet has increased due to a number of new units as a direct response to the
Canterbury earthquakes. These units are maintained as part of a service agreement with the suppliers.
Maintenance includes:
 inspection before use
 monthly testing
 service checks every six months
 fully serviced at 250 or 500 hour intervals depending on the engine.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Generators (fixed).
There is no renewal plan for the generator fleet. When a generator gets to the end of its economic life an analysis will
be done to see if it will be replaced. The standby truck V751 will likely be replaced within the next two years.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 – Replacement budgets: Generators (fixed).

We have resource consents to install 11.5MW of diesel generating capacity at both Bromley and Belfast (23MW in
total). Proceeding with either of these sites is subject to a viable business case being developed. The earthquake
damage to our network in the eastern suburbs has caused us to temporarily locate 4MW of transportable generation at
QEII Park for several years commencing April 2012. After the security of supply is improved at Rawhiti this generation
may be relocated to our Belfast site to cope with increased peak loads as new housing develops in that area.

These assets are disposed of by auction when they become surplus to our requirements or they become uneconomic
to operate. As seismic activity lessens, the level of risk to our network will reduce. Therefore we will continue to
review our needs for the generator fleet.
146 Lifecycle asset management – Protection systems
4.19 Protection systems

Protection systems are installed to protect the network during power systems faults. These systems protect all levels
of the network including the low voltage system where fuses are used.
Protection systems are becoming more complex as expectations of higher standards of network safety, quality and
performance are increasing. This is more so with increasing focus on networks becoming ‘smart’. Predominantly
the primary function of our protection systems is to protect the electrical network in the event of power system faults.
These systems generally consist of current transformers (CT), voltage transformers (VT) and protection relays that
protect items of high voltage primary plant by isolating the faulted section.
Historically, substation protection, control and metering functions were performed with electro-mechanical
equipment. This electro-mechanical equipment has been superseded firstly by analogue electronic equipment, most
of which emulates the single-function approach of their predecessors. More recently, micro-processor based
equipment has begun to provide protection, control and metering functions. The functions performed by these micro-
processor based devices are so wide they have been labelled Intelligent Electronic Devices (IED). Along with IEDs the
introduction of Merging Units (Bricks) has created a paradigm shift in protection system architecture.
While electronic relays have additional benefits, some consequences need to be considered, such as shorter life
cycles, software and firmware upgrades and increased standing load on the substation batteries.
Recently we have introduced ground fault neutralisers (GFN) into our network. The GFN is another system we use to
limit the amount of fault current in our 11kV overhead network during single phase earth-faults. The GFN enables us
to keep power flowing through the two un-faulted phases while reducing the current in the faulted phase to a safe
level. This enables us to reduce the number of outages for single phase faults while ensuring better safety outcomes
for public, personnel and plant. We have a programme to install a GFN in all of our rural zone substations.
Table 4-19a Relay types in Orion’s network
Number in network as Average age

Relay type % of total relays (years)
Electro-mechanical 55 30
Analogue electronic (first generation IED) 7 24
Micro-processor based (second generation IED) 38 7

Electro-mechanical relays have performed adequately in the past, but with increasingly complex control
requirements they are not always suitable. They are becoming difficult to maintain due to their intricate design and
unavailability of spare parts. Electronic relays offer better sensitivity, increased functionality, communication
capability and less maintenance and are replacing electro-mechanical relays in new substations and as part of
switchgear upgrades. However, in areas where fault levels and clearance times are not onerous the reliability of our
electro-mechanical relays is proving satisfactory.
The accuracy on a small number of our CTs and VTs is outside our present standards and some early electronic
relays are becoming problematic due to nuisance tripping and the failure of individual electronic components. There
is a programme in place to phase out and upgrade these systems. The overall performance of our protection
systems is satisfactory and major incidents are avoided with on-going monitoring and maintenance.
The GFNs are new to our network. The units that have been commissioned and put in to service are operating
satisfactorily.
Oil-surge protection on our power transformers operated during some of the larger earthquakes and caused
interruptions to the supply of electricity. As a consequence we have reviewed the performance of our transformer
protection and made minor adjustments to reduce the sensitivity of oil-surge protection. The determination of these
protection settings and trigger points is a fine balance between protecting the transformer and avoiding unnecessary
interruptions.
All of our protection schemes performed well to protect our network, personnel and the public during the
earthquakes.
Lifecycle asset management – Protection systems 147

In 2011 EA Technology Ltd was engaged to develop a condition based risk management (CBRM) model for our
protection relays. Prior to the introduction of the CBRM model all of our protection systems were reviewed against
a number of performance criteria – failure rates, post-event diagnostic capability, manufacturer support, network
suitability and age. A ranking system was created to help identify any relay types that may cause us issues. These
criteria are now embedded in the data used in the CBRM model and we can now calculate a health index for
individual relays rather that a generic score relay types. The following graphs show the health index profile and age
profile of our protection assets.
Figure 4-19a Protection systems - health index profile
1200
Good
1000
Fair
Poor
800
600
400
200
0
(0-1) (1-2) (2-3) (3-4) (4-5) (5-6) (6-7) (7-8) (8-9) (9-10) (10+) No
Category Result
Figure 4-19b Protection systems - age profile
1000
750
500
250
0
FY44
Asset management report for this asset:

 NW70.00.22 - Protection systems
 NW70.57.01 – Protection design.
148 Lifecycle asset management – Protection systems
 NW72.27.01 Unit protection maintenance

 NW72.27.02 Protection
 NW72.27.04 Testing and commissioning of secondary equipment.
We use operator instructions developed in-house for electronic relays installed in our network.
Asset data
 location (asset register)
 age
 setting configuration
 test results
 relay movement history.
following maintenance plan as well as specific inspections carried out as required. All these inspections are used to
further our knowledge of the asset condition .
We keep details of all relays and their current location in our network asset register. A specialised protection
database manages relay firmware and settings.
Details of the on-site installations are shown on our schematic diagrams of the substation equipment.

Protection systems are checked for calibration and operation during the substation maintenance rounds. Results are
recorded and minor adjustments made if necessary. Major faults result in the system being removed from service
and overhauled.
The GFNs are maintained as part of the substation maintenance rounds.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Protection.

Traditionally our protection replacement programme has been directly linked to the replacement of switchgear.
Usually both asset groups were installed at the same time and had similar lifecycles. On some occasions a protection
system will be upgraded due to the performance requirements of the network. With the introduction of the electronic
relays (both analogue and micro-processor based) synchronisation of the lifecycles with switchgear has been lost.
Protection systems with known performance issues are given a higher priority for replacement. Prior to the CBRM
model being available we relied on the ranking system we developed in FY09. This year we used a combination of the
CBRM model and other factors such as the upgrading/replacement of substation primary equipment or changes in the
requirements of the local network to develop the protection relay replacement programme.
We will refine this process on an annual basis as we move from primarily time based replacement to one based on
condition assessment and risk analysis.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 – Replacement budgets: Protection

We have developed a programme to install a GFN in all our rural zone substations. The replacement plan and
upcoming major projects determine the acquisition plan for our other protection systems.
For projects containing this asset group see section 5.6 - Network development proposals.

We dispose of obsolete types of relays as circuit breakers are replaced or the protection system upgraded.
Lifecycle asset management – Communication systems 149
4.20 Communication systems

A communication system is an essential component of our network as it is an integral part of the remote indication
and control of network equipment, and provides contact with operating staff and contractors in the field.
We have both data and voice communication systems. Our voice communication system uses very high frequency
(VHF) radio links as well as private and public telephone, cellular and paging networks. Our data communication
system uses various technologies running over UHF radio, copper communication cables and fibre and is used for
SCADA RTU links to provide access to substation engineering data.
Our cable communication system is mainly in the Christchurch urban area, and is used to link the SCADA master
station with the RTUs and for unit protection at our urban zone and network substations (see section 4.13 -
Communication cables for more information).
In mid 2011 a transportable data centre was commissioned. This facility houses the core server and network
infrastructure that supports our information systems and is now located at our Wairakei Rd office. We have recently
purchased a second transportable data centre to replace our old backup computer room in our Armagh zone
substation. These facilities which are on separate sites and linked by a fibre network ring, create a highly resilient
environment for our information systems.
Voice radio link

Voice radio is provided by a number of linked and same-frequency VHF hilltop radio repeaters. Three linked, different
-frequency repeaters at Mt Pleasant, Marleys Hill and Roundtop provide coverage to the greater Christchurch and
surrounding rural areas. One same-frequency linked repeater at Hilltop provides coverage in the Akaroa and
Peninsula Bays area and a different-frequency solar powered repeater at Hamilton Peak provides coverage in the
Castle Hill and Arthur’s Pass area. All repeaters can be unlinked remotely if required. SCADA radio link
The SCADA radio link comprises of a number of dedicated UHF and VHF repeaters sited on various hilltops. The
number and location of these repeaters is dictated by the coverage they provide and the number of substations they
need to communicate with. Communication from the SCADA master station to the repeaters is by UHF radio, but a
very small number of micro SCADA RTUs share the VHF voice repeater network.
Figure 4-20a Radio communication network repeater sites
Hamilton Peak
Telecom repeater site
Lake Coleridge Orion repeater site
Springfield
Roundtop
Orion control center

Rakaia Gorge Darfield Bower Av
Hororata Sugarloaf and Mt Pleasant
Rolleston
Lyttelton Harbour
Marleys Hill
Dunsandel
Lincoln
Mt Pearce
Rakaia
Leeston
Hilltop
Lake Ellesmere
Akaroa
Southbridge
Banks Peninsula
150 Lifecycle asset management – Communication systems
UHF IP radio system

The UHF IP radio system is a general purpose radio system which can be used in either point-to-point or point-to-
multipoint mode. Significant portions of the SCADA radio link network have been replaced by a UHF IP network. By its
nature this system has in built redundancy to improve reliability of our communications network and protection
schemes.
In point-to-multipoint mode the system provides high speed full duplex Ethernet communications for both SCADA
and engineering access to substations. In point-to-point mode it is possible to simultaneously use the
communication channels for both protection signalling, and also Ethernet SCADA communications.
The system allows a new high speed, high reliability communication network to be developed for rural substations
and will eventually replace the entire older network. During the transition phase a number of substations have and
will continue to use cellular data modems and radio data communications provided by a commercial network.
Cellular systems
Where there are gaps in our radio network cellular data modems are used. These systems are effective and will be
replaced as the new IP radio system expands. All mobile PDA devices, and data connectivity to vehicles is provided
by the public networks.
SCADA cable link

This is comprised of three communication cable technologies:
 audio frequency shift keying (AFSK) modem technology - this has a long reach but a low data transfer rate of
1.2kB
 low frequency modem communication - while this has a higher data transfer rate its reach is typically slightly
less than the AFSK technology but data rates are typically 9.6kB
 high bit-rate digital subscriber line (HDSL) modem communications - shorter reach links that support data rates
from 64kB through to 2MB. This network is extensive and is arranged in rings so that, if one link is broken, then
traffic is routed in a different direction until a repair is completed.
Private telephone network

This is provided by special ‘off premises extensions’ which are a subset of our business telephone switch. This
switch has dual redundant processors, as well as a geographical processor at a remote location. A tested disaster
recovery process is in place should this switch network fail.

As electronic control and monitoring equipment installed in substations has evolved, we have reached the point
where existing communication systems dedicated for SCADA (telemetry) are no longer appropriate. We are well into
a replacement programme converting communications to our substations over to standard IP based network
technology. This communication network is a mix of bandwidths on our existing communication cable network, using
long reach HDSL technology and fibre optic communications where these cables exist.
The cable-based networks where practicable will be configured in a ring topology.
There is a significant number of substations where radio communication is the only practical option. This network is
being replaced by a radio based private IP point-to-point and point-to-multipoint IP radio system.

The older radio system is being replaced by the new IP radio system and while it is still serviceable it is becoming
more challenging to service.
Part of the migration of SCADA communications to modem and HDSL modems is driven by the condition of older
modems.
Our business telephone switch is a hybrid TDM and IP system. It is current with supported hardware/software
releases.
Lifecycle asset management – Communication systems 151

 NW70.00.34 - Communication systems
All radio equipment is licensed and complies with the relevant regulations imposed by the Ministry of Economic
Development’s radio frequency service (RFS).
All telephone voice communications equipment complies with the standards imposed by the public
telecommunications network operators in New Zealand.
Asset data
 location (GPS)
 age
following maintenance plan as well as specific inspections carried out as required. All these inspections are used to

The performance of our UHF stations used to communicate with the SCADA equipment is continually monitored. We
ensure the transmitters comply with the Ministry of Economic Development Radio Spectrum regulations.
We have maintenance contracts with several service providers to provide on-going support and fault resolution. A
maintenance contract for the telephone switch is in place. Maintenance is carried out on a monthly basis. SHDSL
modems, IP radios and other communications equipment are monitored with maintenance scheduled when needed.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Communication systems.

Our replacement programme takes into account the serviceability of equipment, and how appropriate the current
deployed technologies are compared to the task they perform. We are replacing older equipment, and a programme
of SCADA line communication modem replacement and conversion to IP technology is on-going.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 – Replacement budgets: Communication systems.

We have completed an Ethernet-ring around Christchurch to increase the resilience of our communication and
control network by reducing single points of failure. This Ethernet-ring makes use of some of our existing
communications infrastructure.
The long term communications design for our communications and control systems will take into account the future
locations of our control room and hot-site backup and associated facilities.
Voice radios
Our network operators’ vehicles are equipped with back-to-back radios. This allows the vehicle radio to be used
when they leave their vehicle with a low power hand-held radio for communication. Associated with this is automatic
vehicle location and lone-worker alarm generation. All these tools help ensure the safety of this group of staff. We
are about to equip rural operators with a personal satellite tracking unit, which reports a location if activated.
SCADA radios
The roll out UHF IP radio system is on-going and new radios and sites will continue to be installed until those
portions of the network working on the old system have been converted. The acquisition plan has a direct correlation
to the replacement plan.
152 Lifecycle asset management – Communication systems

All electronic equipment is disposed of in accordance with current environmental recommendations. In some
cases surplus equipment is donated to organisations that support Civil Defence or Search and Rescue
communications, or where practicable it is offered to organisations that still use the equipment.
Pole mounted line circuit breaker with SCADA

control via UHF radio link.
Lifecycle asset management – Load management systems 153
4.21 Load management systems

Orion’s network load management system is used to control loads on our network and also seven other networks
which are part of the Upper South Island load management group, thus deferring energy consumption and peak load,
and therefore network investment. Its other main function is tariff switching. It works by injecting an audio frequency
signal into the power network that is acted upon by relays installed at the consumer’s connection point. The relays in
our network are owned by the retail traders, with the exception of some 2,000 Orion owned streetlight control relays.
The system is comprised of an Orion master station, an Upper South Island master station, RTUs at each GXP and two
injection systems.
Communications between the Orion load manager and the injection plants is via the IP communications system which
provides redundant communications paths to all ripple plants.
Load management master station and RTUs

The load management master station is a SCADA system that runs independent of the network operational SCADA
system. The master station consists of two redundant database servers and two communication line servers (CLS) on
dedicated hardware. The load management software utilises algorithms specifically developed for Orion.
Loading information for the system is derived from RTUs located at the GXPs and zone substations. Sources of
information and communication paths are duplicated where reasonably feasible.
Upper South Island load management system

The Upper South Island load management system is a dedicated SCADA system that runs independently of Orion’s
load management and network operational SCADA systems. The system consists of two redundant servers that take
information from Orion, Transpower and seven other Upper South Island distributors’ SCADA systems, monitors the
total Upper South Island system load (retrieved from Transpower) and sends commands to the various distributors’
ripple control systems (including Orion) to control this total load to a predefined target .
Ripple injection system - Telenerg 175 Hz

This system operates within the urban 33kV and 66kV subtransmission network and is the major ripple injecting
system controlling the load of approximately 150,000 consumers. It is made up of more than 25 small injection plants
connected via circuit breakers to the 11kV network at individual 66/11kV zone substations and Christchurch urban
33/11kV zone substations.
These plants can operate independently with all fixed-time signaling carried out from a timetable stored in the
individual plant controller. All ‘anytime’ signaling is controlled by the SCADA system via individual controllers in
response to commands from the load management system running on the master station.
The plants are relatively small and, apart from the coupling cell itself, consist of 19 inch rack mounting equipment for
which spares are held. A complete coupling cell is also kept as a spare. It is also possible in an emergency for a
single plant to signal an adjacent area.
Figure 4-21a Ripple injection system control diagram
SPRINGSTON
317Hz injection plants
LOAD MOFFETT ST
MANAGEMENT 317Hz injection plant
Master station
ALL OTHER
PLANTS
154 Lifecycle asset management – Load management systems
Ripple injection system - Zellweger Decabit 317Hz

The Decabit system operates within the 33kV subtransmission network and is made up of five plants connected to the
33kV system, via air break isolators and protected by circuit breakers, at Springston (two plants), Moffett, Hornby and
Hororata zone substations. Back-up for the injection plants themselves is provided by pairs of plants in each GXP
supply area. Two plants are installed at Springston and the plants at Hornby and Moffett provide back-up for each
other. One plant of each pair is kept as a cold standby. There is no spare plant for Hororata, however, it would be
possible in an emergency to relocate one of the Springston plants to Hororata.
With the ability to transfer load between the urban 66/11kV and 33/11kV systems, 11kV Telenerg ripple plants have
been installed at Hornby, Moffett, Shands, Sockburn Harewood and Prebbleton zone substations. It is anticipated
that the 33kV Decabit plants will be removed from service within the next 10 years once ripple relays within the area
have been re-coded or replaced.
With the installation of the rural 66/11kV substations it has become necessary to install a small 11kV Decabit ripple
plant at each substation. These plants are connected to the network via indoor 11kV switchgear. Back-up for the
11kV plants is provided by the 33kV injection system.
Like the urban Telenerg system, each Decabit plant operates independently with all fixed time signaling carried out
from a timetable stored in the individual plant controller. All anytime signalling is controlled by the load
management system via the load management RTUs at each location in response to commands from the load
management master station.
Load management master station

The master station is a proprietary database system with full graphics running on industry standard hardware and
software. It currently meets the performance requirements for the network load management.

The master station is a proprietary database system with full graphics running on industry standard hardware and
software. It currently meets the performance requirements for the Upper South Island load management system.
Ripple injection system - urban 175Hz

The 66kV injection system was completely replaced in 2002-2004 with small individual 11kV injection plants.
Additional plants have been installed during 2005-2007 in the urban 33kV subtransmission system as 11kV
interconnection capacity has been added between the urban 66 and 33kV subtransmission areas.
A larger number of smaller injection plants will significantly reduce the risk associated with a single plant failure as
adjacent plants can cover for it. New 11kV plant capacity is matched to the capacity of the zone substation it is
connected to. As load growth occurs, additional plants will need to be installed in conjunction with additional zone
substation transformer capacity.
These plants have adequate capacity and performance for the timeframe of this plan.
Ripple injection system - rural 317Hz

The 33kV ripple injection plants have adequate capacity for the networks they are connected to, and would only have
problems if GXP transformers with significantly lower impedance were installed. The existing plants have shown no
sign of increased failure rates due to equipment aging and, apart from the Hororata plant, complete cold standby
plants are available on both the Springston and Islington 33kV networks. Essential spares are held for the Hororata
plant to enable rapid repair in the event of a fault. In a worst-case situation it would be possible to move part or all of
one of the Springston plants to Hororata.
11kV, 317Hz ripple plants were installed at Kimberley, Killinchy, Brookside, Greendale, Te Pirita, Dunsandel and
Weedons when these substations were commissioned because they are physically within the existing 317Hz injection
area, but are supplied from the 66kV subtransmission system. They are of similar design and supplied under the
same contract as those installed as replacements for the urban 175Hz ripple plants.
Lifecycle asset management – Load management systems 155

Load management master station
The hardware and software of the master station is now over seven years old and while still running reliably, is not
being developed by the vendor (Foxboro) any further. The software will not run on later versions of the hardware
platform (Sun Solaris) and support and parts are becoming difficult to source.

This system is approximately three years old and the hardware is just out of warranty. Given the normal life of such
equipment it should be acceptable for a further two to three years before its adequacy needs to be reviewed.
Ripple injection system - urban 175Hz system

The majority of the 11kV injection plants on the 66kV system were installed from FY04, and are expected to have a
minimum life of 15 years. The annual maintenance programme checks for possible faults and variations in
equipment performance.
Ripple injection system - rural 317Hz system

The 33kV ripple plant injection controllers were replaced in FY05 and are expected to have a minimum life of 15 years.
The annual maintenance programme checks for possible faults and variations in equipment performance.

All building construction, methods and materials for any maintenance or replacement are to comply with the
requirements of current building codes and the Resource Management Act. Orion standards will apply for all other
work.

 NW70.00.37 - Load management systems

 NW70.53.01 – Substation design.
 NW70.26.01 - Ripple control system details
 NW72.26.02 - Ripple equipment maintenance.
 NW74.23.09 – Ripple control system.
Operator instructions in use:

 NW72.13.211 – 11kV Enermet ripple plant.
Operator procedures in use:

 NW21.19.20 – Upper South Island Management.
Asset data
 age
 test results.
156 Lifecycle asset management – Load management systems
our knowledge of the asset condition.

Our ripple master maintenance programme consists of a daily operational check during the winter period and a
weekly operational check during summer. This is supplemented by an annual hardware maintenance programme
similar to that performed on the SCADA master stations. The complexity of the software and availability of technical
support increase the difficulty and cost of maintaining the master station system.
Injection plants have a quarterly operational check as well as an annual inspection that includes measurement of
installed capacitors and detailed tests on the inverter. If the plant coupling cells are found to have drifted they are
retuned. Dusting and physical inspections are considered part of the annual maintenance.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Load management.

It is planned to replace the hardware and software platforms of the load management master station in
approximately two years. A review to determine the appropriate enterprise solutions is to be undertaken.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 – Replacement budgets: Load management.

New 11kV ripple injection plants are installed in conjunction with new zone substations.

We plan to retire the 33kV ripple injection plants at Moffett and Hornby substations in FY17. This will provide spares
for the remaining plants at Springston and Hororata.
11kV injection plant at a zone substation.
Lifecycle asset management – Distribution management systems 157
4.22 Distribution management systems

We have had different forms of supervisory control and data acquisition systems (SCADA) on the network since the early
1970s. These systems have traditionally been based on a master station (central control centre) communicating with
remote terminal units (RTU). A distribution management system (DMS) integrates real-time data from SCADA with a
comprehensive model of the electricity network. The DMS has a suite of applications that enhance the functionality
beyond that of a traditional SCADA system. The core and ancillary DMS applications are overviewed below:
CORE DMS APPLICATIONS
(SCADA)
This is the front end that provides our control centre with fully integrated remote control and real time data. It allows
for the configuration, trending and management of all the data points.
Network management system (NMS)

At the heart of the DMS is a comprehensive, fully connected network model (including all lines, cables switches and
control devices, etc.) that is updated in real time with data from network equipment. The model is used to manage the
network switching processes by facilitating planning, enforcing safety rules and generating associated documentation.
It also maintains history in switching logs.
A full graphics ‘human machine interface’ (HMI) is used to display the network model and provide operator interaction
with the system.
Outage management system (OMS)

The OMS allows for the identification, management, restoration and recording of faults. In the case of a fault or event,
the OMS will assist in determining areas affected by outages utilising predictive algorithms.
Customer details are recorded against faults in the OMS which allows our Contact Centre to call customers back after
an outage to confirm that their power supply has been restored.
Mobile field service management
Field services operators are equipped with personal digital assistant (PDA) devices and receive switching instructions
directly from the DMS. The network model is immediately updated to reflect physical changes as switching steps are
completed and confirmed on the PDA.
Due to the increasing business critical nature of our DMS, the application is running duplicated real-time redundancy
on “virtual” servers. The hardware associated with the “virtual” servers is also duplicated in geographically separate
“environmentally suitable “sites. The sites also have un-interruptible backup power supplies consisting of a UPS and a
generator.
ANCILLARY DMS APPLICATIONS
Historian
The Historian is a database that records time series data (binary and analogue) for future analysis. Our DMS system has
only rudimentary time series storage capabilities and a more sophisticated historian is currently being implemented.
The time series data stored in the historian is used by various applications throughout the organisation for planning,
network equipment condition analysis and for reporting network operating performance statistics (such as reliability).
Real-time Load Flow Analysis

The DMS has access to large amounts of real time field data and maintains a connectivity model making it possible to
undertake near real time load flow calculations. Load flow analysis can be used to predict network operating conditions
at locations where no telemetered data is available and can also carry out “what if” scenarios to predict the effects of
modified network topologies and switching.
A load flow analysis system is yet to be implemented.
158 Lifecycle asset management – Distribution management systems
Information Interfaces
Not all information required for operations and planning activities is available from the DMS. Linking DMS records to
data from to other systems greatly enhances our capabilities in both these areas.
DMS data may be presented in reports or used to populate web pages for organisational and public consumption.

DMS
The same DMS software that we use is used at some very large electricity distribution companies’ overseas (greater
than 500,000 connections) and is therefore not constrained by the scale of our business. We also ensure that
supporting infrastructure (server, network etc.) has for sufficient capacity for current and credible near future growth.
The DMS is a critical business application and runs on highly resilient infrastructure which employs multiple,
mirrored and geographically separated servers. The sites in which the servers are deployed are also highly resilient,
with environmental management, smoke and fire detection, un-interruptible backup power supplies and backup
generators.
A separate test DMS environment is used for testing all changes to the production system and for training.
There are no current issues with the capacity, performance or availability of the DMS.
RTUs
We have a number of older RTUs in our network which are no longer supported by their manufacturer. We hold
enough spares to cover these units for maintenance purposes and they are performing adequately. The rest of our
units are performing satisfactorily and are capable of meeting the increased requirements of the new master station.

While some of our older RTUs no longer have manufacturer support their condition is satisfactory. Those units that
do not meet our current operating criteria have been targeted for removal.
The rest of this asset group is in good condition and proving reliable.
Figure 4-22a SCADA remote terminal units (RTU) - age profile
250
200
150
100
50
0
FY44

 NW70.00.36 - Distribution management systems

Lifecycle asset management – Distribution management systems 159
 NW70.56.01 - SCADA functional specification for remote sites.

 NW72.26.04 - SCADA master maintenance
 NW72.26.05 - SCADA RTU maintenance.
Asset data
 type and age
 test results.

The DMS components are maintained on an as-required basis, with component availability the main criteria. This
system is supported internally by our own staff and with the maintenance agreement with the vendor.
Inspections we carry out include:
 weekly general operational checks of equipment software
 annual detailed check of hardware and software systems
 annual operational check of all RTU controls and indications.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Control systems.

DMS
A maintenance contract with the DMS vendor includes upgrades of software and firmware as they become available.
We intend to install upgrades when necessary to provide desirable new functionally and to stay reasonably up to date
with underlying computer operating system releases.
RTU
RTUs are normally replaced as part of substation or communication upgrades, however a replacement plan is being
developed to change some of the older models which are no longer supported by the manufacturer or are no longer
capable of meeting the requirements of the system.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 – Replacement budgets: Control systems.

A network management system (NMS) is being introduced as a two-to-three year project.

We dispose of equipment as part of the replacement programme.
160 Lifecycle asset management – Information systems—Corporate
4.23 Information systems - corporate

Our corporate business information systems and productivity software support cross-organisational processes
within Orion. They include financial systems, employee management systems (e.g. Human resources, Payroll,
Health and Safety) and personal productivity software (desktop applications, email, web and document
management).
Our computer infrastructure hosts, connects and provides the physical tools for access to our information systems.
We manage our computer infrastructure rather than outsource to third parties because of the critical nature of
some of our information systems and the need for them to be continuously connected in real time to equipment on
the electricity network.
Our corporate information systems include:
 corporate financial management system
 HR / payroll
 document management system
 Orion internet website
 email system
 desktop software
 replicated computer room
 VM and SAN
 physical servers
 desktops and laptops.
Corporate financial management system

This system was implemented in 2009. Its capacity and performance are adequate for the period of this plan and
could easily accommodate a significant increase in scale if required.
HR / payroll
As a cloud based application the performance and availability of this system is subject to a service level agreement.
Its capacity and performance are adequate for the period of this plan.

This is a new system and has been built to cater for projected increases in storage and breadth of function. Its
capacity and performance are adequate for the period of this plan.
Orion internet website

The Orion internet web site will be subject to a review in 2014 to determine how best to support Orion’s Web
presence for the future. Its capacity and performance are adequate for the period of this plan if there are no major
changes required.
Email system
The capacity and performance of our Email system are adequate for the period of this plan if there are no further
major changes required.
Desktop software
Our choice of operating system and desktop software capacity/performance are adequate for the period of this plan.
Replicated computer rooms

Main computer facility - Transportable Data Centre has been in service for 12 months and is performing to
expectations. Its capacity and performance are adequate for the period of this plan and could easily accommodate a
significant increase in scale if required.
Armagh substation facility - This facility has been in service for six years and some of the equipment in it is due for
Lifecycle asset management – Information systems—Corporate 161
replacement. Ad hoc changes were made to the room during the period immediately following the February 2011
earthquake and remedial work is required. Work on this facility is programmed for FY14. The capacity and
performance are not adequate for the period of this plan.
VM and SAN
Our VMware Virtual Server infrastructure has recently been upgraded to replace aging and out of warranty
equipment. The capacity of the disk array (SAN) has also recently been upgraded due a rapid increase in the amount
of post quake storage (including image files) and also due to projected increases in the early phases of our document
management implementation.
The capacity and performance are considered mostly adequate for next three years but necessarily beyond that. We
regularly review systems performance and typically expect to replace servers every three to five years.
Physical servers
PowerOn servers and telephony servers are now four years old and outside warranty. The health of these servers is
monitored and we typically replace servers of this type in three to five years. The capacity and performance will not
be adequate for the period of this plan.
Desktops and laptops

We typically upgrade our desktops and laptops on a three yearly cycle. We expect that the capacity and performance
of this equipment will not be adequate for the period of this plan.
Tablets
A number of tough-books (tablets) have just been rolled out to field operations staff. We expect that the capacity and
performance of this equipment will not be adequate for the period of this plan.
Network
Several data networks are supported in our information system infrastructure which uses switches and firewalls to
provide Gigabit network speeds between servers and to desktops. Our policy is to separate corporate and
engineering networks by providing access to each on a least privilege basis.
Corporate financial management system – Microsoft Dynamics Nav

This system has recently been updated.

In-house developed document management solutions are fit for purpose and operating effectively.
Microsoft SharePoint is in the implementation stage and not yet in production.
Orion internet website

The Orion website is a mature system and will be subject to a review in 2014
Email system – Microsoft Exchange Server

Our Email system is a mature and well established application. It will be integrated with document management as
part of the current implementation.
Desktop software
The desktop operating system is current and subject to regular security and performance updates from Microsoft.
Changes may be forced on us in the future as new equipment becomes unsupported on the current version.
Asset management report is to be created.
162 Lifecycle asset management – Information systems—Corporate

All systems are supported directly by the Orion Information Solutions group with vendor agreements for third tier
support where appropriate.
License costs are considered to provide a degree of application support but are substantially a prepayment for
future upgrades. Although licenses guarantee access to future versions of software, they do not pay for the labour
associated with implementation. Our experience has been that significant support is required for the vendor to
accomplish an upgrade and these costs are reflected as capital projects in our budgets.
Software releases and patches are applied to systems as necessary and only after testing.
Production systems are subject to business continuity standards which include:
 an environment that includes development, test and production versions
 mirroring of systems between two facilities to safeguard against loss of a single system or a complete facility
 archiving to tapes which are stored off site at a third party
 change management processes
 least privilege security practices.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.2 – Opex budgets - Non network.

We employ a standard change management approach to all software and hardware systems. Major changes to all
corporate business information systems will follow the predefined steps of Project proposal / concept socialisation,
Business Case and approval, Business requirements and implementation via a Project. All project costs are
capitalised.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.4 – Capex budgets - Non network.
4.23.7 Creation / aquisition plan

Some recoveries are made from salaries to capital budgets to recognise the contribution of our software
development staff in system enhancements.

There are no specific disposal plans for this asset group.
Lifecycle asset management – Information systems—asset management 163
4.24 Information systems - asset management

Our Asset Management Systems hold information about the equipment that comprises the electricity network and
support business processes that build and maintain that equipment. The majority of our primary asset information is
held in our asset register, geographic information system (GIS) and cable databases. We hold information about our
network equipment from GXP connections down to individual LV pole level with a high level of accuracy.
In addition to these asset registers we hold also detailed information regarding customer connections in our
Connections Register and track the process of asset creation and maintenance in Works Management.
Geographic Information System (GIS) – Intergraph suites, G/Electric and GeoMedia

Our GIS records our network assets according to their location, type and electrical connectivity. It interfaces with other
information systems such as substation asset attribute data stored in our asset register. GeoMedia specialises in
reporting and analysing geographic data. In particular; GeoMedia easily combines core GIS and third party datasets
such as aerial imagery for both Orion and contractor/consultant use.
Various GIS viewer technologies enable Orion to deliver ‘fit for purpose’ geographic asset information within Orion
premises, or off site via a secure website. In the case of areas where internet coverage is limited, GIS datasets may be
stored directly on a laptop device
Asset register – EMS WASP

Our asset register, EMS WASP, provides a central resource management application for holding details of key asset
types with their current location/status. The assets covered include land, substations and all our major equipment with
less strategic types being added over time. Schedules extracted from this database are used for preventative
maintenance contracts and it archives any inspection/test data gathered during the contract. Data is also held to
facilitate a valuation of our fixed network assets; the GIS holds the distributed assets (lines and cables).
Cable databases (HV and communication cables)

Separate in-house developed Microsoft Access databases are used to hold information on 66, 33 and 11kV underground
cables and pilot/communication cables. Cable lengths, joint and termination details are held and linked to our GIS by a
unique cable reference number.
Works Management and Enquiry for Supply

All types of works activity are managed using purpose-built in-house developed applications which populate a single
works data repository. The applications are optimised for different types of work including new connections
management, general network jobs and emergency works.
When a job is created in Works Management a companion job is also automatically created in the financial system
(NAV) to track job related invoices.
Connections Register
Our in-house developed Connections Register holds details of all installation control points (ICP) on our network. This
is linked with the industry registry. Links with our GIS systems enable accurate derivation of GXP information by ICP
and the association of ICP with an interruption. Interruptions are now routinely traced within the GIS using the in-built
connectivity model, and accurate information about the number of customers and interruption duration are recorded.

GIS – Intergraph suites, G/Electric and GeoMedia
G/Electric technology and its supporting Oracle database have the capacity to scale up and extend functionality to
support business growth. Geomedia technology is in the process of being upgraded to meet the current growth in
business intelligence requests and ‘access to GIS’ demands from external contractors/consultants.
The supporting physical computer infrastructure exists on a high availability Virtual Server environment, and is
considered to have adequate capacity and performance for the timeframe of this plan.

We use only a subset of the capabilities of the EMS WASP database which can be applied to Works Management as well
as asset tracking. There is also no intention to further develop this system and a systems review to be undertaken
within the next three years may result in its replacement.
164 Lifecycle asset management – Information systems—asset management
Although subject to the outcomes of a systems review due in FY16, the performance and capacity of the database is
adequate for the timeframe of this plan.
Cable databases (HV and communication cables)

The cables databases are in-house applications written in Microsoft Access and as such may be subject to
modification as a consequence of updates to the Microsoft Office Suite. It is our intention that within the timeframe
of this plan that these applications will be either integrated with other databases or modified to run as in house
Microsoft SQL database.

Works Management and Enquiry for Supply are highly customised to support our business processes.
The Connections Register has been modified significantly since its establishment in FY00, to support a range of new
business processes. This system has however reached a “tipping point” and without a change to its underlying
architecture, there is a high degree of risk in developing it further.
Its capacity and performance are adequate for the period of this plan if there are no further major changes required.
This future of this application is subject to the outcomes of a systems review due in FY16.
GIS – Intergraph suites, G/Electric and GeoMedia

The G/Electric suite has recently been upgraded to a current release and resides on a high performance, high
availability Virtual Server environment.
The upgrade included a review of customised code, which was largely replaced with standard application features,
reducing the complexity of the systems from a support perspective.
A review of our Geospatial Information requirements and business processes is underway. Outcomes from the GIS
review are expected to result in changes/additions to GIS data and upgraded interfaces to other Orion information
systems.

EMS WASP will not be further developed and a systems review to be undertaken within the next three years may
result in its replacement. Some issues have arisen regarding interfaces to other systems due to upgrades in those
systems. It is likely to become more difficult overtime to provide integrated views of data from EMS WASP and other
systems.
A systems review due in FY17 will consider the future of EMS WASP.
Cable databases (high voltage and communication cables)

It is undesirable that the cables databases remain as Microsoft Access databases and they will be either integrated
with other databases or modified to run as in house Microsoft SQL database.

Its capacity and performance are adequate for the period of this plan if there are no further major changes required.
This future of this application is subject to the outcomes of a systems review due in FY16.
Asset management report for this asset is being developed.
Lifecycle asset management – Information systems—asset management 165
General
All systems are supported directly by the Orion Information Solutions group with vendor agreements for third tier
support where appropriate.
License costs are considered to provide a degree of application support but are substantially a prepayment for future
upgrades. Although licenses guarantee access to future versions of software they do not pay for the labour
associated with implementation. Our experience has been that significant support is required for the vendor to
accomplish an upgrade and these costs are reflected as capital projects in our budgets.
Software releases and patches are applied to systems as necessary and only after testing.
Production systems are subject to business continuity standards which include:
 an environment that includes development, test and production versions
 mirroring of systems between two facilities to safeguard against loss of a single system or a complete facility
 archiving to tapes which are stored off site at a third party
 change management processes
 least privilege security practices.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.2 – Opex budgets - Non network.
GIS
The G/Electric suite and related computer infrastructure are supported directly by the Orion Information Solutions
group. In addition, support hours are pre-purchased from Intergraph as part of an annual maintenance agreement.
Maintenance costs for the GIS are split 20% to Opex and 80% to Capex.
EMS WASP
EMS WASP and related computer infrastructure are supported directly by the Orion Information Solutions group.
Maintenance costs for EMS WASP are split 20% to Opex and 80% to Capex.
Other systems
All other systems are supported directly by the Orion Information Solutions group. Some recoveries are made from
salaries to capital to recognise the contribution of development in system enhancements.
4.24.6 Renewal plan

Changes to asset management information systems are typically incremental in nature and systems are replaced
infrequently.
As indicated in the previous sections we employ a standard change management approach to all software systems.
Renewal of an information system will follow the predefined steps of project proposal / concept socialisation,
business case and approval, business requirements and implementation via a project.
166 Lifecycle asset management – Metering
4.25 Metering
High voltage (11kV) consumer metering
We own current transformers (CTs) and voltage transformers (VTs) used for metering, along with associated test
blocks and wiring, at approximately 75 consumer sites. Retailers connect their meters to our test blocks. All Orion
CTs and VTs are certified as required by the Electricity Governance Rules.
Transpower grid exit point (GXP) metering

We adopted GXP-based pricing in 1999, and most of our revenue is now derived from measurements by Transpower's
GXP metering.
Orion also owns metering at Transpower GXPs. We input the data from these meters into our SCADA system. Our
measurements can also help the Reconciliation Manager to estimate data if Transpower’s meters fail, or are out of
service.
Transpower has dedicated meters at all metering points. The GXPs at Arthur’s Pass and Castle Hill share CTs with
our metering. All VTs are shared between Orion and Transpower. Although a truly credible check metering system
would have stand-alone components with their own traceable accuracy standards, this is impractical .
Power quality measurement metering

Our power quality management in the past has been mainly reactive . We have responded to consumer complaints
(which generally stem from the consumer's own actions) while assuming that the underlying network performance is
satisfactory. The general underlying qualitative power quality performance of the network and whether it is
deteriorating with time as an increasingly number of non linear loads are connected to the network has been
unknown. These non linear loads (which frequently reduce network power quality) are also generally more sensitive
to the very power quality issues they help to create.
We have completed a three year project to install approximately 30 permanent standards compliant power quality
measurement instruments across a cross-section of distribution network sites which are expected to range from
good (generally urban upper network) to poor (generally remote rural) power quality performance.
These instruments will continue to collect power quality data, the analysis of which will provide a long term
statistical view of typical network performance across a wide range of network conditions and locations. This data
can also be used to provide a view of actual network power quality performance to assist with the development of
standards and regulations.

We check that our metering figures support Transpower’s data. If the two sets of data differ significantly, meter tests
may be required to establish where the discrepancy has occurred.
The two sets of data will never be identical – our GXP metering cannot definitively check Transpower's half-hourly
metering values because:
 some of our meters are in different locations from Transpower’s meters
 our meter-class accuracy differs from Transpower’s
 the error correction factors that apply to Transpower’s metering do not apply to us, as our metering uses
different CTs
 we sum many metered values through auxiliary current summation transformers. As a result, our meters record
more energy than Transpower’s meters, which are all fitted with separate class 0.2 meters.
However, our data can be used to identify changing trends in the difference between the two metering systems, and
to identify gross errors due to equipment failure.

In FY08 we completed a programme to replace all of our GXP metering equipment. All metering equipment is in
good condition.
Lifecycle asset management – Metering 167

 NW70.00.38 - Metering
We have a comprehensive set of GXP metering equipment drawings. These drawings include details of both Orion
and Transpower metering equipment.
Documentation on the status and details of our check meters needs to be improved.

We regularly inspect the metering sites, carry out appropriate calibration checks and witness the calibration checks
on Transpower's metering.
Our meter testing contractors are required to have registered test house facilities which comply with the Electricity
Governance Rules. They must also have documented evidence of up-to-date testing methods, and have competent
staff to perform the work.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are shown in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Meters.

In recent years we have replaced all of our GXP metering in conjunction with Transpower’s metering changes. We
have no plans to carry out further significant replacement work at this stage.
Our budgeted replacement costs are shown in section 7.1.9 – Replacement budgets: Metering.

Additional standards compliant power quality measurement instruments may be installed in the future where we
connect new major customers to provide them with an assurance of the level of power quality they are being
supplied with.

We have no specific plans to dispose of any of this asset group.
168 Lifecycle asset management – Network property
4.26 Network property

This section on network property covers all buildings, kiosks and land assets that form an integral part of our
distribution network.
All of our zone substations, with the exception of Teddington, have buildings which contain switchgear and control
equipment. Most of the buildings are constructed of reinforced and filled concrete block. Eleven of the substation
buildings, mostly in the rural area, are of modular design constructed from a series of large rectangular reinforced
concrete sections connected together to form a rectangular building.
The 225 network and 253 distribution substation buildings vary in both construction and age. We own approximately
80% of the network buildings and approximately 30% of the distribution substation buildings. Some 150 of them are
incorporated in a larger building that we do not own.
Our kiosks are constructed of steel to our own design. The majority fall into two categories; an older high style, and
the current low style as shown below. The low style kiosk is also constructed in half and quarter versions for use
where the transformer is mounted externally or at a remote location.
Full low kiosk.

(Access is by front doors and a hinged lid).
Table 4-26a Distribution kiosk quantities (owned by Orion)

Low (full) Low (half) Low (quarter) High Berm Transformer
Kiosk type Fibreglass Total
steel steel steel steel concrete/steel cover
Quantity 2,114 498 273 653 21 3 35 3,597

Our property assets must meet the following three performance criteria:
1. They must be secure. We are aware of increased public safety and risk management expectations surrounding
our substations. A programme to run over a 10 year period to upgrade security and safety is underway. This will
mainly involve access (locks and gates/doors), fencing and earthing. All ground-mounted installations in
industrial and commercial locations have already been independently surveyed to gauge their susceptibility to
damage. Solutions to minimise the risk of damage are being developed.
2. They must be environmentally sound to ensure that the installed equipment is not compromised. The main
areas of note here are the seismic strength and water-tightness of the buildings. Both these matters are being
addressed.
3. They must be visually acceptable. Work such as damage repair, ground maintenance, graffiti removal and
painting is on-going to achieve this outcome.
The September 2010 M7.1 earthquake, and subsequent M6.3 earthquakes in February and June 2011, caused minor
superficial damage to a number of our substation buildings. Three zone substations incurred more substantial
damage.
Lifecycle asset management – Network property 169
Greendale zone substation

Greendale is situated close to the September fault line and underwent some of the most significant ground
movement observed in the rural area. The site is now slightly higher at one end but major foundations and the
substation building appear to be structurally sound. The substation building appears to have moved approximately
200mm and this has affected water and drainage connections. No further damaged occurred as a result of the
February and June 2011 earthquakes.
Pages switchyard
Pages switchyard has been decommissioned. It was subject to significant liquefaction and surface flooding after each
of the three bigger earthquakes. The structures and buildings sunk making the site unsuitable for continued use.
Brighton zone substation
Brighton zone substation has been decommissioned. It was situated across the road from Pages switchyard and near
the Avon River. As a result of the February 2011 earthquake the site was subject to liquefaction and lateral spread.
While the buildings and structures remained structurally sound they sank approximately 1m. Due to this subsidence
the site was no longer suitable for a substation and a replacement zone substation (Rawhiti) was built in Keyes Rd.
Distribution substations
Across our network we observed only minimal damage to our distribution substation buildings and kiosks. The worst
seismic damage occurred in the Sumner/Redcliffs area due to rock falls and landslides in the February 2011
earthquake. There was minimal extra damage after the June earthquake.
The building substations had been seismically strengthened, and generally we observed movement of plaster
between bricks and some cracking in floors and walls. We have observed significant subsidence around two
distribution building substations and several kiosks.

Our zone substation buildings (see section 4.4.1 for examples) are well designed and mostly constructed with
reinforced and filled concrete blocks. The structural integrity of all the buildings has been inspected and remedial
action taken to bring all zone substations up to the latest building code and related seismic strength code. We are
underway mitigating known issues with our zone substation switchyards.
Our network/distribution building substations vary in both construction and age. Those constructed prior to the early
1960s are very brittle in nature, having walls constructed entirely of non-reinforced clay brick. Those that have been
constructed since the mid-1960s are of a more substantial nature, namely reinforced concrete framed masonry. A
seismic assessment was undertaken on all our substations to determine those which required remedial work to
bring them up to the current standard. A risk analysis of the resulting list concentrated on determining the
consequences to the network of a loss of a given substation. This information was then used to develop our ‘works’
programme. There are a small number of distribution substations in Orion owned and consumer owned buildings
that have not yet had remedial works undertaken. However, it is considered that these will have a low impact on the
network if lost during an abnormal event.
Figure 4-26a Substation buildings (owned by Orion) - age profile
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Pre FY33 FY38 FY43 FY48 FY53 FY58 FY63 FY68 FY73 FY78 FY83 FY88 FY93 FY98 FY03 FY08 FY13
FY29 Total Zone Network/Distribution
170 Lifecycle asset management – Network property
Our kiosks are generally in reasonable condition. Steel kiosks in the eastern suburbs nearer the sea are prone to
some corrosion and it is expected that these kiosks will have to be replaced much sooner than those in the
remainder of our network. They are being attended to as required. We have 21 kiosks of a fibreglass construction
and these have been the subject of a detailed inspection to assess their condition and possible replacement.
We are currently well over half way through a programme to seismic strengthen our dual pole and single pole
substations with large heavy transformers.
Figure 4-26b Kiosks - age profile
500
400
300
200
100
0
FY44

 NW70.00.43 - Network property

 NW70.53.01 - Substation design
 NW70.53.02 - Substation design - customer premises.
 NW72.23.14 - Kiosk installation.
 NW74.23.01 - Kiosk shell - full
 NW74.23.02 - Kiosk shell - half
 NW74.23.03 - Kiosk shell - quarter.
Asset data
 construction type and age
 detail drawings
 land ownership/title details
 maintenance/improvement records.
Lifecycle asset management – Network property 171

A five year maintenance plan has recently commenced with the view to repair all of our buildings which have
suffered earthquake damage. All our buildings and land are inspected regularly, and minor repairs are undertaken
as they are identified. Major repair and maintenance work is scheduled, budgeted for and undertaken on an annual
basis.
Property maintenance is expected to remain at a constant level, although many of the older consumer owned
substations will require seismic upgrading if they are retained. Consumer owned substations that require
maintenance or strengthening to remove risk to our equipment may present some problems in relation to who will
bear the cost of this work. These will be assessed on a case by case basis.
Our substations are maintained on an as-required basis, with most general maintenance work identified during six-
monthly inspections. Work such as damage repair, ground maintenance, graffiti removal, painting, signage and lock
replacement is on-going.
Some of the older kiosk foundations have moved due to surrounding land movement. They need to be levelled to
relieve stress on the attached cables. A small number of them are being attended to each year.
We maintain and repaint our kiosks as required with more focus to deter rust on the coastal areas. Buildings are
repainted approximately every 10 years and we are now using a silicon based product to provide a waterproof
membrane and protect the substation from water ingress through the blockwork.
Graffiti is an on-going problem at virtually all of our sites. We remove it as soon as possible after it is reported. We
liaise with the local councils and community groups in our area to assist us with this problem. We now have a
specific email set up where members of the community can report graffiti.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are in section 7.1.1 – Opex budgets - Network: Buildings and enclosures.

We do not have a replacement plan for our building substations and will review the need for them as we undertake
major works at the sites. These assets are maintained to ensure they provide the required level of performance.
To help maintain the security of our assets we have initiated a programme to replace all locks in our network. This
will take up to four years to complete.
There is a programme to replace all fibreglass kiosks as well as steel kiosks near the coast. We are also in the
process of formulating a roof replacement programme based on a condition assessment.
Allowance has been made for upgrading security fencing and seismic requirements.
Our budgeted replacement costs are in section 7.1.9 – Replacement budgets: Buildings and enclosures.

We construct new buildings and kiosks to meet consumer demand for supply to subdivisions or commercial
ventures and when necessary to place overhead reticulation underground.
We are investigating the ownership of leased/rented sites with the view to create a more secure tenure of all
network land, if required.
For a list of projects containing this asset see section 5.6 - Network development proposals.

Equipment is disposed of as part of the replacement programme.
We are currently engaged in justifying continued ownership of (or easements over) all unused sites. We will
relinquish ownership of sites deemed not required.
172 Lifecycle asset management – Corporate property
4.27 Corporate property

Orion’s corporate property covers our new administration building at 565 Wairakei Rd and property and land
throughout the Canterbury region.
Administration building
We have relocated our administration function to 565 Wairakei Rd, following the FY11 earthquakes, and the former
building at 200 Armagh St is no longer occupied. The Crown has purchased the 200 Armagh St building as of
September 2013. Future development on the site by CERA will include installing a block wall around our existing
Armagh zone substation. Situated at the rear of the substation is our ‘hot-site’ which we can use if an emergency
situation forces us out of our current administration building.
Our 565 Wairakei Rd

building
Rental Properties
We own 10 rental properties of which five are residential properties adjacent to zone substations. Some of these
were acquired as part of a package when substation land was purchased. Others have been strategically purchased
to allow the substation to expand if necessary. We receive income from these properties, provided they are
tenanted, and this rental income is in line with the rental market in the Christchurch area.

As a lifelines utility (Under the Civil Defence Emergency Management Act 2002) providing essential services to the
community, we are required to be operational after a significant event. Our new administration building has been
built to Importance Level 4 (IL4). This means that the building is designed to remain operational following a 1 in 500
year seismic event. The building is also equipped with a standby generator (with 500 litre diesel tank) which is able
to provide back-up power.
Our property assets must meet the following criteria:
 they must be fit for purpose and maintained in a reasonable condition so the tenant can fully utilise the premises
 they shall comply with all building, health and safety standards that may apply
 they must be visually acceptable.

Our corporate properties vary in both construction and age.
Our Wairakei Rd No.565 administration building was new in FY14.
Our residential properties are clad with either brick or timber weather-board with the roofs being a mix of concrete
tile or iron. Other than superficial earthquake damage these properties are in good general condition.
The commercial properties that we have at Darfield (Selwyn Gallery) and Duvauchelle (ex line depot) sustained
mainly superficial damage during the Canterbury earthquakes. The roof at the Selwyn Gallery is due for replacement
and we are in the process of completing this project.
Lifecycle asset management – Corporate property 173
Work has been completed to strengthen and repair the Akaroa Gallery which suffered more substantial damage.
Akaroa Gallery

 NW70.00.42 - Corporate property

 NW72.20.07 – Grounds maintenance

We have no assigned ‘end of life’ for our corporate properties. The purpose of our asset management programme is
to ensure that our corporate property is managed in a manner that is consistent with Orion’s corporate obligations to
deliver an effective and efficient service.
We carry out regular inspections of our buildings to ensure that they do not deteriorate further as a result of the
seismic activity that the area has experienced. Several databases are used to assist us with the management
process such as our asset register (EMS WASP) and our works management system. We also use a ‘fault incident
report’ database to collect any faults or safety issues with our corporate properties. For any instances where further
expertise is sought we employ an external consultant to offer an independent judgement to assist in the decision
making process for any maintenance or repair programmes. The risks that our corporate buildings are exposed to
are listed below in no particular order of importance:
 seismic damage
 liquefaction and subsidence
 defective drainage and guttering
 roof leaks
 vegetation/tree roots
 vandalism- repairs carried out as soon as reported
 rust and rot
 extreme weather conditions
 fire
 graffiti.
Minor repairs are undertaken as they are identified in the inspection process. Major repair and maintenance work is
scheduled, budgeted for and undertaken on an annual basis. Vandalism and graffiti is fixed as soon as we are
notified. We have maintenance contracts in place with several contractors to ensure that all aspects of our property
and land maintenance are covered. These include:
 site security
174 Lifecycle asset management – Corporate property
 grounds maintenance
 building services maintenance
 graffiti removal.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are in section 7.1.2 – Opex budgets - Non network.

We have no replacement plan for our corporate properties. These assets are maintained to ensure they provide the
required levels of performance.
Our budgeted replacement costs are in section 7.1.4 – Capex budgets - Non network/Corporate property.
4.27.7 Creation/aquisition plan

We have no creation plan for our corporate properties at this time.

We currently have no plans to dispose of any corporate property. We will relinquish ownership of sites we no
longer have a use for, or as required under the Christchurch Central Recovery Plan.
Lifecycle asset management – Vehicles 175
4.28 Vehicles
We own 92 vehicles to enable us to operate and maintain the electricity network and to respond to any events. Our
goal is to ensure we have the right vehicle in the right place at the right time with an appropriately trained driver.
Table 4-28a Vehicle quantities
Description Quantity Lifecycle

Generator truck 3 20 years
Network operator utility 17 5 years or 200,000km
Operational vehicle 44 6 years or 140,000km
Van 1 10 years
Unmarked 27 4 years or 100,000km
Total 92

The performance criteria vary for each vehicle class. All are operated within their manufacturer specified
parameters.

Our vehicles are relatively new and regularly maintained. As a result they are in good condition. Road conditions in
some areas of Christchurch are still poor due to the recent earthquakes. As a result of this we have seen a small
increase in premature wear on components such as suspension bushings, etc. Our maintenance plan addresses such
issues.

 NW70.00.47 - Vehicles
Our vehicles are operated to the requirements of current legislation.
Our financial system is used to hold usage data and schedule all regular compliance requirements.

All vehicles within their warranty period are serviced according to the manufacturers’ recommended service schedule
by the manufacturers’ agent. For vehicles outside of their warranty the servicing requirements are also maintained in
accordance with the manufacturers’ specifications by a contracted service agent.
Our budgeted maintenance costs are in section 7.1.2 – Opex budgets - Non network.

Our fleet replacement plan aims to replace vehicles on a like-for-like basis, where applicable, when the vehicle
reaches its designated age or distance covered. If the fundamental needs of the driver change, the change will be
reflected in the type of vehicle purchased for replacement. Where possible we purchase vehicles that better fit our
purpose and where there is a demonstrable gain in safety, efficiency, reliability and value for money .
Our budgeted replacement costs are in section 7.1.4 – Capex budgets - Non network/Vehicles and mobile plant.
176 Lifecycle asset management – Vehicles
4.28.7 Creation/aquisition plan

The aim is to have the right vehicle and driver to the right place at the right time. This is a critical aspect of operating
our network in a safe, reliable and efficient manner.
The key drivers in our vehicle acquisition plan are:
 fitness for purpose
 safety
 reliability
 environment and fuel economy
 value for money / lowest economic cost over the life of the vehicle (including disposal value)
 diversity within the fleet (spreading the risk).

Our vehicles are typically disposed of via auction. In this way we achieve a market value for the vehicle and also incur
the minimum disposal cost in terms of time and money.
Mobile generator truck
Network development 177
5.2 Network architecture 180
5.2.1 Transpower GXPs 180
5.2.2 Urban subtransmission 181
5.2.3 Rural subtransmission 181
5.3 Planning criteria 182

5.3.1 Security Standard 182
5.3.2 Network utilisation thresholds 184
5.3.3 Capacity determination for new projects 184
5.3.4 Project prioritisation 185
5.3.5 Non-network solutions 186
5.4 Energy, demand and growth 190

5.4.1 Observed and extrapolated load growth 191
5.4.2 Methodology for determining GXP and zone substation load forecasts 196
5.4.3 Transpower GXP load forecasts 200
5.4.4 Orion urban zone substation load forecasts 201
5.4.5 Orion rural zone substation load forecasts 204
5.4.6 Utilisation of assets 207
5.5 Network gap analysis 209

5.6 Network development proposals 212
5.6.1 Impact on service level targets 212
5.6.2 Overview of projects 212
5.6.3 Urban 66kV subtransmission review 213
5.6.4 Transpower spur assets 214
5.6.5 Major projects – GXPs 215
5.6.6 Major projects – urban 217
5.6.7 Major projects – rural 226
5.6.8 11kV Reinforcement projects – urban 240
5.6.9 11kV Reinforcement projects – rural 244
5.6.10 Network connections and extensions 247
5.6.11 Underground conversions 247
5.6.12 Demand side management value for network development alternatives 247
178 Network development

5-2 Transpower system in Orion's network area 180 5-3a Distribution network supply Security Standard 183
5-3 Peak demand capping 187 5-3b Standard network capacities 185
5-4a Orion network annual energy trends 191 5-4a Fletcher EQC response to restoring heating 198
5-4b Overall maximum demand trends on the Orion network 192 5-4b GXP substations – load forecasts (MVA) 200
5-4c System load factor 193 5-4c Urban 66 and 33kV zone sub – load forecasts (MVA) 202
5-4d Christchurch urban area network – load duration curves 194 5-4d Urban 11kV zone substations – load forecasts (MVA) 202
5-4e Central Plains Water scheme stages 195 5-4e Rural 66 and 33kV zone sub – load forecasts (MVA) 205
5-4f Rural summer maximum demand (MW) 195 5-5a Transpower GXP security gaps 210
5-4g Rural winter maximum demand (MW) graph 196 5-5b Orion security gaps 211
5-4h Take-up of industrial land 197 5-6a Spur assets, indicative cost to purchase 215
5-4i GXPs – Maximum demand versus firm capacity 200 5-6b Affected Transpower new investment agreements 215
5-4j Urban 66/33 zone substations – max demand v capacity 201 5-6c Major GXP projects 215
5-4k Urban 11kV zone substations – max demand v capacity 201 5-6d Major urban projects 217
5-4l Zone subs – urban (CY-1 max demand as % of capacity) 203 5-6e Major rural projects 226
5-4m Rural zone substations – max demand v firm capacity 204 5-6f 11kV urban reinforcement projects 240
5-4n Zone subs – rural (max demand as a % of firm capacity) 206 5-6g 11kV rural reinforcement projects 244
5-4o 66kV, 33kV and 11kV zone substation utilisation 207 5-6h DSM value for network development alternatives 248
5-4p Zone substation 11kV feeder cable utilisation graph 208
5-4q Distribution transformer utilisation graph 208
5-6a Transpower core grid and spur assets in Orion’s area 214
5-6b Urban subtrans 66kV – existing and proposed (Diagram) 218
5-6c Urban subtrans 33kV – existing and proposed (Diagram) 218
5-6d Urban subtrans 66,33kV – existing and proposed (Map) 219
5-6e Rural subtrans 66kV – existing and proposed (Diagram) 228
5-6f Rural subtrans 33kV – existing and proposed (Diagram) 228
5-6g Rural subtrans 66,33kV – existing and future (Map) 229
5.1 Introduction
Developing our network to meet future demand growth requires significant capital expenditure. Before spending
capital on our network, we consider a number of options including those available in demand side management and
distributed generation.
The amount we spend on our network is influenced by existing and forecast consumer demand for electricity and the
number of new consumer connections to our network. Other significant demands on capital include:
 meet safety and environmental compliance requirements
 meet and maintain our security of supply standard (see section 5.3.1)
 meet our reliability of supply targets.
The growth rate in overall maximum network system demand (measured in megawatts) traditionally drives our
capital investment. Maximum demand is strongly influenced in the short-term by climatic variations (specifically the
severity of our winter conditions). For FY13 the peak total injection was 592MW. This was supplied through
Transpower’s GXPs and by export from distributed generators of 4.8MW. The maximum export recorded from
embedded generators during the year was 8.1MW on the evening of 2 July 2013.
During the winter of 2011, prior to the two snow storms, the peak half hour for the winter had been only 533MW
(based on load through Transpower GXPs i.e. excluding embedded generation). The July 2011 snow led to a 7%
higher half hour peak of 572MW. The August 2011 snow emphasized the effect of climatic variation when the load
peaked 10% higher again at 633MW. In the medium-term it is influenced by growth factors such as underlying
population trends, growth in the commercial/industrial sector and changes in rural land use.
Environment Canterbury’s Clean Air Plan placed small upward pressure on load demand growth as the plan
encouraged consumers to install electric heat pumps. This pressure is largely offset by efficient heat pumps
replacing less efficient forms of electric heating, and increased insulation being installed. The impact of over 35,000
conversions estimated to have occurred so far has had little impact on the peak load. Pending the outcome of an
ECAN review of the Air Quality Chapter of the Natural Resources Regional Plan, there may be further clean air
initiatives that impact on our network demand. In the meantime, we are not forecasting any impact from Clean Air
initiatives.
Another factor that has influenced our network development plan is in-fill housing in existing central suburbs and
new housing estates in areas such as Belfast, Halswell, Wigram, Broomfield, Marshlands, Rolleston and to a lesser
extent in Lincoln, West Melton, Burwood, Cashmere, Huntsbury Hill, Redcliffs and Sumner – it is likely we will extend
our urban 11kV network to meet these developments.
Understanding the impacts of the Canterbury earthquakes and learning from our experiences is vital for our
community and a key driver in our network development plan is to ensure that the replacement and upgrade of assets
in the north and east of Christchurch occurs in a resilient way and also facilitates growth in northern Christchurch.
In this section we discuss our network architecture, planning criteria, energy demand and growth, network gap
analysis and list our proposed projects required to address specific issues. The project list is split into asset type and
area concerned, for example, 11kV reinforcement projects (urban) and 11kV reinforcement projects (rural).
The impact of the Canterbury earthquakes

The 2010/2011 earthquakes in Canterbury caused significant damage to our network. We are proud of our pre-
earthquake network architecture and engineering strategies to minimise the impact of such events and we are
pleased with our operational response during the response and recovery phases. There is much to be learnt from
experiencing an event of this scale and this coupled with permanent network damage has led to an inevitable change
to our pre-earthquake network development plans.
We are actively gathering new information about the impact of the earthquakes on our present and future
communities. Our urban 66kV subtransmission and 11kV network architecture reviews have resulted in a change to
our subtransmission strategy as described in section 5.6.3. We have installed two 2MW generators temporarily at
QE2 to provide support for nearby suburbs until the subtransmission network is rebuilt in the north east of the city.
Our load forecasts have been updated with post-quake population forecasts for Christchurch using the Land Use
Recovery Plan (LURP) prepared for CERA by Environment Canterbury, and CCC vacant industrial land uptake data to
June 2013. Selwyn District Council have provided updated estimates of household numbers for the townships of
Rolleston, Weedons, Lincoln and Prebbleton.
The first census information since the earthquakes is to be released in December 2013. This will be a key input to
forecasts in our next AMP.
5.2 Network architecture

5.2.1 Transpower GXPs
Our network is supplied from nine GXP substations – four in the Christchurch urban area, two on the rural plains and
three remote GXPs at Arthur’s Pass, Coleridge and Castle Hill. The three remote GXPs have a single transformer and
a much lower throughput of energy. With the exception of Hororata and Kimberley all the GXPs peak in winter.
Approximately 65% of our consumers depend on the Islington GXP 220/66kV interconnection made up of two
200/266MVA transformers and one 250/310MVA transformer.
Transpower charges users, for example Orion and Mainpower, for the costs of upgrading and maintaining the GXPs.
Orion owns all the assets connected to the GXPs. We work with Transpower to plan for GXP connection asset
upgrades to ensure that any capital expenditure at the GXP is cost effective.
Security of supply for Orion’s subtransmission network largely depends on how Transpower’s assets are configured.
We continue to review quality and security of supply issues (see our gap analysis in section 5.5).
Urban GXPs
Urban GXPs are located at Islington, Addington, Middleton and Bromley substations. Islington has a 66kV and 33kV
grid connection. Addington has both 66kV and 11kV grid connections while Bromley and Middleton supply a 66kV grid
connection only. Islington and Bromley 220kV substations form part of Transpower’s South Island grid. They
interconnect between the major 220kV circuits from the southern power stations. Addington and Middleton GXPs are
supplied by 66kV lines from the Islington 66kV bus.
The Addington busbar is operationally split into two bus sections to improve reliability for consumers. We have
implemented a similar bus zone protection scheme at Bromley.
Bromley GXP load has dropped below 75% of firm capacity, as a result of the February 2011 earthquake, while
Islington has increased to above 75%.
Figure 5-2 Transpower system in Orion's network area
To West Coast
KEY
t ARTHUR’S PASS Power station
oas
st C ry
220kV circuit
We rbu Cass
t e 66kV circuit
Can Bealey
High voltage direct current line
Transpower GXP
N
Key to GXP max demand -
as a percentage of firm capacity
More than 94%
Between 75% and 94%
CASTLE HILL Less than 75%
Lake Coleridge
To Haywards
Springfield Waimakariri Gorge

To To
Nelson Southbrook Kaiapoi
COLERIDGE Sheffield
Waim River
KIMBERLEY akar
iri
Glentunnel
Christchurch City
Coalgate Kirwee
Darfield
Rakaia Gorge Glenroy ISLINGTON ADDINGTON
BROMLEY
R
ak
HORORATA Templeton
ai
a
To Benmore
Rolleston
Prebbleton
MIDDLETON Lyttelton
R
iv
e
r
Dunsandel Springston Diamond Harbour

Lincoln Tai Tapu
Teddington
To Twizel area
Rakaia Motukarara
Leeston Little River Duvauchelle
Lake Ellesmere
(Te Waihora)
Southbridge Lake Forsyth Akaroa
To Twizel area (Waiwera)
Birdlings
Rakaia Huts
Rural GXPs
Orion takes connection from five rural GXPs; the two main ones are located at Kimberley and Hororata. Each GXP is
supplied via a double 66kV line from the Islington 66kV bus. Hororata supplies Orion at both 66kV and 33kV. Hororata
is also connected to the West Coast via 66kV lines from the Coleridge power station.
The remainder of the rural area is fed at 11kV from three small GXPs at Arthur’s Pass, Coleridge and Castle Hill.
Together these supply less than 1% of Orion's load. Each GXP is fed from the 66kV Coleridge – West Coast lines.
5.2.2 Urban subtransmission

We have 15 urban 66/11kV zone substations, six urban 33/11kV zone substations and eight 11kV zone substations
(with no transformer). The 11kV zone substations are being removed as the equipment comes up for replacement, as
they do not fit with our current network design architecture. This AMP envisages up to three (and one conversion from
33kV to 66kV) new urban zone substations in the period until 2024. However the number, size, and location of these
will depend on the magnitude and geographic distribution of actual load growth in the intervening period.
We can connect most new loads to our urban network at short notice, as required by consumers. The additional load
makes use of network capacity held in reserve for contingency situations. That capacity must be replaced by capital
expenditure in order to ensure that supply security continues to meet our Security Standard and the needs of our
consumers.
Each increment of between 20 and 40MW of new load requires a new zone substation. Zone substations supply an
area close to them and free up capacity in adjacent substations. New zone substations require a suitable site,
transformers, switchgear and subtransmission connected to Transpower's 66kV or 33kV GXPs.
5.2.3 Rural subtransmission

We have eight rural 66/11kV zone substations and fourteen rural 33/11kV zone substations. This AMP envisages up to
five new zone substations and the conversion of up to five zone substations from 33kV to 66kV in the period until 2024.
This plan also makes provision for new substations to connect distributed generation at three locations. However the
number, size, and location of these will depend on the magnitude and geographic distribution of actual load growth in
the intervening period.
Each increment of between 5 and 10MW of new load requires a new zone substation. Zone substations supply an area
close to them and free up capacity in adjacent substations. New zone substations require a suitable site,
transformers, switchgear and subtransmission connected to Transpower's 66kV or 33kV GXPs.
The existing rural subtransmission network has been designed to meet strong load growth whilst optimising cost.
The significant increase in load over the last 15 years has enabled a much more interconnected subtransmission
network to be developed. The number of zone substations operating in radial configuration has reduced over time.
Most sites have only one transformer but the larger townships such as Rolleston and Lincoln have duplicated
transformers. Transformers are generally 7.5MVA or 7.5/10MVA capacity. Rural subtransmission capacity is
generally limited by voltage drop considerations and hence 66kV (as opposed to 33kV) is technically and economically
more attractive for new subtransmission projects.
5.3 Planning criteria

The first stage of planning a distribution network is to ensure that existing network loads are monitored and tested
against existing network capacity. The capacity test involves checking adequacy during contingencies defined in our
Security Standard and also predefined utilisation thresholds. More detail on our Security Standard and utilisation
thresholds is described in the sections to follow.
When network inadequacy is identified, the process of developing solutions begins. Each potential solution is
assessed for compliance with our design standards including safety compliance, capacity adequacy, quality,
reliability, security of supply and economic consequences.
Sections 5.3.1 to 5.3.5 discuss the main planning criteria considered when solutions are developed.
5.3.1 Security Standard

Security of supply is the ability of a network to meet the demand for electricity in certain circumstances when
electrical equipment fails. The more secure an electricity network, the greater its ability to continue to perform or
the quicker it can recover from a fault or a series of faults.
Note that security of supply differs from reliability. Reliability is a measure of how the network actually performs and
is measured in terms of things such as the number of times supply to consumers is interrupted.
The basic structure of our current Security Standard was developed in consultation with external advisors and
adopted by our board in 1998. It is based on the United Kingdom’s P2/6 which is the regulated standard for
distribution supply security in the UK. Consultation with electricity retailers and industry consumer groups was also
carried out. Currently there is only one industry guide published by the Electricity Engineers’ Association of NZ
(EEANZ) and no regulated national standard is in force. The principle is that the greater the size or economic
importance of the demand served, the shorter the interruption time that can be tolerated.
During 2006 we reviewed our Security Standard to ensure it takes into account current consumer preferences for the
quality and price of service that we provide . As a result of our review and consumer consultation, our Security
Standard has been improved to better reflect the current needs of consumers. Our revised Security Standard may
result in slightly lower reliability for our outer-urban consumers but will also reduce the need for future price rises.
These kinds of trade-offs between price and electricity supply reliability are a constant focus for us. Generally, the
more we spend, the more reliable our community’s electricity supply becomes. However, the trade-off is that the
more we spend the higher our prices become, as we need to recover our costs. We are committed to seeking our
consumers’ views on the price/quality trade-off and we want to ensure that our network investment decisions reflect
consumer preferences.
The demand group thresholds in our security of supply standard tend to err on the side of caution and generally
provide a level of security that is slightly above the requirements of the average consumer connection. Our analysis
has also shown that it is appropriate to provide a slightly higher level of network security for the Christchurch CBD.
This approach ensures that consumers who place a high value on security of supply are reasonably represented in
areas where a mix of consumer types exists. The CBD rebuild provides an opportunity to discuss the security and
supply requirements with individual consumers as they re-connect to our network.
Given that six years had elapsed since our last Security Standard review and we had new earthquake related
information to consider, we undertook a review of our urban 66kV and 11kV network architecture in 2012, with rural
66kV and 11kV and urban low-voltage reviews to follow in 2013/14. Once these are complete they may lead to a
further review of our Security Standard.
Further information, including a summary of our 2006 review, can be found on our website oriongroup.co.nz.
In addition to our security of supply standard, consumers are given the opportunity at the time of initial connection to
discuss their individual security of supply requirements. We also facilitate changes to individual security of supply
arrangements for existing consumers.
Our largest urban consumer connections are relatively small on a national level and have peak loads of
approximately 4MW. Our security of supply standard caters for connections of this size and therefore the occurrence
of individual security arrangements on our network is minimal. They are mainly limited to high profile services such
as hospitals, Christchurch airport and public sports venues. The milk processing plants at Darfield and Dunsandel
have peak demands approaching 12MW. We have put in place individual security of supply arrangements for these
connections.
Table 5-3a Distribution network supply Security Standard
N-1 cable, N-2 cable,

Load size
Class Description line or transformer line or transformer Bus fault or switchgear failure
(MW)
contingency contingency
Urban – Transpower GXPs
Lines, buses and supply No interruption for 50% and

A1 15-200 No interruption Restore within 2 hours
banks restore rest within 2 hours
Rural – Transpower GXPs

Lines, buses and supply Restore within 4 hours No interruption for 50% and
B1 15-60 No interruption (Note 1)
banks restore rest within 4 hours (Note 1)
B2 Supply banks 0-1 Restore in repair time Restore in repair time Restore in repair time
Urban – Orion network
Zone substations with

No interruption for 50% and
C1 CBD or special industrial 15-40 No interruption Restore within 1hr
restore rest within 2 hours
load
Zone substations without

No interruption for 50% and
C2 CBD or special industrial 15-40 No interruption Restore within 2 hours
restore rest within 2 hours
load
Zone substations or 11kV Restore 75% within 2

C3 ring with Christchurch 2-15 Restore within 0.5 hour hours and the rest in Restore within 2 hours
CBD or inner urban load repair time
Restore 75% within 2

Outer, mainly residential
C4 4-15 Restore within 2 hours hours and the rest in Restore within 2 hours
zone substations
repair time
Inner 11kV distribution Restore 90% within 1 hour and the

C5 0.5-2 Restore within 1 hour Restore in repair time
feeder rest in 4 hours (use generator)
Outer, mainly residential Restore 90% within 1 hour and the

C6 0.5-4 Restore within 1 hour Restore in repair time
11kV distribution feeder rest in 4 hours (use generator)
Use generator to Use generator to restore

C7 11kV distribution spurs 0-0.5 Restore in repair time
restore within 4 hours within 4 hours
Rural – Orion network
Restore within 4 hours No interruption for 50% and

D1 Subtransmission feeders 15-60 No interruption (Note 1)
restore rest within 4 hours (Note 1)
Restore 50% within 4
Zone substations and Restore within 4 hours
D2 4-15 (Note 1) hours and the rest in Restore within 4 hours (Note 1)
subtransmission feeders
repair time (Note 1)
Small zone substations

Restore within 4 hours Restore 75% within 4 hours and
D3 and 11kV distribution 1-4 (Note 1) Restore in repair time
the rest in repair time (Note 1)
feeders
D4 11kV distribution spurs 0-1 Restore in repair time Restore in repair time Restore in repair time
Note 1. Assumes the use of interruptible irrigation load for periods up to 48 hours.
5.3.2 Network utilisation thresholds

We monitor loads on our major zone substation 11kV feeder cables at half hour intervals. This information is used to
prepare an annual reinforcement programme for our network. Reinforcements recommended in this plan are
generally based on winter loading for the Christchurch urban area and on summer loading for the rural area.
Growth at the 11kV distribution level is largely dependent on individual subdivision development and consumer
connection upgrades. Growth in excess of the system average is not uncommon and therefore localised growth
rates are applied to the region under study. Zone substations, subtransmission and distribution feeder cables are
subject to four distinct types of load:
1) Nominal load: Is the maximum load seen on a given asset when all of the surrounding network is available
for service.
2) N-1 load: Is the load that a given asset would be subjected to if one piece of the network was removed from
service due to a fault or maintenance.
3) N-2 load: Is the load that a given asset would be subjected to if two pieces of the network were removed due
to a fault or maintenance.
4) Bus fault load: Is the load that a given asset would be subjected to if a single bus was removed from service
due to a fault or maintenance.
As defined in our Security Standard, the location and quantity of load supplied by a feeder has a bearing on whether
all or only some of the four load categories described above should be applied to an asset for analysis.
If the nominal load reaches 70% or the N-1, N-2 or bus fault load reaches 90% then a more detailed review of the
surrounding network is instigated.
5.3.3 Capacity determination for new projects

When a capacity or security gap is identified on the network it is necessary to consider different capacity options as
solutions. For example, a constrained 11kV feeder can be relieved by installing an additional 11kV feeder to the
area. But if the zone substation supplying the area is near full capacity then it may be more cost effective to bring
forward the new zone substation investment and avoid the 11kV feeder expense altogether.
When comparing different capacity solutions it is necessary to utilise the net present value (NPV) test. The NPV test
is an economic mechanism that converts the value of future projects to present day dollars. NPV analysis generally
supports the staged implementation of a number of smaller reinforcements. This approach also reduces the risk of
over-capitalisation that ultimately results in stranded assets.
The capacity of a new zone substation and 11kV feeders is generally fixed by the desire to standardise network
equipment. The capacity of a zone substation and transformer/s is based mainly on the load density of the area to be
supplied and the level of the available subtransmission voltage. The expense of 66kV switchgear and underground
11kV cables, along with the high load densities in urban areas facilitate large zone substations without the issues of
excessive voltage drop and losses associated with equivalently sized rural zone substations. Developing a network
based on standardised capacities provides additional benefit when considering future maintenance and repair.
Transformers and switchgear are more readily interchangeable and the range of spares required for emergencies
can be minimised.
When underground cable capacities are exceeded, it is normally most effective to lay new cables. When overhead
line capacities are exceeded, replacement of the current carrying conductor may be feasible. However the increased
weight of a larger conductor may require that the line be rebuilt with different pole spans. In this case it may be
preferable to build another line in a different location that addresses several capacity issues.
For new load it is often necessary to extend the network into new areas. As new load is connected it is necessary to
reinforce the upper network. Overall a conservative approach is taken. New upper network capacity is installed only
once new load growth has or is certain to occur. In the short term, unexpected or accelerated load growth is met by
utilising security of supply capacity.
We discuss our approach to increased capacity in our documents NW70.60.16 - Network Architecture Review:
Subtransmission, NW70.60.06 - Urban 11kV Network Architecture Review, and NW70.50.05 - Network design and
overview.
The following table 5-3b provides a summary of our standard network capacities.
Table 5-3b Standard network capacities
Sub-trans Zone 11kV 11kV tie or 11/400kV

Location/load mission substation feeder size spur (Note 1) substation 400V feeders
Sub-transmission capacity (Note 1 and 2) (Note 1)
density voltage capacity MW) capacity (MW)
(kV) (MW) (MW) (MW)
Urban high 40MW radials

66 40 7 4 0.2-1 Up to 0.3
density loads 40-160MW for interconnected network
Urban high 23MW radials and interconnected
33 23 7 4 0.2-1 Up to 0.3
density loads network
Rural low 30MW radials

66 10-23 6 2 0.025-1 Up to 0.3
density loads 30-50MW interconnected network
Rural low 15MW radials and interconnected

33 7.5-10 6 2 0.025-1 Up to 0.3
density loads network
Notes: 1. Network design requires 11kV and 400V feeders to deliver extra load during contingencies and therefore normal load will be
approximately 50-70% of capacity.
2. 11kV feeders in the rural area are generally voltage constrained to approximately 3-4MW so the 6MW capacity only applies if a
localised high load density area exists.
5.3.4 Project prioritisation
Prioritisation of network solution projects for capacity and constraints is a relatively complex process that involves
multiple factors that are both external and internal to Orion.
The primary factors to be considered when prioritising projects, in decreasing order of significance, are:
1. Coordination with NZ Transport Authority and local authority civil projects:
Where projects are known to occur in the same location, we aim to schedule our projects to coincide with the
timing of key civil infrastructure projects by these two parties. This may cause us to bring forward, or even
delay if possible, capital works projects to avoid major future complications and unnecessary expenditure which
may arise. The most common activity of this type is coordination of planned cable works with any future road-
widening or resealing programmes to avoid the need to re-lay cables or excavate and then reinstate newly laid
road seal. We are working closely with SCIRT as they rebuild the pipes and roads of Christchurch, and we co-
ordinated our Dallington to McFaddens 66kV cable installation with SCIRT’s civil works in this area to allow a
single trenching and resealing programme.
2. Satisfying individual or collective consumer expectations:
We consider satisfying consumer expectations as the most influential factor and give priority to the constraints
that are most likely to impact consumer supply through extended or frequent outages, or compromised power
quality.
3. Managing contractor resource constraints:
We aim to maintain a steady work flow to contractors and ensure project diversity is preserved within a given
year. This ensures that contractor personnel and equipment levels match our capital build program year-on-
year at a consistent level, reducing the risk of our contractors being over or under resourced.
4. Coordination with Transpower:
We endeavour to coordinate any major network structural changes adjacent to a GXP with Transpower’s
planned asset replacement programmes, and also provide direction to Transpower to ensure consistency with
our sub-transmission upgrade plans.
5. Our asset replacement programme:
We extensively review areas of the network where scheduled asset replacement programmes occur to ensure
the most efficient and cost-effective solution is sought to fit in with the current and long-term network
development structure, for example replacement of switchgear in substations.
6. Our asset maintenance programme:
We seek to schedule any major substation works and upgrades to coincide with asset maintenance
programmes, for example zone substation transformer half-life maintenance.
Factors 1-4 are external to the company and 5-6 are internal Orion processes. All are principally objective in nature;
however, while specific issues may result in clear outcomes of consumer satisfaction for the consumers involved,
feedback from our general consumer base is less directly obtained. Sample sets of consumers are surveyed on
some matters, and ultimately direction is provided via the elected representatives of Orion’s shareholders, the
Christchurch City and Selwyn District councils.
After assessing their relative priorities, the final decision to undertake investment projects in the forthcoming year
depends on urgency. Other factors also apply, such as seasonal timing (to avoid taking equipment out of service
during peak loading periods - winter for urban projects, summer for rural), and the necessary order of
interconnected projects. Professional engineering judgements based on experience and expertise may come into
these decisions.
Projects not selected for next year are provisionally assigned to a future year in the 10-year planning window. When
next year’s project selection process is undertaken all projects are reviewed and, depending on changes in
information and priorities, either maintained in the planning schedule, advanced, deferred, modified, or deleted.
Further details of our approach is in our document NW70.60.14 - Project Prioritisation and Deliverability Process.
5.3.5 Non-network solutions

When the network becomes constrained it is not always necessary to relieve that constraint by investing in new zone
substations, 11kV feeders and 400V reinforcement. Before implementing network investment solutions, we consider
the following alternatives:
 demand side management
 distributed generation
 uneconomic connections.
Demand side management

Demand side management (DSM) provides an alternative to transmission and distribution network reinforcement.
DSM can be defined as shaping the overall consumer load profile to obtain maximum mutual benefit to the
consumer and the grid and network operator.
Since legislation required electricity retailers to be separate from network operators, it has become more difficult to
implement a fully integrated DSM strategy. Electricity consumers are generally no longer directly contracted to
Orion. Our primary mechanism for achieving better utilisation of the assets is to signal the investment cost
implications to electricity retailers in our delivery pricing structure. The derivation and application of delivery pricing
is published on our website oriongroup.co.nz.
We are integrating DSM into development of our network. Some of the gains from DSM are:
 increased utilisation of the network
 improved utilisation of Transpower's transmission capacity
 consumers benefit by becoming more efficient in the utilisation of energy and network capacity
 consumer relations improve through less upward pressure on prices.
The following DSM strategies are applied by Orion:

 ripple system – anytime hot water cylinder control
 ripple system – night rate price options to spread load more evenly over the day
 ripple system – major consumer price signalling
 ripple system – interruptible irrigation
 ripple system - generation credits
 power factor correction rebate
 coordinated upper south island load management
 diesel fuelled generation.
For further detail on the potential of consumer DSM initiatives to defer or avoid investment, see section 5.6.12.
We also discuss DSM in our network documents NW70.60.10 - Demand Side Management Stage 1 – Issues &
Opportunities and NW70.60.11 - Demand Side Management Stage 2 – Potential Initiatives.
Figure 5-3 Peak demand capping
Demand (MW)
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
FY70 FY75 FY80 FY85 FY90 FY95 FY00 FY05 FY10 FY15
Measured system demand Estimated peak demand using measured energy
Ripple control
Ripple control is one of the most effective tools available for implementing DSM. Ripple enables us to send a myriad
of load control and pricing signals to our consumers. Over the last 30 years, our commitment to demand side
management through hot water cylinder control and peak and night rate price signalling has resulted in a dramatic
difference between the growth in peak demand and energy. The previous graph shows that significant peak demand
capping occurred during the 1990s as a result of our DSM initiatives.
Since 1980 a gap of 200MW has been achieved between energy based estimated peak demand and actual peak
demand. Committed utilisation of our ripple control system is thought to have been the driver for approximately 100-
150MW of the 200MW gap between demand and energy. The decreased gap following the earthquakes is due to the
large drop in energy delivered due to the reduction in connections supplied. There was no drop in demand for the
first two years following the earthquakes due to significant snow falls in August 2011 and June 2012.
Ripple control has facilitated the implementation of the following DSM strategies:
 hot water cylinder control – 50MW of peak load deferment
 night store heating – 125MW of night load providing an estimated 50MW peak reduction
 price signalling to major consumers – 25MW (includes embedded generation)
 interruptible irrigation load groups (summer only) – 28MW during contingencies.
To ensure that we can continue to achieve these results, three 66kV ripple plants have been replaced with multiple
11kV ripple plants. 11kV ripple plants avoid overloading issues caused by an increasing number of capacitors being
installed on Transpower's grid and also reduce dependence on any one item of plant.
A current issue is our dependency on ripple control receivers located at consumers’ premises. Orion does not own
these receivers and therefore has limited ability to control their installation and maintenance. In 2007 we modified
our Network Code to make it mandatory to install ripple receivers that respond to an emergency signal.
We will continue to work with retailers and meter owners to ensure that the benefits of ripple control continue to be
achievable as the implementation of new technology occurs.
Interruptible load groups – irrigation

When an interruption to supply occurs on our network, there is a cost of lost production and the inconvenience to our
consumers. Our targets for reliability are based on matching the cost of an interruption to the cost of preventing one.
That is, there is a point where investing further in our network is not justified by the cost saving to our consumers
from reduced interruption times.
Not all consumers are exposed to the same costs when an interruption occurs. To reduce expenditure on the
network and therefore control price, it can be useful to first restore supply to consumers who have a high cost of non
supply, and then restore supply to those consumers with a low cost of non supply when the fault is repaired.
Following consultation in 2005 with irrigation consumers, we have extended the possible duration of interruptions
for irrigators up to 48 hours under extreme conditions. At the time of implementation, the ability to do this
prevented the need to construct Ardlui zone substation ($3m) and delayed several other projects ($7m in total). The
continued application of interruptible irrigation has continued to avoid and delay further network investment over
the last seven years. This has significantly reduced pressure on price rises to our consumers. The proposed 2013/4
review of our rural network architecture will re-examine the economics and implementation of our irrigation
interruption scheme.
Power factor correction rebate

If a consumer’s load has a poor power factor then our network and the transmission grid is required to deliver a
higher peak load than is necessary. This may lead to the need for an upgrade.
Our Network Code requires all consumer connections to maintain a power factor of at least 0.95. During 2010 we
introduced a penalty charge for consumers whose power factor falls short of the 0.95 minimum. In the Christchurch
urban area where the predominately underground network is high in capacitance (which helps to improve power
factor), the minimum 0.95 power factor requirement has resulted in an overall 0.99 GXP power factor at times of
network peak. This is a good outcome and any further benefit from offering financial assistance to correct power
factor in the urban area would be uneconomic.
However, in the rural area, the predominately overhead network is high in inductance (which reduces power factor)
and we offer a financial incentive in the form of a ‘power factor correction rebate’ to irrigation consumers with
pumping loads greater than 20kW. The rebate provides an incentive for irrigators to correct their power factor to at
least 0.95. The rebate is set at a level where it is economic for the customer to provide power factor correction,
which is lower than the avoided network investment cost associated with power factor related network upgrades.
Heat pump efficiency promotion

The ECAN Clean Air initiative in Christchurch has encouraged many consumers to change from solid fuel burners to
electric heating. The high efficiency of heat pumps compared to resistive heating methods has lead to strong uptake
of heat pumps in Christchurch. The high variability of efficiency and quality of heat pumps on the market has
resulted in us taking a strong interest in the promotion of appropriate models during the initial phases of
conversion.
When EECA released the new energy-star label on heat pumps we supported a promotion about ‘how to choose your
new heat pump’. It is envisaged that encouraging consumers to purchase high efficiency heat pumps will reduce the
increase in peak demand on our network.
Coordinated Upper South Island load management

As well as controlling hot water cylinder load to manage peaks on our own network we also control hot-water
cylinders to manage peaks on Transpower’s Upper South Island network. We do this via a specifically designed
Upper South Island load manager which communicates with Transpower and all of the Upper South Island
distribution network companies. Through cooperation and the coordination of Upper South Island load control we
are able to maximise the potential to reduce peaks without excessive control of hot-water cylinders.
Distributed/embedded generation
The purpose of our distribution network is to deliver bulk energy from the Transpower GXPs to consumers. In
certain circumstances it can be more economic for the consumer to provide a source of energy themselves in the
form of distributed generation (DG). DG may also reduce the need to extend network capacity.
Our policy (see our website) for DG provides a different treatment for different sizes of distributed generation.
In particular our policy for DG above 750kW gives consideration to the following issues:
 coincidence of DG with Transpower interconnection charges
 benefits of avoided or delayed network investment
 security of supply provided by generators as opposed to network solutions
 hours of operation permitted by resource consents
 priority order for calling on peak lopping alternatives, such as hot-water control versus DG.
In order for DG to be effective we require a contract to ensure that peak lopping is reliably achieved. This is done
through pricing structures that encourage users to control load at peak times. We will continue to encourage DG
through appropriate pricing mechanisms. Given the large investment and significant network constraint deferment
associated with export generators of more than 750kW, we assess them on a case-by-case basis.
We continue to proactively support the installation of DG by major energy users. An incentive for major consumers
to generate electricity is provided through our pricing structure which includes an avoidable control period demand
charge. We estimate that approximately 15MW of generation is available on control period demand signalling. The
total major customer response is about 25MW and some of that is load reduction (rather than generation). There is
also a significant quantity (15MW+) of standby generation owned by consumers for their own use during an
interruption.
Our peak load forecast assumes that an additional 2MW of peak DG will be installed each year. The series of
Christchurch earthquakes has lead to an increase in enquiries to connect diesel generation and we anticipate a
corresponding period of strong growth in the connection of diesel generation. For this to be effective in deferring
network capacity, the generation capacity must be reliably available to support the network in a fault/constraint
situation. In general this requires that generation be offered to operate as and when required, which in turn
necessitates that fuel is able to be stored.
DG using fuel that cannot be stored does not usually substitute for network capacity unless fuel supplies are stable
and reliable. Wind, solar, and run-of-river hydro are three types of generation that provide energy but do not
substitute for network capacity. However, with multiple sites and diversity in fuel characteristics, some certainty of
availability can be determined through analysis of historic data.
We have resource consents to install a total of 23MW of generation capacity split between sites at Bromley and
Belfast. Generation at the Belfast site has the potential to defer investment in a new zone substation at Marshlands.
The recent Christchurch earthquakes have resulted in significant damage to our 66kV subtransmission network
feeding the Christchurch north eastern suburbs. To provide alternative capacity in the area, we have recently
installed two 2MW diesel fuelled generators for short term placement at QE2. We will consider relocating these
generators to Belfast in the future to defer investment in the Marshland zone substation and general 11kV
reinforcement in the area.
Justification for installing generation at the Bromley site will require either an energy-firming contract with an
electricity market retailer or suitable market arrangements to reward us for relieving transmission constraints
between Twizel and Christchurch. Depending on the nature and duration of any contract, this generation may also
provide alternative investment options for our distribution network.
Without creating an ‘at arms-length’ business, our potential involvement in large scale generation projects is limited
by the Electricity Industry Act 2010 to 50MW for embedded generation within the distribution network or 250MW for
grid connected generation.
Uneconomic connections policy

When an application for a new or upgraded connection (larger connections only) is submitted for review, we
undertake an economic assessment of the connection. This assessment determines whether or not our standard
pricing arrangements will cover the cost of utilising existing or new assets associated with the connection. If the
connection is uneconomic (i.e. existing consumers would be subsidising the new connection) then a connection
contribution is required from the new consumer.
This policy ensures that the true cost of providing supply is passed on to the appropriate consumer and thereby
allows them to make the right financial trade-offs. If an economic non-network alternative is available then that
option can be chosen.
5.4 Energy, demand and growth

To effectively plan the future of our network, we need to estimate the size and location of future loads. Long-term
growth in energy consumption has shown a consistent trend until the major earthquakes of FY11. This trend
provides a first estimate of load growth both for the full network, and for specific areas within. However any load
forecasting is an approximation—load cannot be forecast with 100% accuracy. There is some uncertainty due to the
drop in peak demand and energy consumption from a population decrease (particularly in the east of the city), timing
of the commercial rebuild in central Christchurch and increased electricity use for space heating in homes with
damaged insulation and removal of solid fuel burners in damaged houses.
Energy and demand growth is a function of many inputs. Network development is driven by growth in peak demand
(not energy); therefore we focus on demand growth rather than energy. In general, two factors affect load growth:
 population increases
 changes in population behaviour.
At a national level, it is reasonably easy to forecast population growth. When the national forecast is broken down to
regional level, the accuracy is less reliable but still useful in predicting future demand growth.
Many variables affect behavioural change. These include technological advancements, available energy options and
requirements such as Environment Canterbury’s Clean Air Plan (CAP). It is difficult to forecast these variables
accurately. As well as these variables, our DSM strategies shape our peak demand load forecast.
As a high level of accuracy is required to build an appropriate electricity distribution network, we treat load forecasts
as a guide. A major 66kV or 33kV network development project takes approximately three years to plan, design and
build, while smaller 11kV projects take around 18 months. A 400V solution can take several months. In this context
it is prudent to apply flexibility in how we implement our network development proposals, rather than rigidly adhere
to a project schedule based on an outdated forecast.
We derive our load forecast from a combination of bottom-up inputs, such as household growth forecasts by CCC
using the July 2013 draft Land Use Recovery Plan (LURP) prepared for CERA, and historical trends in growth. These
are adjusted to reflect significant inputs such as milk processing plant upgrades and DSM initiatives.
The following sections summarise our key load forecasting inputs.
Earthquake February 2011

The February earthquake reduced energy delivery volumes by approximately 10%. Recent energy consumption
suggests that energy volumes are starting to increase again but it is too early to draw any conclusions.
Projecting on-going recovery post-earthquake is difficult. For post-quake population projections we are using
census area unit projections provided by CCC based on the draft Land Use Recovery Plan developed for CERA. This
forecast is slightly lower than the previously used Urban Development Strategy ’Quick” scenario. More data is
required to access the impact (if any) of this on the timing of our key medium-term growth projects in North
Christchurch. CCC plan to rework their models next year using census results due to be released Dec 2013 so we
can expect an update in the first half of 2014 which is likely to give refined population projections for our next AMP.
Census information will increase forecast confidence, however more than usual uncertainty remains due to the
temporary workforce associated with the rebuild. There are estimates of 10,000+ workers still to arrive and
uncertainty about when and how many will leave.
Impact of economic downturn

Peak demand on our network varies depending on the harshness of the winter weather. Peak demand had not
grown between the high peak reached during our 2006 winter snow storm and the February 2011 earthquake. The
2010 peak was only 2% above the 2002 winter snow storm peak. The potential impact of the pre-earthquake
economic downturn has been somewhat superseded by the earthquake recovery phase. Our underlying growth
forecasts are linked (via the Urban Development Strategy and draft LURP) to Statistics New Zealand population
projections. The economic environment can affect network construction costs and we monitor these costs on an
annual basis to capture the impact of the economic environment on commodity prices, etc.
Impact of DSM on load forecast

Our DSM strategies discussed in section 5.3.5 impact on our peak load forecast. Our network peak demand forecast
assumes that 2MW of DG will be added to our network each year. This is commensurate with growth in DG over the
last five years. Because it is difficult to predict the location of new DG, we have not attempted to apply the growth in
DG to the zone substation load forecasts. Instead we encourage DG in constrained areas on our network by
publishing the area specific network deferral value of DSM initiatives (see section 5.6.12).
The impact of other DSM initiatives such as price signalling, night rate tariffs and hot water cylinder control is
captured in the underlying inputs to our load forecast. For example, we monitor the after diversity maximum
demand (ADMD) of new households and apply this figure to the projected number of subdivision lots for an area to
determine a forecast which includes the impact of our DSM initiatives.
At the 11kV feeder level, and despite the increased size of households and the increased uptake of electrical
appliances and heat-pumps, the ADMD has only grown by 0.5kW to around 3.5kW per household. This process is
applied to our subtransmission forecasts for both new subdivisions and urban infill (3kW per infill household). A
similar process is also applied on a per hectare basis for industrial subdivisions but we recognise that specific
consumer requirements can cause a significant variance from the average case.
This process is described in NW70.60.12 - Long term load forecasting methodology for subtransmission and zone
substations. See also section 5.4.2 - Methodology for determining GXP and zone substation load forecasts.
5.4.1 Observed and extrapolated load growth
Energy throughput (GWh)

Network energy throughput for FY13 was 3,165GWh (including export from distributed generation of about 4GWh), up
3% on the previous year.
The 25-year history suggests an averaged steady growth rate of about 1.8% each year. For the five years prior to the
earthquakes, energy growth was lower than the long term average at 1.4%. Environment Canterbury’s CAP has had
only a modest impact on energy use, as surveys suggest that the high conversion rates of solid fuel burners to heat
pumps has been balanced in part by consumers switching from resistive heating to higher efficiency heat pumps.
The economic downturn and closure of several major customers had led to a slowing in energy growth prior to the
earthquakes.
We have observed a step change in energy demand as a result of the February 2011 earthquake. While there has
been some recovery, demolition work in the CBD and planned demolition in the east is significantly affecting volumes
in those areas. Longer term, we expect the new business and residential buildings will be more energy efficient than
the older buildings they replace, and the CERA Central City Recovery plan also implies fewer, much smaller
rebuilds. Energy volumes have started trending up again since April/May 2012 but the medium term view is very
uncertain. The 2013 winter was particularly mild which lowered usage for FY14. Figure 5-4a shows the projections
of short and long term pre-quake growth rates.
Figure 5-4a Orion network annual energy trends
Energy (GWh per annum)

4000
3750
3500
3250
3000
2750
2500
2250 Measured energy supplied to network

Projection of energy usage: using 5 years pre-quake history (1.4% p.a.)
2000
Projection of energy usage: using 25 years pre-quake history (1.8% p.a.)
1750 Forecast energy usage FY14
1500
FY84 FY89 FY94 FY99 FY04 FY09 FY14 FY19 FY24
Maximum demand
Maximum demand is the major driver of investment in our network. This measure is very volatile and normally
varies by up to 10% depending on winter weather. In 2011 the July snowstorm increased the peak by 7%. After the
August 2011 snowstorm the peak increased by a further 10%. Since demand peaks during the winter, we can record
this as the peak for FY14.
Our network maximum half hour demand, based on load through the Transpower GXPs, for FY14 was 596MW (the
peak that occurred on 20 June 2013), up 19MW from the previous year. The 20/21 June storm was forecast to be the
worst in 20 years (in terms of precipitation and duration) with the possibility of significant snow. Only snow flurries
eventuated in the city on 20th, but some schools did close. Note these figures exclude temporary excursions that
show up in regulatory disclosure data which are not used for forecasting demand.
Forecasting peak demand at the moment has challenges (on top of the earthquakes) including uncertainties with the
global economy and unprecedented applications for embedded generation. Excluding earthquake effects, the long
and short term trends suggest a demand growth rate of around 1% per annum. The following Figure 5-4b of historic
network demand also includes three forecasts:
 Forecast system demand (with and without electric vehicles)

These two forecasts are based on underlying residential growth and industrial uptake models. We have also
added an electric vehicle scenario to our forecast demand which assumes that 10% of households will have an
electric vehicle by 2023 and 20% of these vehicles will be charged at peak. Network reinforcement included in
this AMP is designed to ensure that nominal and security of supply capacity is provided for in this peak demand
forecast. The above average increase in the medium term is due to the increase in residential population from
the draft LURP projections.
 Potential extreme cold snap peak
This forecast is based on events similar to those in 2011 when a substantial snowstorm on 15th August changed
consumer behaviour. Despite having no CBD and fewer consumers in the eastern suburbs, we experienced
extraordinary loads on 17 August as some schools and businesses reopened after being closed for two days
while others remained closed for a third day. This led to very high loads as we experienced a loss of diversity
between consumer types. There was significant demand from residential consumers due to some schools and
businesses remaining closed, while there was also significant demand from businesses that restarted after
several days without operation.
When planning our network, it is not appropriate to install infrastructure to maintain security of supply during a
peak that may occur for two or three hours once every 10 years. This forecast is therefore used to determine
nominal capacity requirements of our network only .
Figure 5-4b Overall maximum demand trends on the Orion network
Demand (MW)
750
Measured system demand
Linear projection of system demand: using 10 years of pre-quake history (0.9% p.a.)
700 Historical trend of system demand
Forecast system demand: excluding electric vehicles
Forecast system demand: with extreme cold snap
650 Forecast system demand
600
550
500
450
400
Load factor
Overall system utilisation
Overall network utilisation is indicated by the system annual load factor (defined as the ratio of average to peak de-
mand). Orion's annual system load factor has generally improved over the last few years, but can vary significantly
as vagaries in our weather influence maximum demands. For FY13 the load factor was 63%, up 7% on the previous
year. This shows a bounce back from last year which was lower due to a combination of reduced energy consump-
tion due to loss of connections after the February 2011 earthquake and extraordinary peak demand following the
August 2011 snow. Improvements in load factor come from increased off-peak loads (irrigation, milk processing
plants and summer air conditioning), combined with effective control of winter peak loads through price signalling
and encouraging alternative fuel use for on-peak heating. Winters with extreme cold weather often lead to lower
load factors due to the very high peak load.
The present trends of reducing irrigation load growth, and increased electrical winter heating load suggest that load
factor may plateau around 60% to 65%. FY14 is expected to be lower due to some very mild months in the 2013
winter which reduced energy consumption significantly.
Figure 5-4c System load factor
Demand and energy (MW and GWh) per annum Load factor
5000 80%
Measured energy supplied to network: with projection using 25 years of pre-quake history (GWh p.a.)
4500 Measured system demand (MW)
Forecast system demand (MW) 75%
Forecast system demand: with extreme cold snap (MW)
4000
Actual system load factor (%)
Forecast load factor (%) 70%
3500 Forecast load factor: with extreme cold snap (%)
65%
3000
2500 60%
2000
55%
1500
50%
1000
45%
500
0 40%
Load duration
With constantly changing load on our network, the peak demands that determine network capacity generally only
occur for very short periods in the year. The following graph shows the load duration curves of our 200 peak half
hour demands on Transpower’s network over 10 years. The graph shows that demand side management has been
successful in flattening the curve in recent years. FY12 is unusual in that consumer demand was reduced due to the
earthquakes, but then new peaks were created with the July 2011 snowstorm, followed by extraordinary load due to
another snowstorm in August. In the six years prior, an increase in demand side management for 10 hours each
year would have reduced our network peak demand by around 10MW. During winter 2012 just 1.5 hours DSM (on the
afternoon of 6 June snow) would have been sufficient to reduce the winter peak by 10MW. It is difficult to pick the
time to utilise DSM to target these few hours when the curve is so flat. To reduce the peak by a further 10MW would
require over 130 hours of DSM in these years. However, extreme weather conditions (as mentioned below) give an
on-going incentive for DSM.
The Transpower grid requires sufficient capacity to meet load during extreme weather conditions that may last for
only a few hours. Peaking generation can help to delay the need for increases in Transpower’s network capacity.
This generation may need to operate for only a few hours over the largest peak demand times, as required to avoid
Transpower’s network constraints. In the 2011 winter, peaking generation of 30MW would only have needed to
operate for about 20 hours to reduce our urban network maximum demand by about 30MW. Winter 2013 was similar
where about 10 hours of peaking generation could have reduced the peak by 25MW. The 20/21 June storm
accounted for eight hours, during which one of the our new 2MW generators located temporarily at QE2 was run to
reduce the peak and support hot water service level. In unusually prolonged cold conditions longer hours of
operation might be needed.
Generation may also be used to reduce Transpower’s charges. If used for this purpose, longer hours of operation
might be needed, especially to avoid reductions in water heating service levels.
Control of the dominant winter maximum demands depends heavily on suitable price signals, and consumers’
response to them. If this is to continue to be effective then it is important that electricity retailers continue to
support demand side management initiatives. Of particular importance is the promotion of night-rate tariffs and
load control via the on-going installation and maintenance of ripple receivers.
Figure 5-4d Christchurch urban area network – load duration curves
Demand from Transpower (MW)

650
625
600
575
550
525
FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09
FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14
500
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200
Half-hour number
Rural load growth

In contrast to our urban area, growth rates for our summer peaking rural areas have been high over the last 10 years.
Since FY02, consumer applications to connect new load to our rural network have been reasonably consistent.
However, the yearly variations in weather and in particular low summer rainfall resulted in an increase of 12MW and
7MW respectively across Hororata and Springston GXPs during the summers of FY08 and FY04. This demonstrates
how variable peak loads can be, and how weather dependent they are – a dry summer on the Canterbury Plains
causes an increase in peak demand as irrigation is required simultaneously across a large area.
The Central Plains Water Scheme (CPW) reached the required subscription threshold late in 2013, and in March 2014
awarded contracts to commence stage 1 supplying 20,000Ha between Rakaia and Hororata rivers, inland from SH1.
Restrictions due to ground water availability and nutrient loads indicate there will be reduced irrigation load growth
other than related to this scheme. Increased surface water irrigation within the scheme however will allow irrigation
load growth between the scheme and the coast due to greater ground water recharge.
Figure 5-4e Central Plains Water scheme stages
Stage 3
Stage 2
Stage 1
The following graph shows recent summer load growth in our rural area. A new GXP was constructed at Kimberley
during FY13 to provide for growth at Fonterra’s new milk processing plant near Darfield. This GXP will also support
new CPW load.
Figure 5-4f Rural summer maximum demand (MW)

200
Demand (MW)
180 Measured total rural summer demand

160 Forecast total rural summer demand
140
120
100
80
60
Approximately 50% of the forecast increase in rural peak demand over the next 10 years is due to the increase in milk
processing capability. The new Fonterra plant has added 11MVA already.
Rural winter load growth has been steady at just over 3% per annum over the last 10 years. The FY11 peak is due to a
significant August snowstorm. The recent Urban Development Strategy (UDS) indicates that significant growth is
expected to continue around Rolleston and Lincoln townships. We forecast winter rural load growth to average
approximately 4% per year over the next 10 years.
Figure 5-4g Rural winter maximum demand (MW) graph
Demand (MW)
100
Measured total rural winter demand
Projected total rural winter demand: using 5 years history (3% p.a.)
90
Projected total rural winter demand: using 10 years history (3.2% p.a.)
Forecast total rural winter demand

80
70
60
50
40
5.4.2 Methodology for determining GXP and zone substation load forecasts
As stated in section 5.4.1, we estimate that future demand growth will average 1.6% (9MW) per annum over the next
10 years, with some one-off additional business increases such as milk processing plants in the next few years.
Significant volatility can be expected in actual maximum demands. Capital investment plans will be modified each
year in accordance with load growth that has actually been observed.
The following sections describe some of the factors and methodologies used to estimate the quantity and location of
load growth. We forecast growth at zone substation level and translate this up to Transpower GXPs and finally to a
total network demand forecast. This total network forecast is higher than the linear projection shown in section 5.4.1
due to the population increase given in the draft LURP projections.
This process is described in NW70.60.12 - Long term load forecasting methodology for subtransmission and zone
substations.
Territorial local authority planning

Our network spans two territorial authority areas; Christchurch City and Selwyn District. Both territorial authorities
publish useful area planning information and we use this extensively to plan for growth on our distribution network.
In addition to individual territorial plans, an urban development strategy (UDS) group was formed in 2004 for the
greater Christchurch region. The intention was to develop a sustainable long term strategy for growth in the greater
Christchurch region. A draft UDS was released in November 2006 and hearings were held in February and March
2007. A modified UDS has been approved for implementation and the impact of this is also reflected in ECAN’s
Regional Policy Statement (RPS).
The UDS proposes a greater level of infill development in central Christchurch and encourages growth at Rolleston
and Lincoln townships. Because consolidated areas of growth are less costly to service than sparse development, it
is expected that the UDS outcome will lead to lower than otherwise costs for our consumers.
The UDS forecasts the growth in household numbers by defined areas. The UDS was an important input into CERA’s
land use recovery plan (LURP). CCC used the LURP to develop household growth numbers by census area unit.
Further refinement of this data and industrial forecasting is described in the following sections.
Christchurch City
The Christchurch City Council (CCC) reports on vacant land on an annual basis. With the advent of the UDS, the CCC
also forecasts yearly household growth by census area unit to 2041. To forecast the growth in residential demand in
the CCC area, we map each of the area units to one or more zone substations in our model. The CCC have provided
a post-earthquake update with household forecast scenarios as described in section 5.4.
To forecast industrial growth we utilise the CCC industrial vacant land reports to identify areas developed and zoned
for potential growth. We utilise historic uptake rates and market judgement to allocate 20 to 25Ha of growth per
annum to the different areas of available land. These allocations are mapped in our model to a zone substation with
a forecast load density of 130kW per hectare. The following figure shows how the uptake has been affected by the
economic slow down and earthquakes.
Finally, we utilise the CCC land zone maps to determine the areas suitable for commercial/industrial infill growth.
This part of our forecast is a relatively discretionary process and is heavily dependent on the swings of the
Figure 5-4h Take-up of vacant industrial land
Area (Ha)
commercial development market.

In summary, recognising that earthquakes have largely destroyed the CBD, the UDS/LURP proposal is anticipated in
the medium term to deliver an increase in residential infill within the Central City and inner city areas around the
shopping malls. In the short term, major subdivision growth is planned for Wigram, Halswell, Belfast and
Marshlands. Industrial development is expected to mainly continue in Hornby, Islington, Wigram, Woolston and
Airport areas in the short term and in Belfast in the medium term. The Canterbury earthquakes and subsequent
development of red zones will to some extent accelerate growth in some areas and may create pressure to release
additional land outside the UDS for development.
Selwyn District
Most of our zone substations within Selwyn District are required to meet irrigation load and predominately have
their peak load in summer. However significant residential growth has occurred around Rolleston and Lincoln zone
substations and these substations have their peak load in winter. As with the CCC, we utilise the UDS/Selwyn
household growth projections to forecast residential growth in the greater Selwyn region.
The Izone industrial park at Rolleston has also experienced significant growth in recent times and we are working
closely with the developer to ensure that our forecasts in this area are consistent with their expectations. Post
earthquake household estimates for Rolleston, Lincoln, Prebbleton and Weedons have been included. Projections
for all of Selwyn District are expected to be available in 2014 (which will make use of the Census results due to be
published in December 2013). Although the Rolleston household growth rate is accelerating, it is expected to be
dominated in the medium term by significant proposed new industrial load in Izone.
Growth drivers and forecasting uncertainty

Our network feeds both high density Christchurch City loads and diverse rural loads on the Canterbury plains and
Banks Peninsula. Growth in electricity consumption can occur from an increase in population and also the
introduction of new end use applications. Growth in electricity consumption in the city and on Banks Peninsula has
historically matched growth in population (holiday population for Banks Peninsula). Conversely, electricity growth on
the Canterbury plains has not matched population growth but has been driven by changes in land use and hence
changes in electricity use.
Winter peak demand on our network is mainly driven by growth in the city and is anticipated to increase by
approximately 100MW (17%) over the next 10 years. Our rural network peaks in the summer and it is anticipated to
increase by approximately 16MW (14%) in the next 10 years.
The following main issues need to be considered when managing growth:
 sufficient time to procure zone substation land and/or negotiate circuit routes (typically one or two years)
 sufficient time for detailed design (typically one year)
 contractor resources managed via a consistent work flow.
The network development projects listed in this ten year plan seek to ensure that capacity and security of supply can
be maintained for the growth rates described above. Actual growth rates are monitored on an annual basis and any
change would be reflected in next year’s development plan.
As well as the impact of the earthquake, there are two other factors that may result in actual demand varying from
forecast demand:
1. Clean Air Plan (CAP)

The ECAN CAP largely bans the use of open fires and non-complying solid fuel burners in developed areas. The
CAP is being implemented in the context of a national air quality compliance strategy which was published in
August 2011 and states maximum levels of PM10 permissible in 2016 and 2020. During 2010, open fires and non-
complying burners were prohibited in Christchurch. The impact of this change on electricity demand appears to
be minimal at this stage. To meet the national air quality standard it was estimated that 42,000 households will
need to convert to clean air heating.
Prior to the earthquakes ECAN had completed more than 20,000 assisted conversions, of which about 60% had
used heat pumps. Others had occurred outside the ECAN clean heat program, and statistics on these are difficult
to obtain. By mid September 2013 Fletcher EQR had completed 10,422 conversions to heat pumps and 5,617 to
compliant solid fuel as part of the response to earthquake damage. The rate of conversions has flattened off.
The following table shows totals for various components of EQRs heating restoration.
Survey evidence in 2009 indicates that the impact of heat pumps and the supporting insulation program may not
lead to an increase in peak demand.
Generally the additional CAP load is spread around the city, although it is slightly more concentrated in the older
established suburbs. During early conversions we used the ECAN ‘clean air appliance installation’ database to
monitor the uptake of new heat pump load.
It is difficult to separate out the impact of heat pump installations from underlying high growth associated with a
period of strong domestic growth. We have not noticed a measurable increase in peak demand on our
distribution transformers. A sample of nearly 1,500 houses from the ECAN clean heat programme with
installations carried out between 2003 and 2007 indicates there is little further increase to peak demand
Table 5-4a Fletcher EQC response to restoring heating
Heating Type Number installed

Gas fire 276
Heat pump 10,422
Log burner 5,155
Night-store 147
Pellet Fire 186
Repair Gas fire 523
Repair Heat pump 312
Repair Log burner 1,504
Repair Pellet fire 397
Grand Total 18,922
expected from conversions. Approximately 800 of this sample were converted to heat pumps and show 0.2kW
ADMD higher than the average (which include ~300 solid fuel, ~275 pellet and 50 gas).
2. Development of irrigation load

Orion has experienced rapid growth in summer irrigation load on the Canterbury plains. In order to meet this
growing load, substantial investment has been needed in our subtransmission and distribution networks.
We closely monitor trends in rural irrigation. Some factors now influencing planning for irrigation load are:
 ECAN constraints on groundwater extraction
 land in some areas is approaching its full irrigation potential
 interruptible load arrangements to cover short term fault situations
 design and implementation of the CPW irrigation scheme and/or other large irrigation schemes
 Trustpower’s proposal to install up to 70MW of hydro generation from Coleridge along the north bank of the
Rakaia River to its gorge.
The proposed CPW irrigation scheme is likely to change irrigation in the affected area from ground water
extraction to pumping from irrigation canals and delivering on-farm pressure through a piped network. This gives
rise to the medium term potential for stranded assets in the Darfield and Te Pirita regions.
We have developed peak demand forecasts for a number of rural irrigation scenarios. A balance of capacity,
security and reliability is required while ensuring that our expectations, and those of our rural consumers, are
met.
Irrigation and its associated industries (such as dairy sheds and milk processing plants) are anticipated to cause
the majority of the forecasted summer peak growth over the next 10 years. This value includes the results of a
2010 Aqualinc study of the impact of likely irrigation changes, and development by Synlait and Fonterra. The
availability of water and the timing/demand changes due to the CPW scheme proceeding causes significant
uncertainty in this forecast. For this reason we have created a timely responsive development plan for the rural
area.
5.4.3 Transpower GXP load forecasts

The forecasts in the following sections have incorporated the impact of the earthquakes, including returning loads to
their normal supply points. However there is more uncertainty than usual due to the influx of temporary workers for
the rebuild that is expected to last more than five years.
The following graph indicates the capacity of each Transpower GXP that supplies our network. Present and expected
10 year maximum demands are also shown. The impact of projects incorporated in this plan is not reflected in the
GXP load forecasts. The tabled loads are those expected if no development work is undertaken. Firm capacity is the
capacity of each site should one item of plant fail. See section 5.2.1 for a map of Transpower’s system.
Figure 5-4i GXPs – Maximum demand versus firm capacity
Addington 66 & 11kV & Middleton
Bromley 66kV
Hororata 33kV
Kimberley 66kV, Hororata 66 & 33kV Note.1
Islington 33kV
Note.2
Orion Islington 66kV Total
0 100 200 300 400 500 600

2024 Forecast Firm Capacity 2013 Maximum MVA
MVA
Arthur's Pass
Note.3
Castle Hill
Coleridge
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
2024 Forecast Firm Capacity 2013 Maximum
MVA
MVA
Notes:
1. Can be limited to 40MW capacity when Coleridge is not generating or providing reactive support.
2. Assumes only 32% of Mainpower’s load is fed from Islington post Islington T6 contingency.
3. Possible upgrade required for the proposed alpine village and winter sports resort near Porters Pass.
Table 5-4b GXP substations – load forecasts (MVA)

Winter
2013 /
Firm Summer
GXP substation capacity 2012/13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FYFY FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24
Addington 66 & 11kV & Middleton 375 163 163 162 164 167 169 172 174 176 179 181 184
Bromley 66kV 210 147 147 145 145 145 146 147 148 150 153 156 159
Islington 33kV 107 67 67 68 71 74 77 80 83 86 88 91 94
Orion Islington 66kV 532 385 385 383 388 395 403 411 419 427 437 448 458
Hororata 33kV 23 28 22 22 26 26 22 18 17 17 16 17 17
Kimberley 66kV, Hororata 66 & 33kV 70* 53 59 60 67 69 68 75 75 76 78 79 80
* Assumes full generating capacity available from Coleridge.
5.4.4 Orion urban zone substation load forecasts

The following two graphs compare the firm capacity of each of our urban zone substations with present and forecast
load. The winter 2013 value is the peak load recorded June 2013.
Figure 5-4j Urban 66 and 33kV zone substations – maximum demand versus firm capacity
Armagh
Barnett Park*
Dallington
Fendalton
Halswell
Harewood
Hawthornden
Heathcote
Hoon Hay
Hornby
Ilam Note.3
Lancaster
McFaddens Note. 2
Middleton
Milton
Moffett Note. 1
Oxford Tuam
Prebbleton
Rawhiti
Shands
Sockburn
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
MVA
* Denotes single transformer substation
MVA
Notes.
1. Constraint to be resolved by Moffett 33kV feeder replacement.
2. Constraint to be resolved by new Marshlands zone substation.
3. Ilam zone substation is included with the 66 and 33kV substations although it is regarded as an 11kV zone substation elsewhere in this plan.
This is because it has no transformers on site but has two dedicated 66/11kV transformers located at Hawthornden.
4. Constraint to be resolved in the short term by transferring load to Hawthornden, then to the new Waimakariri zone substation.
Figure 5-4k Urban 11kV zone substations – maximum demand versus firm capacity
Bishopdale/Papanui Note. 4
Foster
Grimseys-Winters
Note. 2
Knox
Montreal
Pages-Kearneys
Portman
Spreydon
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40
MVA
MVA
Table 5-4c Urban 66 and 33kV zone substations – load forecasts (MVA)
Security Actual
Zone Standard Firm winter
substation class capacity 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Armagh C1 40 11 10 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 12 12 13
Barnett Park C4 15 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 10
Dallington C2 40 29 29 29 29 30 30 30 31 31 32 32 33
Fendalton C2 40 36 36 36 36 36 36 36 37 37 37 38 38
Halswell C4 23 15 15 15 15 15 16 17 17 19 20 22 23
Harewood C4 7.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Hawthornden C2 40 32 31 32 32 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 34
Heathcote C2 40 28 27 28 28 28 29 29 30 30 31 31 31
Hoon Hay C2 40 29 28 29 29 29 29 29 29 30 31 31 32
Hornby C4 20 13 13 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 14 14
Ilam C4 11 8 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
Lancaster C1 40 23 22 22 22 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
McFaddens C2 40 41 40 40 40 41 41 41 42 42 43 43 44
Middleton C2 40 27 27 27 27 27 28 28 28 29 29 29 29
Milton C2 40 24 24 24 24 25 25 25 25 26 26 26 26
Moffett C2 18.1 14 14 16 17 18 18 19 20 21 22 22 23
Oxford-Tuam C1 40 14 14 14 17 18 18 19 19 20 21 22 22
Prebbleton C4 23 5 5 6 6 7 7 8 8 9 9 9 10
Rawhiti C2 40 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 28 28 29 29
Shands C4 20 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 13 13 14 15 16
Sockburn C2 35 24 24 25 25 26 27 28 29 30 30 31 31
Table 5-4d Urban 11kV zone substations – load forecasts (MVA)
Security Actual
Standard Firm winter
Zone substation class capacity 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024
Bishopdale/
C2 28.6 31 30 30 30 30 30 31 31 31 32 32 32
Papanui
Foster C2 26.7 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 25 25 25
Grimseys-
C2 26.5 22 22 22 23 25 26 27 29 30 32 33 35
Winters
Knox C3 12.3 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 11 11
Montreal C3 12.7 11 10 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11
Pages-Kearneys C4 17.2 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 11 11 11
Portman C4 24 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 11 12
Spreydon C4 20 13 13 13 13 14 14 15 15 15 16 16 17
See section 5.3.1 for Security Standard Class definitions
The following urban geographical map has been produced to demonstrate areas of high and moderate loading
on our network. Substations with load exceeding 94% of firm capacity have been coloured red.
The changes from last year are; Bishopdale has moved over the 94% threshold and Knox has dropped below the
75% threshold.
Figure 5-4l Zone substations – urban (2013 maximum demand as a percentage of firm capacity)
Key Key
Zone substation ma xim um dema nd -
Transpower GXP as a percentage of f irm capacity
Orion 66kV substation More than 94%

Orion 33kV substation Between 75% and 94%
Orion 11kV substation Less than 75%
GRIMSEYS
WINTERS
BISHOPDALE
HAREWOOD
PAPANUI RAWHITI
M CFADDENS
HAWTHORNDEN ILAM
DALLINGTON
KNOX
FENDALTON
ARMAGH
ISLINGTON OXFORD-TUAM BROMLEY

ADDINGTON
SOCKBURN
MOFFETT MONTREAL
FOSTER LANCASTER
MIDDLETON MILTON
HORNBY PORTMAN
SHANDS SPREYDON
HOON HAY HEATHCOTE
BARNETT
PARK
PREBBLETON HALSWELL
5.4.5 Orion rural zone substation load forecasts

The following graph compares the firm capacity of each of our rural zone substations with present load and forecast
load. The 2013 maximum value is the peak load recorded over summer 2012/13, or in June 2013 for winter peaking
substations.
A 2014 Aqualinc study on irrigation projections and the CPW scheme indicates that over Orion’s rural network, CPW
pumps could add nearly 10MVA but associated conversion from ground water to surface water irrigation could reduce
load by nearly 30MVA. This net 20MVA decrease shows some site loads increasing partly due to an increase in the
irrigated area. Bankside, Greendale, Highfield and Te Pirita could drop around 5MVA in the medium term. However in
the short term the growth for Hororata and Te Pirita zone substations may need to be addressed if sufficient existing
ground water pumps are not relinquished as soon as the CPW scheme comes online. We are working with CPW to
highlight the importance of the timing of relinquishing existing pumps. This growth may cause a need to rethink our
proposal to convert Hororata to a 10MVA 66kV site. We will continue to research the implications in this area and adjust
our upgrade proposals accordingly in next year’s AMP.
Figure 5-4m Rural 66 and 33kV zone substations – maximum demand versus firm capacity
Annat*
Bankside*
Brookside*
Darfield*
Diamond Harbour*
Dunsandel
Duvauchelle
Greendale*
Highfield*
Hills*
Hororata*
Killinchy*
Kimberley
Larcomb*
Lincoln
Little River*
Motukarara
Rolleston
Springston*
Te Pirita*
Teddington*
Weedons*
0 5 10 15 20 25
MVA
* Denotes single transformer or line substation
MVA
Notes:
1. Dunsandel: Resolve by new transformer.
2. Highfield: Convert to 66kV when needed.
3. Hororata: Convert to 66kV in short term & transfers to new Windwhistle zone substation longer term.
4. Lincoln: Resolved by load-shift to Springston.
5. Rolleston: Resolved by load shift to Larcomb.
6. Springston: Convert to 66kV.
7. Te Pirita: Work with CPW regarding relinquishing existing ground water pumps when scheme comes online and review transformer capacity.
Table 5-4e Rural 66 and 33kV zone substations – load forecasts (MVA)
Actual
Winter
Security 2013/
Standard Firm Summer
Zone substation class capacity 2012/13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24
Annat D3 2.5 1 1 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
Bankside D2 10 9 9 9 9 8 6 3 3 3 3 3 3
Brookside D3 10 9 9 9 9 9 9 10 10 10 10 10 10
Darfield D2 7.5 6 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 6 6 6
Diamond Harbour D3 7.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Dunsandel D2 10 9 10 10 12 12 11 13 13 13 13 13 14
Duvauchelle D2 7.5 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
Greendale D2 10 8 8 8 8 8 7 5 3 3 3 3 3
Highfield D2 7.5 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6 4 2 2 2
Hills D2 7.5 6 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Hororata D2 7.5 7 7 7 10 10 9 6 6 6 6 6 6
Killinchy D2 10 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 7 7 7
Kimberley D1 23 7 13 13 13 13 13 19 19 19 19 20 20
Larcomb D2 23 5 5 6 6 9 9 12 13 16 16 16 17
Lincoln D2 10 8 8 9 10 10 11 11 12 13 13 14 14
Little River D3 2.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Motukarara D3 2.5 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Rolleston D2 10 12 12 13 13 14 15 15 16 17 17 18 18
Springston D2 7.5 6 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 8 8
Teddington D3 2.5 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Te Pirita D2 10 10 10 10 11 11 8 5 5 5 5 6 6
Weedons D2 23 7 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
See section 5.3.1 for Security Standard Class definitions.
We have produced the following rural geographical map to demonstrate areas of high and moderate loading on our
network. Substations with load exceeding 94% of firm capacity have been coloured red. The changes from last
year are, Greendale, Springston, Motukarara and Hills have moved over the 75% threshold, Highfield and Te Pirita
have moved over the 94% threshold.
Summer 2012/13 did not give irrigation loads as high as experienced previously.
Figure 5-4n Zone subs – rural (summer 2012/13 or winter 2013 maximum demand as a percentage of firm capacity)
Key
ARTHUR ’S
ast Transpower GXP
Co ry PASS
st
We t erbu Cass Orion 66/11kV substation
n
Ca Bealey
Orion 33/11kV substation
N
Zone substation ma xim um dema nd -
as a percentage of f irm capacity
More than 94%

CASTLE HILL
Between 75% and 94%
Less than 75%
Springfield
Waimakariri Gorge
ANNAT
LAKE COLERIDG E Kaiapoi
Sheffield
W ai m R iv er
aka r
i ri
Glentunnel KIMBERLEY
Kirwee
DARFIELD
Rakaia Gorge ISLINGTON
HORORATA WEEDONS
HIGHFIELD Templeton
LARCOMB
R
GREENDALE Prebbleton Lyttelton

ak
TE PIRITA ROLLESTON
ai
a
SPRINGSTON LINCOLN
BANKSIDE DIAMOND HARBOUR
Dunsandel Tai Tapu
R
DUNSANDEL BROOKSIDE
iv
TEDDINGTON
e
r
KILLINCHY MOTUKARARA DUVAUCHELLE

Rakaia LITTLE RIVER
Leeston
Lake Ellesmere
HILLS (Te Waihora)
Lake Forsyth Akaroa
Southbridge (Waiwera)
Birdlings
Flat
Rakaia Huts
Notes:
Load will be transferred onto Larcomb to relieve Rolleston zone substation.
5.4.6 Utilisation of assets

GXP, 66kV, 33kV and 11kV zone substation utilisation
For N-1 sites with dual transformers or parallel 11kV incomers, we calculate utilisation by dividing peak load by the
N-1 capacity (capacity available following a single fault) of the site. Utilisation of 100% implies that further increases
in load will require further network investment or the reliability of supply will reduce.
For N security sites with single transformers and/or line or cable supplies, utilisation is calculated by dividing peak
load by the installed site capacity. To provide support to neighbouring N security sites during contingencies it is not
necessarily desirable to aim for 100% utilisation at these sites. Our interruptible irrigation load initiative has
allowed an increase in utilisation of our rural N security sites and utilisation of 70-80% is appropriate in this context.
Note that data for this graph is produced around November each year. The summer and winter peaks are the most
recent available e.g. winter peaks are 2013 and summer peaks are 2012/13.
Figure 5-4o GXP, 66kV, 33kV and 11kV zone substation utilisation
Average asset utilisation of firm capacity (%)

100
90
Notes:
80
[1] Very small GXPs at Arthur’s Pass, Castle
70 Hill and Coleridge
60 [2] Significant new capacity installed in FY12

Transpower GXPs (N-1 sites)
[3] Significant new capacity installed in FY09
50 Transpower GXPs (N sites) [1]
Orion 33 and 66kV urban zone substations (N-1 sites) [2]
40 Orion 11kV urban zone substations (N-1 sites)
Orion 33 and 66kV rural zone substations (N-1 sites) [3]
30 Orion 33 and 66kV rural zone substations (N sites)
20
10
0
FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 FY12 FY13
11kV feeder cable utilisation

We have calculated cable utilisation for all urban zone substation 11kV network feeders from recorded SCADA values.
It is based on peak load under normal system conditions with respect to the nominal design capacity of the smallest
cable section between the zone substation circuit breaker and the first downstream load. A de-rating of 80% has been
applied to the cable capacity to allow for the common thermal environment where cables are laid in parallel.
The following graph 5-4p shows average 11kV feeder cable utilisation is around 40%. Ideally, considering our N-2
urban architecture, the nominal average cable utilisation should be 50%. However, several cables carry zero load
under nominal operating conditions which therefore lowers the overall utilisation. This can be attributed to our
existing 11kV architecture which historically featured a closed-ring subtransmission network in the urban area.
Recent changes to our network design philosophy should see an increase in cable utilisation over time. Over the city
rebuild period however, numerous feeders will have zero utilisation (especially in the CBD) and ‘normal’ conditions
will take time to develop.
Note: in FY11 the data was not meaningful due to serious earthquake disruption (utilisations are meant to be for
'normal' network conditions). In FY12 and to a lesser extent FY13-14, parts of the network are still in transition, there
remain cable faults, and switching rates are higher. While this reduces the usefulness of these curves for year-on-
year comparison, the increase in feeders with zero utilisation can be seen.
Distribution transformer utilisation

The following graph 5-4q shows the distribution of utilisation factors for our 11/0.4kV distribution transformers. The
graph has been determined by dividing the maximum distribution transformer demands, as recorded on the 20 minute
maximum-demand-indicators (MDIs), by the nominal transformer rating.
The graph shows that the majority of distribution transformers have peak loads in the range of 60 to 100% of their
continuous rated load, with an average around 70%.
Figure 5-4p Zone substation 11kV feeder cable utilisation graph
Proportion of zone substation feeders (%)

25 14
FY14
FY07
FY13
13
FY08
20
FY09
FY12
12
FY10
15 FY12
FY11
11
FY13
FY14
FY10
10
10 Average Utilisation
FY09
9
5
FY08
8
0 7
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Asset utilisation (%)
While the graph also shows that around 18% of distribution transformers are above 100% loaded at peak, the load
factor for most distribution transformers is usually quite low. This is certainly true for the transformers that supply
mainly residential consumers. Consumers with higher load factors, such as large industrials, tend to have a
dedicated supply transformer that is closely matched to their load requirements. They therefore know the supply
capacity limitation and will usually request formally any supply capacity changes. Also, transformers have a large
thermal capacity and can tolerate cyclic loads higher than their continuous rating. Therefore we deem it appropriate
to allow peak loads on the majority of distribution transformers to rise to 130% of the continuous rating before
investigating possible replacement/upgrades.
The springtime MDI readings were nearly complete at the time this graph was produced. The effects of the
earthquakes mean that transformer utilisation will depart from a normal pattern for a few years.
Figure 5-4q Distribution transformer utilisation graph
Proportion of distribution transformers (%)

16 FY14
14
FY07
14
13
FY13
FY08
12 FY09
12
FY12
FY10
10 FY12
11
FY11
FY13
8
FY14
FY10
10
Average Utilisation
6
9FY09
4
8FY08
2
0 7
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180
Asset utilisation (%)
5.5 Network gap analysis

Our ‘deterministic’ Security Standard provides a useful benchmark to identify areas on our network that may not
currently receive the same high level of security as the majority of our network.
Economically robust solutions to actual and anticipated network gaps caused by imminent load growth are quickly
provided for by our annual capital spend. Network security is maintained on our 11kV distribution network by
ensuring that the design of new connections is consistent with our Security Standard.
On an annual basis, our network planning group updates contingency plans for all valid subtransmission (220kV,
66kV, 33kV) and 11kV contingencies. In some cases the Security Standard criteria for ‘no interruption’ or
‘restoration time’ of load cannot be economically met.
The network gaps identified in the following tables arise because the cost of reinforcing the network to the
performance level identified in our Security Standard would be economically prohibitive. That is, the cost to provide
the Security Standard level of performance would exceed what consumers are prepared to pay for it.
In general, network security gaps fall into one or more of the following categories:
 solution is currently uneconomic and an economic solution is not anticipated in the foreseeable future
 solution is currently uneconomic but is expected to become economic as load grows in the area under study
 local solution is uneconomic but network expansion in adjacent areas is expected to provide a security
improvement in the future
 solution requires co-ordination with Transpower’s asset replacement programme and/or is subject to
Transpower/Commerce Commission approval.
The economic analysis for each network gap determines the value of lost load (VOLL) when a defined contingency
occurs and then utilises probability theory to determine the annual VOLL. This VOLL is calculated using $6.97 per
kW for the initial interruption and $16.26 per kWhr thereafter. The Electricity Authority (formerly Electricity
Commission) undertook surveys and a review of VOLL in 2010, 2011 and 2012 to better understand the range of
VOLL values for different customer groups and also provide a check on inflationary impacts since the last survey
(1992) and review (2006). The Electricity Authority has undertaken further surveys (including in Christchurch) to
refine the results, which were released in August 2013. The Electricity Authority (CEA) conclusion for an eight hour
outage in Christchurch is $18.69 per kWh. The EA report also supports using higher VOLL values for small to
medium commercial consumers (CDB type loads). Our review of the report does not suggest that a change to our
VOLL values (as stated above) are necessary but it does highlight the large variance in VOLL for different consumer
groups.
Although the VOLL of contingencies can be very high, the low probability of occurrence can often lead to a very low
annualised VOLL and therefore render the proposed solution uneconomic. This often results in the timing of the
solution being largely dependent on the timing of other network development proposals which are required for load
growth or asset replacement.
Because annualised VOLL figures can hide the high VOLL of a particular event it is important to consider the
implications of rare but costly (High Impact Low Probability) events if they were to occur. The Canterbury
earthquakes have reiterated the importance of building a resilient network and any economic analysis should be
considered alongside the asymmetric nature of the risks involved.
Notes to the following tables:

The Electricity Participation Code includes a national transmission grid reliability standard. This standard states
that Transpower is required to maintain an N-1 level of security for the core grid. The GXP gaps identified below are
based on the application of our Security Standard to Transpower’s core-grid, spur or GXP assets. Proposed projects
for Transpower’s core grid assets will be subject to Commerce Commission approval.
The table includes current Security Standard gaps only. Additional projects listed in the ten year AMP provide
solutions for future forecast gaps that are not stated here.
Several projects address more than one security gap and are therefore quoted in more than one location.
Transpower meets the initial capital cost and then charges us an annualised amount for the use of the additional
assets. Transpower costs are essentially passed through to us to be recovered from our consumers. Transpower
project costs are estimates only.
Table 5-5a Transpower GXP security gaps
VOLL
per VOLL Cost Benefit
event p.a. Cost p.a. cost
Network gap $000 $000 Solution $000 $000 ratio Proposed date
Addington
Single Addington No.2 11kV GXP 534 8.0 Install bus zone protection to Orion 2.9 2.8:1 2018 during switchboard
busbar fault causing complete loss of create two bus zones as part of 27 replacement and following
supply to 23MW of load. the planned 11kV switchgear Orion purchase of the assets
Restoration achievable in 2 hours. replacement.
Islington
Partial loss of restoration for an 2,200 4 Convert Shands zone Orion 930 1:233 Influenced by load growth at
Islington 220/33kV dual transformer substation to 66kV (Project 6,455 or or Hornby, Wigram and
failure. 669) or Templeton 66kV zone or 636 1:160 Templeton.
substation (Project 502). (Note 1) 4,416
Hororata
Interruption to all Hororata GXP load 830 19 Install a 66kV bus coupler TP 55 1:2.9 Uneconomic. No date
for a 66kV bus fault (restorable). (75% of load will remain on). 500 proposed. The planned 66kV
links from Highfield to
Greendale and Darfield will
significantly reduce the
restoration time for some load.
Partial loss of restoration for a 1,180 11 Convert Hororata to 66kV. (Note 1) Orion 168 1:15.3 Hororata conversion in FY16.
Hororata 66/33kV dual transformer 1,527
failure.
Interruption to all Hororata 33kV GXP TBA TBA Install a 33kV bus coupler TP 28 TBA The Hororata 33kV switchboard
load for a 33kV bus fault (restorable). (will halve VOLL values). 250 is due for replacement by 2020
and is proposed to simplify
33kV connections and negate
the need for a 33kV busbar by
2019.
Note 1. Shared mobile generation could provide an alternative solution.
Table 5-5b Orion security gaps
Cost Proposed
Substation Network gap Solution $000 date
Dallington Loss of 30MW of load for a single 66kV line or Complete a 66kV loop from Bromley via Rawhiti 6,000 FY20
transformer failure. Restoration achievable in 5 and Marshland by installing a cable from
minutes. Marshlands to McFaddens zone substation
(Project 491).
Single Dallington 11kV busbar fault causing Install bus zone protection to create two bus 80 FY26
complete loss of supply to 33MW of load. zones as part of the planned 11kV switchgear
Halswell Single Halswell 66kV busbar fault causing Installation of a bus coupler at this stage is TBA TBA
complete loss of supply to 42MW of load. uneconomic. In the longer term the Halswell
Restoration of 50% achievable in 2 hours. 66kV bus arrangements will need to change to
a ring bus to accommodate other changes, and
this will resolve the security gap.
Heathcote Single Heathcote 11kV busbar fault causing Install bus zone protection to create two bus 80 FY25
Hoon Hay Single Hoon Hay 11kV busbar fault causing Install bus zone protection to create two bus 80 FY25
Lancaster Loss of 18MW of load for a single 66kV cable Complete a 66kV loop from Hoon Hay to Milton. 6,401 FY25
failure. Restoration achievable in 5 minutes.
Moffett Single Moffett St 11kV busbar fault causing Install bus zone protection to create two bus 80 FY30
Papanui Interruption to all Papanui load for a 66kV bus fault Our northern subtransmission plan includes a 460 FY18
(restorable). bus coupler at Papanui (Project 541).
Single busbar fault at Northcote Rd No.123 network Uneconomic to install an 11kV bus coupler at TBA 2015,
substation on the Belfast 11kV ring causing a Northcote Rd No.123. The impact will be 2016,
cascading loss of supply to 24MW of load. reduced by the installation of Waimakariri
2018,
Restoration achievable in 2 hours. (Project 525) and Marshland zone substations
(Project 488) and the Belfast diesel generators 2030
(Project 634); and then fully solved by Belfast
zone substation or reconfiguring Northcote Rd
No.123.
Rawhiti Single 66kV supply to Rawhiti zone substation due Install new cable from Papanui zone substation 27,865 FY15-16
to the February 2011 earthquake. Loss of 28MW of via proposed Waimakariri and Marshland
load for a single 66kV cable failure. Restoration substations. The cables are not only for
achievable in 2 hours, using QEII Park generators. security of supply to Rawhiti but are needed for
the other substations also.
Bishopdale Single Bishopdale 11kV busbar fault causing This security gap will be resolved as part of 80 FY16
cascading loss of supply to 22MW of load. scheduled switchgear replacement at
Restoration achievable in 2 hours. Bishopdale.
Springston Interruption to all Springston 33kV load for a 33kV The staged conversion of the substations on the FY25
bus fault (restorable). Springston 33kV network to 66kV will
progressively reduce this vulnerability until
there is no 33kV at Springston by 2025,
resolving the security gap.
5.6 Network development proposals

The previous sections tabled network capacity, growth projections and the security constraints on our network. This
section lists our proposals to remove capacity and security constraints.
5.6.1 Impact on service level targets

The network development projects listed in this section are driven mainly by the need to meet the capacity and
security requirements of load growth. Where economic, project solutions have been designed to meet our security
of supply standard requirements.
This ensures that our network configuration and capacity is constructed in a consistent way and the impact on our
reliability of supply service levels will be predictable. It should be noted that reliability of supply service levels are a
function of many inputs and, while network configuration and capacity is a major input, it is not the only factor.
Project solutions also need to consider our safety, power quality, environmental and efficiency targets.
Safety performance during construction is influenced by factors such as site security, operating standards and
contract management practices. Upon completion, high levels of safety performance are achieved by appropriate
choice of network equipment, site security and operating standards.
Power quality is influenced mainly by ensuring that network capacity is adequate. Undersized reticulation or high
impedance transformers will increase the risk of power quality issues. Some projects provide for the connection of
equipment (for example variable speed drives) which can create high levels of harmonic distortion and it may be
necessary to install harmonic filtering equipment to reduce the distortion to acceptable levels.
Environmental targets are met with new projects by ensuring that substation design includes appropriate oil
bunding and, where possible, precludes the installation of SF 6 switchgear. On-going environmental targets are met
by adhering to appropriate resource management standards.
Our efficiency target is met by ensuring that upgrades or extensions to the existing network are not oversized.
During development projects it may be necessary to reconfigure adjacent parts of the network and consideration is
given to economic downsizing of existing underutilised distribution transformer capacity.
5.6.2 Overview of projects

The projects identified in this AMP are sorted into the following categories:
 major projects – GXP
 major projects – urban
 major projects – rural
 11kV reinforcement – urban
 11kV reinforcement – rural.
Within these categories the projects are banded within the following timeframes:
 the current financial year (FY15)
 the next four years (FY16-FY19)
 the remainder of the period (FY20-FY24)
All FY years refer to financial year ending 31 March.
Projects for the current year can be considered firm. Those planned for later years will be reviewed annually, and
may not proceed as currently envisaged. Projects for the remainder of the period (FY20 and beyond) are indicative
only because of the uncertainties as to the nature and magnitude of future loads.
A summary of the options for the major projects has been provided. Because most of the projects beyond FY15 are
still subject to a final review and refinement, it is possible that actual implementation may differ from that proposed
if new information becomes available before the need to start detailed design. For projects beyond FY15, the value
per kW of deferral has been tabled later in this section (5.6.12) to provide a guide to potential DSM providers.
Although GXP alterations are not carried out directly by us, they are included here to provide a greater
understanding of the capacity and security issues we face. Transpower is to undertake the GXP projects to improve
the capacity, security and quality of supply to our consumers. They will meet the initial capital cost and then charge
us an annualised amount for the use of the additional assets. Transpower costs are essentially passed through to
us to be recovered from our consumers.
5.6.3 Urban 66kV subtransmission review

From 2009-2013 we met growth within our urban network without the need to invest significantly in the urban
subtransmission network. In the next three to four years we anticipate that new zone substation capacity will be
required towards the north of Christchurch City. The capacity of our pre-earthquake 66kV subtransmission network
in the area was not sufficient to supply any proposed new zone substation. Permanent damage sustained to our
66kV network from the earthquake meant our network capacity was further reduced. We need to invest significantly
to replace capacity in the east and meet the electrical needs of northern Christchurch consumers. Development
decisions made over the next five years will significantly shape the long term security and reliability of supply
outcomes for the northern part of Christchurch City.
In an environment where our standard of living and health is so heavily dependent on a reliable electricity supply it
has become increasingly important that our network is resilient to a wide range of factors. The earthquakes have
prompted the need to review the architecture of our network and our network security of supply standard and a
reconsideration of the Christchurch subtransmission network was carried out in FY12. This review is described in
our Network Architecture Review - Subtransmission (NW70.60.16).
Our 66kV subtransmission options analysis not only considered the impact of normal network contingencies but
also the widespread impact of natural events on our assets and the flexibility of our network architecture to restore
power following these events. We work hard to apply preventative maintenance measures to ensure that the chance
of electrical, mechanical or external forces causing failure of our assets is economically minimised. However, it is
important to consider the impact of major events such as that seen at Otahuhu in 2007 which caused several hours
of lost electricity supply to the majority of Auckland City and the series of Christchurch earthquakes in 2010 and
2011 which caused widespread outages for a few hours and isolated area outages for many days.
The review resulted in changes to our design for future work, from zone substations being radially fed from GXPs to
a more resilient layout. Future design will be based on a closed-ring network topology so the failure of any single
route will not interrupt supply to a zone substation. Cables will be sized to give sufficient cross-GXP link capacity to
provide full support in the loss of either Islington or Bromley 66kV supply. The preferred layout for 66kV zone
substations is to have a ring-bus which has better fault performance than a conventional bus arrangement for either
circuit breaker failures or bus faults.
5.6.4 Transpower spur assets

Transpower owns a number of 66kV, 33kV and 11kV assets in our network area (see map, section 5.2.1). Many of
these assets do not form part of Transpower’s core grid and deliver electricity solely to our network. We call these
assets ‘spur assets’ to Transpower’s grid and they fundamentally serve the same purpose as our own 66kV, 33kV and
11kV distribution network assets.
The possibility of Transpower selling spur assets New Zealand wide has been discussed in the industry several times
over the last 25 years. This can mainly be attributed to the recognition that these assets serve the purpose of local
distribution rather than national transmission. A change of ownership would enable configuration and construction
efficiency benefits to be achieved through integration into local distribution network asset planning, management,
maintenance and operations which would result in downward pressure on prices to our consumers.
The Commerce Commission gazetted a new set of ‘Input Methodologies’ in December 2010 which sets out the
upfront regulatory methodologies, rules, processes, requirements and evaluation criteria on which lines businesses
will be regulated. As part of our submissions on the draft input methodologies we have encouraged the Commerce
Commission to develop rules that enable lines companies to make a regulated return on the purchase of spur assets.
In our view the input methodologies encourage Orion to purchase spur assets from Transpower and thereby achieve
benefits for our consumers. These benefits are relevant as we focus on the redevelopment of Christchurch with
different patterns and location of growth.
We have worked with Transpower to determine the appropriate ownership boundary between Transpower and Orion
and the following diagram provides a summary of the agreed core grid and spur assets in Orion’s network area.
Figure 5-6a Transpower core grid and spur assets in Orion’s network area
Otira 66kV
Arthurs Pass 11kV
Springston 33kV Castle Hill 66kV Castle Hill 11kV
Coleridge 66kV Coleridge 11kV
Springston 66kV Hororata 66kV Hororata 33kV
Islington 66kV Bromley 220kV
Middleton 66kV Islington 220kV Papanui 66kV Bromley 66kV
Addington 66kV Islington 33kV Bromley 11kV
Key:
Core grid
Spur assets
Addington 11kV Transferred assets
The following table provides an indicative purchase value and date for each of the GXP spur assets. The estimated
spur asset purchase costs are based on the forecast Transpower ‘Regulatory Book Value’ of the assets at the time of
forecast transfer. These forecasts include the forecast value of Transpower planned replacement or enhancement
work prior to the purchase date and also some small transaction costs.
Table 5-6a Spur assets, indicative cost to purchase – $000
Spur asset to be purchased FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23
Bromley 66kV and 11kV 8,800
Addington and Middleton including Islington-Addington 66kV

20 14,000
transmission lines
Castle Hill 66/11kV transformer and 11kV 20 1,530
Hororata 33kV * (including 66/33kV transformers) 20 1,130
Arthurs Pass 66/11kV transformer and 11kV 20 1,470
Islington 33kV* 10 800
Spur assets total 8,840 15,570 2,610 800
*Assumes EA rule change so that Transpower can use customer equipment for GXP metering, thus avoiding a $0.5M - $1M project to shift metering.
In recent years, we have also entered into New Investment Agreements (and other small agreements) with
Transpower for the upgrade of Transpower spur assets at some of these GXPs. The indicative ‘buy-out’ value of
these agreements is also included below.
Although the spur asset purchases included in this AMP reflect the most likely outcome, they are subject to Orion
and Transpower board approval.
In addition to the purchase and new investment agreement buy-out costs tabled below, the ownership of Transpower
spur assets will also require an increase in our budgets for reinforcement, replacement, maintenance and
operations. Additional capital expenditure as a result of the spur asset purchases associated with growth,
reinforcement and replacement has been incorporated into this AMP. Following receipt of further age and asset
condition data from Transpower we will analyse future options in more detail to refine the impact to our capital
replacement, maintenance and operations budgets.
Table 5-6b Affected Transpower new investment agreements – $000
Agreement affected FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23
Bromley 66 and11kV 980
Middleton 66kV GXP connection 1,470
Hororata 33kV 75
Total 980 1,470 75
5.6.5 Major GXP projects
Table 5-6c Major GXP projects
Project FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20

784 Addington metering relocation 560
325 Hororata 66kV bay for Hororata substation 615
629 Hororata 66kV bay for Hororata-Creyke line 615
GXP total 560 615 0 0 0 615
216
Table 5-6c.1 Major projects details – GXP – Current year FY15
Budget
No. Project title Issue Chosen solution Remarks/alternatives Year
SECTION 5
$000
784 Addington The purchase of Transpower’s Addington This project installs metering for the four 560 2015
metering substation and lines means that the revenue overhead circuits from Islington to Addington.
relocation metering must be shifted from Addington to
Transpower’s Islington GXP.
Table 5-6c.2 Major projects details – GXP – FY16 to FY19
Budget
$000
325 Hororata GXP 66kV When Hororata zone substation is converted to This is a Transpower project to provide a new 615 2016
bay for Hororata 66/11kV (Major Rural Project 601) a new 66kV bay with the costs recovered through our new
substation bay will be required on Transpower's bus. investment agreement with Transpower.
Network development
Table 5-6c.3 Major projects details – GXP – FY20 to FY24
Budget
$000
629 Hororata GXP 66kV The installation of the Hororata-Creyke 66kV A new 66kV bay will be installed at Hororata 615 2020
bay for Hororata- line (Major Rural Project 579) will require a new GXP. This is a Transpower project to provide the
Creyke line 66kV line termination bay on the bus. extra bay, where the costs are recovered
through a new investment agreement between
Orion and Transpower.
5.6.6 Major urban projects
Table 5-6d Major urban projects
Projects FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24
521 Land acquisition for Marshland substation 700
525 Waimakariri substation stage 1 5,310
794 Papanui to Waimakariri 66kV link 6,345
332 Moffett substation replace 33kV feeders 215
634 Belfast diesel generation - Stage 1 1,295
650 Rawhiti to Marshland 66kV link 12,805
651 Marshland to Waimakariri 66kV link 13,025
694 Land acquisition for Milton 66kV switchroom 500
721 Land acquisition for Shands 66kV switchyard 100

Land acquisition for Hoon Hay 66kV
722 200
switchyard
723 Milton 66kV switchgear for Lancaster cable 4,410
727 Lancaster 66kV switchgear for Milton cable 810
589 Lancaster to Milton 66kV link 3,415
669 Shands substation convert to 66kV 6,545
778 Bromley substation replace 66kV bay 140 365
488 Marshland substation 6,465
541 Hawthornden substation 66kV T-off 1,485
491 McFaddens to Marshland 66kV link 6,730
522 Yaldhurst substation 5,710
617 McFaddens 66kV switchgear stage 2 405
692 Marshland substation 66kV switchgear 405
416 Prebbleton substation stage 2 580
417 Shands 33kV tee to Prebbleton 825
707 Shands substation 66kV Stage 2 765
Figure 5-6b Urban subtransmission 66kV – existing and proposed
Islington GXP 66kV

FY18-658
Yaldhurst
FY20-522
Shands Templeton Middleton
FY17-669 FY22-502
GXP 66kV
Hawthornden
FY18-541
Middleton
To Springston To Weedons
Fendalton
Papanui
Oxford-Tuam
FY15-794
Halswell Addington (A) Addington (B)
GXP 66kV GXP 66kV Waimakiriri
FY15-525
FY18-542
Hoon Hay Milton

McFaddens
2020-617
Armagh
FY17
-589
FY16-651
Lancaster
FY20-491
* Dallington
Heathcote Bromley
*
Bromley GXP
66kV FY16-650
Marshland
Barnett Park Rawhiti FY15-521
FY18-488
* Overhead line being replaced by underground cable.
Figure 5-6c Urban subtransmission 33kV – existing and proposed
Islington GXP 33kV
Moffett Shands Hornby Sockburn

FY16-332 FY17-669
Harewood Prebbleton
To Springston
Key
FY15-454 Year-project
Proposed circuit
To Lincoln
Existing circuit
Proposed Zone Existing Zone

substation substation
Figure 5-6d Urban subtransmission 66kV and 33kV – existing and proposed
WAIMAKARIRI MARSHLAND
GRIMSEYS
WINTERS
HAREWOOD BISHOPDALE
PAPANUI RAWHITI
3
MCFADDENS
YALDHURST DALLINGTON
2
HAWTHORNDEN
ILAM
KNOX PAGES KEARNEYS
3
FENDALTON
ARMAGH
ISLINGTON OXFORD-TUAM
TEMPLETON ADDINGTON
BROMLEY
MOFFETT MONTREAL
FOSTER
SOCKBURN
2
To Weedons LANCASTER
MIDDLETON
HORNBY MILTON
2
PORTMAN
SHANDS SPREYDON
2
HOON HAY HEATHCOTE
2
2 BARNETT PARK
To Springston
Prebbleton 2 2
& Rolleston
HALSWELL
PREBBLETON
To Lincoln
Transpower GXP 66kV Underground - double circuit Note: For complete Transpower system in
66kV Underground - single circuit Christchurch area see map in section 5.2.1.
66kV Zone Substation 33kV Underground
Proposed
33kV Zone Substation
2 66kV Overhead - multiple circuit
11kV Zone Substation 66kV Overhead - single circuit
Proposed 66kV Substation 33kV Overhead - single circuit
Transpower 66kV
66kV Underground - work in progress
66kV Overhead—temporary
220
Table 5-6d.1 Major project details – urban – current year FY15
Budget
SECTION 5
$000
521 Land acquisition for A site is needed for Marshland substation This project forms part of Orion's urban 700 2015
Marshland - see Project 488. subtransmission strategy. For more detail
substation refer to the document NW70.60.16 Network
Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
525 Waimakariri Orion's upper network requires A new zone substation will be built in two This project forms part of Orion's urban 5,310 2015
substation stage 1 reinforcing in the northwest urban area, stages (see Project 542), along with a 66kV subtransmission strategy. For more detail refer to
to provide for projected growth around the supply from Papanui and Rawhiti zone the document NW70.60.16 Network Architecture
Airport and further north. substations (Projects 794, 650 and 651). Review: Subtransmission.
794 Papanui to The proposed Waimakariri zone The first connection will be a 66kV cable This project forms part of Orion's urban 6,345 2015
Waimakariri 66kV substation (Project 525) requires two 66kV from Papanui zone substation fed from subtransmission strategy. For more detail refer to
link supply points, to conform to our Security Islington GXP (this project). The second the document NW70.60.16 Network Architecture
of Supply standard. connection will be a cable to Rawhiti zone Review: Subtransmission.
substation fed from Bromley GXP (Projects
650 and 651), which also provides a second
connection for Rawhiti.
Network development
Table 5-6d.2 Major project details – urban – years FY16 to FY19
Budget
$000
332 Moffett The firm capacity of Moffett zone substation We propose to increase the firm capacity to 23MVA 215 2016
substation is currently limited to 18MVA by the 33kV (the transformer capacity) by replacing the
replace 33kV and 11kV incomers. Major industrial incomers.
feeders developments around Islington will require
the substation to operate at the full
transformer capacity.
634 Belfast Diesel Load growth in the north of Christchurch is Marshland (Project 488) and ultimately Belfast zone This project forms part of Orion's urban 1,295 2016
Generation - eroding security of supply on the heavily subs will address this constraint as growth subtransmission strategy. For more detail
Stage 1 loaded 11kV primary ring. This growth is continues, but these are expensive assets. Each refer to the document NW70.60.16 Network
forecast to continue in the decades ahead. investment may be deferred for by emergency Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
generation in Belfast which will supply during
outages. Once security of supply for Dallington and
Rawhiti is restored the two 2MVA emergency
generators at QEII will not be needed at that site. We
intend to install these at our Factory Rd substation in
Belfast. Consents have been obtained.
650 Rawhiti to The cables from Bromley GXP to Brighton A 66kV cable is being installed between Bromley GXP A detailed investigation was carried out 12,805 2016
Marshland 66kV zone substation were damaged beyond and Rawhiti. A second feed from Islington GXP will (Rawhiti 66kV Options, 2012) to consider
link repair by the earthquakes. A temporary also be provided (Projects 651, 652 and 794). This underground and overhead alternatives,
overhead line was built from Bromley GXP to project installs a 66kV cable between Rawhiti and the taking seismic data into account. This
Network development
the new Rawhiti zone substation (which future Marshland (Project 488) zone substations and project forms part of Orion's urban
replaced the damaged Brighton substation). forms part of the Islington-Rawhiti link. It also subtransmission strategy. For more detail
A permanent solution is required. provides supply to Waimakariri and Marshland zone refer to our NW70.60.16 Network
substations. Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
651 Marshland to The cables from Bromley GXP to Brighton A 66kV cable is being installed between Bromley GXP A detailed investigation was carried out 13,025 2016
Waimakariri zone substation were damaged beyond and Rawhiti. A second feed from Islington GXP will (Rawhiti 66kV Options, 2012) to consider
66kV link repair by the earthquakes. A temporary also be provided (Projects 794, 651 and 650). This underground and overhead alternatives,
overhead line was built from Bromley GXP to project installs a 66kV cable between Waimakariri taking seismic data into account. This
the new Rawhiti zone substation (which (Project 525) and the future Marshland (Project 488) project forms part of Orion's urban
replaced the damaged Brighton substation). zone substations and forms part of the Islington- subtransmission strategy. For more detail
A permanent solution is required. Rawhiti link. It also provides supply to Waimakariri refer to our NW70.60.16 Network
and Marshland zone substations. Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
694 Land acquisition The Milton-Lancaster (Project 727) and A site will be secured adjacent to Milton substation. This project forms part of Orion's urban 500 2016
for Milton 66kV Milton-Hoon Hay 66kV cables will require subtransmission strategy. For more detail
switchroom switchgear at each substation. A new indoor refer to the document NW70.60.16 Network
66kV switchroom (Project 723) will be built Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
on land adjacent to Milton substation.
221
222
Table 5-6d.3 Major project details – urban – years FY16 to FY19 (continued from previous page)
Budget
SECTION 5
$000
721 Land This project forms part of Orion's urban A site is needed for the extension to Shands substation - We will undertake more options 100 2016
acquisition for subtransmission strategy. For more detail see Project 669. analysis before we commit to this
Shands 66kV refer to our NW70.60.16 Network project and land purchase.
switchyard Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
722 Land The proposed Hoon Hay-Milton 66kV link A site will be secured adjacent to Hoon Hay substation. This project forms part of Orion's urban 200 2016
acquisition for (outside the ten-year AMP period) requires subtransmission strategy. For more
Hoon Hay 66kV 66kV switchgear installations at each detail refer to the document
switchyard substation. Both substations will require NW70.60.16 Network Architecture
land purchases for new switchyards - see Review: Subtransmission.
also Project 694.
723 Milton 66kV The Milton-Lancaster 66kV cable (Project This project commissions a new indoor 66kV switchroom on This project forms part of Orion's urban 4,410 2016
switchgear for 589) will require switchgear installation at land (Project 694) adjacent to Milton substation. subtransmission strategy. For more
Lancaster both substations. See also Project 727. detail refer to the document
cable NW70.60.16 Network Architecture
Review: Subtransmission.
727 Lancaster 66kV The Milton-Lancaster 66kV cable (Project This project commissions new indoor 66kV bays at This project forms part of Orion's urban 810 2016
switchgear for 589) will require switchgear installation at Lancaster substation. subtransmission strategy. For more
Milton cable both substations. See also Projects 694 and detail refer to the document
723. NW70.60.16 Network Architecture
Network development
Review: Subtransmission.
589 Lancaster to As discussed in the post-earthquake An 95MVA circuit between Lancaster and Milton zone This project forms part of Orion's urban 3,415 2017
Milton 66kV Architecture Review, the high value of substations will provide extra security of supply for the subtransmission strategy. For more
link secure supply for the CDB requires CBD. In addition, it contributes our goal of providing for detail refer to the document
additional subtransmission support. In stronger cross-city connections between Islington and NW70.60.16 Network Architecture
particular, improved cover for the loss of Bromley 220kV GXPs to mitigate a major outage at either Review: Subtransmission.
Addington is needed. site. See also Projects 694, 723 and 727.
669 Convert Two large-scale commercial/industrial Several solutions have been considered in a Planning group We will undertake more options 6,545 2017
Shands developments in Islington and South study. The conversion of Shands 33/11kV 20MVA zone analysis before we commit to this
substation to Hornby will potentially demand over substation to 66/11kV 40MVA is a leading candidate; the project and associated land purchase
66kV 20MVA. The existing zone substations in Islington-Springston 66kV double circuit is adjacent, and a (see project 721).
the area will need to be augmented to 66kV substation in the centre of our 33kV urban network
provide for this. will provide better cover for a 33kV outage. The upgrading
of Moffett substation (Project 332) will also assist. The
location and timing of growth will inform the final
decisions.
Table 5-6d.4 Major project details – urban – years FY16 to FY19 (continued from previous page)
Budget
$000
778 Bromley The 66kV switchgear at Bromley GXP is due The Bromley 66kV bus will be in Orion 365 2017
66kV for replacement over the next few years. ownership at this point (as part of the
substation Bay 140, which will connect the Rawhiti Spur Asset Transfer schedule). We will
replace bay cable (Project 619), will need to be uprated replace the end-of-life switchgear in
140 to 160MVA once the northern link between bay 140 with new plant.
Islington and Bromley GXPs is complete
(Projects 641, 650, 651).
488 Marshland The results of the Urban Development A new 66/11kV zone substation will be Substantial growth is expected to the north of Christchurch. 6,465 2018
substation Strategy (UDS) and subsequent ECAN commissioned, with 66kV connections To meet the demand for electricity, a 66/11kV substation/s
Regional Policy Statement (RPS) project to Waimakariri and Rawhiti zone will be required in the area. Where economically viable, a
further residential growth to the north of substations (Projects 650 and 651). substation to the north of the city will be delayed by diesel
Christchurch (mainly Belfast). The CCC generation at Belfast (Project 634). Belfast zone substation
Belfast Area Plan indicates significant would delay the need for Marshland zone substation, but the
industrial growth in the Belfast area is Belfast site, far from existing 66kV supplies, would cause a
likely when the new northern motorway is lower level of security of supply at a similar cost. Marshland
installed. A local community group also zone substation provides an opportunity to install a 66kV
proposes to request a change to the RPS connection between Transpower's Islington and Bromley
which would allow an additional 2500 GXPs. This significantly enhances the security of supply for
households in the Marshlands area. our consumers in the northern half of Christchurch. This
project forms part of Orion's urban subtransmission
strategy. For more detail refer to our NW70.60.16 Network
Network development
Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
541 Hawthornden Load growth means that the loss of the 2 We intend to supply Hawthornden, This project forms part of Orion's urban subtransmission 1,485 2018
substation Islington-Hawthornden/Ilam overhead Yaldhurst and Papanui from the three strategy. For more detail refer to the document NW70.60.16
66kV T-off circuits can no longer be covered by 11kV Islington-Papanui high capacity tower Network Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
ties from adjacent substations. lines currently in service. This project
provides for these connections and
66kV re-arrangements at Papanui. We
will then be able to decommission the
lower capacity Islington-Hawthornden
tower lines.
542 Waimakariri The end-of-life replacement of the four To replace this capacity and security of This project forms part of Orion's urban subtransmission 2,420 2018
substation Papanui 66/11kV transformers by two supply we will commission Marshland strategy. For more detail refer to the document NW70.60.16
stage 2 20/40MVA banks will reduce the zone substation (Project 488) and Network Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
substation's firm capacity to 40MVA. This complete Waimakariri zone substation
capacity and security of supply must then as a full N-1 40MVA site by installing a
be provided by adjacent substations. second transformer.
223
224
Table 5-6d.5 Major project details – urban – years FY20 to FY24
Budget
SECTION 5
$000
491 McFaddens to Orion's urban subtransmission This circuit will connect the two major 66kV routes to the This project forms part of Orion's urban 6,730 2020
Marshland 66kV strategy proposes two 66kV closed north of the city (Bromley-Dallington-McFaddens- subtransmission strategy. For more detail
link rings supplied from Bromley GXP. Papanui-Islington and Bromley-Rawhiti-Marshland- refer to the document NW70.60.16 Network
This cable completes the northern Waimakariri-Hawthornden-Islington). It will provide more Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
ring with Rawhiti, Marshland, load transfer options between Islington and Bromley
McFaddens and Dallington zone GXPs, and improve security of supply by allowing the four
substations. A new 66kV bay will be zone substations to operate in closed subtransmission
needed at McFaddens (Project 617) rings with uninterrupted N-1 security. It will also limit N-2
and Marshland (Project 692). events to a single zone substation. The network
robustness in HILP events will be markedly improved.
522 Yaldhurst To provide for the decommissioning It is planned to use the transformers from Ilam substation This project forms part of Orion's urban 5,710 2020
substation of Harewood substation (due to with 66kV supply taken from the Islington-Papanui tower subtransmission strategy. For more detail
expansion at the Airport) and to lines. refer to the document NW70.60.16 Network
maintain security of supply to the Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
Airport area and western outer city
suburbs as load grows, a new zone
substation will be required.
617 McFaddens 66kV New 66kV switchgear will be A bay will be installed in the indoor switchroom at This project forms part of Orion's urban 405 2020
switchgear stage 2 required at McFaddens zone McFaddens zone substation. subtransmission strategy. For more detail
substation to terminate the 66kV refer to the document NW70.60.16 Network
Network development
circuit from Marshland substation Architecture Review: Subtransmission.

(Project 491).
692 Marshland 66kV New 66kV switchgear will be A bay will be installed in the indoor switchroom at This project forms part of Orion's urban 405 2020
switchgear required at Marshland zone Marshland zone substation. subtransmission strategy. For more detail
substation to terminate the 66kV refer to the document NW70.60.16 Network
circuit from McFaddens substation Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
(Project 491).
416 Prebbleton Depending on diversity of loads The most cost-effective way to increase reliability and This project forms part of Orion's urban 580 2021
substation stage 2 between Hornby, Shands and security of supply to Prebbleton is to install the Larcomb subtransmission strategy. For more detail
Prebbleton zone substations, when 33/11kV 23MVA transformer (made available by Project refer to the document NW70.60.16 Network
the load at Prebbleton zone 414) at Prebbleton (this project), and a closed ring 33kV Architecture Review: Subtransmission.
substation reaches 15MVA the supply (Project 417).
capacity of the 33kV subtransmission
network will need to be increased.
417 Shands 33kV tee to See Project 416. We propose to install a second 33kV incomer at 825 2021
Prebbleton Prebbleton zone substation by teeing onto the existing
Shands to Rolleston overhead circuit.
Table 5-6d.6 Major project details – urban – years FY20 to FY24 (Continued from previous page)
Budget
$000
707 Shands Shands 66kV zone substation (Project 669) will initially be This project installs another 66kV bay at This project forms part of Orion's urban 765 2023
substation 66kV supplied from a tee off one of the Islington-Springston Shands substation and the line works subtransmission strategy. For more
Stage 2 circuits. When the Birdlings substation (Major Rural necessary to cut into the switchyard. detail refer to the document NW70.60.16
Project 576) is commissioned, the Springston-Birdlings Network Architecture Review:
circuit will no longer terminate on the Springston bus but Subtransmission.
will tee off the Islington-Shands-Springston line (Major
Rural Projects 447, 583. 697, and 725). For protection
design reasons, the tee at Shands will be replaced by
cutting the line in and out of the Shands 66kV bus.
Network development
225
5.6.7 Major rural projects
Table 5-6e Major rural projects
Project FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24
361 Teddington transformer upgrade 775

500 Land acquisition for Burnham 66kV substation 250
697 66kV line to Greenpark substation 625
601 Convert Hororata substation to 66/11kV 1,240
666 Porters Village 3,730
671 Castle Hill generators 180
672 Arthurs Pass generators 70
415 Weedons to Highfield tee 66kV line conversion 1,605
528 Land acquisition for Rossendale 66kV substation 250
637 Railway Rd 11kV substation (Westland Milk) 2,705
639 Burnham 66kV substation stage 1 3,890
655 Land acquisition for Creyke 66kV substation 250
699 Dunsandel transformer upgrade 2,415
716 Land acquisition for Southbridge 66kV substation 100
114 Convert Highfield substation to 66/11kV 810
306 Annat transformer upgrade 395
580 Darfield to Creyke 66kV line 625
584 Creyke 66kV substation stage 1 2,720
587 Te Pirita 66kV bays 805
654 Land acquisition for Norwood 66kV substation 250
670 Steeles Rd substation 66kV Line 3,010
597 Norwood 66kV substation 3,355
603 Bankside 11kV ripple plant 370
605 Annat 11kV ripple plant 370
626 Norwood to Highfield/Weedons tee 66kV line 2,425
348 Windwhistle 66kV substation 4,650
505 Springston T2 - 66/11 kV transformer 1,075
527 Land acquisition for Templeton 66kV substation 100
577 Windwhistle to The Point 66kV line 1,925
579 Hororata to Creyke 66kV line upgrade 1,180
581 Highfield to Greendale/Creyke tee 66kV line 1,790
588 Te Pirita to Windwhistle 66kV line 1,065
608 The Point 66kV substation 3,370
703 Creyke to Greendale/Highfield tee 66kV Line 1,010
705 Greendale to Dunsandel/Norwood tee 66kV line 1,830
Continued over page
Major rural projects continued
Table 5-6e Major rural projects
706 Norwood to Greendale/Dunsandel tee 66kV line 1,450
717 Land acquisition for The Point 66kV substation 80
728 Springston 11kV switchroom 750
473 Dunsandel 66kV bay for Norwood line 405
586 Greendale 66kV bay for Hororata line 405
609 Dunsandel to Greendale/Norwood tee 66kV line 1,665
610 Southbridge 66kV substation 3,290
627 Southbridge 66kV line 1,085
720 Land acquisition for Birdlings substation 80
502 Templeton 66kV substation 4,410
447 Greenpark to Motukarara 66kV line conversion 1,590
576 Birdlings 66/33kV substation 4,000
583 Tancred tee to Greenpark 66kV line 650
725 Birdlings to Motukarara 66kV line 1,815
Figure 5-6e Rural subtransmission network 66kV – existing and proposed
Islington GXP 66kV
FY18-580 Creyke
Kimberley GXP
*FY18-584/FY22-689
Templeton
FY22-703
FY22-581
Hororata FY22-502 FY23-583
FY22
-579
*FY16-601
FY15-697
Hororata GXP 66kV Highfield * FY17-415
Weedons Springston 66kV
FY16-325 FY22-629 *FY18-114 FY20-505
FY19-626
FY23-447
Windwhistle Greendale
FY20-348 *FY20-586 Larcomb
-577
FY20
FY21-609 Norwood
FY23-725
FY21-705 FY19-597
The Point Brookside
FY20-588
FY21-608
Dunsandel
FY17-699 Killinchy
Steeles FY21
-627
FY21-473
FY18-670 Birdlings
FY22-576
Te Pirita Southbridge
FY18-587 FY21-610
Figure 5-6f Rural subtransmission network 33kV – existing and proposed
Hororata GXP 33kV
Hororata
*FY16-601
Highfield
Darfield **FY18-114
* FY17
-415
Bankside Annat
FY19-603 FY19-605 Burnham
**FY17-639
To Shands
Rolleston
Hills Springston 33kV
Key Lincoln To Prebbleton
FY15-454 Year-project number

Proposed line * FY15-697
Existing, convert to 66kV

Existing
Motukarara Little River Duvauchelle
Transpower
Proposed Zone Existing Zone

substation substation
Teddington Diamond Harbour
FY15-361
* Convert to 66kV
** Built for 66kV, operating at 33kV until conversion
Figure 5-6g Rural subtransmission network 66 and 33kV – existing and future
Key
st
oa ARTHUR’S PASS Transpower GXP
s tC
We ry
rbu Orion 66/33kV Zone substation
nte Cass
Ca
Orion 66/11kV Zone substation
Bealey Orion 33/11kV Zone substation
Proposed GXP
N Proposed 66kV Zone substation
Proposed 33kV Zone substation constructed at 66kV
CASTLE HILL Convert 33kV Zone substation to 66kV

Proposed 66kV line
Convert 33kV line to 66kV
Springfield 66kV Construction, alive at 11or33kV
Waimakariri Gorge Transpower 66kV
ANNAT
COLERIDGE
Kaiapoi
Sheffield
THE POINT KIMBERLEY Waim

akar River
iri
Glentunnel
CREYKE
b n
DARFIELD Kirwee
Network development
Rakaia Gorge HORORATA
TEMPLETON
ISLINGTON
WINDWHISTLE WEEDONS
HORNBY
HIGHFIELD
LARCOMB SHANDS
R
PREBBLETON
a
GREENDALE BURNHAM Lyttelton
k
a
NORWOOD
ia
STEELES ROLLESTON
LINCOLN DIAMOND HARBOUR
TE PIRITA
BANKSIDE Dunsandel Tai Tapu
R
DUNSANDEL BROOKSIDE SPRINGSTON TEDDINGTON
iv
e
r
KILLINCHY
Rakaia MOTUKARARA DUVAUCHELLE
LITTLE RIVER
Leeston
SOUTHBRIDGE
HILLS Lake Ellesmere
(Te Waihora)
Lake Forsyth Akaroa
Southbridge BIRDLINGS (Waiwera)
Rakaia Huts
229
230
Table 5-6e.1 Major project details – rural – Current year FY15
Budget
SECTION 5
$000
361 Teddington Teddington zone substation provides contingent We propose to relocate the long reach 7.5MVA An alternative would be to install a 775 2015
transformer capacity for faults at Diamond Harbour zone transformer from Motukarara to Teddington (where second transformer at Diamond
upgrade substation and vice versa. Teddington has a single the long reach is required), and install the 2.5MVA Harbour, but this option would require
2.5MVA transformer, which would be overloaded at transformer from Teddington (see Project 612) at major civil works and a bigger
peak load if a fault occurred at Diamond Harbour. Motukarara. This work would coincide with other substation yard.
major replacement work at Teddington.
500 Land Rolleston 33kV substation will be converted to 66kV We will build stage 1 of the new 66kV substation 250 2015
acquisition for at some point in the future, according to our rural (Project 639) and operate it initially at 33kV. A
Burnham subtransmission strategy. The current site is not suitable site has been identified and purchase
66kV large enough for a 66kV switchyard, so a new zone negotiations are underway.
substation substation will be built on a site nearby. However
growth in the Rolleston/Izone area (see Project 638)
will shortly exceed the capacity of the existing
substation.
697 66kV line to The 33kV line from Motukarara to the Springston- We propose to build a 66kV overhead circuit to the The simplest solution is to underground 625 2015
Greenpark Lincoln tee runs down Edward St in Lincoln. northeast of the township and run it at 33kV the 33kV line in Edward St. This cable
substation Reticulation in this area is being progressively initially. The new line will tee onto the Lincoln- would become redundant in 2022, and a
undergrounded. Since this circuit will be converted Prebbleton 33kV circuit, run along Tancred Rd from 66kV solution would still be necessary at
to 66kV in 2022 (Project 583), a strategic solution is Birchs Rd and down Ellesmere Rd to the future that point. Installing a 66kV rather than
Network development
required. Greenpark substation site, and connect to the a 33kV cable would be much more
Motukarara circuit at the end of Edward St. The expensive.
overhead on Edward St can then be removed. This
solution is consistent with the subtransmission plan
for Birdlings (Project 576). See also Projects 447,
583, and 725.
Table 5-6e.2 Major project details – rural – years FY16 to FY19
Budget
$000
601 Convert Hororata Orion's and Transpower's 33kV switchgear at Our strategic plan is to upgrade our rural 33kV assets A new Transpower 66kV bay at 1,240 2016
substation to Hororata zone substation is due for to 66kV when replacement or reinforcement is Hororata GXP will be needed (Project
66/11kV replacement. Current standards require 33kV required. Rather than building an expensive 33kV 325). The 33/11kV transformer will be
switchgear to be built indoors. Also the 33/11kV switchroom we intend to replace the 33/11kV 7.5MVA installed at Burnham zone substation
transformer is at maximum capacity. transformer at Hororata with a new 10MVA 66/11kV (Project 639).
unit. The remaining 33kV network can be supplied
without a 33kV bus.
666 Porters Village A large resort development near Porters Pass The magnitude of the load and distance from existing A comprehensive study has yet to be 3,730 2016
will require a major network solution, owing to assets makes the requirements very challenging. done.
the remoteness of the location. Preliminary studies have been undertaken to provide
an initial estimate of the costs but detailed design is
yet to be undertaken. The solution may involve major
business decisions such as GXP changes or the
adoption of 22kV assets.
671 Castle Hill The geography of this remote location means Our fleet of emergency generators was extended in A second GXP transformer would not 180 2016
Generators that outages are not uncommon and can take a the aftermath of the earthquakes. We now have be economic given the small load.
long time to restore. several units at our disposal and locating two at
Castle Hill substation will improve security of supply
for this area.
Network development
672 Arthurs Pass The geography of this remote location means Our fleet of emergency generators was extended in A second GXP transformer would not 70 2016
Generators that outages are not uncommon and can take a the aftermath of the earthquakes. We now have be economic given the small load.
long time to restore. The Arthurs Pass Town several units at our disposal and locating one at
supply is interrupted more than any other part Arthurs Pass substation will improve security of
of the Orion network. The generator would offer supply for this area. A new step-up transformer and
a cost effective N-2 solution. earthing transformer will be required. This depends
on the purchase of the Arthur's Pass spur asset from
Transpower.
415 Weedons to See Project 114 (conversion of Highfield zone To allow the conversion of Highfield to 66kV the 1,605 2017
Highfield Tee substation to 66/11kV). existing redundant 33kV line from Weedons to the
66kV line Highfield tee-off will be converted to 66kV Jaguar
conversion construction. The line from the tee-off to Highfield
and the breaker at Highfield are already rated at
66kV. Two additional line termination bays will be
installed at Weedons.
231
232
Table 5-6e.3 Major project details – rural – years FY16 to FY19
Budget
SECTION 5
$000
528 Land acquisition Load growth in the West Melton district will A suitable site will be acquired. In view of the 250 2017
for Rossendale necessitate a new zone substation at some strategic nature of this purchase, we intend to
66kV substation point. This may also be a site for a future secure the land well in advance of the substation
220/66kV GXP. commissioning.
637 Railway Rd 11kV The proposed Westland Milk Products (WMP) We will build an 11kV substation at the site with The magnitude of the point load, plus the on- 2,705 2017
substation processing plant in the Izone industrial park two dedicated cables from Larcomb zone going growth around Rolleston, meant that a
(Westland Milk) will require up to 8MVA. Steady load growth substation and a backup circuit from Rolleston new zone substation near WMP was an option.
around this district also means further 11kV zone substation, all along Jones Rd. While the The fact that there are three subs nearby with
reinforcement is necessary to maintain trenches are open we will also take the sufficient capacity (especially after Rolleston is
security of supply. opportunity to complete the undergrounding of converted to 66kV), and that 11kV feeders to
our remaining overhead 11kV lines in Jones and adjacent subs in this project would still be
Hoskyns Rds and install an extra cable from needed for contingent support, means an 11kV
Larcomb into Izone. solution is much cheaper and more efficient
use of existing assets. When a new zone sub is
finally needed, the Rossendale site (Project
528) will be a more optimal location.
639 Burnham 66kV Rolleston 33kV substation will be converted We will build stage 1 of the new Burnham 66kV One alternative is to bring forward the 66kV 3,890 2017
substation stage to 66kV at some point in the future, according substation and operate it initially at 33kV, using a conversion. This is interconnected with a
1 to our rural subtransmission strategy. The transformer which will become available from number of other subtransmission projects and
current site is not large enough for a 66kV Hororata (Project 601). A suitable site has been would be very expensive, taking place before
Network development
switchyard, so a new zone substation will be identified (Project 500). The existing Rolleston these investment are strictly necessary.
built on a site nearby. Growth in the substation will continue in service until the 66kV Deferring the conversions makes the most of
Rolleston/Izone area will shortly exceed the conversion. our 33kV assets for as long as possible.
capacity of the existing substation. Another option is to transfer load to Larcomb,
but the security of supply becomes problematic
with no increase in capacity at Rolleston.
655 Land acquisition The conversion of Darfield zone substation to A suitable site will be acquired. 250 2017
for Creyke 66kV 66kV will necessitate a new location (Creyke,
substation Project 584).
699 Dunsandel Load growth at Dunsandel - principally at the We intend to upgrade the 2 x 7.5/10MVA The purchase of new transformers allows the 2,415 2017
transformer Synlait dairy factory - will exceed the transformers to 2 x 11.5/23 MVA. The network existing assets to be utilised elsewhere.
upgrade substation capacity. spare will go to Springston (Project 505) and the
other bank to Highfield (Project 114).
716 Land acquisition Forecast growth in the Southbridge area will A suitable zone substation site will be acquired. 100 2017
for Southbridge exceed the network capacity at both 11kV and
66kV substation 33kV. See Project 610.
Table 5-6e.4 Major project details – rural – years FY16 to FY19 (continued from previous page)
Budget
$000
114 Convert Highfield Highfield zone substation is currently We propose to convert Highfield zone substation to 66kV, as The timing of this plan maximises our 810 2018
substation to fed by 33kV line from Springston GXP. part of our rural subtransmission strategy. The existing assets by re-deploying two
66/11kV This line also supplies Rolleston ZS. 7.5MVA 33/11kV transformer will be installed at Creyke zone transformers rather than purchasing
During peak summer loads the Highfield substation (Project 584) and a 10MVA 66/11kV transformer new banks.
transformer reaches its maximum tap made available from the Dunsandel upgrade (Project 699) will
due to voltage drop in the 33kV line and be installed at Highfield. A new 11kV ripple plant will also be
the contingency loading on the Rolleston required since the 33kV ripple signal will no longer be
33kV circuits is approaching capacity. received. See also Project 415.
306 Annat The Central Plains Irrigation Scheme is We propose to replace the Annat 2.5MVA transformer with a Several options exist for Annat. If 395 2018
transformer likely to require an increase in capacity 7.5MVA transformer. growth is high the load on the
upgrade at Annat to pump water from the Hororata 33kV GXP will be beyond the
Waimakariri or Kowhai Rivers to N-1 limit; one option could be to
Springfield and Sheffield. convert Annat to 66kV. If there is no
growth the 33kV line could be run at
11kV and the transformer removed
(Rural Reinforcement Project 662).
Options will be reviewed annually.
580 Darfield to Creyke See Projects 584 and 689 (Creyke zone It is proposed to build a new 66kV over 11kV line from DAR to 625 2018
66kV line substation). Creyke (Project 584) to replace the old Highbank line. The
line will be run at 33kV until Creyke is upgraded to 66kV
Network development
(Project 689).
584 Creyke 66kV It is estimated by 2019 the load on Rather than invest in 33kV assets at Darfield we will develop a The existing Darfield 33kV site will 2,720 2018
substation stage 1 Darfield zone substation will exceed the new substation at 66kV and initially run it at 33kV in parallel remain in the medium term. Once
transformer capacity. with Darfield. It will require a new 66kV line (Project 580). It Creyke has a second 66kV feed
will be upgraded to 66kV in stage 2 (Project 689). A 33/11kV (Projects 703, 581) the 33/11kV site
transformer from Highfield (Project 114) will be installed. can be decommissioned.
587 Te Pirita 66kV The Central Plains Water scheme will Two 66kV circuit breaker bays will be installed at Te Pirita for A 66kV switching substation at corner 805 2018
bays create an opportunity for a 7MVA hydro the existing Hororata circuit and the Steeles Rd line. If the of Ardlui and Sharlands Rd (the
generation scheme near Steeles Rd. generator does not proceed, these bays will still be required Hororata-Te Pirita-Bankside tee)
Assets will be required to connect this when the Windwhistle (Project 348) and/or The Point (Project would be more expensive and would
into our 66kV network (see Project 670). 608) substations are commissioned. not have the same security benefits.
654 Land acquisition Load growth in the Norwood district A suitable zone substation site will be acquired. 250 2018
for Norwood 66kV (including two large industrial plants)
substation will exceed the network capacity at
some point (see Project 597).
233
234
Table 5-6e.5 Major project details – rural – years FY16 to FY19 (continued from previous page)
Budget
SECTION 5
$000
670 Steeles Rd The Central Plains Water scheme will A dedicated substation will be installed at the 3,010 2018
Substation create an opportunity for a 7MVA hydro generator site. We will build a 66kV line from this
66kV Line generation scheme near Steeles Rd. substation to Te Pirita zone substation. Switchgear will
Assets will be required to connect this be required at Te Pirita (Project 587).
into our 66kV network.
597 Norwood 66kV Load growth in the Norwood district A 66/11kV 10MVA substation will be installed, to be 3,355 2019
substation (including two large industrial plants) will supplied by new 66kV lines from Weedons- Highfield
exceed the network capacity at some Tee (Project 626) and then Dunsandel (Project 609) at a
point. later date. The substation will also help the Brookside
N-1 contingency which is presently quite stretched.
603 Bankside 11kV With the Hororata 33kV bus being An 11kV ripple plant will be installed at Bankside New metering technology may provide the 370 2019
ripple plant decommissioned in 2020, the 33kV ripple before the 33kV plant is removed. Presently the option to use other forms of signalling
plant will be removed. This leaves Annat Hororata ripple plant is due for replacement in 2017. It technology. We will investigate the viability of
and Bankside substations without ripple is proposed to delay this for 3 more years to coincide using alternative technologies.
control. See Project 605. with the 33kV busbar decommissioning unless
problems start to arise.
Network development
605 Annat 11kV With the Hororata 33kV bus being An 11kV ripple plant will be installed at Annat before New metering technology may provide the 370 2019
ripple plant decommissioned in 2020, the 33kV ripple the 33kV plant is removed. Presently the Hororata option to use other forms of signalling
plant will be removed. This leaves Annat ripple plant is due for replacement in 2017. It is technology. We will investigate the viability of
and Bankside substations without ripple proposed to delay this for 3 more years to coincide with using alternative technologies.
control. See Project 603. the 33kV busbar decommissioning unless problems
start to arise.
626 Norwood to The Norwood zone substation (Project A new 66kV line will be constructed from the Norwood 2,425 2019
Highfield/ 597) requires a 66kV supply. site to Rolleston zone substation. The redundant 33kV
Weedons tee line from Rolleston to the Weedons-Highfield 66kV line
66kV line will be converted to 66kV to complete the circuit.
Table 5-6e.6 Major project details – rural – FY20 to FY24
Budget
$000
348 Windwhistle The Windwhistle region is currently This project will install a new 66/11kV zone As the line assets from Hororata to Windwhistle 4,650 2020
66kV substation supplied from Hororata via an 11kV line. substation. The site location has been purchased have already been installed and built to 66kV
Peak load in this area is less than near the intersection of Sleemans and Leaches Rds. construction, an alternative would be to install a
1.5MVA. As a precursor to the Central The existing Windwhistle 11kV line is built for 66kV new 33kV bay and operate Windwhistle as a
Plains Irrigation Scheme, a large farm and will tee into the Hororata-Greendale circuit. A 33/11kV substation. However, 33kV supply banks
irrigation proposal may increase second circuit from Te Pirita will also be at Hororata GXP are already at their N-1 capacity,
demand by up to 3MW. Load in excess constructed (Project 113). so further growth off Hororata GXP should be
of 2MW would require new connected to the 66kV bus.
transformation capacity.
505 Springston T2 - The greater Christchurch urban When required, we propose to install the 66/11kV The increase in load could be supplied by Lincoln 1,075 2020
66/11kV development strategy proposes further 7.5/10MVA network spare transformer from and/or Springston zone substation. Investment at
transformer residential zoning of land at Lincoln, Dunsandel (Project 699) at Springston. The existing Lincoln is not preferred since it will be replaced
and so provision needs to be made to 33/11kV 7.5MVA bank will remain until the 33kV by a 66kV substation at Greenpark. The Greenpark
increase capacity. network is decommissioned. substation could be advanced instead of this
project, but would be more expensive. This project
also makes efficient use of an existing
transformer asset.
527 Land The districts and townships to the A site is needed for Templeton substation - see 100 2020
acquisition for southwest of Christchurch are expected Project 502.
Network development
Templeton to show strong growth over the next

66kV substation decade and our zone substations and
11kV overhead feeders in the area are
becoming constrained.
577 Windwhistle to Subtransmission is required to connect A new 66kV substation will be commissioned near A Transpower GXP would be more expensive and 1,925 2020
The Point 66kV proposed wind and/or hydro generation The Point (Project 608) below Roundtop. This also require some new 66kV line construction.
line in the area. project connects it to Windwhistle zone substation
(Project 348) with a new 66kV line. A connection to
Te Pirita is also planned (Project 113).
579 Hororata to See Projects 584 and 689 (Creyke zone We will upgrade the Hororata-Darfield circuit The Hororata-Annat-Darfield circuit could be 1,180 2020
Creyke 66kV substations stages 1 and 2). towards Creyke to 66kV (this project), connecting to used. However this would involve upgrading
line upgrade the line (Project 580) from Darfield to Creyke Annat to 66kV also.
substation. A new GXP bay at Hororata is required
(GXP Project 629).
235
236
Table 5-6e.7 Major project details – rural – FY20 to FY24 (continued from previous page)
Budget
SECTION 5
$000
581 Highfield to Our rural subtransmission strategy provides for an We intend to build a new 66kV line (this project and 1,790 2020
Greendale/Creyke exit from 33kV as these assets are due for Project 703) from Highfield to Creyke (Projects 584
Tee 66kV line replacement or as otherwise considered economic. and 689) and install a 66kV bus with two new bays at
The prospect of significant generation on the Highfield. At a later date a line will from Greendale
Rakaia River requires planning for increased will tee onto this circuit.
subtransmission capacity from our eastern region
into the Springston network. A new 66kV link
between Hororata and Springston GXPs via Creyke
and Highfield substations meets both these
objectives.
588 Te Pirita to Trustpower's proposed generation on the upper It is proposed to install a 66kV Jaguar tie line The extended use of interruptible 1,065 2020
Windwhistle 66kV Rakaia River will require subtransmission between Windwhistle and Te Pirita district irrigation load has allowed a delay
line reinforcement to adequately connect to our substations. This project constructs a line from to this project by facilitating the Te
network. In addition, the zone substations at Windwhistle to tee onto the Steeles Rd-Te Pirita line Pirita outage plan. and this date is
Windwhistle (Project 348) and The Point (Project (Project 670) above the existing 11kV along Rakaia timed to coincide approximately
608) share a radial feed, and Te Pirita zone Terrace Rd. Part of the 11kV circuit along the route with the potential Central Plains
substation is also on a radial feed. A 66kV already has poles built to 66kV construction. It is Irrigation scheme. A new GXP in
connection between Windwhistle and Te Pirita will also proposed to join the 1.45km gap between the the area would partly address the
form part of the generation solution while two 11kV circuits along the same road under the issues, but is much more
improving security of supply to the three zone 66kV. expensive than the proposed line.
substations.
Network development
608 The Point 66kV Subtransmission is required to connect proposed A new 66kV substation will be commissioned near A Transpower GXP would be more 3,370 2020
substation wind and/or hydro generation in the area. The Point below Roundtop. A circuit (Project 577) expensive and also require some
will be constructed back to Windwhistle zone new 66kV line construction.
substation (Project 348). A connection to Te Pirita is
also planned (Project 113).
689 Creyke 66kV The Darfield site will exceed its capacity by 2019 Rather than invest in 33kV assets at Darfield we The removal of the 33kV bus at 3,490 2020
substation stage 2 and the 33kV network fed from Hororata will start intend to develop a new substation site (Creyke, Hororata (rather than
to be decommissioned. Project 584). Initially the site will be run at 33kV and replacement) will require the
then be upgraded to 66kV in this project, connected existing Darfield 33kV site to be
to new 66kV circuits from Hororata (Project 580) and decommissioned.
Highfield (Projects 581 and 703). Two extra line
termination bays will also be added for the Highfield
line. A new ripple plant will be required.
Budget
$000
703 Creyke to Our rural subtransmission strategy provides for an exit We intend to build a new 66kV line (this 1,010 2020
Greendale/ from 33kV as these assets are due for replacement or as project and Project 581) from Highfield to
Highfield Tee otherwise considered economic. The prospect of Creyke (Projects 584 and 689). At a later
66kV Line significant generation on the Rakaia River requires date a line will from Greendale will tee onto
planning for increased subtransmission capacity from this circuit.
our eastern region into the Springston network (see also
Project 705). A new 66kV link between Hororata and
Springston GXPs via Creyke and Highfield substations
meets both these objectives.
705 Greendale to The prospect of significant generation on the Rakaia This project installs a line connecting 1,830 2020
Dunsandel/ River requires planning for increased subtransmission Greendale substation to the Dunsandel-
Norwood Tee capacity from our eastern region into the Springston Norwood line (Projects 609 and 706). A
66kV line network (see also Project 703). A new 66kV link between 66kV bus will be needed at Greendale and
Hororata and Springston GXPs via Greendale and this project also installs a bay to terminate
Norwood substations provides for this and improves the Hororata line. Another bay will be
security of supply for Hororata, Greendale and Burnham needed for the Hororata-Greendale line
zone substations. (Project 586).
706 Norwood to See Project 705. This project installs a 66kV line to connect See Project 705. 1,450 2020
Greendale/ with the Greendale (Project 705) and
Dunsandel Tee Dunsandel (Project 609) lines, and an
66kV line additional line termination bay at Norwood.
Network development
717 Land acquisition See Project 608. A suitable site will be acquired. 80 2020
for The Point
66kV substation
728 Springston 11kV The 11kV switchgear at Springston zone substation is A new switchroom will be built. 750 2020
switchroom housed in two buildings which have operational and
maintenance drawbacks, and which do not provide room
for expansion. Extra breakers for the 66kV transformer
(Major Project 505), bus coupler, new feeders and an
11kV ripple plant will be needed.
473 Dunsandel 66kV The Dunsandel to Norwood-Greendale tee line (Project The Dunsandel zone substation has been An alternative to the additional circuit 405 2021
bay for Norwood 609) requires termination on the Dunsandel 66kV bus. designed to accommodate three line breaker to establish the new bay would
line termination circuits. Therefore all that is be to share an existing bay with the
required is to install an additional 66kV Killinchy line. This would be
circuit breaker to establish the new bay. operationally hard to manage and
would require the installation of a
complicated line protection scheme.
237
238
Budget
SECTION 5
$000
586 Greendale 66kV bay Connecting Greendale to the Dunsandel This project installs a bay to terminate the Hororata See Project 705. 405 2021
for Hororata line -Norwood line (Project 705) will line. The bay for the Dunsandel-Norwood line is
complete a 66kV ring fed from Hororata. included in that project.
A 66kV bus will be needed at Greendale.
609 Dunsandel to Projected load growth in the area It is planned to build a 8.8 km 66kV Jaguar circuit A Dunsandel-Greendale link is an option and 1,665 2021
Greendale/ requires expansion of the 66kV network, between the Norwood Tee (see Projects 705 and may be installed at a later date, but the
Norwood Tee 66kV to increase both capacity and security of 706) and Dunsandel zone substations. A new 66kV proposed connection between Dunsandel,
line supply. The proposed Southbridge zone bay will be needed at Dunsandel (Project 473). Greendale and Norwood provides more
substation (Project 610) will also Dunsandel (currently supplied from Hororata under benefit.
increase load on the Springston- normal conditions) will be transferred to Springston
Killinchy 66kV circuit. GXP on the new circuit. Under fault conditions it will
be switched to Hororata rather than the Springston-
Killinchy line as at present.
610 Southbridge 66kV Forecast growth in the area will exceed It is planned build a new 66/11kV substation at Options include increasing capacity at Hills 3,290 2021
substation the network capacity at both 11kV and Southbridge. The substation will be supplied from sub. This involves investment in a 33/11kV
33kV. the Brookside-Killinchy circuit (Project 627). This transformer which is not consistent with our
location means that 11kV reinforcement is not rural subtransmission strategy, and additional
necessary. The Hills Rd 33/11kV zone substation 11kV circuits and regulators would still be
will remain until the Springston 33kV network is required. Converting Hills to 66kV is an option
decommissioned. but Southbridge is a more optimal location,
being closer to the load growth in Rakaia.
Network development
627 Southbridge 66kV Forecast growth in the area will exceed A 66kV line will be built from Southbridge to tee 1,085 2021
line the network capacity at both 11kV and onto the Killinchy-Brookside circuit.
33kV. See Project 610.
720 Land acquisition for The possibility of wind generation at A suitable site will be acquired. 80 2021
Birdlings various sites on Bank Peninsula is being
substation explored. If generation exceeds 17 MW
then a 66kV substation will be required.
502 Templeton 66kV The districts and townships to the A new district/zone substation will be needed to We have reconfigured the 11kV feeders in the 4,410 2022
substation southwest of Christchurch are expected provide security of supply to the Templeton area to share load more evenly and have
to show strong growth over the next township and surrounding district. The new installed an 11kV regulator to increase
decade and our zone substations and substation will be supplied from the 66kV Islington capacity. The close proximity of the Islington
11kV overhead feeders in the area are to Weedons line. to Weedons 66kV line makes a new zone
becoming constrained. substation cost effective when compared to
11kV reinforcement from constrained zone
substations in the area.
Budget
$000
447 Greenpark to The Birdlings 66/33kV substation This project upgrades the section between the 1,590 2023
Motukarara 66kV (Project 576) requires the conversion of Greenpark zone substation site and Motukarara from
line conversion the 33kV circuit from Springston to 33kV Dog over 11kV to 66kV Jaguar over 11kV. See also
66kV. Projects 583, 578, 697, and 725.
576 Birdlings 66/33kV The possibility of wind generation at The substation would require a 66/33kV transformer A second 33kV line is an option. A resource 4,000 2023
substation various sites on Bank Peninsula is being and a circuit breaker. It would also be planned to consent would need to be obtained.
explored. If generation exceeds 17MW move one of the Springston ripple plants to Birdlings.
then a 66/33kV substation will be The 33kV circuit from Springston to Birdlings would be
required. upgraded to Jaguar conductor at 66kV (Projects 447,
583, 697, and 725). See also Project 578.
583 Tancred tee to The Birdlings 66/33kV substation A new 3.54km 66kV Jaguar over 11kV circuit will tee Another bay at Springston and a longer 650 2023
Greenpark 66kV (Project 576) requires the conversion to off the Islington-Springston circuit and run along circuit round the north of Lincoln is an
line 66kV of the 33kV circuit from Springston Tancred St. It will connect to the 66kV circuit (Project alternative, which would cost more.
to Motukarara and Birdlings. The circuit 697) to the Greenpark substation site. The tee will
will no longer terminate at Springston avoid another 66kV bay at Springston GXP. If the
substation but will tee off one of the Birdlings substation is not commissioned, this project
Islington-Springston 66kV lines. See will still be required when Lincoln 33kV zone
also Major Urban Project 707. substation is replaced by Greenpark 66kV substation.
Network development
See also Projects 447, 697, and 725.
725 Birdlings to The Birdlings 66/33kV substation The Motukarara-Birdlings section of part of the 1,815 2023
Motukarara 66kV (Project 576) requires the conversion of Motukarara-Little River line will be upgraded from
line the 33kV circuit from Springston to 33kV Dog over 11kV to 66kV Jaguar over 11kV. See also
66kV. Projects 447, 583, and 697.
239
5.6.8 11kV urban reinforcement projects
Table 5-6f 11kV urban reinforcement projects
Project FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19

50 Lyttelton cable stage 1 525
565 Wigram reinforcement: Wigram Rd feeder 155
646 Waimakariri Rd feeders 775
789 Sockburn feeder upgrade 340
793 Marshs Rd cable stage 1 50
810 Shands zone substation switchgear 100
485 Addington-Fielding St circuit 25
635 Smart meter trial 250
685 Tyrone St reinforcement 135
687 Awatea reinforcement stage 2 470
700 Southern Motorway reinforcement stage 1 440
792 Pages Rd switchgear 30
809 Jessons Rd switchgear 75
682 Hickory Pl cable 290
785 Hayton Rd reconfiguration 25
788 Travis Rd reinforcement 110
801 Shands Rd reinforcement 150
807 Aidanfield Dr cable 165
802 Prestons Rd reinforcement stage 3 270
The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority’s Christchurch Central Recovery Plan was released to the public on
30 July 2012. Our underground 11kV network in the central city does not appear to have suffered major damage,
although much of it is carrying no load at present as demolition continues and few new buildings are finished and
occupied. The network is probably adequate in general terms to supply the proposed rebuild as the total CBD
demand is unlikely to reach pre-earthquake levels. Some alterations and reinforcement will be necessary, in
particular for large point loads such as the Convention Centre, Metro Leisure Centre and stadium. CBD
reinforcement projects have not been included in this list as the nature and timing of load growth is yet to be
established.
Table 5-6f.1 11kV reinforcement project details – urban – current year FY15
Remarks/alternatives Budget
No. Project title Issue Chosen solution Year
$000
50 Lyttelton cable Supply to Lyttelton is vulnerable to failures of the The first stage of reinforcement An alternative would be a 66/11kV substation in 525 2015
stage 1 (single tower) lines over the Port Hills or N-2 involves laying a cable through the Lyttelton. We would need to reinsulate the existing
events at Heathcote substation. Projected growth Lyttelton road tunnel (see Project lines to 66kV and find an appropriate Lyttelton site.
at the Port Company and landslip damage to one 536 for Stage 2). This would protect against Heathcote outages but
of our network substation sites require us to would still be vulnerable to common-mode tower line
reconfigure our network in Lyttelton. faults. It would also cost several million dollars more.
Reinforcing from Diamond Harbour would also require
a large investment in new lines and a voltage regulator,
and the phase shift is a problem.
565 Wigram New industrial load currently under construction We will lay a new cable down A new feeder from Sockburn into Wigram would be 155 2015
reinforcement: in Wigram development will be supplied from Wigram Rd to connect to Aidanfield more expensive, and wouldn't improve links between
Wigram Rd Middleton zone substation, but there is currently network substation (on a primary Middleton and Halswell/Hoon Hay.
feeder no backup feed for a Middleton contingency. ring from Hoon Hay zone substation).
Existing load to the east already exceeds the This will also provide backup from
capacity available from Sockburn if there is an Middleton for the developing Awatea
outage at Middleton. area.
646 Waimakariri Rd 11kV feeder cables will be laid from the new Cables will be laid from the new 775 2015
feeders Waimakariri zone substation (Major Urban Project substation site down Waimakariri Rd
525) into the surrounding district. and Watsons Rd to Harewood Rd.
Network development
789 Sockburn The 11kV feeders laid out of our older 33kV urban Two new cables will be laid from Reinforcement from neighbouring zone substations 340 2015
feeder upgrade zone substations are of lower capacity than our Sockburn zone substation to Springs would require longer cable runs.
current standard. Industrial load is growing in the Rd. The existing cables will be
west of the city and two of the Sockburn feeders reconfigured to remain in service.
are of insufficient post-contingency capacity.
793 Marshs Rd Industrial development in South Hornby requires In addition to the undergrounding of Routes which avoid this intersection are much longer. 50 2015
cable stage 1 a new feeder into the area (see Project 681). NZTA existing circuits, we will lay a new
are altering the intersection of Pound and cable from Marshs Rd which will
Waterloo Rds in 2014-15, so we need to lay part of later be connected to Shands zone
the cable before the roadworks are complete. substation by a new feeder.
810 Shands zone Industrial developments in the South Hornby area We will install new ring main units at 100 2015
substation require new feeders to be laid from Shands Shands substation.
switchgear substation. Switchgear needs to be installed to
terminate the cables.
241
242
Table 5-6f.2 11kV reinforcement project details – urban – years FY16 to FY19
SECTION 5
$000
485 Addington- The planned decommissioning of Montreal A new section of cable from Fielding St kiosk has been joined to an An alternative is to lay a 25 2016
Fielding St zone substation requires re-arrangement of existing disused cable. This project will connect this to the Trotting completely new piece of cable
circuit the 11kV network to maintain supply to the Grounds feeder which passes Lincoln 235 from Addington. The all the way back to Addington.
load currently fed from Montreal. See also Trotting Grounds will be fed from a currently unused breaker at This would not utilise the
Project 553. Lincoln 235. This provides tie support from Addington substation existing redundant assets and
into the Addington commercial area. would increase costs.
635 Smart meter At present our low voltage network is not as We intend to set up a trial with up to 50 smart meters located at 250 2016
trial comprehensively modelled or analysed as distribution transformers/low voltage feeders and the associated
our upper network. To prepare for smart back office systems. This will provide real time data on load and
grid developments and the penetration of power quality within the low voltage network. It also provides an
electric cars, we have undertaken a major opportunity to investigate the best metering and communications
study of our distribution network. Data at technologies for our network and this project is as much about
selected points is required as part of this these solutions as it is about the network data.
study.
685 Tyrone St Proposed developments in north Belfast We will lay a cable up Tyrone St from Factory Rd to Chaneys. This 135 2016
reinforcement require extension of the 11kV network. will connect to a circuit from the 85 Factory Rd network substation.
This will provide for growth in a manner consistent with supply
from the proposed Belfast zone substation at a later date.
Network development
687 Awatea As the southern motorway is completed in Cables will be laid along McTeigue Rd and Owaka Rd between 470 2016
reinforcement this area, industrial and residential Awatea and Halswell Junction Rds. These circuits will interconnect
stage 2 development is accelerating. 11kV the subdivisions with Shands and Halswell zone substations, and
reinforcement and extension is required to later become feeders from the proposed Awatea zone substation.
connect this load and provide security of
supply.
700 Southern Transit NZ's Southern Motorway project We will lay a new trunk feed between Shands zone substation and 440 2016
Motorway requires the undergrounding of our network the developing Awatea district. This will make use of the proposed
reinforcement in the affected area. While the trenches are expansion of capacity at Shands (Major Urban Project 669) and
stage 1 open, an opportunity is provided to also provide for growth around Awatea, deferring the need for Awatea
install new circuits at a much reduced cost. zone substation. Once both substations are commissioned this
See also Rural Project 701. cable will allow them to provide contingent support for each other.
792 Pages Rd The South Brighton network carries too New switchgear on the old Brighton zone substation site will allow 30 2016
switchgear much load to be transferred onto Bromley some load to be taken off the South Brighton ring. It also allows
zone substation for planned or unplanned load to be transferred from Bromley to Rawhiti, which aligns with
outages, without secondary switching. our longer term plan for Bromley to become a 40MVA substation.
Table 5-6f.3 11kV reinforcement project details – urban – years FY16 to FY19 (continued from previous page)
$000
809 Jessons Rd To realise the full benefit of the new Waimakariri zone We will install a ring-main unit at the corner of Pound Rd An alternative is a new cable 75 2016
switchgear substation (Major Urban Project 525) some 11kV and Jessons Rd. This project allows the transfer of load in from Logistics Dr along
alterations need to be made. the McLeans Island area to Waimakariri from the more McLeans Island Rd, but this is
distant Hawthornden and Bishopdale substations. Makes more expensive and leaves a
better use of an underutilised feeder, and improves 240Al cable underutilised.
sectionalising of overhead circuits.
681 Marshs Rd A major commercial/industrial development is We will lay a cable from Shands zone substation to the 330 2017
cable stage 2 planned for the former Islington freezing works site. western end of the subdivision. Part of the cable will be laid
There is a supply from Moffett zone substation but earlier (Project 793) to coordinate with NZTA roadworks.
little backup capacity is available. See also Project 682 which is adjacent.
682 Hickory Pl A major commercial/industrial development is Cable will be laid from Hornby zone substation into the 290 2017
cable planned for the area around Shands and Marshs Rds. area. Later, cable from Shands substation will be needed to
The 11kV network will need reinforcement to provide provide backup as load grows. See also Project 681 which
for this. is adjacent.
785 Hayton Rd In a Middleton contingency, one Sockburn feeder is By swapping the two cables at a distribution substation, the 25 2017
reconfiguration overloaded while an adjacent feeder has spare overload is removed and some load growth on one cable is
capacity. enabled.
Network development
788 Travis Rd A cable in Travis Rd has a section of 95Al which is The section will be replaced by 185Al. 110 2017
reinforcement overloaded in a Rawhiti contingency.
801 Shands Rd The Southern Motorway extension affects the Shands- Two new feeders will be laid from Shands substation to 150 2017
reinforcement Marshs Rds intersection. While the undergrounding Marshs Rd, for Projects 681 and 700. Two new cables will
work is underway, we will coordinate some also be laid northwest along Shands Rd.
reinforcement required for the Marshs Rd cable
(Project 681) and also for the conversion of Shands
zone substation to 66kV.
807 Aidanfield Dr The Wigram development is supplied by circuits from A 185Al cable from Aidanfield Dr network substation to 165 2017
cable Sockburn and Middleton zone substations, but there McMahon Dr will allow the full capacity of the Wigram Rd
will be insufficient backup once load grows beyond a cable (Project 565) to support the Wigram-Middleton area.
certain point. The circuit is currently constrained by a 95Al cable.
802 Prestons Rd Two major residential subdivisions in Marshland have This project completes the 11kV works to provide for the 270 2018
reinforcement been approved. The 11kV network needs to be demand of the completed subdivisions, and to connect to
stage 3 reinforced to provide capacity and security of supply. the Marshland zone substation (Major Project 488).
See Project 678.
243
5.6.9 11kV rural reinforcement projects
Table 5-6g 11kV rural reinforcement projects
Project FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19

495 Rural power factor correction 400
642 Frasers Rd - Annat reinforcement 140
698 Central Plains Water canal pumps 900

790 Leeston reinforcement 10
663 Darfield Township reinforcement from Kimberley 540
791 West Melton cable 350
806 Gerald St Lincoln cable 110
808 Edward St Lincoln cables 560
803 Lincoln feeders (Weedons Rd) 550
Table 5-6g.1 11kV reinforcement project details – rural – current year FY15
$000
495 Rural power The power factor on our rural network is To minimise reactive off-take charges, reduce losses This project defers the need to bring forward 400 2015
factor not optimal. Changes in the regulatory and help with voltage support during contingencies on major subtransmission reinforcement
correction regime will incentivise power factor the subtransmission network we propose to fit projects to increase capacity and security of
correction by way of reactive off-take switchable capacitor banks to strategic 11kV busses supply in areas where the constraints are
charges. and feeders on the rural network. This project will be voltage-driven.
the first in a series of installations.
642 Frasers Rd - Supply to the Springfield township is A new 11 kV line along Frasers Rd between Keens Rd Alternative routes were considered but the 140 2015
Annat dependent on a single circuit, with and Domain Rd will provide a second circuit. An chosen route involves the least construction
reinforcement restoration in repair time. As we consider existing section of this circuit will be re-conductored. and best benefit for future river pumping load.
our rural townships to be 'urban' in terms This will also reinforce the network to provide for
of the 11kV security of supply, the network expected future pumping requirements.
does not meet the standard.
698 Central Plains The Central Plains Water (CPW) canal The reinforcement plan depends on the exact pump 900 2015
Water canal project has received approval. Providing sizing and locations, and also on yet to be determined
pumps supply for several large pumps along the reductions in existing pump loads. Conductor
first stages of the canal will require 11kV upgrades, new spur lines and voltage support are
reinforcement. expected to be required.
Network development
790 Leeston Ellesmere College and part of Leeston We will connect the Leeston Dunsandel Rd and Market 10 2015
reinforcement township are vulnerable to single line Rd circuits and install an ABI, providing backup for
faults. As we consider our rural townships both.
to be 'urban' in terms of the 11kV security
of supply, the network does not meet the
standard.
245
246
Table 5-6g.2 11kV reinforcement project details – rural – years FY16 to FY19
Remarks/ Budget
SECTION 5
No. Project title Issue Chosen solution alternatives Year
$000
663 Darfield Growth at Darfield township is expected to reach the An 11kV cable will be laid from Kimberley ZS to Darfield. This will carry the 804 540 2016
Township 4MVA threshold for security of supply class D2, township load in the event of a Darfield zone substation outage or dual 11kV
reinforcement which requires some switchable restoration after N- feeder fault. Support for Kimberley from Darfield zone substation is also
from Kimberley 2 events. Also, while Darfield has N-1 33kV line improved. Investment at Darfield (e.g. second transformer) is not economic,
security, it only has a single transformer so is strictly as it will be decommissioned in 2020. Its replacement, the proposed Creyke
on N security. 66/11kV zone substation, will also be permitted to have a single transformer
because of the security offered by this cable, resulting in substantial savings.
711 Rural power See Project 495. This project continues the programme of rural zone substation capacitor See Project 400 2016
factor correction installations. 495.
791 West Melton The residential development at West Melton has We will lay a cable through the township so that the northern overhead 350 2016
cable become a township. A large area of OH network is network can be supplied from a separate circuit from the village. The low
also supplied by this cable network, reducing voltage problem is also improved, allowing for some growth before other
reliability for the township. There is also low voltage solutions such as capacitors become necessary.
on the northern fringes in a Weedons contingency.
806 Gerald St This project (along with Project 808) concludes our The remaining 11kV lines in Gerald St will be undergrounded as the sequence 110 2016
Lincoln, cable reinforcement of the main road circuits in Lincoln of reinforcement is completed.
township, including the removal of overhead lines.
808 Edward St See Project 806. The remaining 11kV lines in Edward St (Lincoln) will be undergrounded as the 560 2016
Network development
Lincoln, cables sequence of reinforcement is completed. This project lays cable which will
become feeders for the proposed Greenpark zone substation.
701 Southern NZTA's SH1 widening project requires network We will lay a new feeder cable into east Rolleston township from Larcomb 240 2017
Motorway undergrounding in the affected area. While the zone substation. This is an area of prolonged expansion requiring significant
reinforcement trenches are open, an opportunity is provided to also capacity increase in the 11kV network. Part of this route involves trenching
stage 2 install new circuits at a much reduced cost. See also beyond the NZTA road works.
Urban Reinforcement Project 700.
803 Lincoln feeders Steady residential development south of Lincoln Two new cables will be laid from Springston in to the Lincoln underground 550 2018
(Weedons Rd) township will exceed the backup capacity from network. This will allow for contingency support and load transfer between
Springston zone substation, and eventually exceed the zone substations. It will also allow the separation of rural overhead
the transformer capacity at Lincoln zone substation. network from the township's underground network, improving reliability.
5.6.10 Network connections and extensions
Overview
Network connections can range from a 60 amp single-phase connection to a large industrial connection or a big
subdivision of several thousand kVA.
Consumer connections
We anticipate that we will continue to connect consumers to our network at the present rate of approximately 3,000
each year. Supplying these connections creates a need for:
 kiosk substations
 pole substations
 network or large consumer building substations
 low voltage services
 network extensions.
Subdivisions
The level of subdivision activity depends on economic conditions and population growth. On average 850 residential
lots are developed annually within Christchurch City. We expect this number to increase in the short term whilst
households relocate from earthquake damaged areas. In our rural area most subdivisions are for lifestyle
reasons. In our urban area it can be industrial, commercial or residential, though most developments are
residential. Our subdivision investment is made after negotiating with the developer on the basis of a commercial
rate of return.
5.6.11 Underground conversions

The local authority or the New Zealand Transport Agency instigates conversions from overhead line to
underground cable. In conjunction with the relevant roading authority we consider converting overhead lines on
highways and other places where safety is a major issue. Where a capacity increase requires us to reinforce our
network, we may replace overhead lines with underground cables as per the local authority’s district plan.
5.6.12 Demand side management value for network development alternatives

Demand side management (DSM) initiatives can provide alternatives to investment in traditional network
development solutions. This section is included in our AMP to assist potential DSM providers to determine the
approximate funding available from Orion when specific projects are deferred through DSM.
The table on the following page is a high level assessment of the annual per kW cost of proposed network solutions
where DSM could be used to defer the project. If a DSM solution is presented, then further detailed analysis is
undertaken to compare options. Multiple projects are sometimes required to resolve network constraints – these
have been grouped together by colours in the table. The $/kW available for DSM solutions is the sum of all
similarly coloured projects.
For example:
Upgrading Shands substation to 66kV scheduled for FY17 has a capital cost of $6.5m and an annual capital funding
cost of $0.79m. It provides capacity and security of supply for 400kW of load growth per annum. For a DSM
solution to be economic and provide a one year deferral of a network solution, the cost per kW must be lower than
$1,970 ($0.79m/400 kW). If the DSM solution can provide three years of deferral (1.2MW at peak) then the DSM
proposal cost must be lower than:
 $1,970 for 0.4MW in the first year
 $990 for 0.8MW in the second year, and
 $660 for 1.2MW in the third year.
The values in the following table assume that the DSM solution is provided in the year required and therefore
discounted values apply for DSM solutions implemented earlier than required.
Table 5-6h DSM value for network development alternatives
Budget Growth $ per kW available for

Year Project description capital per year DSM alternative
($000) (kW) Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
2016 Convert Hororata zone substation to 66/11kV* 1,200 1,500 100 50 30
2016 Hororata 66kV bay for Hororata zone substation* 620 1,500 50 30 20
2016 Porters Village 3,730 5,000 90 50 30
2016 Moffett zone substation replace 33kV feeders 210 1,000 30 20 10
2017 Burnham 66kV zone substation stage 1 3,890 700 670 340 220
2017 Convert Shands zone substation to 66kV 6,550 400 1,970 990 660
2018 Annat zone substation transformer upgrade* 390 1,000 50 30 20
2018 Marshlands zone substation 6,460 2,000 390 200 130
2020 Springston T2 - 66/11kV transformer 1,070 600 210 110 70
2020 Yaldhurst zone substation 5,710 200 3,430 1,720 1,140
2021 Southbridge 66kV zone substation 3,290 110 3,590 1,800 1,200
2021 Southbridge 66kV line 1,090 110 1,190 600 400
2022 Templeton zone substation 4,410 900 590 300 200
2023 Shands zone substation 66kV Stage 2 770 600 150 80 50
* Growth driven by new CPW pumps
Risk management 249
Risk management 6
6.1.1 Risk management context 251
6.1.2 Risk management responsibilities 251
6.1.3 Risk management process 252
6.1.4 Risk management plans 253
6.2 Governance and operational business risks 255

6.2.1 Safety 255
6.2.2 Legislative compliance 255
6.2.3 Network performance 256
6.2.4 Commercial management 256
6.2.5 Reputation 256
6.2.6 Environment 257
6.2.7 Human resources 259
6.3 Safety 258
6.4 Environment 259

6.4.1 Management process and documentation 259
6.5 Network risk analysis 261

6.5.1 Assessment of risks 261
6.6 Interdependence 262

6.6.1 Interdependence with other services 262
6.6.2 Transpower sites 263
6.7 Natural disaster 264

6.7.1 Management system 264
6.7.2 Earthquake 265
6.7.3 Flooding 266
6.7.4 Snowfall 266
6.7.5 Wind 266
6.7.6 Tsunami 266
6.8 Asset failure 267

6.8.1 Administration building 267
6.8.2 66kV cable network 267
6.8.3 Ripple system 267
6.8.4 Distribution management (DMS) system 268
Continued overleaf
250 Risk management
6.9 Mitigation measures 269

6.9.1 Procedures and plans 269
6.9.2 Engineering measures 270
6.9.3 Avoidance of major supply failure 271
6.9.4 Mitigation of major supply failure 272
6.9.5 Historic examples 273
6.9.6 Insurance 273

6-1a The three components of risk 251 6-5a Primary risk for major assets 261
6-1b Key risk responsibilities 251 6-5b Possible cause of contaminant discharge and risks 261
6-1c Orion risk acceptability matrix 252 6-6a Interdependence of lifelines (1 week after earthquake) 262
6-1d Orion risk acceptability chart 252 6-6b GXP – Liquefaction potential and related damage 263
6-4a Environmental management documentation 259 6-7a Orion – Liquefaction potential and related damage 265
6-4b Environmental management process 260
Risk management 251
6.1 Introduction
6.1.1 Risk management context
To maintain a sustainable business we perform risk management to identify acceptable levels of risk. Risk needs to
be understood and, where it cannot be eliminated, we use training, competency, safe work practices and network
design to control the level of risk. Risk needs to be controlled and mitigated within acceptable limits to achieve the
most satisfactory outcome.
Risk is often measured or quantified as the product of a probability and a consequence, however, a less obvious but
important factor is context. While the consequence of some risks is similar, their contexts, such as location, may
result in a difference in risk rating.
Figure 6-1a The three components of risk
Context
Likelihood Consequence
6.1.2 Risk management responsibilities

The following chart shows the responsibilities of key Orion staff who help to manage risk. These responsibilities help
us to plan and respond to situations that may arise from any of the causes discussed in the remainder of this section.
Note: We have aligned our Civil Defence responsibilities using the ‘four R’s’ approach to resilience planning—
reduction, readiness, response and recovery.
Figure 6-1b Key risk responsibilities
Overall business continuity

Chief executive officer
Public communication CDEM network overview Pandemic

Communications and Chief operating officer GM information solutions
engagement manager
Readiness Reduction
Operations manager Network asset manager
Response Recovery
Control centre manager Contract works manager
Property and projects manager
252 Risk management
6.1.3 Risk management process

Our risk management process is based on the risk management standard AS/NZS 31000.
The acceptability of risk is determined on the basis of likelihood and consequences of the event associated with the
risk occurring. The evaluated ranking of these two is used to establish the priority for managing the risk.
We have two risk assessment tools, both of which have been calibrated to present the risk acceptability ranking in a
similar manner:
 Desktop—paper based work area assessment utilising the following risk acceptability matrix.
Figure 6-1c Orion risk acceptability matrix
Likelihood
Frequent (happens often) H H VH E E
Likely (happens sometimes) M H VH VH E
Possible (happens rarely) L M H VH VH
Unlikely (happens somewhere) L M M H VH
Rare (hasn’t happened yet) L L L M VH
Consequence Minor Moderate Serious Major Catastrophic
Classification Escalation
E = Extreme Board to be informed
VH = Very high CEO to be informed
H = High Corporate manager to be informed
M = Moderate Line manager to be informed
L = Low No escalation
 Quantate—a dedicated risk management software application that allows us to prioritise risk across our
business with results presented on the bands of the following risk acceptability chart.
Figure 6-1d Orion risk acceptability chart

Likelihood
Consequence
In the following sections we concentrate on the physical aspects of risk associated with managing network assets.
The objective is to avoid catastrophe, reduce uncertainty and improve predictability.
Risk management 253
6.1.4 Risk management plans

We have several risk management plans for different aspects of our network. We summarise these below:
 Disaster resilience summary – (NW70.00.14)

We created this document to inform Civil Defence and others of our network resilience.
 Asset risk management plan – (NW70.60.02)

The Civil Defence Emergency Management Act also requires us to plan for major events. In particular it requires
us to:
i. function to the fullest extent during and after an emergency
ii. hold plans which show how we plan to function during and after an emergency
iii. participate in civil defence emergency planning at national and regional level if requested
iv. provide technical advice on civil defence emergency management issues where required.
As part of these requirements, our asset risk management plan focuses on the physical aspects of risk
associated with managing network assets in the event of a major incident or emergency. Topics covered include:
i. exposure to natural disaster with details of specific hazards
ii. establishing a rating system to easily identify those areas most at risk
iii. mitigation measures and practical solutions to reduce risk or impact
iv. the location, likely reasons for failure and contingency provisions for each asset group
v. a schedule of the risk-based spares we hold.
For further discussion on natural disaster and asset failure see sections 6.7 and 6.8.
 Security Standard
Our Security Standard is key to how we plan to meet the demand for electricity in certain circumstances when
electrical equipment fails on our network. It is discussed in detail in section 3.3.3 and section 5.3.1.
 Network physical access security plan – (NW70.60.03)

Our network physical access security plan details our security policies, principles and procedures that restrict
physical access to our electrical network and associated infrastructure. The principles defined in this document
underpin our stated commitment to provide a safe reliable network and a safe and healthy environment for the
public, employees and contractors.
The predominant focus of the plan is to restrict access by unauthorised personnel. However, some of the risks
associated with access to equipment, together with mitigation measures, also directly affect authorised
personnel.
In terms of security, the general principle is to prevent unauthorised entry by the public and opportunist
intruders without specialised tools, and slow determined intruders. This is achieved by:
i. reasonable measures to prevent access by members of the public to potentially fatal voltages
ii. additional measures to deter, detect and slow determined intruders at higher risk sites.
For further discussion on safety see section 6.3.
 Environmental risk register – (NW70.10.06)

The aim of this register is to summarise the environmental risks that relate to our business and operations,
including likelihood of occurrence, consequences and mitigation.
Environmental risks associated with loss of supply or fluctuations in supply are not included, either generally, or
in relation to particular large industrial users. At this stage we consider these risks are more appropriately
addressed through the asset management process, Lifelines Project and individual users' own environmental
risk assessments.
254 Risk management
We have assessed the risk (likelihood, consequence) of an event and our mitigation-effectiveness based on a
subjective estimate. This assessment is therefore not supported by historical data or records.
The register is a tool that helps us to manage risk – it is not an exhaustive list of all risks. Its value is that it
identifies general risk to the company and highlights any areas of high risk that may require particular
management attention.
 Business continuity plans

The aim of these plans is to provide an assessment of the risks that relate to the continuity of our business and
operations due to the loss of systems or personnel.
Each corporate manager is responsible for their functional part of these plans.
Risk management 255
6.2 Governance and operational business risks

Governance risk management is the responsibility of the Orion board. To manage this obligation the board approves
our annual statement of intent, our annual business plan and our asset management plans.
Our board has established an audit and risk management committee to liaise with Orion’s auditor and provide
additional assurance regarding the quality and reliability of internal controls for financial information used by and
issued by the board. The committee also oversees Orion’s insurance practices and monitors the effectiveness of the
company’s risk and loss control activities.
Operational business risk management is the responsibility of the CEO but is overseen by the Orion board. Key
operational risks are delegated to business group managers. Some risks are common to all business groups but
generally key risks are directly managed by the group with the greatest exposure.
We have assessed our greatest risks as:
 safety
 legislative compliance
 network performance
 commercial management
 reputation
 environment
 human resources.
6.2.1 Safety
Refer to section 6.3 - Safety.
6.2.2 Legislative compliance

Material compliance is assessed using standard risk assessment methods to prioritise and quantify our known risks.
As part of our regular reporting to the board, specific issues associated with our compliance programmes are
reported.
The following Acts and Regulations are those that we consider key to the management of our business:
 Electricity Act 1992
 Electricity Regulations 1997
 Electricity Industry Act 2010
 Resource Management Act 1991
 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996
 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992
 Building Act 2004
 Fire Service Act 1975
 Fire Safety and Evacuation of Buildings Regulations 1997
 Commerce Act 1986
 Companies Act 1993
 Energy Companies Act 1992
 Electricity Industry Reform Act 1998
 Financial Reporting Act 1993
 Taxation Legislation
 Consumer Guarantees Act 1993
 Fair Trading Act 1986
 Sale of Goods Act 1908
 Employment Relations Act 2000
 Holidays Act 2003
 Human Rights Act 1993
256 Risk management
 Injury Prevention, Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 2001

 Minimum Wage Act 1983
 Wages Protection Act 1983
 Parental Leave and Employment Protection Act 1987
 Smoke Free Environments Act 1990
 Privacy Act 1993.
6.2.3 Network performance

Refer to section 6.7 - Natural disaster, 6.8 - Asset failure and 6.9 - Mitigation measures.
6.2.4 Commercial management

The commercial management of Orion includes governance, finance, insurance, auditing, pricing, valuation,
industry submissions and information technology.
Ensuring that sufficient financial resources are available to support the continued operation, maintenance,
replacement and growth of the network is a key task of management. Central to this is managing revenue risk and
the relationship between cost and income. Several activities assist in the management of this risk:
 Prudential requirements
The most common form of contract for network delivery services in the electricity industry is ‘interposed’ -
where electricity retailers act as the customer interface for invoicing. The downside to this is that our network’s
prudential risk is concentrated in the hands of a small number of electricity retailers. The use of a range of
contractual measures—including payment terms, bonds and bank guarantees is necessary to manage this risk
and provide consumers with the certainty that the network will have the financial resources to continue its
essential service.
 Managing contracts and potential liabilities
The liabilities faced by a network must be viewed in the context of other delivery mechanisms in the economy –
for example a courier driver. Just as in the courier driver example it is unrealistic to have uncapped liabilities
for the network delivery service and as a prudent operator we contractually manage our liabilities.
 Relationship between price and cost
We utilise dynamic peak pricing to link a core driver of cost in our business (capital spend due to peak demand
growth) with our income. Over time and in other circumstances ‘the relevant cost driver’ can change. An
example of this change is the growth in summertime rural irrigation load. We have recently reflected the
anytime capacity cost driver relevant to this dominant rural load in a new pricing structure.
 Regulatory risk
Recent changes to Part 4 of the Commerce Act require the Commerce Commission to develop ‘input
methodologies’. One application of these methodologies is their use as a means of resetting the prices charged
by networks. Work continues on these methodologies at the time of writing and it is unclear as to the level of
revenue risk posed by this initiative. We take an active part in formal submissions on any proposed changes to
Part 4 and any proposed regulatory decisions or actions by the Commission under Part 4.
6.2.5 Reputation
We value our reputation and relationship with our customers and aim to be recognised for excellence in customer
service and stakeholder relationships, lead collaboration across the electricity industry for the benefit of all, apply
technology and demand side management to benefit our customers, and be recognised for excellence in leadership
and management. To achieve these aims we have developed the following values:
Risk management 257
We will Meaning
Value relationships We build and maintain positive relationships with our internal and external stakeholders (our employees,
customers, shareholders, suppliers, contractors, regulators, community organisations etc.)
Be trustworthy We demonstrate honesty, sound judgement, understanding and empathy. We earn the trust and respect of
our community
Be proactive We create opportunities and promptly respond to challenges with initiative. We empower our employees to
be accountable and focus on results
Maintain a long Decisions we make must not compromise the achievement of our purpose
term focus
Be effective and We strive for competence, effective planning and execution, consistency in application and efficiency
efficient
Be innovative We maintain a learning environment. We explore and adopt ideas that create value
Value safety and We provide a safe and healthy work environment to protect ourselves, other people and property
wellbeing
Value our natural We are mindful of our impact on the natural environment and seek ways to minimise our effects
environment
6.2.6 Environment
See section 6.4 Environmental management.
6.2.7 Human resources

A sophisticated network of electrical assets is central to how we function. The skilled employees who operate this
equipment are also critical to our business.
We are committed to providing a work environment that enables professional and personal growth—we recognise our
responsibility to ensure our people achieve the best mix of skills they can while they are here.
An aging workforce and an industry shortage of skilled staff remain issues and we continue to plan ahead to recruit
and retain skilled employees. To ensure that we are not left short of skilled employees in the future, we support
several initiatives that focus on training, recruitment and staff retention:
 In-house development programme
These programmes are designed to train employees to a level where they are sufficiently skilled to replace
employees who we expect to retire in the next five to 10 years.
 CPIT Trades Innovation Centre
We continue to advise on ways to retain and attract people into electricity related trades. We have invested in a
distribution trades training centre as a partner with CPIT.
 Power Engineering Excellence Trust
The Trust and University of Canterbury have established an Electric Power Engineering Centre to support power
engineering education.
 Wellness programme
Our wellness programme helps our employees maintain good standards of health and wellbeing. Wellness
activities include; health and wellbeing seminars, on-site health nurse, full health checks, flu vaccinations, fitness
activities, healthy eating lunches, employee counselling, earthquake-related support and subsidised visual
examinations.
As an employer committed to developing the potential of our employees we believe it is important to understand their
concerns. Each year we survey our employee’s to get their view on their working environment.
258 Risk management
6.3 Safety
We are committed to providing a safe, reliable network and a safe, healthy work environment—we take all
practicable steps to minimise risk to the community, our staff and the environment. We control hazards through
training, guidelines and standards. Potential hazards, in particular electrical hazards, are also considered when
new network installations are being designed and constructed.
Legacy assets
With long life networks there is inevitably a number of legacy assets that do not meet current improved operational
or safety standards. When we become aware of assets or safety issues that do not meet modern expectations, we
prioritise mitigation measures to reduce the risk to both the public and our workers.
These actions may include full replacement over time or may include strategies to reduce risk until replacement
can be achieved. Key areas where we are currently managing these types of risk are: low voltage panels at our
older substations; low voltage panels at our older link-boxes, and our legacy low voltage system where service
mains are t-jointed into our distribution network.
Staff
We are committed to consultation and co-operation between management and employees. Maintaining a safe
healthy work environment benefits everyone and is achieved through co-operative effort. We focus on line
managers taking responsibility for themselves and their staff to manage hazards which may be present in their work
areas. We have introduced risk based hazard assessment to our staff.
Our systems systematically identify, assess and manage potential hazards in the work place. Our Health, Safety and
Environment Committee and support from health and safety practitioners are also important.
Contractors
Since almost all work associated with our network is carried out by contractors, we have developed registers of
specific known hazards along with recommended actions to control hazards. Contractors must have their own
documented health and safety management systems and they are further reminded of their health and safety
obligations when they sign a new contract. We carry out regular site audits to ensure compliance.
Most hazards can be successfully managed if access to hazardous areas is restricted to competent personnel, and
industry-recognised safe working practises are used.
Public
We have an on-going advertising campaign to promote public safety around our network and we monitor concerns
about health and electrical fields. Due to the disruption to schools over the recent past, and the schools preference
for interactive teaching methods, we have suspended our in-school education programme in the short term.
Thousands of additional contractors are now working on repairs to the infrastructure and buildings in the city. Many
of these repairs will necessitate working in close proximity to our live network.
We have increased our public safety resource to educate these contractors and to provide a process for issuing
minimum safe approach consents as mandated by Regulation.
We recently engaged an independent consultant to undertake a risk analysis of security where access to our
network could be considered a significant hazard to the public. As a general principle, significant electrical hazards
within the public arena are controlled using two barriers of protection. Signage on the initial locked barrier alerts
visitors to the general hazard and that access is restricted to authorised personnel only. The second barrier has
further warning signage and a barrier preventing inadvertent contact with the hazard. The form of the barriers may
differ depending on the level of risk and the practicality of implementation.
Risk management 259
6.4 Environment
We follow a policy of environmental sustainability and work to optimise electrical losses on our network.
Our environmental sustainability policy covers protection of the biosphere, sustainable use of natural resources,
reduction and disposal of waste, wise use of energy, risk reduction, restoration of environment, disclosure,
commitment of management resources, stakeholder consultation, assessment and annual audit.
Our major identified responsibilities are:
 a duty to avoid discharge of any contaminants into the environment
 a duty to avoid unreasonable noise
 a duty to avoid, remedy or mitigate any adverse effect on the environment.
Target levels of service for our environmental measures are detailed in section 3.3.7.
6.4.1 Management process and documentation

We are committed to being environmentally responsible. Legislation such as the Resource Management Act 1991
and our own environmental sustainability policy govern our activities.
Figure 6-4a Environmental management documentation
Policy
Overall objectives
EMS manual
System overview
Responsibilities
Management review
Auditing
Procedures
Risk assessment, setting of targets and objectives
Compliance with legislation
Supplier assessment
Environmental management
programmes
Treated timber, Hazardous substance and
Recycled material programmes
Operational controls
Spill control, Emergency response
Hazardous substances storage and control
Several years ago we documented specific management systems that our service providers are required to adhere to
for the handling of:
 SF6 gas - NW70.10.01 SF6 gas management procedures
 Oil and fuel - NW70.10.02 environmental management procedures for oil and fuel.
260 Risk management
Figure 6-4b Environmental management process
Issue
Obligation to comply with:
 Relevant environmental legislation (Resource management Act, Hazardous substances and new organisms Act, Building Act etc.)
 Orion NZ Ltd.'s Environmental sustainability policy
Objectives Result
 Full compliance with all environmental legislation  Proactive rather than reactive environmental management
 Other objectives as in our Environmental sustainability policy  System development mirrors Orion risk profile
 Develop as a sustainable business  Market edge over competitors in environmental responsibility
Policies Monitoring
 Environmental sustainability policy  Schedule regular monitoring
 Incident reporting
 Auditing
Methods
 Assessment of environmental risks
 Develop and implement procedures and standards to minimise significant risks
 Develop targets and programmes to improve environmental performance and minimise environmental risk
Risk management 261
6.5 Network risk analysis

6.5.1 Assessment of risks
We assess critical assets for risk to clearly establish the impact of asset failure, based on expected failure rates for
given assets. This work includes the likely impact or consequence of failure and takes into account aspects such as
the availability of equipment and the lead time required to purchase replacement equipment. This, coupled with the
impact from the most credible natural events, establishes the justifiable spares levels.
The need for spares is created by the likelihood of two events in addition to average failure mode levels. These
additional events are earthquakes (65% chance in the next 50 years) and storm conditions (100% chance in the next
50 years).
Earthquakes create the most significant risk to our network, since both likelihood and consequence is high and long
equipment replacement times are a major consideration. We are having another look at our earthquake risk in the
light of what we now know after the September 2010 and February 2011 earthquakes. These recent earthquakes
have given us new data that we now need to consider. The table below shows that earthquakes dominate our asset
exposure.
Table 6-5a Primary risk for major assets
Asset Type Main risk

Cables All Earthquake
Lines All Storm
Switchgear All Earthquake
Transformers Ground mounted Earthquake
Pole mounted Lightning
With auto tap-changer Earthquake
Regulator Earthquake
Table 6-5b Possible causes of contaminant discharge and their relative risks
Risk of discharge of contaminant – (low, moderate, high)

Transformer oil spill Inside/
outside PCB Holding Portable
Zone Building Pole Pad or OCB oil capacitor tank Transport tank Oil filled Battery
Cause of discharge substn substn substn kiosk spill leak spill accident spill cable leak fluid spill
External/natural *1 L L M L L L L L L L L
Accident L L M L L L L L/M M L
Vandalism L L L L/M L L L L L L L
Fire L L L L L L L L L L L
Vehicle collision L L M L/M L L L L/M L/M L L
Human error L L L L M/H L M M M M L/M
Design fault L L L/M L L L L L L L L
Plant failure L L L L L/M L L L L/M L/M L
Probable severity of
outcome *2 H M/H L/M L/M L H *2 M/H L/H M/H H L
Note.*1 Includes discharge of contaminants occurring as a result of damage caused by earthquake, wind, snow, flood, lightning or other causes.
Note.*2 Severity of outcome with respect to contravention of the Resource Management Act.
262 Risk management
6.6 Interdependence
6.6.1 Interdependence with other services
Many service organisations rely on the services of others to perform. In particular communication systems are of
critical importance to all lifeline utilities. It is important to understand this ‘interdependence’ in the recovery stage
of any disaster.
The following table was produced as part of a lifelines study into how natural disasters would affect Christchurch. It
indicates various interdependencies from a lifelines point of view one week after an earthquake.
Table 6-6a Interdependence of lifelines (one week after earthquake)
Telephone systems
Telephone systems
Standby electricity
Standby electricity
Sanitary drainage
Sanitary drainage
Mains electricity
Mains electricity
Storm drainage
These
Storm drainage
Sea transport
Broadcasting
Sea transport
Water supply
Broadcasting
Air transport
Water supply
are dependent on
Air transport
Fire fighting
Fire fighting
Fuel supply
Fuel supply
VHF radio
these
VHF radio
Railways
Railways
Roading
Roading
Water supply 2 # # # # # # # # # # # 3
Sanitary drainage # # # # # # # # # # # # #
Storm drainage # 2 # # # # # # # # # # #
Mains electricity 2 3 2 # 3 3 # 2 # 3 1 # #
Standby electricity 3 3 2 # 3 3 # # # 3 3 2 #
VHF radio 1 1 2 3 # 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 3
Telephone systems 2 1 # 1 1 # # # # 1 3 1 2
Roading 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 3
Railways # # # # # # # # 1 # # # #
Sea transport # # # # # # # # # # # 1 #
Air transport # # # 1 # # # # # # # # #
Broadcasting 1 2 # # # # 1 1 # # # # 1
Fuel supply 3 2 1 # 3 2 1 3 2 # 1 1 3
Fire fighting # # # # # # 1 # # # 2 # 1
Equipment 3 3 2 3 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 2 2
3. High dependence 2. Moderate dependence 1. Low dependence # No dependence
Since this table was produced there has been consolidation of fuel supply storage from contractor’s yards and small
local service stations to larger centralised service stations. These stations have electronic controlled pumps that
depend on a power supply for their operation.
Restoration after a disaster, such as an earthquake, has a very high dependence on an adequate fuel supply. We
have purchased an above-ground diesel tank to provide an emergency reserve supply for up to three days for our
operator vehicle fleet and building generator should the Christchurch supply lines become disrupted. The plan is to
maintain a reserve of 8,000 litres and take delivery of 7,000 litres at a time.
Risk management 263
6.6.2 Transpower sites

Transpower’s transmission lines, buildings and equipment have in general been designed and strengthened to
withstand damage from most credible hazard events, with minimal damage. However, notwithstanding this, the
ground conditions at three of Transpower’s sites may be susceptible to liquefaction, which could result in relatively
significant differential settlement. While this may cause some problems in the switchyards, the major problems
would be damage to control buildings and underground cables.
Support from non-liquefiable ground could reduce the vulnerability of cables to damage although this would be a
very costly remedy. A more practical solution is be to build diversity into future network development.
The following table is an attempt to quantify the relative risk between the three GXPs.
Table 6-6b Transpower GXP sites – Relative liquefaction potential and related damage
Liquefaction susceptibility Potential for Settlement

Potential for settlement induced estimation
Substation 150 year 450 year 1000 year foundation failure damage (mm)
Addington Medium/High Medium/High Medium/High Possible Likely 150-200
Bromley Low Medium Medium Possible Possible 20-40
Islington Low Low Low Unlikely Unlikely
After the September 2010 earthquake, minimal damage with equipment was observed. Supply was interrupted at
three of Transpower’s major GXPs and one minor GXP and constrained at one further GXP. Supply was able to be
restored at all the major GXPs within three hours of the earthquake.
After the February 2011 earthquake, damage with equipment was observed and supply interrupted for five hours at
Bromley GXP. Liquefaction was minor and most damage was due to severe shaking.
As a result of the earthquakes we expect Transpower may review some of the GXP susceptibility ratings in the table
above.
264 Risk management
6.7 Natural disaster

6.7.1 Management system
Orion is a founding member of the steering committee of the Canterbury engineering lifelines group. The purpose of
this group is to increase the resilience of Canterbury’s infrastructure and to assist lifeline utilities to participate in
all phases of civil defence emergency management.
Our integrated emergency management approach is based around the four R’s—reduction, readiness, response and
recovery:
 Reduction
Risk management is an integral component of the reduction phase; identifying and analysing risks and
developing plans and systems to reduce risk. As part of this process we analyse and identify the probability,
magnitude and consequences of risk. We also establish what are acceptable levels of risk.
 Readiness
This involves developing operational systems and capabilities before an emergency happens. We maintain a
range of plans and documents in readiness for an emergency, including an asset risk management plan, major
outage communication plan, contact lists for the electricity industry and emergency contractors and a recovery
plan.
We regularly contribute to emergency readiness programmes. We have a backup control centre so we can
continue to function if anything happens to our primary control centre.
 Response
In our response to emergencies, our first concern is the preservation of life. The safety of the public, contractors
and staff is paramount. During an emergency situation we assess the scale of the event before planning our
response.
We have operational procedures in place detailing the actions we need to take immediately before, during and
directly after an emergency. We have contingency plans in place for natural event/equipment failure, supply of
emergency generators, loss of supply to the CBD, zone substations and GXPs, and energy shortage (rolling power
cuts).
Communication is the key to recovery after a disaster. The most secure of our communication systems is our
own radio network installed in key Orion vehicles and emergency contractors’ vehicles. We have also entered
into a mutual aid arrangement with several other power companies.
 Recovery
This involves rehabilitation and restoration to provide original functionality of the Orion network. As part of our
recovery plan for an emergency situation, we review our customers’ needs and our interdependencies with other
services, and set priorities to restore full functionality.
During and after an emergency situation, we provide regular updates to keep the public and stakeholders
informed, advise them of the severity of the problem and likely time to restoration. Customers and suppliers are
also advised of any situation on our website, which is updated on a regular basis.
Earthquakes and storms are our major natural event risks. We continue to invest significant time and money to
ensure our network is prepared for such events. During the mid-1990s our network was part of an ‘engineering
lifelines’ study into how natural disasters would affect Christchurch. Since this study, further detailed studies have
been undertaken and we have minimised the overall risk to our network in a cost-effective manner.
After the 2010/2011 Canterbury earthquakes we commissioned Kestrel Group to carry out an independent review of
how we performed. Kestrel’s review endorsed our approach to prior planning and prior risk mitigation measures,
our preparedness and our emergency response. We take into consideration Kestrel’s report and recommendations
as part of our on-going asset management and planning.
We have addressed risk to communications at the two main communication sites – Sugarloaf and Marleys Hill.
Sugarloaf is operated by others and now takes its primary power supply from our urban underground network. This
site has generator back-up. The adjacent site at Marleys Hill has many operators. Primary power supply is from our
rural network which diversifies the source of power to our two main lifeline communication sites. We have replaced
the ‘most at risk’ section of the overhead line supplying Marleys Hill with underground cable. Key operators at the
site have a back-up power supply.
Risk management 265
Post event improvements

Lyttelton Port is an important lifeline site. We are currently negotiating to install an 11kV cable through the road
tunnel to provide an alternative supply to the Port.
We have also installed a cable to allow the airport to be supplied by both Harewood and Hawthornden zone
substations. This dual feed improves security of supply to the airport, an important lifeline site.
6.7.2 Earthquake
Although we have had several significant earthquakes and thousands of aftershocks during 2010/11, there still
remains a 1 in 123 chance that an M8 earthquake on the Alpine Fault will occur in any year.
Liquefaction hazard evaluation

In 1998 we engaged Soils and Foundations (geotechnical consulting engineers) to evaluate the liquefaction hazard
at key substation sites. Based on knowledge of local ground conditions, the following sites were selected as
potentially sitting on liquefiable material: Addington GXP, Bromley GXP and Armagh, Dallington, Heathcote, Milton,
Portman, and Lancaster zone substations.
The Engineers estimated the most severe damage due to liquefaction would be failure of the substation building
foundations, towers and associated structures. A less severe, but more likely, cause of damage is post-earthquake
settlement. The potential for liquefaction-related damage is summarised in the following table.
Table 6-7a Orion sites – Relative liquefaction potential and related damage
Liquefaction susceptibility
Zone Potential for Potential for settlement
substation 150 year 450 year 1,000 year foundation failure induced damage
Armagh Medium Medium Medium Unlikely Unlikely
Dallington Low Medium Medium Unlikely Unlikely
Heathcote Medium Medium Medium/High Unlikely Possible
Lancaster Medium/High Medium/High Medium/High Possible Likely
Milton Medium Medium Medium/High Possible Unlikely
Papanui High High High Possible Likely
Portman Medium/High Medium/High Medium/High Unlikely Unlikely
Note that the earthquake events used to assess the probability of liquefaction hazard in the study were taken from
the seismicity model developed by Elder et al in 1991 and subsequently amended in 1993.
During the 2010/2011 earthquakes liquefaction occurred at our Brighton and Pages 66kV zone substations. Both
these substations have since been decommissioned and a replacement substation built (Rawhiti) at a site that did
not suffer liquefaction. No damaging liquefaction occurred at any of our other zone substations.
Substation seismic risk evaluation

We engaged consultants to evaluate substation seismic risk in 1995. A sample of 30 network substations was
chosen (by the consultants) from a possible 528 to determine structural ability to withstand a moderate-to-severe
earthquake. A seismic risk assessment report was prepared. This report showed that significant improvement in
seismic performance could be achieved by internally strengthening the substations. A generic strengthening
system was developed for a typical pre-1965 substation and we have now strengthened these substations. All
network substations were graded on their importance in the network and we used this grading to prioritise the
strengthening work. Strengthening work was substantially completed in 2008. During the 2010/2011 earthquakes
minor superficial damage occurred, however no catastrophic failures (as seen in similarly constructed buildings)
occurred.
Kiosk substations are likely to survive a moderate earthquake because the transformers are connected to flexible
cables and can’t move far because of the kiosk housing. Most transformers have metal cable boxes over the high
voltage bushings that should protect them from impact damage. A severe earthquake may cause more substantial
damage; several kiosks sank or developed a lean due to liquefaction in the 2010/2011 earthquakes.
We expect most cables to cope well in an earthquake, although damage can be expected where cables are
stretched due to ground movement. Damage to the overhead reticulation system should be easily repaired.
266 Risk management
6.7.3 Flooding
In general our distribution network is not exposed to any great flooding risk. Flooding in excess of 800mm above
foundation level would be required before catastrophic failure of most high voltage equipment would occur.
Events such as the August 1992 storm, its associated snow melt and high spring tides have already shown the
network is quite robust, with only localised flooding around substations close to the Heathcote and Avon rivers. It
would be possible, where localised flooding deeper than 800mm occurs, to electrically isolate substations as needed
before electrical equipment is significantly damaged. Our control centre on the first floor of our Wairakei Rd site is
not considered a flood risk.
6.7.4 Snowfall
The last big snow storm in June 2006 disrupted power supplies to some consumers on our network for up to six
days. The storm was generally considered a 1-in-20 year event with localised areas considered a 1-in-50 year
event. Approximately 60% of individual outages during the storm were related to trees affecting our overhead line.
After we restored all power we engaged an independent consultancy to review our line design and construction
practices. The review also looked at our efforts to restore power and suggested enhancements we could make to
reduce the effects of further storms.
The review showed that our current standards were adequate, however some weaknesses were determined in the
existing network. As a result approximately 150 sections of line were identified with more than 10 poles in a row
without a strong point. We have now installed additional stays on these line sections.
6.7.5 Wind
Wind damage is considered a high risk to our overhead line network. The most devastating winds in Canterbury
have been from the northwest. History has shown that lines crossing this wind direction suffer more damage than
others. Northwest windstorms have caused major damage in our rural area, however the city urban area is less
affected. Trees falling and flying debris cause most damage and repairs usually cannot be made until the wind
subsides to a safe level.
6.7.6 Tsunami
In light of recent world events we are reviewing our risk in this area. New information available from the emergency
management group suggests a number of scenarios will determine the effect a tsunami will have on our network.
Risk management 267
6.8 Asset failure

We analyse our exposure to asset failure by assessing individual key assets based on known past performance.
Asset life for electrical distribution equipment is very difficult to predict because data on actual life expectancy is
limited for most assets. In the absence of hard information we make judgments based on perceived trends and our
experience of what happens in practice.
Modern testing technology such as partial discharge testing has minimised the risk of asset failure, especially
within switchgear. This has helped with end-of-life planning and asset replacement. Further work is underway to
establish a history of failure modes for other assets to help minimise risk and establish end-of-life planning.
6.8.1 Administration building

In early to mid 2010 we reviewed our administration building in Manchester St. We found that the building did not
meet the requirements of a Level 4 ‘lifelines’ standard. In August 2010 the Orion board gave it’s ‘in principal’
approval for us to construct a new purpose-built building which would satisfy our lifeline requirements.
Initially our administration building performed well in the 4 September and Boxing Day earthquakes in 2010,
suffering only minor damage. However in the February 2011 earthquake the damage was so extensive that we had
to evacuate the building immediately. We occupied a circa 1930 building on our Armagh site until the end of May
2013.
The Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Authority (CERA) have now acquired our site for the rebuild of the
Christchurch CBD to form part of a green “frame”. The site was compulsorily acquired under the provisions of the
Canterbury Earthquake Recovery Act.
Our earlier planning had already located a suitable alternative site at the airport end of Wairakei Rd (No.565). This
site was purchased, and a Level 4 “lifelines” (IL4) compliant building was constructed and ready for occupation in
June 2013. This site meets all our accommodation and operational requirements for the short term.
Risk review
We also reviewed the environmental risks associated with the Wairakei Rd site. The risks assessed included
seismic events, flooding from the Waimakariri River, localised weather events (rain, wind and snow), tsunami and
land movement (slips and subsidence). In addition we looked at the likelihood and consequences of fire within the
building.
Our conclusion was that the Wairakei Rd site was appropriate for our requirements and that the IL4 building
standard dealt with many of the risks we identified. We will also develop contingency hot-sites at some distance
from our main site.
6.8.2 66kV cable network

The most significant risk of catastrophic asset failure is in our 66kV oil-filled cables. Unsatisfactory joint systems
connect the aluminium conductors of each section of cable. Thermal expansion of conductors during load cycling
can cause buckling and excessive core movement within the joints. We engaged an international consultancy to
help quantify the risk across the various cable types and sizes.
We instigated a joint replacement programme that prioritised the joints most at risk. The joints were replaced as
quickly as is practicable, consistent with available resources and the need to avoid undue stress on neighbouring
cables during the relatively long outages required. This programme to replace all of the at-risk joints was
completed in 2010.
Our 66kV cables to Brighton and Dallington zone substations were damaged and subsequently abandoned after the
2010/2011 earthquakes. The Dallington cable has been replaced by a temporary overhead line and Brighton zone
substation has been decommissioned. Installation of new cables to replace the damaged ones is mostly completed.
These cables use different routes to spread the risk of damage.
6.8.3 Ripple system

We use the ripple system to control load and limit maximum demand and therefore reduce the need for network
investment. Risk of ripple plant failure, which could result in loss of network peak load control, is addressed
through system spares. Our decision to replace the existing 66kV injection system with multiple independent 11kV
plants has significantly reduced risk as plants can provide back-up to each other.
268 Risk management
While we own and control the ripple injection plants, the ripple receivers, which actually control load at consumers’
premises, were sold to the retailers in late 1998 when distribution and retailing were split into separate businesses.
This introduced significant risk. If retailers choose not to install or maintain ripple receivers we may progressively
lose control over system peak load. This would result in an increase of up to 15% in maximum demand and we
would need to invest more heavily in our network.
To counter this risk, our contracts with retailers enable us to continue to control network system load using the
ripple control system with existing ripple control receivers. We also introduced a mandatory requirement from 1
April 2007 that existing ripple receivers must be maintained and all new connections must have a ripple receiver, or
its equivalent, to enable us to control any available suitable controllable load, such as an electric water-heater, at
least in an emergency.
Our pricing structure also encourages retailers to continue to install and maintain existing ripple control receivers.
6.8.4 Distribution management (DMS) system

Our DMS with its integrated SCADA module is a key tool for monitoring and operating our electricity network assets
in real time. Through alarms it notifies of potential or actual equipment failure. The DMS can be used to view the
electrical state of devices and is invaluable in diagnosing faults and delivering solutions to network related
problems.
The DMS aggregates and interprets incoming data which is accessed from throughout our network using software
located on an array of servers. Loss of the DMS and SCADA system could significantly reduce our ability to detect,
diagnose and respond to important network events.
In addition to warranty and maintenance agreements that provide software and systems support, the system is
made fault tolerant through the use of backup hardware and communications routing. Multiple identical servers
are configured at independent sites with databases mirrored between them. In the event that any of these servers
fail, the DMS will continue to operate. All servers must be lost for the system to fail completely.
Future work will focus on communications lines to remote field devices, which currently have single points of
failure will be able to be routed to both server sites in the future.
Risk management 269
6.9 Mitigation measures

6.9.1 Procedures and plans
We mitigate risk on several fronts, starting with plans and procedures to handle events beyond our control, and
work practices and systems to prevent events within our control from occurring. In particular we:
 inspect assets and identify risks, using maintenance programmes, before they become a problem, which allows
time to engineer measures to minimise or remove the risk of failure
 introduce modern technical monitoring systems to give early warning of imminent failure
 use design standards and technical specifications to maintain a high degree of integrity in the construction and
maintenance of our network (these are detailed under the individual assets in section 4 – Lifecycle asset
management)
 we closely manage contracts and audit construction to enforce these standards and specifications
 regularly train and certify staff and contractors in the correct procedures to access the network in a safe
manner that does not compromise either staff or the network
 have operational procedures that enable us to respond promptly to electricity outages caused by a wide range of
emergencies, as part of our routine operations. These include plans to address oil spills
 have contingency plans and emergency procedures for disaster training that will assist in the event of a major
system disruption. These plans include:
 Contingency plan – natural event/equipment failure – NW20.40.01
This plan covers:
i. activating the plan
ii. notification of senior management
iii. priority of restoration (preservation of life)
iv. the roles of personnel associated with the plan
v. customer communication
vi. preliminary action on notice of a tsunami.
 Contingency plan – supply of emergency generators – NW20.40.02

This plan covers:
i. activating the plan
ii. notification of senior management
iii. priority of restoration (preservation of life)
iv. generators owned by Orion
v. consumer-owned embedded generation
vi. details of generator hire companies.
 Contingency plan – loss of supply to the CBD, zone substations and GXPs – NW20.40.03
This plan contains site specific information for the Christchurch CBD and each of our zone substations. It
provides:
i. low, medium or high risk grading for each zone substation
ii. details of major plant installed
iii. details of specific problems
iv. some restoration options.
 Security of supply - Participant outage plan – NW20.40.09

This plan supersedes our Contingency Plan - Rolling Outages (NW20.40.04) and was created to comply with
the Electricity Commission’s Security of Supply Outage Plan.
The procedures outlined in the plan are in response to major generation shortages and/or significant
transmission constraints. Typical scenarios include unusually low inflows into hydro-generation facilities,
loss of multiple thermal generating stations or multiple transmission failures.
270 Risk management
The main energy saving measure listed is rolling outages and how these are structured and implemented is
discussed. How an event is declared and how the Electricity Authority should communicate its requests are
also detailed.
Under the regulations, participant outage plans (POP) are required to specify the actions that would be taken
to:
i. reduce electricity consumption when requested by the Electricity Authority
ii. comply with requirements of the Electricity Authority’s Security of Supply Outage Plan
iii. comply with Electricity Industry (Enforcement) Regulations 2010
iv. supplement the Electricity Authority’s Security of Supply Outage Plan.
Reducing demand by disconnecting supply to customers would be a last resort after all other forms of
savings including voluntary savings had been exhausted. Orion will always endeavour to keep supply on to
customers.
 Disconnection of demand as required by the Electricity Authority rules – NW20.40.05

The purpose of this plan is to mitigate the effects of manual disconnection and demand shedding at points of
connection as required by the Electricity Authority Rules through:
i. maintaining an up-to-date process to disconnect demand for points of connection, including the
provision to Transpower System Operator of a feeder priority based on a ‘regional or GXP
emergency requiring demand shedding’
ii. assisting Transpower with their automatic under frequency load shedding by providing a schedule
of our preferred locations
iii. assisting Transpower with automatic under voltage load shedding for upper South Island (Zone 3)
transmission constraints by providing a schedule of Orion’s preferred locations
iv. Providing blocks of load to Transpower for emergency demand shedding.
6.9.2 Engineering measures

We have implemented the mitigation measures outlined below.
We have engaged an emergency contractor to manage distribution equipment spares and provide adequate
response to any event on our network. Emergency equipment is stored in a secure environment and we carry out
regular audits of stock availability and security. This process is driven by a risk analysis of the possible failure of
specific equipment. The spares held support the contingency plans in place to meet our security standard. We hold
complete units of some equipment if it is no longer supported by the manufacturer.
Structural checks are ongoing to ensure network installations are structurally sound and have adequate hold-down
provisions should an earthquake occur. Those buildings and structures found in need of strengthening are the
subject of strengthening programmes detailed in section 4 – Lifecycle asset management.
We have installed oil containment bunds at sites that hold oil in excess of 1,500 litres. This limits the possibility of
oil entering the environment. These sites are also inspected regularly. More appropriate methods exist other than
to install bunds for sites with oil volumes below 1,500 litres.
Excessive differential ground settlement during an earthquake could damage our 66kV cables. Bridges have been
identified as the locations with the greatest risk of this settlement. We have investigated the bridges and reinforced
them or taken alternative measures to reduce our dependency on the affected cables.
Installation of a new 11kV ripple system to replace the existing overloaded 66kV plants was completed in 2004.
We are committed to on-going contracts to inspect, test and maintain key assets. These contracts are identified in
section 4 – Lifecycle asset management.
Risk management 271
6.9.3 Avoiding major supply failure

The plans and processes in the preceding section are designed to manage a wide range of identified risks associated
with our day-to-day business of delivering electricity safely and efficiently to all our consumer connections.
There is another class of event – major outage causing huge economic damage (MOCHED) event – that would cause
huge economic losses to our consumer base and the community because of its unexpected occurrence. The cause
could be a major storm, earthquake or multiple failure of major network assets.
Examples include the Canterbury earthquakes and the 1998 failure of the 110kV subtransmission cables that supply
Auckland’s CBD. In the Auckland case, a network with an apparent N-2 security standard sustained a complete
failure of four main cables (i.e. N-4 failure), leaving the CBD with severely restricted power supply for many weeks.
To avoid this form of ‘cascade plant failure’ we need all the above elements of good asset rating and condition
knowledge, clear operational and monitoring rules and an inventory of key emergency spares, along with good
operational contingency and system security planning.
Our main network plant failure modes which we consider could lead to a MOCHED situation have been identified as:
(a) Major subtransmission 66kV cable failure leading to loss of supply from two or more urban zone substations
In most cases N-2 failures in the urban network can be managed with pre-prepared emergency switching
plans. This off-loads the affected major zone substation using our existing interconnected 11kV primary
distribution network. In times of very high peak system loading it could be necessary to shed all water-
heating load, plus additional load, to manage these events within the remaining available capacity.
However, if an event occurs that causes outages to more than two major 66kV subtransmission feeders, the
potential of more serious overload and potential plant damage to the remaining 66kV cables increases. A
66kV cable failure has a relatively long repair time (up to one week for oil filled cables).
In our network the most likely cause of this type of failure is electrical failure of the joints or terminations of
66kV oil-filled cables due to heat from high power loadings (see section 6.7.1).
Because most 66kV oil-filled cables are laid as pairs separated by only 600mm, it is also likely that physical
damage to the cables could arise from road excavation work or severe differential settlement of the
surrounding ground due to earthquake.
Multiple failures of cable terminations at GXPs could also cause outages to two or more urban substations.
Repair times for this type of failure would be two or three weeks, due to the complexity and resource
requirements involved in repairing oil-filled cable plant.
(b) Multiple major transformer failures
The failure of one urban zone substation transformer (typically 20–40MVA capacity) is not necessarily a major
problem as all such substations have two transformers with dual rating to cope with this type of contingency.
However, if both transformers became unavailable for extended periods (N-2 contingency) then the potential
for overloading adjacent substations and possibly losing additional customer load is significantly increased,
especially during winter peak load periods. Transformer repair times can be weeks or many months.
The main reason for operating with less than two zone substation transformers is to carry out planned
maintenance. We have an on-going programme to undertake half-life maintenance of major transformers to
ensure that their expected life can be fully realised. This process involves removing the transformers from
site to a suitable maintenance workshop for three to six months depending on their condition. We could thus
be subject to a higher risk of interruption to supply from faults on the remaining ‘in-service’ transformers
during this half-life maintenance period.
The most likely causes of a transformer fault are high loadings, lightning strikes or high fault currents
resulting in either mechanical or electrical breakdown, causing tap-changer, or winding failure. Mal-
operation of cooling equipment or overloading can also contribute to excessive temperature rise and
subsequent over temperature protection trip operation.
Avoiding cascade failure of major transformers is therefore dependent on good understanding of their
capability and condition, as well as co-ordinating their extended maintenance with other major plant outages.
The mere act of removing transformers from service for extended periods requires careful management, as
it is in itself a significant risk factor.
Earthquake damage could also cause common mode multiple transformer failures on our network and at
Transpower grid exit points.
272 Risk management
(c) Switchgear
Catastrophic failure of high voltage switchgear units (66, 33 or 11kV) can cause a complete section of busbar
to fail, either by associated collateral physical damage from explosions or extensive conductive combustion
products shorting out internal busbars.
Cascade failures involving multiple busbar sections are rare in our network due to the physical partitioning of
switchgear in separate fire-rated compartments (e.g. indoor 11kV switchgear), therefore the consequence of
failure is generally lower than that for major cables and transformers.
Repair time for switchgear failures are generally also a lot less than for major cables and transformers (i.e.
12 – 24 hours) however there is still potential for a MOCHED situation.
Earthquake damage to 66kV and 33kV outdoor switchgear and structures is also a potential common mode
failure for both Orion and Transpower substations.
6.9.4 Mitigation of major supply failure

Our main mitigation strategies and initiatives to avoid a MOCHED situation from the three main plant failure modes
described above are:
 We have replaced all at risk 66kV oil-filled cable joints with newly designed joints that will withstand thermo-
mechanical buckling forces. We will continue to inspect the other manufacturer’s joints (Dianichi) that are
assessed to be low-risk. They will be replaced on a case-by-case basis following inspections of their condition.
 In association with the joint renewal programme we are retrofitting cable joints and known hot spots with
thermocouple thermometers connected to our SCADA system. This will enable cable temperature operating
limits to be closely monitored especially in times of emergency.
 Careful co-ordination of work plans for any cable joint replacement and transformer half-life overhauls to avoid
excessive risk and a potential cascade failure due to exceeding plant capacity.
 The purchase of two spare transformers so that our zone substations are not left for extended periods with only
one in-service transformer while transformer half-life overhauls are carried out.
 We cover-off general 11kV switchgear failures by deploying system emergency spares, largely from stock.
 If multiple 66kV oil-filled cables fail, our plan is to assess the repair times and compare time and costs with the
construction of temporary 66kV overhead lines. Such lines would be constructed on public roads and run parallel
with the faulted cable sections where feasible. Feasible routes servicing the CBD have been assessed. Standard
construction designs would be implemented.
 Buildings that house a 66kV zone substation transformer have been modified to allow the roof to be removed for
bushing type connection to any emergency 66kV lines.
 We ensure that our network has sufficient capacity to restore supply for N-2 events on our subtransmission
network. This is necessary because, unlike Transpower’s overhead tower lines that have a relatively short repair
time, our 33 and 66kV oil-filled cables may require up to a week to repair. During that time an undersized (N-1)
network is exposed to high loads which increase the chance of further failures. By providing N-2 capacity we
reduce the risk of cascade failure during cable repair. In the event that further failure does occur, supply can be
restored using the N-2 security assets.
 N-2 contingency plans for switching load away from zone substations are in place and arrangements to maximise
the use of existing customer-owned standby diesel generators and obtain additional ones have been identified.
 We make significant efforts to understand and access all reasonable and prudent emergency ratings of existing in
-service plant.
 We hold one major transformer emergency spare for each of our standard ratings and voltages.
 Our extensive power system modelling software and applications can assist in understanding resultant power
flows and avoid excessive loadings of network elements caused by network configuration changes. This capability
also assists in mitigating plant failure due to excess loading.
 Earthquake damage has potential to cause significant damage to multiple major Orion substations and
Transpower GXPs. Our risk mitigation to date has targeted network substation building strengthening and
diversity of supply through improved interconnection between such substations and grid exit points over time.
Risk management 273
 We have minimised the risk of major zone substation 11kV switchgear failure through assessing switchgear
condition and the importance of each site to network security. On this basis, we have now replaced switchgear
at Armagh, Fendalton, Grimseys Winters and Milton zone substations.
 Implemented a network management system (PowerOn) so that restoration of supply through switching can be
undertaken quickly and safely. This also enables us to prioritise works efficiently.
6.9.5 Historic examples

The following two examples of network failure illustrate the above strategies and initiatives being applied in the
past.
Heathcote N-2
In 2004, an N-2 transformer contingency at Heathcote zone substation caused loss of supply to 25MW. We avoided
an extended outage of approximately six hours and restored supply in 40 minutes because of the following
mitigation measures:
 our network was built to meet an appropriate N-2 security standard
 we had completed asset capability modelling of the surrounding network and loaded the network capability
ratings into our SCADA system
 pre-contingency load flow modelling complete and N-2 contingency plans pre-written.
Sockburn/Middleton N-2
In 2006 an N-2 cable contingency on the Sockburn/Middleton 33kV subtransmission feeders caused a loss of supply
to 15MW. We avoided a cascade failure of remaining assets that could have caused outages of several days and
restored supply within two hours because of the following mitigation measures:
 our network built to meet an appropriate N-2 security standard
 we reduced load to ratings established through asset capability modelling to avoid cascade failure of the
remaining 33kV feeder. It took slightly longer to restore power using 11kV feeders, but we chose not to risk
extended outages through potential cascade failures of the 33kV subtransmission network
 pre-contingency load flow modelling was complete and N-2 contingency plans were pre-written.
6.9.6 Insurance
The following mitigation measures are in place:
 Our material damage insurance policy insures us against accidental physical loss or damage to buildings, plant,
equipment, zone and network substation buildings and contents and is based on assessed replacement
values. This policy does not extend to include our overhead lines and underground cables. Earthquake cover is
restricted to a maximum claim of $100m for material damage and business interruption with a 10% deductible
per site.
 Our business interruption insurance policy which indemnifies us for a reduction in our electricity network
delivery revenues and/or increased costs of working as a consequence of an insured loss to our assets as above
is for an indemnity period of 12 months.
 Contractors that work for us are required to arrange appropriate insurance for the work being undertaken,
giving cover for:
i. third party liabilities
ii. contract works
iii. plant and equipment
iv. motor vehicle third party.
274 Risk management
Financial 275
Financial 7
7.1.1 Opex budgets - network 277
7.1.2 Opex budgets - non network 278
7.1.3 Capex budgets - network 278
7.1.4 Capex budgets - non network 278
7.1.5 Capital contributions income 278
7.1.6 Capex budgets - major GXP projects 279
7.1.7 Urban reinforcement budgets 279
7.1.8 Rural and total reinforcement budgets 280
7.1.9 Replacement budgets 281
7.1.10 Urban major project budgets 282
7.1.11 Rural major project budgets 283
7.1.12 Transpower spur assets, indicative cost to purchase 284
7.1.13 Transpower new investment agreement buyouts 285
7.1.14 Transpower new investment agreement charges 285
7.2 Changes from our previous forecasts 286
276 Financial

7-1.1 Opex budgets - network 277
7-1.2 Opex budgets - non network 278
7-1.3 Capex budgets - network 278
7-1.4 Capex budgets - non network 278
7-1.5 Capital contributions income 278
7-1.6 Major GXP projects 279
7-1.7 Urban reinforcement budgets 279
7-1.8 Rural and total reinforcement budgets 280
7-1.9 Replacement budgets 281

7-1.10 Urban major project budgets 282
7-1.11 Rural major project budgets 283
7-1.12 Transpower spur assets, indicative cost to purchase 284
7-1.13 Transpower new investment agreement buyouts 285

7-1.14 Transpower new investment agreement charges 285
Financial 277
7.1 Financial forecasts

Our forecasts are based on network opex and capex programmes and projects as detailed in sections 4 and 5.
All figures in section 7.1 are in ‘real’ (FY15) dollar terms. Appendix A has the same tables, reworked to include
general CPI inflation and other cost escalators.
Changes described in these budgets are referenced to our last published AMP for the period from 1 April 2013 to 31
March 2023.
No provisions have been made in the forecasts for inflation but a $1.5m contingency provision has been added to
the opex estimates. This contingency provision covers future unknowns such as:
 further regulatory compliance costs
 road authority access costs
 additional worker and public safety compliance costs
 additional uncertainty around land access
 uncertainty associated with the local impact of economic growth, for example the proposed Central Plains Water
irrigation scheme
 uncertainty associated with Environment Canterbury’s clean air requirements.
7.1.1 Opex budgets - network
Table 7-1.1 Opex budgets - network - $000
Category FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24
Subtransmission overhead lines 2,045 1,590 1,695 1,695 1,695 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680 1,680
11kV overhead lines 4,105 4,310 3,655 3,655 4,105 4,105 4,060 3,655 3,655 4,105
400V overhead lines 4,585 4,790 4,055 4,055 3,605 3,605 3,605 4,055 4,055 3,605
Earths 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245 245
Subtransmission underground cables 1,175 1,195 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175 1,175
11kV underground cables 2,510 2,875 2,510 2,510 2,510 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340 2,340
400V underground cables 2,500 2,825 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500
Mapping and asset information 565 570 460 460 460 460 460 460 460 460
Storms 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230 230
Meters 70 70 70 70 70 70 70 140 140 140
Protection 520 560 520 510 510 510 510 510 510 510
Communication cables 290 305 290 290 290 290 290 290 290 290
Communication systems 740 720 725 725 725 785 725 725 725 725
Control systems 695 765 695 735 695 735 695 735 695 735
Load management 365 355 550 550 475 475 475 475 475 475
Switchgear 2,610 2,065 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180 1,180
Transformers 1,405 1,445 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,405 1,405
Substations 805 815 805 465 465 465 465 465 465 465
Buildings and enclosures 2,415 2,105 1,675 1,675 1,675 1,675 1,675 1,675 1,675 1,675
Grounds 660 590 590 590 590 590 590 590 590 590
Generators (fixed) 265 515 195 205 205 205 205 205 205 205
Asset storage 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 445 445
Sub totals 29,245 29,385 25,670 25,370 25,255 25,170 25,025 25,180 25,140 25,180
Contingency 0 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500 1,500
Grand totals 29,245 30,885 27,170 26,870 26,755 26,670 26,525 26,680 26,640 26,680
Grand totals from 1 April 2013 AMP 28,222 29,135 26,656 26,285 26,380 26,184 26,184 26,143 26,142 n/a
278 Financial
7.1.2 Opex budgets - non network

Table 7-1.2 Opex budgets - non network - $000
System operations and network support 15,845 15,940 15,983 16,014 15,963 15,898 15,943 15,925 15,935 15,947
Business support 14,672 14,549 14,806 14,814 14,902 14,495 14,476 14,477 14,499 14,481
Totals 30,517 30,489 30,789 30,828 30,865 30,393 30,419 30,402 30,434 30,428
7.1.3 Capex budgets - network

Table 7-1.3 Capex budgets - network - $000
Consumer connections/Network extensions 13,100 13,400 12,300 10,900 10,400 10,400 10,400 10,400 10,400 10,400
Reinforcement 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500
Underground conversions 1,500 5,500 3,300 1,250 750 750 750 750 750 750
Major projects 14,005 38,580 21,540 18,985 6,520 37,015 8,335 4,410 8,820
Replacement 27,785 27,395 26,345 24,190 24,200 23,915 22,905 24,900 24,650 23,780
Transpower spur asset indicative purchase values 8,840 15,570 2,610 800
Transpower new investment agreement buyouts* 980 1,470 75
Capital works carry-over** 13,015
Totals 83,725 106,415 70,670 60,625 46,370 76,580 46,890 44,960 49,120 39,430
Totals from 1 April 2013 AMP 102,578 83,193 65,010 67,243 50,249 80,496 49,237 56,178 42,529 n/a
*Note: These are finance leases already on our RAB and therefore excluded from schedule 11 appendices
**Note: This applies to approved projects from the previous AMP that are underway and will be completed in this AMP period
7.1.4 Capex budgets - non network
Table 7-1.4 Capex budgets - non network - $000
Sundry land and buildings 400 330 330 310 310 310 310 310 310 310
Vehicles and mobile plant 503 949 650 933 841 629 480 509 795 1,139
Information solutions 998 1,965 598 737 1,552 1,042 799 886 1,284 674
Sundry tools and equipment 527 561 426 371 416 561 326 371 366 321
Capex totals 2,428 3,805 2,004 2,351 3,119 2,542 1,915 2,076 2,755 2,444
Less disposals:
Sundry equipment 99 248 180 283 266 195 172 165 171 350
Totals 2,329 3,557 1,824 2,068 2,853 2,347 1,743 1,911 2,584 2,094
7.1.5 Capital contributions income
Table 7-1.5 Capital contributions income - $000
Underground conversions (2,250) (3,080) (1,980) (955) (555) (555) (555) (555) (555) (555)
Consumer connections/Network extensions (1,621) (1,621) (1,333) (1,333) (1,333) (1,333) (1,333) (1,333) (1,333) (1,333)
Major projects (1,865) (1,353) (1,505)
Totals (3,871) (6,566) (4,666) (3,793) (1,888) (1,888) (1,888) (1,888) (1,888) (1,888)
Financial 279
7.1.6 Major GXP projects (non capex)*

Table 7-1.6 Major GXP projects - $000
Addington metering relocation 560
Hororata 66kV bay for Hororata substation 615

Hororata 66kV bay for Hororata-Creyke line 615
Totals 560 615 615
*Note: Treated as finance leases and added to RAB and schedule 11 appendices
7.1.7 Urban reinforcement budgets

Table 7-1.7 Urban reinforcement budgets - $000
Project FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18
50 Lyttelton cable stage 1 525
565 Wigram reinforcement: Wigram Rd feeder 155
646 Waimakariri Rd feeders 775
789 Sockburn feeder upgrade 340
810 Shands zone substation switchgear 100
485 Addington-Fielding St circuit 25
635 Smart meter trial 250
685 Tyrone St reinforcement 135
687 Awatea reinforcement stage 2 470
792 Pages Rd switchgear 30
809 Jessons Rd switchgear 75
682 Hickory Pl cable 290
785 Hayton Rd reconfiguration 25
788 Travis Rd reinforcement 110
801 Shands Rd reinforcement 150
807 Aidanfield Dr cable 165
802 Prestons Rd reinforcement stage 3 270
Urban reinforcement totals 1,945 1,425 1,070 270
For details of individual projects see section 5.6.8 – 11kV urban reinforcement projects.
280 Financial
7.1.8 Rural and total reinforcement budgets
Table 7-1.8 Rural and total reinforcement budgets - $000
Project FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18
642 Frasers Rd - Annat reinforcement 140
698 Central Plains Water canal pumps 900
790 Leeston reinforcement 10
663 Darfield Township reinforcement from Kimberley 540
791 West Melton cable 350
806 Gerald St Lincoln cable 110
808 Edward St Lincoln cables 560
803 Lincoln feeders (Weedons Rd) 550
Rural reinforcement totals 1,450 1,960 640 950
Urban reinforcement totals 1,945 1,425 1,070 270
General
196 Non scheduled reinforcement 1000 1000 1000 1000
205 Non identified reinforcement 105 115 1,790 2,280
Reinforcement grand totals 4,500 4,500 4,500 4,500
Grand totals from 1 April 2013 AMP 4,939 4,939 4,939 4,939
For details of individual projects see section 5.6.9 – 11kV rural reinforcement projects.
Financial 281
7.1.9 Replacement budgets
Table 7-1.9 Replacement budgets - $000
66kV overhead lines 300 0 0 0 2,280 0 0 2,280 0 0
33kV overhead lines 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400 400
11kV overhead lines 2,335 2,335 2,335 2,335 2,335 2,335 2,335 2,335 2,335 2,335
400V overhead lines 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525 525
66kV underground cables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
33kV underground cables 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
11kV underground cables 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300 1,300
400V underground cables 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900 900
Meters 180 180 260 155 155 210 155 210 155 155
Protection 2,045 2,105 1,920 2,080 2,055 2,460 2,340 2,320 2,675 2,870
Communication cables 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235 235
Communication systems 800 850 770 670 630 630 670 670 670 670
Control systems 1,320 870 1,120 1,140 970 625 755 625 675 825
Asset management systems 890 50 820 895 50 50 125 50 50 125
Load management 175 850 1,550 1,025 675 375 705 205 375 205
Switchgear 11,035 11,815 10,880 9,500 8,920 11,100 9,690 10,075 11,585 10,465
Transformers 4,225 3,225 2,225 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925
Substations 290 490 340 340 340 340 340 340 340 340
Buildings and enclosures 830 1,265 765 765 505 505 505 505 505 505
Generators (fixed) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Replacement totals 27,785 27,395 26,345 24,190 24,200 23,915 22,905 24,900 24,650 23,780
Totals from 1 April 2013 AMP 25,640 27,914 27,574 24,985 26,516 26,632 25,923 25,558 25,644 n/a
282 Financial
7.1.10 Urban major project budgets
Table 7-1.10 Urban major project budgets - $000
521 Land acquisition for Marshland substation 700
794 Papanui to Waimakariri 66kV link 6,345
332 Moffett substation replace 33kV feeders 215
634 Belfast diesel generation - Stage 1 1,295
650 Rawhiti to Marshland 66kV link 12,805
651 Marshland to Waimakariri 66kV link 13,025
694 Land acquisition for Milton 66kV switchroom 500
721 Land acquisition for Shands 66kV switchyard 100
722 Land acquisition for Hoon Hay 66kV switchyard 200
723 Milton 66kV switchgear for Lancaster cable 4,410
727 Lancaster 66kV switchgear for Milton cable 810
589 Lancaster to Milton 66kV link 3,415
669 Shands substation convert to 66kV 6,545
778 Bromley substation replace 66kV bay 140 365
488 Marshland substation 6,465
541 Hawthornden substation 66kV T-off 1,485
491 McFaddens to Marshland 66kV link 6,730
522 Yaldhurst substation 5,710
617 McFaddens 66kV switchgear stage 2 405
692 Marshland substation 66kV switchgear 405
416 Prebbleton substation stage 2 580
417 Shands 33kV tee to Prebbleton 825
707 Shands substation 66kV Stage 2 765
Major urban project totals 12,355 33,360 10,325 10,370 0 13,250 1,405 0 765
Major rural project totals 1,650 5,220 11,215 8,615 6,520 23,765 6,930 4,410 8,055
Grand totals 14,005 38,580 21,540 18,985 6,520 37,015 8,335 4,410 8,820
Totals from 1 April 2013 AMP 38,227 19,731 14,479 24,183 6,848 36,979 6,429 13,735 0 n/a
For details of individual projects see section 5.6.6 – Major urban projects.
Financial 283
7.1.11 Rural major project budgets

Table 7-1.11a Rural major project budgets - $000
361 Teddington transformer upgrade 775
500 Land acquisition for Burnham 66kV substation 250
697 66kV line to Greenpark zone substation 625
601 Convert Hororata substation to 66/11kV 1,240
666 Porters Village 3,730
671 Castle Hill generators 180
672 Arthurs Pass generators 70
415 Weedons to Highfield tee 66kV line conversion 1,605
528 Land acquisition for Rossendale 66kV substation 250
637 Railway Rd 11kV substation (Westland Milk) 2,705
639 Burnham 66kV substation stage 1 3,890
655 Land acquisition for Creyke 66kV substation 250
699 Dunsandel transformer upgrade 2,415
716 Land acquisition for Southbridge substation 100
114 Convert Highfield substation to 66/11kV 810
306 Annat transformer upgrade 395
580 Darfield to Creyke 66kV line 625
587 Te Pirita 66kV bays 805
654 Land acquisition for Norwood 66kV substation 250
670 Steeles Rd substation 66kV Line 3,010
597 Norwood 66kV substation 3,355
603 Bankside 11kV ripple plant 370
605 Annat 11kV ripple plant 370
626 Norwood to Highfield/Weedons tee 66kV line 2,425
348 Windwhistle 66kV substation 4,650
505 Springston T2 - 66/11kV transformer 1,075
527 Land acquisition for Templeton substation 100
577 Windwhistle to The Point 66kV line 1,925
579 Hororata to Creyke 66kV line upgrade 1,180
581 Highfield to Greendale/Creyke tee 66kV line 1,790
588 Te Pirita to Windwhistle 66kV line 1,065
608 The Point 66kV substation 3,370
703 Creyke to Greendale/Highfield tee 66kV Line 1,010
705 Greendale to Dunsandel/Norwood tee 66kV line 1,830
Continued over page
For details of individual projects see section 5.6.7 – Major rural projects.
284 Financial
Rural major project budgets (continued)
Table 7-1.11b Rural major project budgets - $000
706 Norwood to Greendale/Dunsandel tee 66kV line 1,450
717 Land acquisition for The Point 66kV substation 80
728 Springston 11kV switchroom 750
473 Dunsandel 66kV bay for Norwood line 405
586 Greendale 66kV bay for Hororata line 405
609 Dunsandel to Greendale/Norwood tee 66kV line 1,665
610 Southbridge 66kV substation 3,290
627 Southbridge 66kV line 1,085
720 Land acquisition for Birdlings substation 80
502 Templeton 66kV substation 4,410
447 Greenpark to Motukarara 66kV line conversion 1,590
576 Birdlings 66/33kV substation 4,000
583 Tancred tee to Greenpark 66kV line 650
725 Birdlings to Motukarara 66kV line 1,815
Rural major projects subtotal 1,650 5,220 11,215 8,615 6,520 23,765 6,930 4,410 8,055
For details of individual projects see section 5.6.7 – Major rural projects.
7.1.12 Transpower spur assets, indicative cost to purchase

Table 7-1.12 Transpower spur assets, indicative cost to purchase - $000
Spur asset to be purchased FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24
Bromley 66kV and 11kV 8,800
Addington and Middleton including Islington-Addington 66kV

20 14,000
transmission lines
Castle Hill 66/11kV transformer and 11kV 20 1,530
Hororata 33kV (including 66/33kV transformers) 20 1,130
Arthurs Pass 66/11kV transformer and 11kV 20 1,470
Islington 33kV 10 800
Spur assets total 8,840 15,570 2,610 800
Financial 285
7.1.13 Transpower new investment agreement buyouts

Table 7-1.13 Transpower new investment agreement buyouts - $000
Agreement affected FY15 FY16 FY17 FY18 FY19 FY20 FY21 FY22 FY23 FY24
Springston 66kV upgrade
Bromley 66 and 11kV 980
Middleton 66kV GXP connection 1,470
Hororata 33kV 75
Islington additional 33kV feeder 0
Total 980 1,470 75
7.1.14 Transpower new investment agreement charges
Table 7-1.14 Transpower new investment agreement charges - $000
Islington GXP additional 33kV feeder 32 32 16
Hororata GXP additional 66kV feeder 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
Middleton 66kV GXP connection 86
Islington GXP 66kV bay for Weedons line 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
GXP Metering relocation from Papanui and Springston

126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126 126
to Islington
305 Bromley GXP 220/66kV transformer upgrade 847 847 847 847 847 847 847 847 847 847
632 Hororata GXP 33kV bus alterations 24 24 24 24 24 24 24 24
704 Kimberley GXP 1,188 1,188 1,188 1,188 1,188 1,188 1,188 297
Totals 2,342 2,256 2,240 2,224 2,224 2,224 2,224 1,333 1,012 1,012
Note: Assumes 35 year contracts.
286 Financial
7.2 Changes from our previous forecasts

Changes described in these budgets are referenced to our last published AMP (for the period from 1 April 2013 to 31
March 2023). All forecasts are now in FY14 dollar terms (previously in FY13 dollar terms).
Opex budgets - Network

Details of our maintenance plans are described by asset type in section 4 – Lifecycle asset management.
Our maintenance forecasts are generally consistent with last year’s forecasts.
Capex budgets - Network
ASSET REPLACEMENT
Our replacement plans are described by asset type in section 4 – Lifecycle asset management. In real terms our
overall projections for replacement have reduced slightly over the forecast period.
CONSUMER CONNECTIONS AND NETWORK EXTENSIONS
Our load demand forecasts are detailed in section 5 – Network development. Our network extensions and consumer
connection cost forecasts are based on our current and forecast business and residential growth forecasts. In
general, demand growth has continued to be slow while decisions are finalised regarding earthquake affected land in
the east of the city. Over the next few years we expect connection growth to be high as proposed subdivisions
become available to meet the requirements of people relocated from the east, and development begins in the CBD.
UNDERGROUND CONVERSIONS
Underground conversions are carried out predominantly with road works, at the direction of Selwyn District Council,
Christchurch City Council and/or the New Zealand Transport Agency (NZTA). Costs associated with these works can
vary depending on council or roading authority demands. Currently the Christchurch City Council has indicated they
will not be carrying out undergrounding within the next four years. Selwyn District Council is continuing with its on-
going programme. Undergrounding associated with NZTA projects has currently provided works that have
compensated for the reduction by CCC. We estimate that activity will decrease after the major ‘Roads of National
Significance (RONS)’ Programme is completed by NZTA over the next few years.
REINFORCEMENT
Our reinforcement forecasts have remained steady, at approximately $4.5m per annum, and we expect activity to
remain at this level for the foreseeable future. Our reinforcement forecasts are in section 5 – Network development.
MAJOR PROJECTS
Our major projects have a long term focus and are mainly strategic in nature. The AMP major project list and our
plans for the proposed configuration of our network does not normally change significantly each year but the timing
of projects will often change to reflect the actual rate of load growth.
Our last AMP captured the impact of the earthquakes and hence the configuration and timing of our recovery for the
northern city subtransmission network remains largely unchanged. There is a subtle change to the installation of
Waimakiriri zone substation which reduces costs by approximately $2m in FY15. Also we have delayed the Rawhiti to
Marshland link ($12.8m) to FY16 to better manage workflows. All other urban major projects are largely unchanged
but some adjustments to budgets occur as a result of inflation and small project refinements
In the rural area we have delayed approximately $5m of capital expenditure from FY15 to FY16 including the
upgrades at Hororata and Porter Heights skifield. The Railway Rd 11kV substation (Westland Milk) was delayed from
FY14 to FY17 ($2.7m). There are further project delays later in the 10 year period including Southbridge
(approximately $3.5m from FY18 to FY21) and the Creyke substation and line works (approximately $7m from FY18 to
FY20). There are other minor changes in the 10 year period.
Evaluation of performance 287
8.2 Review of consumer service 289

8.2.1 Review of reliability 289
8.2.2 Least reliable feeders 291
8.2.3 Cause of interruptions 292
8.2.4 Reliability performance comparisons 292
8.3 Efficiency 293

8.3.1 Economic efficiency 293
8.3.2 Capacity utilisation 294
8.3.3 Load factor 294
8.3.4 Losses 294
8.4 Works 297

8.4.1 Expenditure in FY13 297
8.4.2 Project completion status 298
8.5 Safety 299
8.6 Environment 299
8.7 Legislation 299
8.8 Improvement initiatives 300

8.8.1 Subtransmission network 300
8.8.2 Distribution overhead lines 300
8.8.3 Substations 303
8.8.5 Emergency stock 305
8.9 Gap analysis 306

8.9.1 Asset management processes 306
8.9.2 Reliability 307
8.9.3 Security standard 307
288 Evaluation of performance

8-2a SAIDI - Orion network FY92-Current year 290 8-2a Orion network reliability for CY and 5 year average 289
8-2b SAIFI - Orion network FY92-Current year 291 8-2b Service targets and results for network power quality 292
8-2c Least reliable rural feeders CY-5 to CY (SAIDI) 291 8-3a Capacity utilisation results for CY and 5 year average 294
8-2d Cause of interruptions CY-15 to CY 292 8-3b Load factor results for CY and 5 year average 294
8-3a Capex per annum per MWh supplied to consumers 293 8-3c Loss results for CY and 5 year average 294
8-3b Opex per annum per MWh supplied to consumers 293 8-3d Network loss contributors 294
8-3c Opex per annum per ICP 293 8-3e Transformer loss values 295
8-9a AMMAT scores relative to PAS-55 compliance 306 8-3f Underground cable versus overhead line comparison 295
8-4a Project completion status 298
8-5a Personal safety – performance results 299
8-6a Environmental responsibility – performance results 299
8-8b Installation of GFN – reliability savings 303
8.1 Introduction
In this section we review our performance against targets stated in our previous AMP. These targets may be actual
target values as stated in section 3, or a declaration to carry out particular maintenance or reduce risk. We also
include whether or not budgets were met and explain any variances.
Also included is a discussion on some current and future initiatives along with a reliability gap analysis.
8.2 Review of consumer service

8.2.1 Review of reliability
Interruption data recorded in our control centre provides all relevant statistical data needed to calculate our
reliability statistics using the international measures of SAIDI, SAIFI and CAIDI (see the Glossary for a definition of
these measures).
It is important to note that one-off factors such as bad weather and earthquakes can heavily influence the results in
any one year. As shown in the table below, our FY13 SAIDI and SAIFI results were over target. Even though major
emergency repairs are finished, there is still much work ahead of us to build strength back into our network.
Significant infrastructure rebuilding activity in the city will also likely see an increase in damage and disturbance of
our network assets. We expect it will take up to five years to restore our network to near pre-earthquake reliability
levels.
As shown in the following figures, there were heavy snow storms in FY93, FY03 and FY07 that caused major damage
Table 8-2a Orion network actual reliability results for FY13 and last five year average
Category FY13 target FY13 result FY09-FY13 average
SAIDI <59.7 93.8 852
SAIFI <0.78 0.97 1.5
CAIDI <90 97 332
Faults restored within 3 hours (%) >60 66.2 61
Faults/100 circuit-km all voltages <11.0 13.1 13.1

to our network and the most recent major storm (prior to end of FY13) in June 2006 (FY07) caused the loss of some
19 million consumer minutes. Earthquakes in FY11 caused the loss of 718 million consumer minutes.
Figure 8-2a SAIDI - Orion network FY92-FY13
Average number of minutes a consumer is without power per year (SAIDI)
4,200
4,000
3,800
3,600
3,400
3,200
3,000
2,800
2,600
2,400
2,200
2,000
1,800
1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
800
600
400
200
-
Total SAIDI Rural Urban
Figure 8-2b SAIFI - Orion network FY92-FY13
9.0
Average number of interruptions per consumer per year (SAIFI)
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
-
Urban Rural Total SAIFI
8.2.2 Least reliable feeders

Our network has 94 rural and 336 urban 11kV feeders that originate from our zone substations.
The 10 least reliable feeders on our rural network are shown below. All of these feeders were adversely affected by
the June 2006 snow storm and some were also affected by the earthquakes in FY11.
Figure 8-2c Orion’s 10 least reliable rural feeders FY09-FY13 (SAIDI) (unplanned interruptions only)
Rural Feeder Average
Hills Rd 113 Southbridge
Brookside 123 Irwell
Duvauchelle 123 Eastern Bays
Duvauchelle 124 Wainui
Highfield 114 Highfield Rd N
Springston 113 Waterholes
Hororata 112 Hororata (Bealey)
Weedons 112 Women’s Prison
Hororata 113 Hartnells Rd
Weedons 122 Weedons Ross Rd No.376
0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600 1,800 2,000 2,200 2,400
FY09-FY13 Average SAIDI FY13
Average minutes lost per consumer per annum (SAIDI)
8.2.3 Cause of interruptions

The chart below compares the cause of consumer minutes lost per annum on our network over the 15 year period
FY99 to FY13 against the most recent year (FY13).
Where plant-failure and vegetation interruptions have been caused by severe abnormal weather conditions, such as
a snow or wind storm, they are placed in the ‘environment’ category.
Figure 8-2d Cause of interruptions FY99-FY13
Vermin
Human Error
Birds
3rd Party
Vehicles
Unknown
Vegetation
Planned
Plant Failure
Environment
Earthquake
0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 30.0 35.0 40.0 45.0 50.0 55.0
FY99-FY13 FY13
Millions of consumer minutes lost per annum
8.2.4 Reliability performance comparisons

When compared with other New Zealand line companies, the reliability of our urban network (when not subjected to
earthquakes) appears to be above average, while our rural network is slightly below average. There is still scope to
improve our performance and we discuss improvement initiatives later in this section.
8.2.5 Power quality

Our main objective in relation to power quality is to identify and resolve consumer quality of supply enquiries. To
achieve this we fit test instruments close to the point where ownership changes between Orion’s network and the
consumer’s electrical installation.
Data gathered from the test instruments is analysed against the current New Zealand Electricity Regulations. By
applying key regulations in relation to voltage, frequency, quality of supply and harmonics we are able to determine
which quality problems have originated within our network.
Our network performs well in terms of voltage and quality. We receive a number of voltage complaints every year
but only approximately 30% of complaints are due to a problem in our network. In the following table, ‘proven’
means that the non-complying voltage or harmonic originated in our network.
Table 8-2b Service level targets and results for FY13 – network power quality
Performance Measurement
Category Measure Target Achieved FY13 indicator procedure
Voltage complaints Non compliances

<70 40 Tracking of all enquiries
(proven) per annum
Power quality
Harmonics (wave form) Non compliances Checks performed using a
<2 0
complaints (proven) per annum harmonic analyser
8.3 Efficiency
8.3.1 Economic efficiency
Economic efficiency reflects the level of asset investment required to provide network services to consumers, and
the operational costs associated with operating, maintaining and managing the assets.
Figure 8-3a Capex per annum per MWh supplied to consumers FY03-FY13
$/MWh
30
25
20
15
10
0
Industry average Orion Capex/MWh
Figure 8-3b Opex per annum per MWh supplied to consumers FY03-FY13
$/MWh
30
25
20
15
10
0
Industry average Orion Opex/MWh
Figure 8-3c Opex per annum per ICP FY03-FY13

400
$/ICP
350
300
250
200
150
100
Industry average Orion Opex/ICP
8.3.2 Capacity utilisation

This ratio measures the utilisation of transformers in our network. It is calculated as the maximum demand
experienced on our network divided by the network distribution transformer capacity.
Table 8-3a Capacity utilisation results for FY13 and five year average FY09-FY13
Category Target Achieved FY13 Achieved five year average
Capacity utilisation (%) No target set* 29 32
* See section 3.3.8 for reasoning why no specific target is set for capacity utilisation.
8.3.3 Load factor

Annual load factor is calculated as the average load that passes through our network divided by the maximum load
experienced in a given year. We always seek to optimise load factor as this indicates better utilisation of capacity in
the network. Load factor has trended upwards over the 15 years from 1990-2005 by ~1% per annum, and has since
levelled off. Some further improvement is forecast due to on-going winter peak load management and increasing
summer energy use by milk processing plants
Table 8-3b Load factor results for FY13 and five year average FY09-FY13
Load factor (%) No target set* 61.0 60.6
* See section 5.4.1 for our load factor forecasts.
8.3.4 Losses
Measurement of losses
Electrical losses are the difference between energy volumes entering our network (mainly at Transpower GXPs) and
the energy volumes leaving our network at consumer connections. We estimate that these losses are around 5%
with a margin of error of +/- 1 percentage. Significant deviations from this value exist in some parts of our network,
for example, when we compare urban areas against rural areas.
Table 8-3c Loss results for FY13 and five year average FY09-FY13
Losses (%) No target set* <5 estimated <5 estimated
* See the following for reasoning why no specific target is set for losses.
Source of losses
Our assessment of the main contributors to our loss ratio is as follows:

NETWORK
Table 8-3d Network loss contributors
Asset Urban Rural Average

Subtransmission lines and cables 0.4% 1.0%
Zone substation (power) transformers 0.4% 0.4%
11kV lines and cables 1.4% 3.5%
Subtotal subtransmission + 11kV 2.2% 5.0%
Distribution transformers 1.1% 1.0%
230/400V lines and cables 1.2% 0.3%
Subtotal low voltage 2.3% 1.3%
Totals 4.5% 6.2% 5%
OTHER SOURCES
Internal usage by Orion – All our major facilities, such as our administration office, are metered and we purchase
electricity from a retailer like any normal consumer. However, many unmetered supplies are needed at our
substations to operate equipment that is integral to a safe and reliable network. The annual volume of energy involved
is estimated at 0.1% of total energy volume across our network.
Unmetered supplies – Substantial volumes, such as supply to street and traffic lights, are estimated and included with
retail sales. Other miscellaneous outlets, such as those at parks, contribute towards losses at insignificant levels.
Theft – Theft may significantly contribute towards losses, although actual volume is unknown. Electricity retailers are
responsible for integrity of metering at connections and for reading meters. It is in their interest to minimise theft.
Transformer purchases
New distribution transformers that we purchase must comply with the Minimum Energy Performance Standards
(MEPS) as prescribed in AS2374.1. In addition to MEPS, our equipment specification NW74.23.05 – Distribution
Transformers 200 to 1,500kVA, includes a ‘no-load load loss’ multiplier and a ‘load loss multiplier’ that are used for
the capitalisation of loss costs when comparing distribution transformers for purchase. As a result we purchase even
lower loss transformers than MEPS requires.
Our equipment specifications for power transformers also use these loss multipliers when we evaluate tenders.
For more detailed assessments in specific circumstances, we also refer to ‘Purchase and Operating Costs of
Transformers’, published by the Electricity Engineers’ Association of New Zealand.
Our approach ensures we consider the trade-offs between purchase cost and the future cost of energy losses. It costs
more to manufacture a transformer with lower losses because higher quality materials are needed. Our loss
capitalisation calculation for transformers assumes a value of 11.055c/kWh for the future cost of energy. This leads to
the capitalisation values per kW of losses shown in the table. We review these values when we purchase new power
transformers and when we tender distribution transformer supply contracts for transformers up to 1500kVA.
Table 8-3e Transformer ‘loss’ values
Present value of Present value of

Transformer size ‘no load loss’ ($/kW) ‘load loss’ ($/kW)
Up to 200kVA Pole mounted 9,319 833
200 to 500kVA Ground mounted 9,319 1,184
750 to 1500kVA Ground mounted 9,319 1,625
7.5 to 40MVA Zone substation 9,523 1,424
Selecting conductor size

Most electrical losses in our network occur in the conductors. We calculate losses from the expression I 2R, where I is
the current, and R is the resistance of the conductor. The connected load determines the current and conductor size,
while materials determine the conductor resistance. The larger the conductor size, the lower the resistance and
losses. However, larger conductors cost more so a trade-off exists between costs of capital and losses.
Overhead lines
There is a complex trade-off between conductor size, losses, capital cost and alternatives such as regulators and
capacitors. We are currently modelling and reviewing our rural 66kV and 11kV architecture to seek the most optimum
network. It should be noted that a conductor is typically a low cost component of overhead line construction and
therefore larger conductors are often economically effective.
Underground cables
For a given rating, cables cost more and have lower resistance per unit length. A comparative example is shown in the
following table 8-3f:
Table 8-3f Underground cable versus overhead line comparison
Conductor Rating (amps) Installed cost ($/km) Resistance (ohms/km)
Dog overhead line 350 $40,000 0.273
185mm2Al cable 280 $160,000 0.164
Consequently, with much higher capital costs and much lower resistance, we never achieve an economic cross-over
because losses are already low – an increase in size cannot be justified by the small reduction in losses alone.
However, the collective benefits (increased security of supply, reduced losses and reduced transmission charges)
justify the increased cost of the larger cable. We proved this justification when we reviewed our Security Standard in
FY06. Analysis showed it was economic to install an 11kV network capable of restoring power for N-2 faults at zone
substations. Two thirds of the additional expenditure required for larger N-2 feeder cables was justified by reduced
energy losses and lower peak demand charges due to fewer losses at peak. Our security standard drives economic
investment in our 11kV network – the policy to install N-2 capacity creates fewer losses on our network.
Selecting voltage
For the same power or energy volume delivered, losses are lower when conductors are operated at a higher voltage.
Capital costs also increase for higher voltage equipment. A continuous range of voltage is not practical. We use
discrete voltages of 66kV, 33kV, 11kV and 230/400V.
When extending our network, we model the development and consider all future costs, including the cost of losses.
In a rural area, for example, our network may be extended at 11kV, 33kV or 66kV to supply future loading such as
large irrigation plants.
For developments at the connection level, we also consider alternatives for supply voltage and whether or not to
extend the low or high voltage reticulation. We may consider losses when we make decisions although other factors
tend to dominate such as future access to plant, shared land use and customer preferences.
Summary
Overall, losses do not impact significantly on how we design and operate our network – other factors tend to
dominate. Losses are significant in some aspects of network design though, and require policies for optimisation.
Significant points are:
 lines and cables (around two-thirds) and transformers (around one-third) account for nearly all the losses on our
network
 a trade-off exists between capital and loss costs, which results in optimisation of losses, not minimisation
 we give specific consideration to losses when purchasing transformers
 we optimise losses on the 11kV underground network by applying our economically derived security of supply
standard to reinforcement
 we consider loss optimisation when we design overhead lines but other factors tend to dominate
 for any major network development, we consider the cost of losses.
8.4 Works
8.4.1 Expenditure in FY13
The previous AMP figures shown here are from our AMP for the period 1 April 2012 to 31 March 2022.
Maintenance
Our maintenance costs for FY13 were $19.6m, compared with our budget forecast of $23.1m. The under-
expenditure was largely due to deferred works due to the uncertain requirements around earthquake recovery third
-party works and constrained resources.
Capex
CONSUMER CONNECTIONS AND EXTENSIONS

Our consumer connection and extension costs for FY13 were $6.6m, compared with our previous budget forecast of
$9.6m. The under-expenditure was largely due to a slower recovery from the earthquakes than expected.
REINFORCEMENT
Our reinforcement costs for FY13 were $4m, compared with our previous budget forecast of $4.3m.
UNDERGROUND CONVERSION
Our underground conversion costs for FY13 were $3.3m, compared with our previous budget forecast of $2.3m.
This expenditure is dependent on project timing associated with the needs of the Roading Authority and works
undertaken by the Christchurch City Council and the NZ Transport Agency (NZTA).
The over-expenditure is due to NZTA having undertaken a significant ‘Roads of National Significance’ construction
programme requiring undergrounding works.
MAJOR PROJECTS
Major project costs for FY13 were $22.6m, compared with our previous budget forecast of $19.6m ($15.7m Major
Projects plus $3.9m Spur assets). The over-expenditure was largely due to the Kimberley GXP and substation works
which were not included in our previous AMP.
REPLACEMENT
Our replacement costs for FY13 were $10.1m, compared with our previous budget forecast of $22.6m. The under-
expenditure reflects the variable and unpredictable nature of our work as we recover from the earthquakes. The
difference is largely due to the following factors:
 allowance for replacement of earthquake impaired cables not required in the period
 less distribution transformer replacement due to lower energy demand
 deferred works associated with control systems
 switchgear replacement deferred due to our architecture review, network access issues and decisions in regard
of disestablished earthquake zones.
8.4.2 Project completion status
Table 8-4a Project completion status
Project Completion
number Description date Comments (if applicable)
Grid exit points
305 Bromley 220/66kV transformer upgrade Jun 2013

Papanui (spur asset purchase) Sep 2012
Major projects – urban
490 Dallington zone sub to McFaddens 66kV cable Jun 2013
492 Bromley to Dallington link - Stage 1 n/a Delayed due to issues with route
619 Bromley to Rawhiti 66kV link - Stage 1 n/a On-going
606 Queen Elizabeth II Park generators Jun 2013
645 Land acquisition for Redwood substation n/a Substation no longer required
Major projects – rural
900 Ground Fault Neutralisers n/a On-going
250 Land acquisition for Burnham substation n/a Awaiting suitable land
935 Larcomb-Weedons 66kV line conversion Nov 2011
Reinforcement – urban
635 Smart meter trial n/a Deferred
547 Johns Rd feeders Jul 2013
562 Wilkinsons Rd/Styx Mill Rd feeder Oct 2012

Reinforcement – rural
445 West Melton 11kV reinforcement Oct 2012
555 Weedons feeder upgrade Nov 2012
534 Lincoln North Belt feeder Feb 2013
644 New Brookside feeder May 2013
624 Homebush Rd line Feb 2013
623 Auchenflower Rd line Aug 2012
8.5 Safety
We report all employee injury incidents in our Human Resources database. We separately collect similar statistical
incident data from our contractors. These contractor statistics, our own statistical data and our incident
investigations, enable us to provide staff and contractors with indicators of potential harm.
See section 6.3 – Risk management – Safety, for details of our risk mitigation initiatives.
Table 8-5a Personal safety – performance results
Key asset Performance Measurement

management driver Measure Target Achieved FY13 indicator procedure
Injuries to staff 0 2
Number of ‘lost-time’
injury accidents Accident/incident
Personal safety Injuries to our contractors 0 9
reports
Injuries to public 0 0
8.6 Environment
All service providers are required to adhere to our environmental management manual and procedures.
All polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) have previously been removed from our network.
Table 8-6a Environmental responsibility – performance results
Key asset Performance Measurement

management driver Measure Target Achieved FY13 indicator procedure
SF6 gas lost <1% loss <1% loss Identification of

Environmental Environmental
environmental
responsibility spill/loss report
Oil spills (uncontained) 0 0 problems
8.7 Legislation
We have analysed our compliance with relevant statutes and identified the risk, compliance process and managerial
responsibility for each.
Statutes analysed include:
 Electricity Act 1992 and associated regulations
 Electricity Industry Act 2010
 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992 and associated regulations
 Resource Management Act 1991
 Hazardous Substances and New Organisms Act 1996
 Building Act 2004
 Fire Services Act 1975 and associated regulations
 We report our compliance, including any exceptions and corrective actions, to our board twice each year.
8.8 Improvement initiatives

Our initiatives to reduce network risk in areas such as safety, seismic damage and major asset failure are discussed
in section 6 – Risk management.
We discuss initiatives to improve network performance and reliability in the following sections.
8.8.1 Subtransmission network

We have identified a need to improve security and performance in the upper network (higher voltage), since this asset
affects the largest number of consumers. Initiatives taken in relation to this asset include:
Underground
 carried out thermal engineering checks to determine/confirm the current rating of cables
 specify trench backfill to provide the required thermal and mechanical support
 replaced the 66kV oil-filled cable joints and 33kV oil-filled cables to counter thermo-mechanical effects that may
cause the joints to fail – see sections 4.9.3 and 4.10.3.
Overhead
 replaced insulators and install vibration dampers
 re-rated conductor for 750C operating temperature
 applied dynamic ratings
 assessed condition of tower foundations and repaired where required.
Transpower GXP
 increased reliability at Addington GXP by splitting the 66kV bus
 major alterations at Islington GXP to increase capacity and alter vector grouping along with replacing half of the
33kV outdoor switchgear with indoor equipment
 rearranged existing 11kV supplies at Addington GXP to increase security
 installed a 66kV bus zone scheme at Bromley
 constructed a 66kV bus at Springston.
8.8.2 Distribution overhead lines

Historical performance
Over the past 22 years our rural reliability performance has improved by a factor of approximately two. During this
period the 11kV overhead line fault rate has decreased from approximately 25 faults per 100km per year to around 12.
These improvements are primarily attributed to some major maintenance projects and better tree control. In
addition, live-line work practices have reduced planned outages. More line circuit breakers and shortened feeders as
new zone substations are installed have also improved performance.
Our major initiatives are:
 completed a review of our overhead line design standards
 use live-line techniques where appropriate
 complete regular tree maintenance on a complete feeder basis
 introduce softwood poles and phase-out concrete poles
 increase the use of thermal/corona scanning to identify potential problems
 install wedge connectors to replace parallel-grove clamps on high voltage lines
 increase use of smooth-body conductors in areas exposed to snow and high winds
 remove Pacific type high voltage transformer fuses (completed)
 re-tighten hardware to minimise damage caused by loose components
 modify protection systems and add remote control to all line circuit breakers
 install additional pole mounted line circuit breakers
 underground selected troublesome consumer high voltage spur lines
 replace older air break switches.
Opportunities for further improvement

The reliability performance of our rural network is driven by the fault rate on overhead lines. Methods to improve
performance can either attempt to reduce the overhead line fault rate or minimise its impact. We initially improved
our reliability performance by reducing the fault rate. More recent improvements have come from minimising the
impact of line faults.
In the five years from FY00-FY04 we installed 29 additional line circuit breakers in our rural network – the first
significant installation of line circuit breakers in approximately 15 years. Significant performance gains were seen.
We believe it is sensible to compare the costs of reliability improvements with the reduced costs of lost supply to our
consumers. The CAE Reliability of Electricity Supply Project Report, 1993, published the values of un-served energy,
providing typical values of between $5.00 and $10.00 per kWh. Adjusting these costs for inflation, we get un-served
energy costs of between $14 and $20 per kWh. Further analysis of irrigation consumers during 2005 indicated that
the value of supply to irrigation pumps is significantly less than $14 to $20 per kWh, but it is thought that the high
value placed on milking supply balances the analysis. A value of $15 per kWh is applied in the analysis below.
We estimate that the average load of a rural consumer is 2kW, so the cost of an outage to the average rural
consumer is $30 per hour. Therefore the annual cost of network enhancement must not exceed the $30 per hour of
consumer reliability improvement. The annual cost of network enhancement is approximately 14% of the capital
cost. For example in the case of a $50,000 line circuit breaker, we require $7,000 of annual revenue to be charged
to consumers.
The first circuit breaker in the FY00-FY04 installation programme was installed in a feeder from our Lincoln zone
substation. This programme has continued, identifying locations that provide the maximum improvement in system
reliability. However, as circuit breakers have been installed in the most effective locations, the benefits versus costs
have decreased.
Current available options to improve rural network reliability come at considerably differing costs and each needs to
be assessed for its suitability to the application. These options include:
1. Increase our tree trimming programme – this could improve our network reliability significantly. Of our
unplanned interruptions, trees currently cause between 15 and 20% of total consumer-minutes lost. However,
our analysis of existing tree trimming programme indicates it probably cannot be expanded in any major way.
We trimmed trees to the limit allowed under previous law, i.e. clear of power lines for safety reasons. Tree
control legislation that defines clearance corridors has now been passed into law.
If we increased our expenditure on tree trimming around 11kV lines by approximately $500,000 each year we
could reduce consumer minutes lost in the range of 500,000 to 1,000,000 minutes (8,350 to 16,700 hours) at an
annual cost of $15 to $30 per kWh. The economic benefits of this approach are therefore marginal, but the
project is also driven by safety and legislation. Our remaining tree trimming expenditure is in relation to 400V
lines and will not be reflected in our interruption statistics.
Another possible way to reduce faults due to trees would be to selectively install covered conductors in areas
subject to tree problems. This would be suitable in areas where small branches contact or fall on lines, but
would probably provide very little benefit where whole trees fall, pulling down the line including poles. It is very
difficult to show a positive cost benefit case for this option.
2. Continue to install additional line circuit breakers – we appear to have reached an incremental level of
around 15,000 minutes (250 hours) per $50,000 line circuit breaker installation ($14 per kWh). This suggests
additional line circuit breakers would have marginal benefit for rural consumers.
3. Shorten feeder lengths by installing additional zone substations. Each additional substation could halve the
length of three existing feeders and, if we assume that each feeder supplies 250 consumers and consists of
50km of 11kV line, this strategy could reduce consumer-minutes lost by about 500,000 (8,300 hours). An
additional rural zone substation typically costs about $4m, giving an annualised cost of $33 per kWh. This
exceeds the benefit of reliability improvement. Therefore this method of performance improvement is generally
only acceptable as a side-effect of network reinforcement.
4. Replace the existing bare conductor with a covered conductor on a major proportion of the rural overhead
network. If we assume the average cost of replacing the existing conductor, including strengthening existing
poles and structures and installing modified covered ancillary equipment (switches, transformers etc.) is $25 per
metre, then for 3,200km of rural overhead line, the cost would be approximately $80m. Covered conductors’
impact on reliability has not been comprehensively documented elsewhere in the world. However, a Norwegian
network operator has claimed improvement ratios of 10:1. Part of this improvement may be due to the fact that
the network was substantially rebuilt when the covered conductor was installed, which in itself would improve
reliability, at least transiently, until the aging process reduced the reliability again.
We prefer to be conservative in claiming reliability improvement from covered conductor and choose to assume
a long term reduction in consumer-minutes lost to 33% of existing figures. This could result in a reduction of 4.3
million minutes or 71,700 hours (assumes rural SAIDI of 300 and 21,500 consumers giving total minutes of 6.45
million minutes) at an annualised cost of $78 per kWh. This once again clearly exceeds the benefit of reliability
improvement, therefore this method of performance improvement is not viable.
5. Replace the existing bare conductor overhead system with underground cable. The cost to convert our
rural network to underground is estimated to be $600m. This would reduce the loss of customer-minutes by
approximately six million (100,000 hours) at an annualised cost of approximately $870 per kWh.
6. Installing ground fault neutralisers (GFN) at rural zone substations has the potential to significantly improve
network reliability. The potential to cost-effectively improve reliability using traditional methods (1-5) is limited
and expensive. However, we have successfully trialled a GFN and are completing the installation of this
technology at all of our rural zone substations.
A GFN can reduce the residual earth-fault current close to zero during single-phase earth-faults and makes it
safe to leave the distribution network alive with permanent earth-faults while faults are located and isolated.
The estimated installation cost of each GFN is $300,000.
Investigation has shown we can conservatively assume that 20% of unplanned long-term outages due to
permanent faults, and 30% of all momentary interruptions, can be attributed to single-phase earth-faults, and
therefore eliminated.
Our analysis for installing a GFN at all rural zone substations using these conservative estimates yields
reliability savings greater than the annual cost to consumers. A breakdown of reliability savings for each of the
existing rural substations (excluding Dunsandel) is shown in the table on the following page.
Rural spur lines

We have achieved significant reliability improvements through maintaining our main rural lines. However, to
continue to achieve improvements in rural performance, we have for the past 12 years maintained lines right up to
the consumer’s building at no direct cost to the consumer. This allows us to plan work based on performance and
safety rather than on a consumer’s willingness to pay.
Table 8-8b Installation of GFN – reliability savings
Anticipated savings
Zone substation/ Anticipated savings for momentary Total anticipated Benefit/cost
Transpower GXP for long term interruptions p.a. ($) savings p.a. ($) ratio
Lincoln 78,432 36,852 115,284 3.07
Rolleston 69,289 32,352 101,641 2.71
Hills Rd 52,623 45,135 97,758 2.61
Weedons 47,319 49,879 97,198 2.59
Hororata 41,738 47,233 88,970 2.37
Springston 55,278 31,414 86,692 2.31
Brookside 35,112 40,554 75,666 2.02
Killinchy 31,213 41,993 73,206 1.95
Darfield 28,321 37,951 66,272 1.77
Duvauchelle 24,558 23,637 48,195 1.29
Bankside 15,546 24,387 39,933 1.06
Motukarara 26,863 9,762 36,624 0.98
Te Pirita 7,230 25,606 32,836 0.88
Greendale 6,772 18,476 25,248 0.67
Annat 10,052 9,272 19,324 0.52
Highfield 4,394 10,417 14,810 0.39
Teddington 11,356 2,878 14,234 0.38
Diamond Harbour 5,923 4,255 10,178 0.27
Little River 6,083 3,699 9,781 0.26
Castle Hill GXP 4,223 1,830 6,053 0.16
Coleridge GXP 3,368 2,569 5,937 0.16
Arthur’s Pass GXP 2,133 207 2,340 0.06
Average 48,554 1.29
8.8.3 Substations
We have instigated several initiatives to reduce problems with switchgear, primary transformers and their
terminations. These include:
Metal-clad switchgear
 standardise equipment types
 improve installation drawings
 engage internationally recognised consultants to evaluate switchgear in the network
 establish partial discharge testing as ongoing preventive maintenance
 locate and replace older air terminations using tape insulation with heat shrink
 remove dual cable terminations with insufficient clearances
 ventilate air termination cable boxes
 increase levels of training for jointers working on this equipment
 modify older circuit breakers to enable more reliable operation.
Primary transformers
 carry out half-life maintenance programme
 replace/refurbish on-load tapchangers
 replace pressure relief glass bursting diaphragms with pressure relief valves
 conduct tests to establish on-site overload ratings
 install extra cooling as required
 install dynamic controllers at key locations
 perform dissolved gas analysis of transformers.
Interference with telecommunications networks

We have installed neutral earthing resistors (NER) at five urban 33/11kV zone substations in the Hornby area where
11kV reticulation is predominantly overhead. In these areas we frequently connect industrial/commercial
consumers with short lengths of underground cable connected to the overhead, with no continuous earth
connection back to the zone substation. Faults on these isolated sections of cable can cause extremely high earth
potential rise (EPR) on consumer’s premises. This may result in severe damage to telecommunications plant and
consumer equipment and possible injury to telecommunications workers. NERs restrict earth fault current and
minimise damage to telecommunications equipment.
Significant industrial and commercial area development in Rolleston and Darfield townships brings an increased
risk of damage to telecommunications equipment from EPR in those areas. Instead of an NER we have now
installed a ground fault neutraliser (GFN) at 15 rural zone substations to reduce earth fault levels and are in the
process of installing GFNs at other rural zone substations including Rolleston.
8.8.4 Power quality

Although the power quality attributes discussed in section 3.3.4 and other parts of this AMP are well known, until
recently considerable disagreement has existed about how to qualitatively measure them. As a result equipment
manufacturers have developed their own individual measurement methods. Therefore equipment from different
manufacturers gives different results when it measures the same input quantities. This is not ideal as it is
impossible to accurately and consistently compare power quality measurement results.
A comprehensive set of international standards (IEC61000) now exists which defines standardised methods to
measure power quality. Equipment that conforms to these standards is now available.
Our power quality management has generally been reactive. We respond to consumer complaints which usually
arise from the consumer’s own activities, and assume that fundamental network performance is satisfactory.
We have therefore undertaken a three year project to install approximately 30 power-quality measurement
instruments at selected sites throughout our distribution network. This equipment complies with the standards
mentioned above. The aim of the project is to undertake a long term survey to determine the power quality
performance of our distribution network and how it changes over time. The measurement sites chosen represent
the average and worst performing parts of our network over a variety of customer types.
We have also purchased the ‘PQView power quality analysis package’ to archive and analyse the data. These
instruments collect power quality trend data plus triggered transient event information
We are now collating the results to develop and calculate power quality indices to define the power quality
performance of our distribution network.
Our initial analysis of data collected showed very high harmonic levels on the network supplied from Hororata GXP
which have been traced to the installation of large numbers of unfiltered variable speed drives on irrigation pumps.
This data has helped us to analyse the problem and develop economic solutions. The solutions chosen are in two
parts:
1. All new variable speed drive (VSD) pump installations must include harmonic filters that reduce the total
harmonic current to less than 10%.
2. Because of the difficulty of retrofitting harmonic filters on existing installations (cost and size), all transformers
supplying VSD pump installations were identified and sorted by pump motor size. The transformers supplying
approximately half of the total load were replaced with Dzn0 units which provide a 30 degree electrical phase
shift from the normal Dyn11 units. This phase shift cancels most of the troublesome harmonic currents and
reduces the resulting harmonic voltage.
At Darfield, total harmonic voltage distortion was exceeding 8% during the summer of FY09. During the summer of
FY10 after the transformers were changed and despite an increase of 50% in the VSD load, the total harmonic
voltage decreased to approximately half that of the previous summer. Note that transformers removed from
service are simply put back in stock and used elsewhere so the cost is limited to the actual change-out costs plus a
slight premium for the Dzn0 transformer.
The data has also assisted Transpower to analyse the effect of transposing the 220kV lines as part of a project to
reduce voltage imbalance and has also been used to discover and monitor the increasing harmonic distortion
caused by everyday domestic consumer electronic equipment.
The European Union and the EL/34 joint committee of Standards Australia and New Zealand are currently
attempting to develop more statistically defensible methods of measuring the limits on the characteristics of power
delivered to customers. The measurements from our power quality instruments will provide invaluable information
about how our network currently performs and will help the committee develop the standards.
The New Zealand Foundation for Research, Science and Technology in conjunction with the Electricity Engineer’s
Association awarded a contract to the University of Canterbury Electric Power Engineering Centre to carry out
research into power quality issues in New Zealand electricity networks. The research work developed a set of
guidelines for network development and mitigation techniques for existing problems. To assist with this work Orion
provided power quality data collected over the past two years from approximately 30 sites within our network.
8.8.5 Emergency stock

Our emergency stock holdings valued at approximately $4m have been reviewed by looking at the reliability
statistics of each asset, and systematically identifying the need for components that make up that asset. It was
necessary to set a reasonable level of risk to ensure that we balanced the need for carrying emergency supplies
with the cost of holding these items. For the overhead line asset we set this level at about a 1-in-50 year event. As
risk assessment of individual items is further refined some items may be released or additional critical items will
be held.
8.9 Gap analysis

8.9.1 Asset management processes
Orion engaged EA Technology Ltd to undertake an independent review of our asset management systems and
processes in accordance with the requirements of the Commerce Commission’s Asset Management Maturity
Assessment Tool (AMMAT). This tool assesses a selection of asset management capabilities and provides an
assessment against the requirements of BSI PAS-55 Optimised Management of Physical Assets. The benefits of
engaging an independent consultant to undertake the asset management maturity review are:
 identification of any blind-spots or gaps in our processes and practices
 the results will give a true and unbiased indication of our asset management maturity
 EA Technology Ltd have a better understanding of the PAS-55 requirements than our in-house resource.
Their review found we are fully compliant with the requirements in a number of important, high impact areas,
notably asset management strategy, asset management plans and outsourcing. However, there are a number of
areas identified by the review where our documentation does not fully demonstrate that our asset management
systems and processes fully meet the requirements of PAS-55.
EA Technology note that “While the scores allocated in many cases suggest that systems and processes do not meet
PAS-55 requirements, this should not be interpreted as Orion's systems and processes necessarily being deficient
or not fit for purpose.” In areas where we are not shown to be fully PAS-55 compliant, we consider our existing
systems to be appropriate for our organisation and allow us to remain flexible, responsive and adaptive.
The primary reason for the discrepancy observed in the scores presented, is that the PAS-55 assessment criteria
used for this review require that asset management systems and processes be formally documented as a means of
ensuring consistency and to enable effective audit. In order to achieve a fully compliant score it is in most cases
necessary to provide documentary evidence showing the required process and how it is being complied with. The
following spider graphic shows the average scores for each PAS-55 subject area examined. Where more than one
question is evaluated for a given subject area, then these are presented as the average score. A score of three
indicated by the red line in the graphic indicates PAS-55 compliance.
Figure 8-9a Orion’s AMMAT scores relative to PAS-55 compliance
Asset management policy

Continual improvement 3.5 Asset management strategy
3
Corrective and preventative action Asset management plan(s)
2.5
Audit 2 Contingency planning
1.5
Investigation of asset-related failures, incidents 1

Structure, authority and responsibilities
and nonconformities
0.5
0
Performance and condition monitoring Outsourcing of asset management activities
Lifecycle activites Training, awareness and competence
Legal and other requirements Communication, participation and consultation
Use and maintenance of asset risk information Asset management system documentation
Risk management process(es) Information management
PAS-55 Compliance Orion: FY13 Orion: FY14
8.9.2 Reliability
Our network has generally improved over the 21 years that we have compiled detailed reliability statistics.
Statistics from the first few years indicate that most interruptions occurred in the rural area and were due to trees
on lines, vehicles hitting poles and equipment failure to a lesser extent.
Since then we have made considerable effort to control tree growth and instigate various maintenance
programmes on our rural 11kV lines. A project to install reflectors on roadside poles to reduce the incidence of
vehicles hitting poles has also been completed.
Our plant failure statistics show that as loads increase in parts of our network, we have to work harder to keep
aging equipment performing satisfactorily. We now use a UV corona imaging camera in a move that utilises the
latest technology in an effort to identify potential problems before they cause an interruption.
We have also completed a project to shorten the interrupted portions of our feeders by installing additional line
circuit breakers. Circuit breakers are relocated to more appropriate locations as the network is altered and total
50 in our rural network.
We have installed and put into service 23 Ground Fault Neutralisers (GFN). These units are equipped with 5 th
harmonic residual current compensation and are starting to contribute to an improvement in rural network
reliability and safety.
8.9.3 Security Standard

Our Security Standard provides a useful benchmark to identify areas on our network that may not currently receive
the high level of security that the majority of our network has. Any gaps against our Security Standard are
discussed in section 5.5 – Network gap analysis.
Appendices 309
Appendices A
A Disclosure schedules 11 - 13 311

11a Report on forecast capital expenditure 312
11b Report on forecast operational expenditure 316
12a Report on asset condition 317
12b Report on forecast capacity 319
12c Report on forecast demand 321
12d Report on forecast interruptions and duration 322
13 AMMAT report 323
B Cross reference table 340

C Glossary of terms 341
D Certificate of compliance (schedule 17) 344
Orion New Zealand Limited 10 year Asset Management Plan - From 1 April 2014 SECTION A
310 Appendices
SECTION A Orion New Zealand Limited 10 year Asset Management Plan - From 1 April 2014
Appendices 311
Appendix A - Disclosure schedules
SCHEDULE 11a: Report on forecast capital expenditure 306
SCHEDULE 11b: Report on forecast operational expenditure 310
SCHEDULE 12a: Report on asset condition 311
SCHEDULE 12b: Report on forecast capacity 313
SCHEDULE 12c: Report on forecast demand 315
SCHEDULE 12d: Report on forecast interruptions and duration 316
SCHEDULE 13: AMMAT report 317
312
Schedule 11a: Report on forecast capital expenditure Company name: Orion NZ Ltd.
AMP Planning period: 1 April 2014 - 31 March 2024
7 Current year CY+1 CY+2 CY+3 CY+4 CY+5 CY+6 CY+7 CY+8 CY+9 CY+10
8 For year ended 31 Mar 14 31 Mar 15 31 Mar 16 31 Mar 17 31 Mar 18 31 Mar 19 31 Mar 20 31 Mar 21 31 Mar 22 31 Mar 23 31 Mar 24
SECTION A
9 11a(i) Expenditure on Assets Forecast $000 (in nominal dollars)
10 Consumer connection 12,829 13,100 14,084 13,364 12,275 12,004 12,363 12,733 13,114 13,507 13,912
11 System growth 42,844 40,420 61,533 30,682 27,025 12,398 48,995 15,313 10,795 17,301 6,020
12 Asset replacement and renewal 22,783 25,275 26,128 25,909 24,494 25,427 25,837 25,374 28,648 28,909 28,609
13 Asset relocations 6,570 1,500 5,847 3,677 1,447 883 906 929 953 977 1,002
14 Reliability, safety and environment:
15 Quality of supply - - - - - - - - - - -
16 Legislative and regulatory - - - - - - - - - - -
17 Other reliability, safety and environment 3,342 3,010 2,560 3,041 3,152 2,932 3,857 3,108 3,200 3,111 3,204
18 Total reliability, safety and environment 3,342 3,010 2,560 3,041 3,152 2,932 3,857 3,108 3,200 3,111 3,204
19 Expenditure on network assets 88,368 83,305 110,152 76,673 68,393 53,644 91,958 57,457 56,710 63,805 52,747
20 Non-network assets 8,025 2,428 3,912 2,125 2,578 3,533 2,977 2,319 2,598 3,568 3,272
21 Expenditure on assets 96,393 85,733 114,064 78,798 70,971 57,177 94,935 59,776 59,308 67,373 56,019
22
23 plus Cost of financing 1,495 - - - - - - - - - -

24 less Value of capital contributions 7,073 3,871 6,932 5,134 4,311 2,190 2,211 2,286 2,364 2,445 2,528
25 plus Value of vested assets - - - - - - - - - - -
26
27 Capital expenditure forecast 90,815 81,862 107,132 73,664 66,660 54,987 92,724 57,490 56,944 64,928 53,491
28
Appendices
29 Value of commissioned assets 106,400 82,862 107,132 73,664 66,660 54,987 92,724 57,490 56,944 64,928 53,491
30
32 $000 (in constant prices)

33 Consumer connection 12,829 13,100 13,400 12,300 10,900 10,400 10,400 10,400 10,400 10,400 10,400
34 System growth 42,844 40,420 59,265 28,300 23,935 10,670 41,075 12,485 8,560 13,320 4,500
36 Asset relocations 6,570 1,500 5,500 3,300 1,250 750 750 750 750 750 750
Orion New Zealand Limited 10 year Asset Management Plan - From 1 April 2014
40 Other reliability, safety and environment 3,342 3,010 2,445 2,795 2,795 2,535 3,240 2,535 2,535 2,395 2,395
41 Total reliability, safety and environment 3,342 3,010 2,445 2,795 2,795 2,535 3,240 2,535 2,535 2,395 2,395
42 Expenditure on network assets 88,368 83,305 105,560 70,595 60,625 46,370 77,195 46,890 44,960 49,120 39,430
43 Non-network assets 8,025 2,428 3,805 2,004 2,351 3,119 2,542 1,915 2,076 2,755 2,444
44 Expenditure on assets 96,393 85,733 109,365 72,599 62,976 49,489 79,737 48,805 47,036 51,875 41,874
45
46 Subcomponents of expenditure on assets (where known)

47 Energy efficiency and DSM reduction of energy losses - - - - - - - - - - -
48 Overhead to underground conversion 6,570 1,500 5,500 3,300 1,250 750 750 750 750 750 750
49 Research and development - - - - - - - - - - -
Company name: Orion NZ Ltd.
Schedule 11a: Report on forecast capital expenditure (cont) AMP Planning period: 1 April 2014 - 31 March 2024
57
Current year CY+1 CY+2 CY+3 CY+4 CY+5 CY+6 CY+7 CY+8 CY+9 CY+10
58 For year ended 31 Mar 14 31 Mar 15 31 Mar 16 31 Mar 17 31 Mar 18 31 Mar 19 31 Mar 20 31 Mar 21 31 Mar 22 31 Mar 23 31 Mar 24
59 Difference between nominal and constant price forecasts $000
60 Consumer connection - (0) 684 1,064 1,375 1,604 1,963 2,333 2,714 3,107 3,512
61 System growth - - 2,268 2,382 3,090 1,728 7,920 2,828 2,235 3,981 1,520
62 Asset replacement and renewal - - 1,178 2,009 2,749 3,412 4,107 4,654 5,933 6,654 7,224
63 Asset relocations - 0 347 377 197 133 156 179 203 227 252
67 Other reliability, safety and environment - - 115 246 357 397 617 573 665 716 809
68 Total reliability, safety and environment - - 115 246 357 397 617 573 665 716 809
69 Expenditure on network assets - (0) 4,592 6,078 7,768 7,274 14,763 10,567 11,750 14,685 13,317
70 Non-network assets - - 107 121 227 414 435 404 522 813 828
71 Expenditure on assets - (0) 4,699 6,199 7,995 7,688 15,198 10,971 12,272 15,498 14,145
74 11a(ii) Consumer Connection

75 Consumer types defined by EDB (see note) $000 (in constant prices)
76 General connections 1,183 1,102 1,100 898 894 902
77 Large customers 2,835 2,642 2,636 2,639 2,374 1,794
78 Subdivisions 5,724 5,335 5,323 4,416 3,788 3,823
Appendices
79 Switchgear 1,062 2,095 2,420 2,423 2,170 2,190

80 Transformers 2,025 1,926 1,921 1,924 1,675 1,691
81
82 Consumer connection expenditure 12,829 13,100 13,400 12,300 10,900 10,400

83 less Capital contributions funding consumer connections 526 1,621 1,621 1,333 1,333 1,333
84 Consumer connection less capital contribution 12,303 11,479 11,779 10,967 9,567 9,067
85 11a(iii) System Growth

86 Subtransmission 22,533 22,762 40,183 6,894 2,691 2,426
87 Zone substations 8,095 11,763 12,104 13,832 16,743 3,746
88 Distribution and LV lines 1,339 2,460 1,088 1,104 1,089 1,088
89 Distribution and LV cables 6,257 3,267 4,440 5,613 3,258 3,255
90 Distribution substations and transformers 1,469 168 155 555 155 155
91 Distribution switchgear 207 - - 303 - -
92 Other network assets 2,944 - 1,294 - - -
93 System growth expenditure 42,844 40,420 59,265 28,300 23,935 10,670
94 less Capital contributions funding system growth - - 1,865 1,353 1,505 -
95 System growth less capital contribution 42,844 40,420 57,400 26,947 22,430 10,670
Note: Our Capex budgets for new connections are broken down into asset types rather than consumer types and therefore the consumer type definitions in this schedule differ from schedule 12c(i).
313
314
Schedule 11a: Report on forecast capital expenditure (cont) AMP Planning period: 1 April 2014- 31 March 2024
103 Current year CY+1 CY+2 CY+3 CY+4 CY+5

104 For year ended 31 Mar 14 31 Mar 15 31 Mar 16 31 Mar 17 31 Mar 18 31 Mar 19
105 11a(iv) Asset Replacement and Renewal $000 (in constant prices)
SECTION A
106 Subtransmission 380 700 400 400 400 2,680
107 Zone substations - 5,445 5,190 3,305 2,580 2,715
108 Distribution and LV lines 2,972 2,225 2,225 2,225 2,225 2,225
109 Distribution and LV cables 2,237 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200 2,200
110 Distribution substations and transformers 2,957 2,695 2,895 2,745 2,445 2,445
111 Distribution switchgear 7,985 6,300 6,835 6,815 6,160 5,180
112 Other network assets 6,252 5,710 5,205 6,210 5,735 4,570
113 Asset replacement and renewal expenditure 22,783 25,275 24,950 23,900 21,745 22,015
114 less Capital contributions funding asset replacement and renewal
115 Asset replacement and renewal less capital contributions 22,783 25,275 24,950 23,900 21,745 22,015
116 11a(v) Asset Relocations

117 Project or programme
118 NZTA 1,857 400 4,381 2,200 150 150
119 Christchurch City Council 874 800 814 800 800 300
120 Selwyn District Council 328 300 305 300 300 300
121 Developer specific project 3,511 - - - - -
123
124 All other asset relocations projects or programmes

125 Asset relocations expenditure 6,570 1,500 5,500 3,300 1,250 750
126
Appendices
less Capital contributions funding asset relocations 4,700 2,250 3,080 1,980 955 555
127 Asset relocations less capital contributions 1,870 (750) 2,420 1,320 295 195
129 11a(vi) Quality of Supply

131 *See note. - - - - - -
132 - - - - - -
133 - - - - - -
136
137 All other quality of supply projects or programmes - - - - - -
138 Quality of supply expenditure - - - - - -
139 less Capital contributions funding quality of supply
140 Quality of supply less capital contributions - - - - - -
142 11a(vii) Legislative and Regulatory
144 *See note. - - - - - -
145 - - - - - -
146 - - - - - -
149
150 All other legislative and regulatory projects or programmes - - - - - -

151 Legislative and regulatory expenditure - - - - - -
152 less Capital contributions funding legislative and regulatory - - - - - -
153 Legislative and regulatory less capital contributions - - - - - -
Note. We have not separated out these portions of our expenditure as any figures would be indicative only. Our predominant drivers are customer connections, system growth,
asset replacement, asset relocation and reliability.
Schedule 11a: Report on forecast capital expenditure (cont) Company name: Orion NZ Ltd.

163 11a(viii) Other Reliability, Safety and Environment

164 Project or programme $000 (in constant prices)
165 Installation of barriers and T-joint replacement 1,688 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000 2,000
166 Security fencing, structures seismic upgrades 435 510 445 445 445 185
167 Ground Fault Neutralisers 1,219 500 350 350 350
168
170
171 All other reliability, safety and environment projects or programmes

172 Other reliability, safety and environment expenditure 3,342 3,010 2,445 2,795 2,795 2,535
173 less Capital contributions funding other reliability, safety and environment
174 Other reliability, safety and environment less capital contributions 3,342 3,010 2,445 2,795 2,795 2,535
178 11a(ix) Non-Network Assets

179 Routine expenditure
181 Sundry land and buildings 258 400 330 330 310 310
182 Vehicles and mobile plant 867 503 949 650 933 841
183 Information solutions 1,629 998 1,965 598 737 1,552
184 Sundry tools and equipment 634 527 561 426 371 416
Appendices
186
187 All other routine expenditure projects or programmes

188 Routine expenditure 3,388 2,428 3,805 2,004 2,351 3,119
189 Atypical expenditure

191 Head office building project 4,637
192
193
194
196
197 All other atypical expenditure projects or programmes

198 Atypical expenditure 4,637 - - - - -
199
200 Non-network assets expenditure 8,025 2,428 3,805 2,004 2,351 3,119
315
316

Schedule 11b: Report on forecast operational expenditure AMP Planning period: 1 April 2014 - 31 March 2024
7 Current year CY+1 CY+2 CY+3 CY+4 CY+5 CY+6 CY+7 CY+8 CY+9 CY+10
SECTION A
8 31 Mar 14 31 Mar 15 31 Mar 16 31 Mar 17 31 Mar 18 31 Mar 19 31 Mar 20 31 Mar 21 31 Mar 22 31 Mar 23 31 Mar 24
9 Operational Expenditure Forecast $000 (in nominal dollars)
10 Service interruptions and emergencies 6,903 7,275 9,135 8,053 8,360 8,523 8,748 8,983 9,225 9,472 9,726
11 Vegetation management 2,760 2,930 3,110 3,243 3,367 3,432 3,523 3,618 3,716 3,815 3,917
12 Routine and corrective maintenance and inspection 13,873 15,350 17,389 16,056 16,324 16,506 16,841 17,114 17,772 18,195 18,737
14 Network Opex 27,029 29,245 32,788 30,074 30,879 31,343 32,071 32,753 33,833 34,685 35,668
15 System operations and network support 15,592 15,845 16,255 16,680 17,148 17,554 17,946 18,447 18,932 19,433 19,945
16 Business support 19,231 14,672 14,907 15,586 16,052 16,629 16,644 17,106 17,619 18,164 18,670
17 Non-network opex 34,823 30,517 31,162 32,266 33,200 34,183 34,590 35,553 36,551 37,597 38,615
18 Operational expenditure 61,852 59,762 63,950 62,340 64,079 65,526 66,661 68,306 70,384 72,282 74,283
$000 (in constant prices)

22 Service interruptions and emergencies 6,903 7,275 8,605 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275 7,275
23 Vegetation management 2,760 2,930 2,930 2,930 2,930 2,930 2,930 2,930 2,930 2,930 2,930
24 Routine and corrective maintenance and inspection 13,873 15,350 16,380 14,505 14,205 14,090 14,005 13,860 14,015 13,975 14,015
26 Network Opex 27,029 29,245 30,885 27,170 26,870 26,755 26,670 26,525 26,680 26,640 26,680
27 System operations and network support 15,592 15,845 15,940 15,983 16,014 15,963 15,898 15,943 15,925 15,935 15,947
28 Business support 19,231 14,672 14,549 14,806 14,814 14,902 14,495 14,476 14,477 14,499 14,481
Appendices
29 Non-network opex 34,823 30,517 30,489 30,789 30,828 30,865 30,393 30,419 30,402 30,434 30,428
30 Operational expenditure 61,852 59,762 61,374 57,959 57,698 57,620 57,063 56,944 57,082 57,074 57,108
31 Subcomponents of operational expenditure (where known)
33 Energy efficiency and DSM, reduction of energy losses - - - - - - - - - - -
34 Direct billing* - - - - - - - - - - -
35 Research and Development - - - - - - - - - - -
36 Insurance 2,463 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020 2,020
37 *Direct billing expenditure by suppliers that direct bill the majority of their consumers
41
Difference between nominal and real forecasts $000
42 Service interruptions and emergencies - - 530 778 1,085 1,248 1,473 1,708 1,950 2,197 2,451
43 Vegetation management - - 180 313 437 502 593 688 786 885 987
44 Routine and corrective maintenance and inspection - - 1,009 1,551 2,119 2,416 2,836 3,254 3,757 4,220 4,722
45 Asset replacement and renewal - - 183 263 367 422 498 578 660 743 829
46 Network Opex - - 1,903 2,904 4,009 4,588 5,401 6,228 7,153 8,045 8,988
47 System operations and network support - - 315 697 1,134 1,591 2,048 2,504 3,007 3,498 3,998
48 Business support - - 358 780 1,238 1,727 2,149 2,630 3,142 3,665 4,189
49 Non-network opex - - 673 1,477 2,372 3,318 4,197 5,134 6,149 7,163 8,187
50 Operational expenditure - - 2,576 4,381 6,381 7,906 9,598 11,362 13,302 15,208 17,175
Schedule 12a: Report on asset condition AMP Planning period: 1 April 2014 - 31 March 2024
7 Asset condition at start of planning period (percentage of units by grade)

Data % of asset
Grade accuracy to be
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 unknown (1-4) replaced in
9 Voltage Asset category Asset class Units % % % % % % next 5 years
10 All Overhead line Concrete poles / steel structure No. 9 90 1 4 1
11 All Overhead line Wood poles No. 17 83 4 4
12 All Overhead line Other pole types No. N/A
13 HV Subtransmission Line Subtransmission OH up to 66kV conductor km 13 87 3 2
14 HV Subtransmission Line Subtransmission OH 110kV+ conductor km N/A
15 HV Subtransmission Cable Subtransmission UG up to 66kV (XLPE) km 100 3
16 HV Subtransmission Cable Subtransmission UG up to 66kV (Oil pressurised) km 100 3
17 HV Subtransmission Cable Subtransmission UG up to 66kV (Gas pressurised) km N/A
18 HV Subtransmission Cable Subtransmission UG up to 66kV (PILC) km 100 3
19 HV Subtransmission Cable Subtransmission UG 110kV+ (XLPE) km N/A
20 HV Subtransmission Cable Subtransmission UG 110kV+ (Oil pressurised) km N/A
21 HV Subtransmission Cable Subtransmission UG 110kV+ (Gas Pressurised) km N/A
22 HV Subtransmission Cable Subtransmission UG 110kV+ (PILC) km N/A
23 HV Subtransmission Cable Subtransmission submarine cable km N/A

Appendices
24 HV Zone Substation Buildings Zone substations up to 66kV No. 18 82 2
25 HV Zone Substation Buildings Zone substations 110kV+ No. N/A
26 HV Zone Substation Switchgear 22/33kV CB (Indoor) No. 100 4
27 HV Zone Substation Switchgear 22/33kV CB (Outdoor) No. 4 96 4 17
28 HV Zone Substation Switchgear 33kV Switch (Ground Mounted) No. N/A
29 HV Zone Substation Switchgear 33kV Switch (Pole Mounted) No. 16 84 4
30 HV Zone Substation Switchgear 33kV RMU No. N/A
31 HV Zone Substation Switchgear 50/66/110kV CB (Indoor) No. N/A
32 HV Zone Substation Switchgear 50/66/110kV CB (Outdoor) No. 3 97 4 3
33 HV Zone Substation Switchgear 3.3/6.6/11/22kV CB (ground mounted) No. 28 72 4 15
34 HV Zone Substation Switchgear 3.3/6.6/11/22kV CB (pole mounted) No. N/A
See Section 4.3 for explanation of condition grading methodology
317
318

Schedule 12a: Report on asset condition AMP Planning period: 1 April 2014 - 31 March 2024
42 Asset condition at start of planning period (percentage of units by grade)
SECTION A
% of asset
Grade Data to be
Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3 Grade 4 unknown accuracy replaced in
44 Voltage Asset category Asset class Units % % % % % (1-4) next 5 years
45 HV Zone Substation Transformer Zone Substation Transformers No. 7 23 70 3 3
46 HV Distribution Line Distribution OH Open Wire Conductor km 18 82 2 3
47 HV Distribution Line Distribution OH Aerial Cable Conductor km N/A
48 HV Distribution Line SWER conductor km 2 98 2
49 HV Distribution Cable Distribution UG XLPE or PVC km 100 3
50 HV Distribution Cable Distribution UG PILC km 10 90 2 1
51 HV Distribution Cable Distribution Submarine Cable km N/A
52 HV Distribution switchgear 3.3/6.6/11/22kV CB (pole mounted) - reclosers and sectionalisers No. 100 4
53 HV Distribution switchgear 3.3/6.6/11/22kV CB (Indoor) No. 32 68 4 12
54 HV Distribution switchgear 3.3/6.6/11/22kV Switches and fuses (pole mounted) No. 21 79 4 18
55 HV Distribution switchgear 3.3/6.6/11/22kV Switch (ground mounted) - except RMU No. 51 49 4 72
56 HV Distribution switchgear 3.3/6.6/11/22kV RMU No. 12 88 4 7
57 HV Distribution Transformer Pole Mounted Transformer No. 4 88 8 3 10

Appendices
58 HV Distribution Transformer Ground Mounted Transformer No. 16 82 2 3 12
59 HV Distribution Transformer Voltage regulators No. 6 19 75 3
60 HV Distribution Substations Ground Mounted Substation Housing No. 9 91 3 2
61 LV LV Line LV OH Conductor km 1 70 29 2
62 LV LV Cable LV UG Cable km 100 3 1
63 LV LV Street lighting LV OH/UG Streetlight circuit km N/A
64 LV Connections OH/UG consumer service connections No. 10 90 2 1
65 All Protection Protection relays (electromechanical, solid state and numeric) No. 18 82 4 28
66 All SCADA and communications SCADA and communications equipment operating as a single system Lot 4 96 3 4
67 All Capacitor Banks Capacitors including controls No. 100 2
68 All Load Control Centralised plant Lot 100 2 5
69 All Load Control Relays No. 100 2 1
70 All Civils Cable Tunnels km 100 2
See Section 4.3 for explanation of condition grading methodology

Schedule 12b: Report on forecast capacity AMP Planning period: 1 April 2014 - 31 March 2024
7 12b(i) System Growth - Zone Substations (Urban)

Utilisation Installed Installed
Current Installed Security of of installed firm firm
8 Zone substation - Urban peak firm supply Transfer firm capacity +5 capacity +5 Installed firm capacity
load capacity classification capacity capacity years years constraint +5 years
(MVA) (MVA) (type) (MVA) % (MVA) % (cause) Explanation
9 Armagh 11 40 N-2 11 26% 40 27% No constraint within +5 years Earthquake caused a dramatic drop in CBD load
Single 66kV line and 23MVA transformer backed up by 11kV but limited to 15MVA by
10 Barnett Park 9 15 N-1 9 62% 15 61% No constraint within +5 years
compliance with security of supply standard
11 Dallington 29 40 N-2 29 73% 40 75% No constraint within +5 years
12 Fendalton 36 40 N-2 36 90% 40 90% No constraint within +5 years
13 Halswell 15 23 N-2 15 64% 23 70% No constraint within +5 years
14 Harewood 2 8 N-2 2 24% 8 27% No constraint within +5 years
15 Hawthornden 32 40 N-2 32 80% 40 80% No constraint within +5 years
16 Heathcote 28 40 N-2 28 70% 40 71% No constraint within +5 years
17 Hoon Hay 29 40 N-2 29 72% 40 72% No constraint within +5 years
18 Hornby 13 20 N-2 13 66% 20 67% No constraint within +5 years
19 Ilam 8 11 N-2 8 69% 11 69% No constraint within +5 years
20 Lancaster 23 40 N-2 23 56% 40 56% No constraint within +5 years
21 McFaddens 41 40 N-2 41 102% 40 102% Transformer Constraint to be resolved by new Marshlands zone substation
22 Middleton 27 40 N-2 27 67% 40 69% No constraint within +5 years

Appendices
23 Milton 24 40 N-2 24 61% 40 62% No constraint within +5 years
24 Moffett 14 18 N-2 14 76% 20 92% No constraint within +5 years Feeder replacement increases capacity
25 Oxford Tuam 14 40 N-2 14 34% 40 45% No constraint within +5 years Earthquake caused a dramatic drop in CBD load
26 Prebbleton 5 - N-2 5 - - - No constraint within +5 years New zone substation only recently installed
27 Rawhiti 27 40 N-2 27 68% 40 67% No constraint within +5 years
28 Shands 9 20 N-2 9 47% 20 58% No constraint within +5 years
29 Sockburn 24 35 N-2 24 68% 35 78% No constraint within +5 years
30 Bishopdale/Papanui 31 29 N-2 31 107% 29 106% Transformer Constraint to be resolved by new Waimakariri zone substation
31 Foster 24 27 N-2 24 89% 27 90% No constraint within +5 years
32 Grimseys Winters 22 27 N-2 22 82% 27 98% No constraint within +5 years Constraint to be resolved by new Waimakariri zone substation
33 Knox 9 12 N-2 9 72% 12 73% No constraint within +5 years
34 Montreal 11 13 N-2 11 83% 13 85% No constraint within +5 years
35 Pages Kearneys 10 17 N-2 10 60% 17 59% No constraint within +5 years
36 Portman 11 24 N-2 11 45% 24 46% No constraint within +5 years
37 Spreydon 13 20 N-2 13 66% 20 71% No constraint within +5 years To be decommissioned within next 5 years when CB replacement due
Continued on next page...
319
320

Schedule 12b: Report on forecast capacity (cont) AMP Planning period: 1 April 2014 - 31 March 2024
7 12b(i) System Growth - Zone Substations (Rural)

Utilisation Installed Installed
SECTION A
Current Installed Security of of installed firm firm
8 Zone substation - Rural peak firm supply Transfer firm capacity +5 capacity +5 Installed firm capacity
load capacity classification capacity capacity years years constraint +5 years
(MVA) (MVA) (type) (MVA) % (MVA) % (cause) Explanation
40 Annat 1 - N-1 1 - - No constraint within +5 years
41 Bankside 9 - N-1 6 - - No constraint within +5 years
42 Brookside 9 - N-1 6 - - No constraint within +5 years
43 Darfield 6 - N-1 4 - - Transformer Constraint resolved by transferring load to Kimberley
44 Diamond Harbour 2 - N-1 2 - - No constraint within +5 years
45 Dunsandel 9 10 N-1 6 88% 10 No constraint within +5 years Transformer replacement increases capacity
46 Duvauchelle 4 8 N-1 4 56% 8 No constraint within +5 years
47 Greendale 8 - N-1 6 - - No constraint within +5 years
48 Highfield 7 - N-1 5 - - No constraint within +5 years Emerging constraint
49 Hills 6 - N-1 4 - - No constraint within +5 years
50 Hororata 7 - N-1 5 - - No constraint within +5 years
51 Killinchy 8 - N-1 5 - - No constraint within +5 years
52 Kimberley 7 23 N-1 5 30% 23 No constraint within +5 years

Appendices
53 Larcomb 5 23 N-1 4 22% 23 No constraint within +5 years
54 Lincoln 8 10 N-1 6 83% 10 No constraint within +5 years Emerging constraint to be resolved by transferring load to Springston
55 Little River 1 - N-1 1 - - No constraint within +5 years
56 Motukarara 2 3 N-1 2 80% 3 No constraint within +5 years
57 Rolleston 12 10 N-1 8 119% 10 Transformer Constraint resolved by transferring load to Larcomb
58 Springston 6 - N-1 4 - - No constraint within +5 years
59 Teddington 1 - N-1 1 - - No constraint within +5 years
Depends on surface water irrigation plans. If needed constraint resolved by
60 Te Pirita 10 - N-1 7 - - Transformer
transferring load to Hororata->Greendale.
61 Weedons 7 23 N-1 5 29% 23 No constraint within +5 years
61 12b(ii) Transformer Capacity

62 (MVA)
63 Distribution transformer capacity (EDB owned) 1,817
64 Distribution transformer capacity (non-EDB owned) 224
65 Total distribution transformer capacity 2,042
66
67 Zone substation transformer capacity 1,032

Schedule 12c: Report on forecast network demand AMP Planning period: 1 April 2014 - 31 March 2024
7 12c(i): Consumer Connections
8 Number of ICPs connected in year by consumer type Number of connections

11 Consumer types defined by EDB
12 Street lighting 6 6 6 3 2 2
13 General 3,555 4,766 4,766 4,069 3,570 3,570
14 Irrigation 12 20 20 20 20 20
15 Major customer 4 8 8 8 8 8
16 Large customer 2 - - - - -
17 Connections total 3,579 4,800 4,800 4,100 3,600 3,600
18
19 Distributed generation
20 Number of connections 120 150 150 90 50 50
21 Installed connection capacity of distributed generation (MVA) 2 3 3 2 1 1
22 12c(ii): System Demand
Current year CY+1 CY+2 CY+3 CY+4 CY+5

24 Maximum coincident system demand (MW) For year ended 31 Mar 14 31 Mar 15 31 Mar 16 31 Mar 17 31 Mar 18 31 Mar 19
25 GXP demand 596 595 603 610 620 630
Appendices
26 plus Distributed generation output at HV and above 1 1 1 1 1 1

27 Maximum coincident system demand 597 596 604 611 621 631
28 less Net transfers to (from) other EDBs at HV and above 1 1 1 1 1 1
29 Demand on system for supply to consumer’s connection points 596 595 603 610 620 630
Electricity volumes carried (GWh)

30
31 Electricity supplied from GXPs 3,172 3,218 3,264 3,312 3,360 3,408
32 less Electricity exports to GXPs - - - - - -
33 plus Electricity supplied from distributed generation 4 4 4 4 4 4
34 less Net electricity supplied to (from) other EDBs 5 5 5 5 5 5
35 Electricity entering system for supply to ICPs 3,171 3,217 3,263 3,311 3,359 3,407
36 less Total energy delivered to ICPs 3,030 3,070 3,120 3,160 3,210 3,250
37 Losses 141 147 143 151 149 157
38
39 Load factor (%) 61 62 62 62 62 62

40 Loss ratio (%) 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.6
321
322
Schedule 12d: Report forecast interruptions and duration Company name: Orion NZ Ltd.

SECTION A
10 SAIDI
11 Class B (planned interruptions on the network) 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5 15.5
12 Class C (unplanned interruptions on the network) 121.5 117.5 105.5 101.5 89.5 78.5
13 SAIFI
14 Class B (planned interruptions on the network) 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
15 Class C (unplanned interruptions on the network) 1.73 1.73 1.63 1.43 1.23 1.13
Appendices
Appendices 323
Appendix A.13 - Disclosure schedule 13

Report on Asset Management Maturity
324

Schedule 13: Report on asset management maturity AMP Planning period: 1 April 2014 - 31 March 2024
AM standard applied: PAS-55
SECTION A
No. Function Question Score Evidence-Summary User guidance Why Who Documented info
3 Asset To what extent has an An asset management policy document has Widely used AM practice standards require an Top management. The The organisation's asset
management asset management 2.5 been approved by the board. The policy organisation to document, authorise and management team that has overall management policy, its
policy policy been however has not been widely communicated communicate its asset management policy (e.g., as responsibility for asset organisational strategic plan,
documented, and is not well known within the organization. required in PAS 55 Para 4.2 i). A key pre-requisite management. documents indicating how the
authorised and Opportunities exist to simplify and refine the of any robust policy is that the organisation's top asset management policy was
communicated? policy so that it does not need to be edited management must be seen to endorse and fully based upon the needs of the
and reviewed at each asset management support it. Also vital to the effective implementation organisation and evidence of
plan cycle. of the policy, is to tell the appropriate people of its communication.
content and their obligations under it. Where an
organisation outsources some of its asset-related
activities, then these people and their organisations
must equally be made aware of the policy's content.
Also, there may be other stakeholders, such as
regulatory authorities and shareholders who should
be made aware of it.
10 Asset What has the Section 2.7 of the asset management plan In setting an organisation's asset management Top management. The The organisation's asset
management organisation done to 3 "Asset Management Processes" defines strategy, it is important that it is consistent with any organisation's strategic planning management strategy
strategy ensure that its asset overall strategies or methodologies other policies and strategies that the organisation team. The management team that document and other related
management strategy employed by Orion to convert asset has and has taken into account the requirements of has overall responsibility for asset organisational policies and
is consistent with management objectives (termed Asset relevant stakeholders. This question examines to management. strategies. Other than the
other appropriate Management Drivers in the AMP document) what extent the asset management strategy is organisation's strategic plan,
organisational to asset management plans. There is a clear consistent with other organisational policies and these could include those
policies and linkage of asset management strategies to strategies (e.g., as required by PAS 55 Para 4.3.1 b) relating to health and safety,
strategies, and the customer service levels. A suite of Asset and has taken account of stakeholder requirements environmental, etc. Results
needs of Management Reports have been prepared as required by PAS 55 Para 4.3.1 c). Generally, this of stakeholder consultation.
Appendices
stakeholders? that provide a detailed description of will take into account the same polices, strategies
strategies at the asset class level. Section 5.3 and stakeholder requirements as covered in
of the AMP defines the load and security drafting the asset management policy but at a
planning strategy and provides linkage to the greater level of detail.
corporate objectives by providing guidance on
how to achieve the desired price/service level
trade-off.
11 Asset In what way does the Section 2.7 of the asset management plan Good asset stewardship is the hallmark of an Top management. People in the The organisation's
management organisation's asset 3 describes strategies covering the lifecycle of organisation compliant with widely used AM organisation with expert documented asset
strategy management strategy the asset. Lifecycle phases covered in the standards. A key component of this is the need to knowledge of the assets, asset management strategy and
take account of the AMP are. (i) planning, (ii) design and take account of the lifecycle of the assets, asset types, asset systems and their supporting working
lifecycle of the assets, construction, (iii) procurement, (iv) operating types and asset systems. (For example, this associated life-cycles. The documents.
asset types and asset and (v) inspection and maintenance. Asset requirement is recognised in 4.3.1 d) of PAS 55). management team that has overall
systems over which Management Reports contain strategies for This question explores what an organisation has responsibility for asset
the organisation has managing asset lifecycle phases for key done to take lifecycle into account in its asset management. Those responsible
stewardship? asset classes. For planning there are management strategy. for developing and adopting
network architecture review documents that methods and processes used in
describe the overall development strategy at asset management
various voltage levels.
26 Asset How does the Orion's asset management work plan is The asset management strategy need to be The management team with The organisation's asset
management organisation establish 3 documented in in broad terms within the translated into practical plans so that all parties overall responsibility for the asset management plan(s).
plan(s) and document its AMP. Finer detail of work plans are know how the objectives will be achieved. The management system. Operations,
asset management documented in the annual work plan and development of plans will need to identify the maintenance and engineering
plans across the life project/program specific work package specific tasks and activities required to optimize managers.
cycle activities of its documents. Asset management plan costs, risks and performance of the assets and/or
assets and asset documents are made available to asset systems, when they are to be carried out and
systems? stakeholders as appropriate to their role the resources required.
within the asset management system.
Schedule 13: Report on asset management maturity (cont) AMP Planning period: 1 April 2014 - 31 March 2024
No. Function Question Maturity level 0 Maturity level 1 Maturity level 2 Maturity level 3 Maturity level 4
3 Asset To what extent has an The organisation does not have a The organisation has an asset The organisation has an asset The asset management policy is The organisation's processes
management asset management documented asset management management policy, but it has not been management policy, which has been authorised by top management, is surpass the standard required to
policy policy been policy. authorised by top management, or it is authorised by top management, but it widely and effectively communicated comply with requirements set out in
documented, not influencing the management of the has had limited circulation. It may be to all relevant employees and a recognised standard.
authorised and assets. in use to influence development of stakeholders, and used to make these
communicated? strategy and planning but its effect is persons aware of their asset related The assessor is advised to note in the
limited. obligations. Evidence section why this is the case
and the evidence seen.
10 Asset What has the The organisation has not The need to align the asset management Some of the linkages between the All linkages are in place and evidence The organisation's process(es)
management organisation done to considered the need to ensure that strategy with other organisational long-term asset management is available to demonstrate that, surpass the standard required to
strategy ensure that its asset its asset management strategy is policies and strategies as well as strategy and other organisational where appropriate, the organisation's comply with requirements set out in
management strategy appropriately aligned with the stakeholder requirements is understood policies, strategies and stakeholder asset management strategy is a recognised standard.
is consistent with organisation's other organisational and work has started to identify the requirements are defined but the consistent with its other
other appropriate policies and strategies or with linkages or to incorporate them in the work is fairly well advanced but still organisational policies and strategies. The assessor is advised to note in the
organisational stakeholder requirements. drafting of asset management strategy. incomplete. The organisation has also identified Evidence section why this is the case
policies and OR and considered the requirements of and the evidence seen.
strategies, and the The organisation does not have an relevant stakeholders.
needs of asset management strategy.
stakeholders?
11 Asset In what way does the The organisation has not The need is understood, and the The long-term asset management The asset management strategy takes The organisation's process(es)
management organisation's asset considered the need to ensure that organisation is drafting its asset strategy takes account of the lifecycle account of the lifecycle of all of its surpass the standard required to
strategy management strategy its asset management strategy is management strategy to address the of some, but not all, of its assets, assets, asset types and asset comply with requirements set out in
Appendices
take account of the produced with due regard to the lifecycle of its assets, asset types and asset types and asset systems. systems. a recognised standard.
lifecycle of the assets, lifecycle of the assets, asset types asset systems.
asset types and asset or asset systems that it manages. The assessor is advised to note in the
systems over which OR Evidence section why this is the case
the organisation has The organisation does not have an and the evidence seen.
stewardship? asset management strategy.
26 Asset How does the The organisation does not have an The organisation has asset management The organisation is in the process of Asset management plan(s) are The organisation's process(es)
management organisation establish identifiable asset management plan plan(s) but they are not aligned with the putting in place comprehensive, established, documented, surpass the standard required to
plan(s) and document its (s) covering asset systems and asset management strategy and documented asset management plan implemented and maintained for comply with requirements set out in
asset management critical assets. objectives and do not take into (s) that cover all life cycle activities, asset systems and critical assets to a recognised standard.
plans across the life consideration the full asset life cycle clearly aligned to asset management achieve the asset management
cycle activities of its (including asset creation, acquisition, objectives and the asset management strategy and asset management The assessor is advised to note in the
assets and asset enhancement, utilisation, maintenance strategy. objectives across all life cycle phases. Evidence section why this is the case
systems? decommissioning and disposal). and the evidence seen.
325
326

SECTION A
27 Asset How has the The Asset Management Plan is published Plans will be ineffective unless they are The management team with Distribution lists for plan(s).
management organisation 3 annually and made public on Orion's web communicated to all those, including contracted overall responsibility for the asset Documents derived from
plan(s) communicated its site. Service providers and stakeholders are suppliers and those who undertake enabling management system. Delivery plan(s) which detail the
plan(s) to all relevant actively engaged with respect to the content function(s). The plan(s) need to be communicated in functions and suppliers. receivers role in plan
parties to a level of of the AMP, particularly if change to past a way that is relevant to those who need to use delivery. Evidence of
detail appropriate to programs are required. The AMP process is them. communication.
the receiver's role in sufficiently mature that stakeholders are
their delivery? aware of the availability of the AMP and may
access as required. Detailed work plans are
communicated directly with contractors via
the outsourcing process.
29 Asset How are designated Overall responsibility of delivery of the AMP The implementation of asset management plan(s) The management team with The organisation's asset
management responsibilities for 3 is documented to reside with the Network relies on (1) actions being clearly identified, (2) an overall responsibility for the asset management plan(s).
plan(s) delivery of asset plan Asset Manager. Asset management tasks owner allocated and (3) that owner having sufficient management system. Operations, Documentation defining
actions documented? are detailed through contract specifications delegated responsibility and authority to carry out maintenance and engineering roles and responsibilities of
clearly defining requirements for individual the work required. It also requires alignment of managers. If appropriate, the individuals and
work packages. Responsibility for delivery of actions across the organisation. This question performance management team. organisational departments.
tasks by service providers is formalised explores how well the plan(s) set out responsibility
through a commercial contract which is for delivery of asset plan actions.
actively managed. A formal delegation of
authority document exists and appears
appropriate for execution of the AMP.
31 Asset What has the Delivery of the asset management work plan It is essential that the plan(s) are realistic and can The management team with The organisation's asset
management organisation done to 3 is achieved through outsourcing be implemented, which requires appropriate overall responsibility for the asset management plan(s).
Appendices
plan(s) ensure that arrangements with service providers. Asset resources to be available and enabling mechanisms management system. Operations, Documented processes and
appropriate management planning actively considers in place. This question explores how well this is maintenance and engineering procedures for the delivery
arrangements are contractor work levelling in the timing of achieved. The plan(s) not only need to consider the managers. If appropriate, the of the asset management
made available for projects. Publishing long term plans actively resources directly required and timescales, but also performance management team. plan.
the efficient and cost signals future workload to the contracting the enabling activities, including for example, If appropriate, the performance
effective market. While these mechanisms are training requirements, supply chain capability and management team. Where
implementation of the somewhat informal they appear to be procurement timescales. appropriate the procurement team
plan(s)? effective in ensuring appropriate capability is and service providers working on
available for asset management plan the organisation's asset-related
(Note this is about delivery. activities.
resources and
enabling support) Mutual aid agreement with other utilities.
Emergency response is included in contracts.
33 Contingency What plan(s) and Orion has a documented contingency Widely used AM practice standards require that an The manager with responsibility The organisation's plan(s)
planning procedure(s) does the 3.5 planning process in place and this process organisation has plan(s) to identify and respond to for developing emergency plan(s). and procedure(s) for dealing
organisation have for has been shown to be effective as emergency situations. Emergency plan(s) should The organisation's risk with emergencies. The
identifying and demonstrated by Orion's response to recent outline the actions to be taken to respond to assessment team. People with organisation's risk
responding to earthquakes. Contingency planning includes specified emergency situations and ensure designated duties within the plan assessments and risk
incidents and participation in regional lifelines planning, continuity of critical asset management activities (s) and procedure(s) for dealing registers.
emergency situations policy defining emergency roles and including the communication to, and involvement of, with incidents and emergency
and ensuring responsibilities, and detailed contingency external agencies. This question assesses if, and situations.
continuity of critical plans for major network scenarios. Orion how well, these plan(s) triggered, implemented and
asset management has load flow contingency plans including resolved in the event of an incident. The plan(s)
activities? switching sheets prepared for total loss of all should be appropriate to the level of risk as
zone substations. determined by the organisation's risk assessment
methodology. It is also a requirement that relevant
Emergency response contract is in place to personnel are competent and trained.
provide field resources in the event of
emergency work being required.
27 Asset How has the The organisation does not have plan The plan(s) are communicated to some The plan(s) are communicated to The plan(s) are communicated to all The organisation's process(es)
management organisation (s) or their distribution is limited to of those responsible for delivery of the most of those responsible for delivery relevant employees, stakeholders and surpass the standard required to
plan(s) communicated its the authors. plan(s). but there are weaknesses in contracted service providers to a level comply with requirements set out in
plan(s) to all relevant OR identifying relevant parties resulting of detail appropriate to their a recognised standard.
parties to a level of Communicated to those responsible for in incomplete or inappropriate participation or business interests in
detail appropriate to delivery is either irregular or ad-hoc. communication. The organisation the delivery of the plan(s) and there is The assessor is advised to note in the
the receiver's role in recognises improvement is needed as confirmation that they are being used Evidence section why this is the case
their delivery? is working towards resolution. effectively. and the evidence seen.
29 Asset How are designated The organisation has not Asset management plan(s) Asset management plan(s) Asset management plan(s) The organisation's process(es)
management responsibilities for documented responsibilities for inconsistently document responsibilities consistently document consistently document responsibilities surpass the standard required to
plan(s) delivery of asset plan delivery of asset plan actions. for delivery of plan actions and activities responsibilities for the delivery of for the delivery actions and there is comply with requirements set out in
actions documented? and/or responsibilities and authorities actions but responsibility/authority adequate detail to enable delivery of a recognised standard.
for implementation inadequate and/or levels are inappropriate/ inadequate, actions. Designated responsibility and
delegation level inadequate to ensure and/or there are misalignments authority for achievement of asset The assessor is advised to note in the
effective delivery and/or contain within the organisation. plan actions is appropriate. Evidence section why this is the case
misalignments with organisational and the evidence seen.
accountability.
31 Asset What has the The organisation has not The organisation recognises the need to The organisation has arrangements The organisation's arrangements fully The organisation's process(es)
management organisation done to considered the arrangements ensure appropriate arrangements are in in place for the implementation of cover all the requirements for the surpass the standard required to
plan(s) ensure that needed for the effective place for implementation of asset asset management plan(s) but the efficient and cost effective comply with requirements set out in
Appendices
appropriate implementation of plan(s). management plan(s) and is in the arrangements are not yet adequately implementation of asset management a recognised standard.
arrangements are process of determining an appropriate efficient and/or effective. The plan(s) and realistically address the
made available for the approach for achieving this. organisation is working to resolve resources and timescales required, The assessor is advised to note in the
efficient and cost existing weaknesses. and any changes needed to functional Evidence section why this is the case
effective policies, standards, processes and the and the evidence seen.
implementation of the asset management information
plan(s)? system.
33 Contingency What plan(s) and The organisation has not The organisation has some ad-hoc Most credible incidents and Appropriate emergency plan(s) and The organisation's process(es)
planning procedure(s) does the considered the need to establish arrangements to deal with incidents and emergency situations are identified. procedure(s) are in place to respond surpass the standard required to
organisation have for plan(s) and procedure(s) to identify emergency situations, but these have Either appropriate plan(s) and to credible incidents and manage comply with requirements set out in
identifying and and respond to incidents and been developed on a reactive basis in procedure(s) are incomplete for continuity of critical asset a recognised standard.
responding to emergency situations. response to specific events that have critical activities or they are management activities consistent with
incidents and occurred in the past. inadequate. Training/ external policies and asset management The assessor is advised to note in the
emergency situations alignment may be incomplete. objectives. Training and external Evidence section why this is the case
and ensuring agency alignment is in place. and the evidence seen.
continuity of critical
asset management
activities?
327
328

User
No. Function Question Score Evidence-Summary Why Who Documented info
SECTION A
guidance
37 Structure, What has the The organisation is structured as an asset In order to ensure that the organisation's assets and Top management. People with Evidence that managers with
authority and organisation done to 3 management organisation. Group roles are asset systems deliver the requirements of the asset management responsibility for responsibility for the delivery of
responsibilities appoint member(s) of defined and overall accountability for the management policy, strategy and objectives the delivery of asset asset management policy, strategy,
its management team delivery of asset management outcomes responsibilities need to be allocated to appropriate management policy, strategy, objectives and plan(s) have been
to be responsible for resting with the Chief Operating Officer. people who have the necessary authority to fulfil objectives and plan(s). People appointed and have assumed their
ensuring that the Being a relatively small organization by their responsibilities. (This question, relates to the working on asset-related responsibilities. Evidence may
organisation's assets international standards, Orion operates a organisation's assets e.g., Para b), s 4.4.1 of PAS activities. include the organisation's
deliver the somewhat flexible management structure 55, making it therefore distinct from the documents relating to its asset
requirements of the with strong interpersonal communication requirement contained in Para a), s 4.4.1 of PAS 55). management system,
asset management replacing rigid process. This approach is organisational charts, job
strategy, objectives proving appropriate for Orion's scale and descriptions of post-holders,
and plan(s)? operating environment. annual targets/objectives and
personal development plan(s) of
post-holders as appropriate.
40 Structure, What evidence can A management review process exists where Optimal asset management requires top Top management. The Evidence demonstrating that asset
authority and the organisation's top 3 achievement of asset management activities management to ensure sufficient resources are management team that has management plan(s) and/or the
responsibilities management provide are routinely monitored and discussed at available. In this context the term 'resources' overall responsibility for asset process(es) for asset management
to demonstrate that General Manager level. Asset management includes manpower, materials, funding and service management. Risk plan implementation consider the
sufficient resources related resourcing is routinely adjusted to provider support. management team. The provision of adequate resources in
are available for asset ensure that outcomes are achieved. organisation's managers both the short and long term.
management? Evidence of adjustment of resourcing was involved in day-to-day Resources include funding,
found with the establishment of additional supervision of asset-related materials, equipment, services
AM engineering positions. activities, such as frontline provided by third parties and
managers, engineers, foremen personnel (internal and service
A strategy is in place for ensuring that and charge-hands as providers) with appropriate skills
sufficient field resources are available for the
Appendices
appropriate. competencies and knowledge.

execution of plans. This includes regular
meetings with service providers to discuss
long term strategic issues and resource
requirements.
42 Structure, To what degree does A range of strategies are employed to Widely used AM practice standards require an Top management. The Evidence of such activities as road
authority and the organisation's top 3 communicate the importance of meeting organisation to communicate the importance of management team that has shows, written bulletins,
responsibilities management asset management requirements. These meeting its asset management requirements such overall responsibility for asset workshops, team talks and
communicate the range from (i) weekly management meetings that personnel fully understand, take ownership of, management. People involved in management walk-abouts would
importance of attended by all asset management groups, (ii) and are fully engaged in the delivery of the asset the delivery of the asset assist an organisation to
meeting its asset regular group manager level meetings with management requirements (e.g. PAS 55 s 4.4.1 g). management requirements. demonstrate it is meeting this
management service providers, and road-show requirement of PAS 55.
requirements? presentations to all Orion and service
provider scheduled as required. Brown bag
lunch asset management plan briefings are
used to communicate technical detail of
asset management plan content.
45 Outsourcing of Where the All field delivered works are managed Where an organisation chooses to outsource some Top management. The The organisation's arrangements
asset organisation has 3 through an outsourcing arrangement with of its asset management activities, the organisation management team that has that detail the compliance required
management outsourced some of two principal service providers. Formal must ensure that these outsourced process(es) are overall responsibility for asset of the outsourced activities. For
activities its asset management processes are in place to assure service under appropriate control to ensure that all the management. The manager(s) example, this this could form part
activities, how has it provider capability and work quality. Control requirements of widely used AM standards (eg, PAS responsible for the monitoring of a contract or service level
ensured that processes include formal project 55) are in place, and the asset management policy, and management of the agreement between the
appropriate controls specifications and documentation, capability strategy objectives and plan(s) are delivered. This outsourced activities. People organisation and the suppliers of
are in place to ensure audits, process audits and practical includes ensuring capabilities and resources across involved with the procurement of its outsourced activities. Evidence
the compliant delivery completion inspections of works. A manager a time span aligned to life cycle management. The outsourced activities. The that the organisation has
of its organisational is accountable for the control of compliant organisation must put arrangements in place to people within the organisations demonstrated to itself that it has
strategic plan, and its delivery of outsourced activities. control the outsourced activities, whether it be to that are performing the assurance of compliance of
asset management external providers or to other in-house outsourced activities. The outsourced activities.
policy and strategy? departments. This question explores what the people impacted by the
organisation does in this regard. outsourced activity.
37 Structure, What has the Top management has not Top management understands the need Top management has appointed an The appointed person or persons have The organisation's process(es)
authority and organisation done to considered the need to appoint a to appoint a person or persons to ensure appropriate people to ensure the full responsibility for ensuring that the surpass the standard required to
responsibiliti appoint member(s) of person or persons to ensure that that the organisation's assets deliver the assets deliver the requirements of organisation's assets deliver the comply with requirements set out in
es its management team the organisation's assets deliver requirements of the asset management the asset management strategy, requirements of the asset a recognised standard.
to be responsible for the requirements of the asset strategy, objectives and plan(s). objectives and plan(s) but their areas management strategy, objectives and
ensuring that the management strategy, objectives of responsibility are not fully defined plan(s). They have been given the The assessor is advised to note in the
organisation's assets and plan(s). and/or they have insufficient necessary authority to achieve this. Evidence section why this is the case
deliver the delegated authority to fully execute and the evidence seen.
requirements of the their responsibilities.
asset management
strategy, objectives
and plan(s)?
40 Structure, What evidence can the The organisation's top management The organisations top management A process exists for determining what An effective process exists for The organisation's process(es)
authority and organisation's top has not considered the resources understands the need for sufficient resources are required for its asset determining the resources needed for surpass the standard required to
responsibiliti management provide required to deliver asset resources but there are no effective management activities and in most asset management and sufficient comply with requirements set out in
es to demonstrate that management. mechanisms in place to ensure this is cases these are available but in some resources are available. It can be a recognised standard.
sufficient resources the case. instances resources remain demonstrated that resources are
are available for asset insufficient. matched to asset management The assessor is advised to note in the
management? requirements. Evidence section why this is the case
42 Structure, To what degree does The organisation's top management The organisations top management Top management communicates the Top management communicates the The organisation's process(es)
authority and the organisation's top has not considered the need to understands the need to communicate importance of meeting its asset importance of meeting its asset surpass the standard required to
Appendices
responsibiliti management communicate the importance of the importance of meeting its asset management requirements but only management requirements to all comply with requirements set out in
es communicate the meeting asset management management requirements but does not to parts of the organisation. relevant parts of the organisation. a recognised standard.
importance of requirements. do so.
meeting its asset The assessor is advised to note in the
management Evidence section why this is the case
requirements? and the evidence seen.
45 Outsourcing Where the The organisation has not The organisation controls its outsourced Controls systematically considered Evidence exists to demonstrate that The organisation's process(es)
of asset organisation has considered the need to put controls activities on an ad-hoc basis, with little but currently only provide for the outsourced activities are appropriately surpass the standard required to
management outsourced some of in place. regard for ensuring for the compliant compliant delivery of some, but not controlled to provide for the compliant comply with requirements set out in
activities its asset management delivery of the organisational strategic all, aspects of the organisational delivery of the organisational strategic a recognised standard.
activities, how has it plan and/or its asset management policy strategic plan and/or its asset plan, asset management policy and
ensured that and strategy. management policy and strategy. strategy, and that these controls are The assessor is advised to note in the
appropriate controls Gaps exist. integrated into the asset management Evidence section why this is the case
are in place to ensure system and the evidence seen.
the compliant delivery
of its organisational
strategic plan, and its
asset management
policy and strategy?
329
330

SECTION A
48 Training, How does the Orion has conducted a review of resourcing There is a need for an organisation to demonstrate that Senior management Evidence of analysis of future
awareness organisation develop 2.5 requirements which has resulted in the it has considered what resources are required to responsible for agreement work load plan(s) in terms of
and plan(s) for the human development of a trainee program to provide develop and implement its asset management system. of plan(s). Managers human resources. Document(s)
competence resources required to necessary asset management related skills. There is also a need for the organisation to responsible for developing containing analysis of the
undertake asset To assist in meeting projected requirements demonstrate that it has assessed what development asset management strategy organisation's own direct
management for field resources Orion has funded the plan(s) are required to provide its human resources and plan(s). Managers with resources and contractors
activities - including development of an electricity industry trades with the skills and competencies to develop and responsibility for resource capability over suitable
the development and training centre. implement its asset management systems. The development and timescales. Evidence, such as
delivery of asset timescales over which the plan(s) are relevant should recruitment of staff minutes of meetings, that
management Key competencies are documented in Job be commensurate with the planning horizons within the (including HR functions). suitable management forums are
strategy, process(es), profiles and competence is assessed during asset management strategy considers e.g. if the asset Staff responsible for monitoring human resource
objectives and plan bi annual performance reviews. Training management strategy considers 5, 10 and 15 year time training. Procurement development plan(s). Training
(s)? requirements are identified during the scales then the human resources development plan(s) officers. Contracted service plan(s), personal development
performance review process. While effective should align with these. Resources include both 'in providers. plan(s), contract and service level
actions are in place there is no documentary house' and external resources who undertake asset agreements.
evidence that a forward plan exists and that management activities.
this is being regularly reviewed.
49 Training, How does the As for question 48 above, core competencies Widely used AM standards require that organisations to Senior management Evidence of an established and
awareness organisation identify 2.5 are identified in the job design process and undertake a systematic identification of the asset responsible for agreement applied competency
and competency included in job profiles. Competency is management awareness and competencies required at of plan(s). Managers requirements assessment
competence requirements and regularly reviewed against the requirements each level and function within the organisation. Once responsible for developing process and plan(s) in place to
then plan, provide of the job profile and training needs identified the training required to provide the necessary asset management strategy deliver the required training.
and record the identified. competencies should be planned for delivery in a timely and plan(s). Managers with Evidence that the training
training necessary to and systematic way. Any training provided must be responsibility for programme is part of a wider, co
achieve the A structured means for recording recorded and maintained in a suitable format. Where development and -ordinated asset management
Appendices
competencies? competencies and training for all core asset an organisation has contracted service providers in recruitment of staff activities training and
management related competencies is not place then it should have a means to demonstrate that (including HR functions). competency programme.
currently in place. this requirement is being met for their employees. Staff responsible for Evidence that training activities
(e.g. PAS 55 refers to frameworks suitable for training. Procurement are recorded and that records
identifying competency requirements). officers. Contracted service are readily available (for both
providers. direct and contracted service
provider staff) e.g. via
organisation wide information
system or local records
database.
50 Training, How does the Service provider training and competence A critical success factor for the effective development Managers, supervisors, Evidence of a competency
awareness organization ensure 2.5 requirements are controlled through and implementation of an asset management system is persons responsible for assessment framework that
and that persons under its contractual relationships with the service the competence of persons undertaking these developing training aligns with established
competence direct control provider and are audited for compliance. activities. organisations should have effective means in programmes. Staff frameworks such as the asset
undertaking asset While not completely implemented, Orion is place for ensuring the competence of employees to responsible for procurement management Competencies
management related developing capability to deploy competency carry out their designated asset management function and service agreements. HR Requirements Framework
activities have an requirements to a lower level (for example (s). Where an organisation has contracted service staff and those responsible (Version 2.0); National
appropriate level of jointer product training) providers undertaking elements of its asset for recruitment. Occupational Standards for
competence in terms management system then the organisation shall Management and Leadership; UK
of education, training In house asset management skills and assure itself that the outsourced service provider also Standard for Professional
or experience? competencies are managed less formally via has suitable arrangements in place to manage the Engineering Competence,
the job profile and twice yearly performance competencies of its employees. The organisation Engineering Council, 2005.
review process. PAS-55 compliance could be should ensure that the individual and corporate
enhanced through the development of a competencies it requires are in place and actively
formal skills and competence framework monitor, develop and maintain an appropriate balance
linked to process roles. of these competencies.
48 Training, How does the organisation The organisation has not The organisation has recognised the The organisation has developed a The organisation can demonstrate The organisation's process(es)
awareness develop plan(s) for the recognised the need for need to assess its human resources strategic approach to aligning that plan(s) are in place and effective surpass the standard required to
and human resources required assessing human resources requirements and to develop a plan(s). competencies and human resources in matching competencies and comply with requirements set out in
competence to undertake asset requirements to develop and There is limited recognition of the to the asset management system capabilities to the asset management a recognised standard.
management activities - implement its asset management need to align these with the including the asset management plan system including the plan for both
including the development system. development and implementation of but the work is incomplete or has not internal and contracted activities. The assessor is advised to note in the
and delivery of asset its asset management system. been consistently implemented. Plans are reviewed integral to asset Evidence section why this is the case
management strategy, management system process(es). and the evidence seen.
process(es), objectives and
plan(s)?
49 Training, How does the organisation The organisation does not have The organisation has recognised the The organisation is the process of Competency requirements are in The organisation's process(es)
awareness identify competency any means in place to identify need to identify competency identifying competency requirements place and aligned with asset surpass the standard required to
and requirements and then competency requirements. requirements and then plan, provide aligned to the asset management management plan(s). Plans are in comply with requirements set out in
competence plan, provide and record and record the training necessary to plan(s) and then plan, provide and place and effective in providing the a recognised standard.
the training necessary to achieve the competencies. record appropriate training. It is training necessary to achieve the
achieve the competencies? incomplete or inconsistently applied. competencies. A structured means of The assessor is advised to note in the
recording the competencies achieved Evidence section why this is the case
is in place. and the evidence seen.
50 Training, How does the organization The organization has not Competency of staff undertaking asset The organization is in the process of Competency requirements are The organisation's process(es)
awareness ensure that persons under recognised the need to assess management related activities is not putting in place a means for identified and assessed for all surpass the standard required to
and its direct control the competence of person(s) managed or assessed in a structured assessing the competence of person persons carrying out asset comply with requirements set out in
competence undertaking asset undertaking asset management way, other than formal requirements (s) involved in asset management management related activities - a recognised standard.
Appendices
management related related activities. for legal compliance and safety activities including contractors. internal and contracted.
activities have an management. There are gaps and inconsistencies. Requirements are reviewed and staff The assessor is advised to note in the
appropriate level of reassessed at appropriate intervals Evidence section why this is the case
competence in terms of aligned to asset management and the evidence seen.
education, training or requirements.
experience?
331
332

SECTION A
53 Communicati How does the Orion's small size allows a less formal Widely used AM practice standards require that Top management and senior Asset management policy
on, organisation ensure 3 communication strategy to be effective than would pertinent asset management information is effectively management representative statement prominently
participation that pertinent asset be necessary for large PAS-55 compliant communicated to and from employees and other (s), employee's displayed on notice boards,
and management organisations. stakeholders including contracted service providers. representative(s), intranet and internet; use of
consultation information is Pertinent information refers to information required in employee's trade union organisation's website for
effectively A range of communication strategies are used to order to effectively and efficiently comply with and representative(s); contracted displaying asset
communicated to and facilitate two way communication with staff. For deliver asset management strategy, plan(s) and service provider performance data; evidence
from employees and example a weekly trickle down briefing is provided objectives. This will include for example the management and employee of formal briefings to
other stakeholders, within the infrastructure division, staff and service communication of the asset management policy, asset representative(s); employees, stakeholders
including contracted provider road-shows are employed to brief on the performance information, and planning information as representative(s) from the and contracted service
service providers? content of asset management plans. The small appropriate to contractors. organisation's Health, Safety providers; evidence of
team and open door approach of management and Environmental team. inclusion of asset
ensures that information flows freely within the Key stakeholder management issues in team
company. representative(s). meetings and contracted
service provider contract
meetings; newsletters, etc.
59 Asset What documentation Orion has in place the key elements of an asset Widely used AM practice standards require an The management team that The documented
Management has the organisation 2.5 management system and these are documented organisation maintain up to date documentation that has overall responsibility for information describing the
System established to within the Asset Management Plan and Network ensures that its asset management systems (ie, the asset management. main elements of the asset
documentatio describe the main standards framework. Documentation to comply systems the organisation has in place to meet the Managers engaged in asset management system
n elements of its asset with a PAS-55 asset management system would standards) can be understood, communicated and management activities. (process(es)) and their
management system be readily achieved by process or system operated. (eg, s 4.5 of PAS 55 requires the interaction.
and interactions documentation defining how key processes maintenance of up to date documentation of the asset
between them? operate and how the existing elements are management system requirements specified
interlinked. throughout s 4 of PAS 55).
Appendices
62 Information What has the The overarching information requirements for Effective asset management requires appropriate The organisation's strategic Details of the process the
management organisation done to 3 asset management are defined in Section 2.8 of information to be available. Widely used AM standards planning team. The organisation has employed
determine what its the AMP. The overall design of this system is therefore require the organisation to identify the asset management team that has to determine what its asset
asset management based on a continual review of information needs management information it requires in order to overall responsibility for information system should
information system(s) as part of Orion's business as usual continual support its asset management system. Some of the asset management. contain in order to support
should contain in improvement processes. Where gaps are information required may be held by suppliers. Information management its asset management
order to support its identified, changes are initiated. for larger team. Operations, system. Evidence that this
asset management projects (e.g. proposed upgrades to the asset The maintenance and development of asset maintenance and has been effectively
system? management systems) the Lifecycle Manager management information systems is a poorly engineering managers implemented.
surveys stakeholders within Orion to identify understood specialist activity that is akin to IT
potential requirements, these are then management but different from IT management. This
rationalised to produce a project specification and group of questions provides some indications as to
business case. whether the capability is available and applied. Note:
To be effective, an asset information management
system requires the mobilisation of technology, people
and process(es) that create, secure, make available
and destroy the information required to support the
asset management system.
63 Information How does the Processes exist to verify the integrity of mission The response to the questions is progressive. A higher The management team that The asset management
management organisation maintain 3 critical asset information such as network scale cannot be awarded without achieving the has overall responsibility for information system,
its asset management connectivity. Less critical information are verified requirements of the lower scale. asset management. Users of together with the policies,
information system(s) on an exception basis with errors being reported the organisational procedure(s), improvement
and ensure that the and corrected as required. This question explores how the organisation ensures information systems. initiatives and audits
data held within it that information management meets widely used AM regarding information
(them) is of the practice requirements (eg, s 4.4.6 (a), (c) and (d) of PAS controls.
requisite quality and 55).
accuracy and is
consistent?
53 Communicati How does the The organisation has not There is evidence that the pertinent The organisation has determined Two way communication is in place The organisation's process(es)
on, organisation ensure that recognised the need to formally asset management information to be pertinent information and relevant between all relevant parties, ensuring surpass the standard required to
participation pertinent asset communicate any asset shared along with those to share it parties. Some effective two way that information is effectively comply with requirements set out in
and management management information. with is being determined. communication is in place but as yet communicated to match the a recognised standard.
consultation information is effectively not all relevant parties are clear on requirements of asset management
communicated to and their roles and responsibilities with strategy, plan(s) and process(es). The assessor is advised to note in the
from employees and respect to asset management Pertinent asset information Evidence section why this is the case
other stakeholders, information. requirements are regularly reviewed. and the evidence seen.
including contracted
service providers?
59 Asset What documentation has The organisation has not The organisation is aware of the need The organisation in the process of The organisation has established The organisation's process(es)
Management the organisation established documentation that to put documentation in place and is in documenting its asset management documentation that comprehensively surpass the standard required to
System established to describe describes the main elements of the the process of determining how to system and has documentation in describes all the main elements of its comply with requirements set out in
documentatio the main elements of its asset management system. document the main elements of its place that describes some, but not asset management system and the a recognised standard.
n asset management asset management system. all, of the main elements of its asset interactions between them. The
system and interactions management system and their documentation is kept up to date. The assessor is advised to note in the
between them? interaction. Evidence section why this is the case
62 Information What has the The organisation has not The organisation is aware of the need The organisation has developed a The organisation has determined what The organisation's process(es)
management organisation done to considered what asset to determine in a structured manner structured process to determine what its asset information system should surpass the standard required to
determine what its asset management information is what its asset information system its asset information system should contain in order to support its asset comply with requirements set out in
management should contain in order to support its contain in order to support its asset management system. The a recognised standard.
Appendices
required.
information system(s) asset management system and is in management system and has requirements relate to the whole life
should contain in order the process of deciding how to do this. commenced implementation of the cycle and cover information The assessor is advised to note in the
to support its asset process. originating from both internal and Evidence section why this is the case
management system? external sources. and the evidence seen.
63 Information How does the There are no formal controls in The organisation is aware of the need The organisation has developed a The organisation has effective The organisation's process(es)
management organisation maintain its place or controls are extremely for effective controls and is in the controls that will ensure the data controls in place that ensure the data surpass the standard required to
asset management limited in scope and/or process of developing an appropriate held is of the requisite quality and held is of the requisite quality and comply with requirements set out in
information system(s) effectiveness. control process(es). accuracy and is consistent and is in accuracy and is consistent. The a recognised standard.
and ensure that the data the process of implementing them. controls are regularly reviewed and
held within it (them) is of improved where necessary. The assessor is advised to note in the
the requisite quality and Evidence section why this is the case
accuracy and is and the evidence seen.
consistent?
333
334

SECTION A
64 Information How has the Section 2.7 of the AMP describes the Widely used AM standards need not be prescriptive The organisation's strategic The documented process the
management organisation's ensured its 3 overall information architecture and about the form of the asset management planning team. The organisation employs to ensure its
asset management demonstrates alignment with the information system, but simply require that the management team that has asset management information
information system is asset management information needs asset management information system is overall responsibility for asset system aligns with its asset
relevant to its needs? of the business. Asset data users appropriate to the organisations needs, can be management. Information management requirements. Minutes
confirm that data is relevant to needs. effectively used and can supply information which is management team. Users of of information systems review
consistent and of the requisite quality and accuracy. the organisational information meetings involving users.
There is an Informal continual review systems.
of asset information requirements
with small changes to systems
initiated as required. For larger
capital IT projects a business case
and associated analysis is prepared.
69 Risk How has the organisation Orion has a number of separate Risk management is an important foundation for The top management team in The organisation's risk management
management documented process(es) 2 initiatives for the management of risk proactive asset management. Its overall purpose is conjunction with the framework and/or evidence of
process(es) and/or procedure(s) for across the various lifecycle phases. to understand the cause, effect and likelihood of organisation's senior risk specific process(es) and/ or
the identification and Examples of sub systems include, adverse events occurring, to optimally manage such management representatives. procedure(s) that deal with risk
assessment of asset and Quantate, CBRM, Public Safety risks to an acceptable level, and to provide an audit There may also be input from control mechanisms. Evidence that
asset management Management System and others. trail for the management of risks. Widely used the organisation's Safety, the process(es) and/or procedure(s)
related risks throughout While general strategies are standards require the organisation to have process Health and Environment team. are implemented across the business
the asset life cycle? documented in the AMP, there does (es) and/or procedure(s) in place that set out how Staff who carry out risk and maintained. Evidence of agendas
not appear to be a consistent the organisation identifies and assesses asset and identification and assessment. and minutes from risk management
overarching risk management asset management related risks. The risks have to meetings. Evidence of feedback in to
framework and means for collating be considered across the four phases of the asset process(es) and/or procedure(s) as a
asset related risks and ensuring that lifecycle (eg, para 4.3.3 of PAS 55). result of incident investigation(s).
Appendices
they are evaluated and managed on a Risk registers and assessments.

consistent basis.
79 Use and How does the While there is evidence that risks are Widely used AM standards require that the output Staff responsible for risk The organisations risk management
maintenance organisation ensure that 2 being identified, and mitigated, there from risk assessments are considered and that assessment and those framework. The organisation's
of asset risk the results of risk is not evidence that mitigating actions adequate resource (including staff) and training is responsible for developing and resourcing plan(s) and training and
information assessments provide are being comprehensively linked to identified to match the requirements. It is a further approving resource and competency plan(s). The organisation
input into the resourcing, competencies and requirement that the effects of the control training plan(s). There may should be able to demonstrate
identification of adequate training plans. measures are considered, as there may be also be input from the appropriate linkages between the
resources and training implications in resources and training required to organisation's Safety, Health content of resource plan(s) and
and competency needs? achieve other objectives. and Environment team. training and competency plan(s) to
the risk assessments and risk control
measures that have been developed.
82 Legal and What procedure does the Orion has commissioned a In order for an organisation to comply with its legal, Top management. The The organisational processes and
other organisation have to 3 compliance manual outlining the regulatory, statutory and other asset management organisations regulatory team. procedures for ensuring information
requirements identify and provide company's legal compliance requirements, the organisation first needs to ensure The organisation's legal team of this type is identified, made
access to its legal, obligations. This manual is reviewed that it knows what they are (eg, PAS 55 specifies this or advisors. The management accessible to those requiring the
regulatory, statutory and annually with company lawyers in s 4.4.8). It is necessary to have systematic and team with overall information and is incorporated into
other asset management monitoring relevant legislation and auditable mechanisms in place to identify new and responsibility for the asset asset management strategy and
requirements, and how is regulation for change. Senior changing requirements. Widely used AM standards management system. The objectives
requirements managers are required to review the also require that requirements are incorporated into organisation's health and
incorporated into the manual an ensure that obligations the asset management system (e.g. procedure(s) safety team or advisors. The
asset management pertinent to their area of operations and process(es)) organisation's policy making
system? are met. team.
64 Information How has the organisation's The organisation has not The organisation understands the The organisation has developed and The organisation's asset The organisation's process(es)
management ensured its asset considered the need to determine need to ensure its asset management is implementing a process to ensure management information system surpass the standard required to
management information the relevance of its management information system is relevant to its its asset management information aligns with its asset management comply with requirements set out in
system is relevant to its information system. At present needs and is determining an system is relevant to its needs. Gaps requirements. Users can confirm a recognised standard.
needs? there are major gaps between appropriate means by which it will between what the information system that it is relevant to their needs.
what the information system achieve this. At present there are provides and the organisations needs The assessor is advised to note in the
provides and the organisations significant gaps between what the have been identified and action is Evidence section why this is the case
needs. information system provides and the being taken to close them. and the evidence seen.
organisations needs.
69 Risk How has the organisation The organisation has not The organisation is aware of the need The organisation is in the process of Identification and assessment of The organisation's process(es)
management documented process(es) considered the need to document to document the management of asset documenting the identification and asset related risk across the asset surpass the standard required to
process(es) and/or procedure(s) for the process(es) and/or procedure(s) related risk across the asset lifecycle. assessment of asset related risk lifecycle is fully documented. The comply with requirements set out in
identification and for the identification and The organisation has plan(s) to across the asset lifecycle but it is organisation can demonstrate that a recognised standard.
assessment of asset and assessment of asset and asset formally document all relevant incomplete or there are appropriate documented
asset management related management related risks process(es) and procedure(s) or has inconsistencies between approaches mechanisms are integrated across The assessor is advised to note in the
risks throughout the asset throughout the asset life cycle. already commenced this activity. and a lack of integration. life cycle phases and are being Evidence section why this is the case
life cycle? consistently applied. and the evidence seen.
79 Use and How does the organisation The organisation has not The organisation is aware of the need The organisation is in the process Outputs from risk assessments are The organisation's process(es)
maintenance ensure that the results of considered the need to conduct to consider the results of risk ensuring that outputs of risk consistently and systematically surpass the standard required to
of asset risk risk assessments provide risk assessments. assessments and effects of risk assessment are included in used as inputs to develop comply with requirements set out in
information input into the identification of control measures to provide input into developing requirements for resources, training and competency a recognised standard.
adequate resources and reviews of resources, training and resources and training. The requirements. Examples and
Appendices
training and competency competency needs. Current input is implementation is incomplete and evidence is available. The assessor is advised to note in the
needs? typically ad-hoc and reactive. there are gaps and inconsistencies. Evidence section why this is the case
82 Legal and What procedure does the The organisation has not The organisation identifies some its The organisation has procedure(s) to Evidence exists to demonstrate that The organisation's process(es)
other organisation have to identify considered the need to identify its legal, regulatory, statutory and other identify its legal, regulatory, statutory the organisation's legal, surpass the standard required to
requirements and provide access to its legal, regulatory, statutory and asset management requirements, but and other asset management regulatory, statutory and other comply with requirements set out in
legal, regulatory, statutory other asset management this is done in an ad-hoc manner in requirements, but the information is asset management requirements a recognised standard.
and other asset requirements. the absence of a procedure. not kept up to date, inadequate or are identified and kept up to date.
management requirements, inconsistently managed. Systematic mechanisms for The assessor is advised to note in the
and how is requirements identifying relevant legal and Evidence section why this is the case
incorporated into the asset statutory requirements. and the evidence seen.
management system?
335
336
User
guidance
SECTION A
88 Life Cycle How does the organisation Orion has a comprehensive suite of standards and Life cycle activities are about the Asset managers, design staff, Documented process(es) and
Activities establish implement and 3 specifications covering all aspects of the asset implementation of asset management plan construction staff and project procedure(s) which are relevant to
maintain process(es) for the lifecycle. These include equipment procurement (s) i.e. they are the "doing" phase. They managers from other impacted demonstrating the effective
implementation of its asset specifications, design standards, construction need to be done effectively and well in areas of the business, e.g. management and control of life
management plan(s) and control standards, operating procedures and maintenance order for asset management to have any Procurement cycle activities during asset
of activities across the creation, standards. While documented standards are in place, practical meaning. As a consequence, creation, acquisition,
acquisition or enhancement of some processes are not clearly documented and rely widely used standards (eg, PAS 55 s 4.5.1) enhancement including design,
assets. This includes design, upon the experience and expertise of key staff. While require organisations to have in place modification, procurement,
modification, procurement, effective, some benefit may be obtained from more appropriate process(es) and procedure(s) construction and commissioning.
construction and commissioning detailed documentation of key asset management for the implementation of asset
activities? processes than is currently included in the AMP. management plan(s) and control of
lifecycle activities. This question explores
those aspects relevant to asset creation.
91 Life Cycle How does the organisation Orion's outsourcing processes ensure that only pre- Having documented process(es) which Asset managers, operations Documented procedure for review.
Activities ensure that processes and/or 3 qualified service providers may construct, operate ensure the asset management plan(s) are managers, maintenance managers Documented procedure for audit
procedures for the and maintain Orion assets. Contract specifications implemented in accordance with any and project managers from other of process delivery. Records of
implementation of asset and standards clearly define scope of work and place specified conditions, in a manner impacted areas of the business previous audits, improvement
management plans and control requirements on contractor competency and training. consistent with the asset management actions and documented
of activities during maintenance An audit process checks for compliance in terms of policy, strategy and objectives and in such confirmation that actions have
(and inspection) of assets are contractor capability, work process and finished a way that cost, risk and asset system been carried out.
sufficient to ensure activities are product. Orion asset management staff or approved performance are appropriately controlled
carried out under specified auditors witness key operations to ensure compliance is critical. They are an essential part of
conditions, are consistent with with standards. turning intention into action (e.g. as
AM strategy and control cost, required by PAS 55 s 4.5.1).
risk and performance?
95 Performance How does the organisation Orion has identified a suite of service levels and Widely used AM standards require that A broad cross-section of the people Functional policy and/or strategy
and condition measure the performance and 3 associated performance measures. These service organisations establish implement and involved in the organisation's asset- documents for performance or
Appendices
monitoring condition of its assets? levels, associated measures and targets are maintain procedures to monitor and related activities from data input to condition monitoring and
documented in the AMP. measure the performance and/or condition decision-makers, i.e. an end-to end measurement. The organisation's
of assets and asset systems. They further assessment. This should include performance monitoring
Orion has implemented a comprehensive set out requirements in some detail for contactors and other relevant third frameworks, balanced scorecards
methodology (CBRM) for using asset condition and reactive and proactive monitoring, and parties as appropriate. etc. Evidence of the reviews of any
performance information to evaluate asset health and leading/lagging performance indicators appropriate performance
risk. The methodology has been consistently applied together with the monitoring of results to indicators and the action lists
to all key asset classes. provide input to corrective actions and resulting from these reviews.
continual improvement. There is an Reports and trend analysis using
expectation that performance & condition performance and condition
monitoring will provide input to improving information. Evidence of the use
AM strategy, objectives and plans. of performance and condition
information shaping
improvements and supporting AM
strategy, objectives and plan(s).
99 Investigation How does the organisation Orion has a robust system in place for recording Widely used AM standards require that the The organisation's safety and Process(es) and procedure(s) for
of asset- ensure responsibility and the 3 customer outage information and collating network organisation establishes implements and environment management team. the handling, investigation and
related authority for the handling, performance statistics. Network outages are maintains process(es) for the handling and The team with overall responsibility mitigation of asset-related
failures, investigation and mitigation of routinely reviewed. Minor failures are monitored at a investigation of failures incidents and non- for the management of the assets. failures, incidents and emergency
incidents and asset-related failures, incidents statistical level, with action being taken if frequency conformities for assets and sets down a People who have appointed roles situations and non conformances.
nonconformit and emergency situations and increases abnormally, major failures and incidents number of expectations. Specifically this within the asset-related Documentation of assigned
ies non conformances is clear, are investigated on a case by case basis. question examines the requirement to investigation procedure, from those responsibilities and authority to
unambiguous, understood and Responsibility for investigation rests initially with the define clearly responsibilities and who carry out the investigations to employees. Job Descriptions,
communicated? Asset Lifecycle manager. authorities for these activities, and senior mgmt who review the Audit reports. Common
Procedures for emergency response and repair are communicate these unambiguously to recommendations. Operational communication systems i.e. all
clear, with this process being initiated from the relevant people including external controllers resp for managing the Job Descriptions on Internet etc.
control room. stakeholders if appropriate. asset base under fault conditions
and maintaining services to
A manager is responsible for investigating equipment
consumers, contractors and other
failures and recommending actions. Actions are
third parties as approp.
implemented through normal management channels.
88 Life Cycle How does the organisation The organisation does not have The organisation is aware of the need The organisation is in the process of Effective process(es) and The organisation's process(es)
Activities establish implement and maintain process(es) in place to manage to have process(es) and procedure(s) putting in place process(es) and procedure(s) are in place to surpass the standard required to
processes for the implementation and control the implementation in place to manage and control the procedure(s) to manage and control manage and control the comply with requirements set out in
of its asset management plans of asset management plan(s) implementation of asset management the implementation of asset implementation of asset a recognised standard.
and control of activities across during activities related to asset plan(s) during activities related to management plan(s) during activities management plan(s) during
the creation, acquisition or creation including design, asset creation including design, related to asset creation including activities related to asset The assessor is advised to note in the
enhancement of assets. This modification, procurement, modification, procurement, design, modification, procurement, creation including design, Evidence section why this is the case
includes design, modification, construction and construction and commissioning but construction and commissioning. modification, procurement, and the evidence seen.
procurement, construction and commissioning. currently do not have these in place Gaps and inconsistencies are being construction and
commissioning activities? (note: procedure(s) may exist but they addressed. commissioning.
are inconsistent/incomplete).
91 Life Cycle How does the organisation ensure The organisation does not have The organisation is aware of the need The organisation is in the process of The organisation has in place The organisation's process(es)
Activities that processes and/or procedures process(es)/procedure(s) in to have process(es) and procedure(s) putting in place process(es) and process(es) and procedure(s) to surpass the standard required to
for the implementation of asset place to control or manage the in place to manage and control the procedure(s) to manage and control manage and control the comply with requirements set out in
management plans and control of implementation of asset implementation of asset management the implementation of asset implementation of asset a recognised standard.
activities during maintenance management plan(s) during this plan(s) during this life cycle phase but management plan(s) during this life management plan(s) during this
(and inspection) of assets are life cycle phase. currently do not have these in place cycle phase. They include a process life cycle phase. They include a The assessor is advised to note in the
sufficient to ensure activities are and/or there is no mechanism for for confirming the process(es)/ process, which is itself regularly Evidence section why this is the case
carried out under specified confirming they are effective and procedure(s) are effective and if reviewed to ensure it is effective, and the evidence seen.
conditions, are consistent with where needed modifying them. necessary carrying out modifications. for confirming the process(es)/
asset management strategy and procedure(s) are effective and if
control cost, risk and necessary carrying out
performance? modifications.
Appendices
95 Performance How does the organisation The organisation has not The organisation recognises the need The organisation is developing Consistent asset performance The organisation's process(es)
and condition measure the performance and considered how to monitor the for monitoring asset performance but coherent asset performance monitoring linked to asset surpass the standard required to
monitoring condition of its assets? performance and condition of its has not developed a coherent monitoring linked to asset management objectives is in comply with requirements set out in
assets. approach. Measures are incomplete, management objectives. Reactive place and universally used a recognised standard.
predominantly reactive and lagging. and proactive measures are in place. including reactive and proactive
There is no linkage to asset Use is being made of leading measures. Data quality The assessor is advised to note in the
management objectives. indicators and analysis. Gaps and management and review Evidence section why this is the case
inconsistencies remain. process are appropriate. and the evidence seen.
Evidence of leading indicators
and analysis.
99 Investigation How does the organisation ensure The organisation has not The organisation understands the The organisation are in the process of The organisation have defined The organisation's process(es)
of asset- responsibility and the authority considered the need to define requirements and is in the process of defining the responsibilities and the appropriate responsibilities surpass the standard required to
related for the handling, investigation and the appropriate responsibilities determining how to define them. authorities with evidence. and authorities and evidence is comply with requirements set out in
failures, mitigation of asset-related and the authorities. Alternatively there are some gaps or available to show that these are a recognised standard.
incidents and failures, incidents and emergency inconsistencies in the identified applied across the business and
nonconformit situations and non conformances responsibilities/authorities. kept up to date. The assessor is advised to note in the
ies is clear, unambiguous, Evidence section why this is the case
understood and communicated? and the evidence seen.
337
338

User
SECTION A
guidance
105 Audit What has the As Orion does not have a formally This question seeks to explore what the organisation has The management team The organisation's asset-related
organisation done to 3 certified PAS-55 asset management done to comply with the standard practice AM audit responsible for its asset audit procedures. The methodology
establish procedure system there is no requirement for requirements (eg, the associated requirements of PAS 55 management procedure(s). The by which it determined the scope
(s) for the audit of its formal periodic audits. However Orion s 4.6.4 and its linkages to s 4.7). team with overall responsibility for and frequency of the audits and the
asset management does take actions to periodically review the management of the assets. criteria by which it identified the
system (process(es))? its overall asset management system Audit teams, together with key appropriate audit personnel. Audit
and capability. Evidence includes a staff responsible for asset schedules, reports etc. Evidence of
2007 PAS-55 gap analysis, annual AMP management. For example, Asset the procedures by which the audit
reviews commissioned by the Management Director, Engineering results are presented, together with
Commerce Commission and this Director. People with any subsequent communications.
external AMMAT review. responsibility for carrying out risk The risk assessment schedule or
assessments risk registers.
109 Corrective & How does the Orion does not currently have a formal Having investigated asset related failures, incidents and The management team Analysis records, meeting notes and
Preventative organisation instigate 2 non-conformance process such as a non-conformances, and taken action to mitigate their responsible for its asset minutes, modification records.
action appropriate non conformance register. Non consequences, an organisation is required to implement management procedure(s). The Asset management plan(s),
corrective and/or conformances or issues are however preventative and corrective actions to address root causes. team with overall responsibility for investigation reports, audit reports,
preventive actions to actively managed through normal Incident and failure investigations are only useful if the management of the assets. improvement programmes and
eliminate or prevent business activities, roles and appropriate actions are taken as a result to assess Audit and incident investigation projects. Recorded changes to
the causes of responsibilities and the subcontractor changes to a businesses risk profile and ensure that teams. Staff responsible for asset management procedure(s)
identified poor management process. Orion could appropriate arrangements are in place should a planning and managing corrective and process(es). Condition and
performance and non potentially benefit from the recurrence of the incident happen. Widely used AM and preventive actions. performance reviews. Maintenance
conformance? implementation of a non conformance standards also require that necessary changes arising reviews
register, possibly linked or associated from preventive or corrective action are made to the asset
with the corporate risk register. management system.
Appendices
113 Continual How does the Orion has a proven track record for Widely used AM standards have requirements to establish, The top management of the Records showing systematic
Improvement organisation achieve 3 innovation and continuous implement and maintain process(es)/procedure(s) for organisation. The manager/team exploration of improvement.
continual improvement. Examples include identifying, assessing, prioritising and implementing responsible for managing the Evidence of new techniques being
improvement in the introduction of GFNs, new outage actions to achieve continual improvement. Specifically organisation's asset management explored and implemented.
optimal combination management system, changes in there is a requirement to demonstrate continual system, including its continual Changes in procedure(s) and
of costs, asset related maintenance practices that have improvement in optimisation of cost risk and performance/ improvement. Managers process(es) reflecting improved use
risks and the reduced reactive maintenance, and the condition of assets across the life cycle. This question responsible for policy development of optimisation tools/techniques
performance and introduction of (CBRM). While Orion explores an organisation's capabilities in this area— and implementation. and available information. Evidence
condition of assets does not have a formal innovation or looking for systematic improvement mechanisms rather of working parties and research.
and asset systems continual improvement process, that reviews and audit (which are separately examined).
across the whole life evidence indicates that a continual
improvement is embedded within the
cycle?
Orion culture. A recent example is the
introduction of asset management
reports defining asset fleet
management strategies.
115 Continual How does the Orion obtains information for One important aspect of continual improvement is where The top management of the Research and development projects
Improvement organisation seek and 3 improvements from a range of sources. an organisation looks beyond its existing boundaries and organisation. The manager/team and records, benchmarking and
acquire knowledge External sources of information knowledge base to look at what 'new things are on the responsible for managing the participation knowledge exchange
about new asset include: market'. These new things can include equipment, organisation's AM system, incl its professional forums. Evidence of
management related - equipment suppliers processes, tools, etc. An org. which does this (e.g. by the continual improvement. People correspondence relating to
technology and PAS 55 s 4.6 standards) will be able to demonstrate that it who monitor the various items that knowledge acquisition. Examples of
- consultants
practices, and continually seeks to expand its knowledge of all things require monitoring for 'change'. change implementation and
evaluate their - domestic and international affecting its AM approach and capabilities. The People that implement changes to evaluation of new tools, and
potential benefit to conferences organisation will be able to demonstrate that it identifies the organisation's policy, strategy, techniques linked to asset
the organisation? - participation in industry groups such any such opportunities to improve, evaluates them for etc. People within an organisation management strategy and
as ENA and EEA. suitability to its own organisation and implements them as with responsibility for objectives.
appropriate. This question explores an organisation's investigating, evaluating,
A nominated manager is assigned to
approach to this activity. recommending and implementing
study and where appropriate
new tools and techniques, etc.
implement innovation opportunities.
105 Audit What has the The organisation has not The organisation understands the The organisation is establishing its The organisation can demonstrate The organisation's process(es)
organisation done to recognised the need to establish need for audit procedure(s) and is audit procedure(s) but they do not yet that its audit procedure(s) cover all surpass the standard required to
establish procedure(s) procedure(s) for the audit of its determining the appropriate scope, cover all the appropriate asset- the appropriate asset-related comply with requirements set out in
for the audit of its asset asset management system. frequency and methodology(s). related activities. activities and the associated reporting a recognised standard.
management system of audit results. Audits are to an
(process(es))? appropriate level of detail and The assessor is advised to note in the
consistently managed. Evidence section why this is the case
109 Corrective & How does the The organisation does not The organisation recognises the need The need is recognized for systematic Mechanisms are consistently in place The organisation's process(es)
Preventative organisation instigate recognise the need to have to have systematic approaches to instigation of preventive and and effective for the systematic surpass the standard required to
action appropriate corrective systematic approaches to instigating corrective or preventive corrective actions to address root instigation of preventive and comply with requirements set out in
and/or preventive actions instigating corrective or preventive actions. There is ad-hoc causes of non compliance or corrective actions to address root a recognised standard.
to eliminate or prevent actions. implementation for corrective actions incidents identified by investigations, causes of non compliance or incidents
the causes of identified to address failures of assets but not compliance evaluation or audit. It is identified by investigations, The assessor is advised to note in the
poor performance and the asset management system. only partially or inconsistently in compliance evaluation or audit. Evidence section why this is the case
non conformance? place. and the evidence seen.
113 Continual How does the The organisation does not consider A Continual Improvement ethos is Continuous improvement process(es) There is evidence to show that The organisation's process(es)
Improvement organisation achieve continual improvement of these recognised as beneficial, however it are set out and include consideration continuous improvement process(es) surpass the standard required to
continual improvement factors to be a requirement, or has has just been started, and or covers of cost risk, performance and which include consideration of cost comply with requirements set out in
in the optimal not considered the issue. partially the asset drivers. condition for assets managed across risk, performance and condition for a recognised standard.
combination of costs, the whole life cycle but it is not yet assets managed across the whole life
Appendices
asset related risks and being systematically applied. cycle are being systematically applied. The assessor is advised to note in the
the performance and Evidence section why this is the case
condition of assets and and the evidence seen.
asset systems across the
whole life cycle?
115 Continual How does the The organisation makes no attempt The organisation is inward looking, The organisation has initiated asset The organisation actively engages The organisation's process(es)
Improvement organisation seek and to seek knowledge about new asset however it recognises that asset management communication within internally and externally with other surpass the standard required to
acquire knowledge about management related technology or management is not sector specific sector to share and, or identify 'new' asset management practitioners, comply with requirements set out in
new asset management practices. and other sectors have developed to sector asset management professional bodies and relevant a recognised standard.
related technology and good practice and new ideas that practices and seeks to evaluate them. conferences. Actively investigates and
practices, and evaluate could apply. Ad-hoc approach. evaluates new practices and evolves The assessor is advised to note in the
their potential benefit to its asset management activities using Evidence section why this is the case
the organisation? appropriate developments. and the evidence seen.
339
340 Appendices
Appendix B - Cross reference table

As our AMP has been structured as a practical planning tool, it does not strictly follow the order laid out in the
Electricity Distribution Information Disclosure Determination 2012. We have prepared the cross reference table
below to help you find specific sections.
Sections as per the Electricity Distribution Information Disclosure Orion AMP

Determination 2012
1. Summary of the plan 1. Summary
2. Background and objectives 2. Background and objectives
3. Assets covered 4. Lifecycle asset management
4. Service levels 3. Service level targets
5. Network development plans 5. Network development
6. Lifecycle asset management planning (maintenance and renewal) 4. Lifecycle asset management
7. Risk management 6. Risk management
8. Evaluation of performance 8. Evaluation of performance
Appendices 341
Appendix C - Glossary of terms

ABI: Air break isolator, a pole mounted isolation switch. Usually manually operated.
Alternating current (ac): a flow of electricity which reaches maximum in one direction, decreases to zero, then
reverses itself and reaches maximum in the opposite direction. The cycle is repeated continuously.
Ampere (A): unit of electrical current flow, or rate of flow of electrons.
Bushing: an electrical component that insulates a high voltage conductor passing through a metal enclosure.
CAIDI: an international index which measures the average duration of an interruption to supply for consumers that
have experienced an interruption. Usually calculated on a per annum basis.
Capacity utilisation: a ratio which measures the utilisation of transformers in the network. Calculated as the maximum
demand experienced on an electricity network in a year, divided by the transformer capacity on that network.
Capacitance: is the ability of a body to store an electrical charge.
Circuit breaker (CB): a device which detects excessive power demands in a circuit and cuts off power when they occur.
Nearly all of these excessive demands are caused by a fault on the network. In the urban network, where most of these
CBs are, they do not attempt a reclose after a fault as line circuit breakers may do on the rural overhead network.
Continuous rating: the constant load which a device can carry at rated primary voltage and frequency without
damaging and/or adversely effecting it characteristics.
Conductor: is the ‘wire’ that carries the electricity and includes overhead lines which can be covered (insulated) or
bare (not insulated) and underground cables which are insulated.
Current: the movement of electricity through a conductor, measured in amperes (A).
Demand side management (DSM): shaping the overall consumer load profile to obtain maximum mutual benefit to the
consumer and the network operator.
DIN: Deutsches Institut für Normung (the German Institute for Standardization).
Distributed/embedded generation (DG): a privately owned generating station connected to our network.
Distribution substation: is either a building, a kiosk, an outdoor substation or pole substation taking its supply at 11kV
and distributing at 400V (see sections 4.4.3 and 4.26).
Dog: an aerial aluminium conductor with steel reinforcing (ACSR) and a cross sectional area of 103mm 2.
DPP: The Commerce Act (Electricity Distribution Default Price-quality Path) Determination
EA Technology Ltd: is an international consultancy based in the UK. They were appointed as peer reviewers to the
Auckland CBD cable failure ministerial enquiry and subsequently engaged by us to review our 66kV cable network .
Fault current: the current from the connected power system that flows in a short circuit caused by a fault.
Feeder: a physical grouping of conductors that originate from a zone substation circuit breaker.
Flashover: a disruptive discharge around or over the surface of an insulator.
Flounder: a aerial aluminium conductor with steel reinforcing (ACSR) and a cross sectional area of 20mm 2. The cores
are shaped to give the conductor a smooth surface that offers less resistance to wind and snow.
Frequency: on alternating current circuits, the designated number of times per second that polarity alternates from
positive to negative and back again, expressed in Hertz (Hz)
Fuse: a device that will heat up, melt and electrically open the circuit after a period of prolonged abnormal current
flow.
Gradient, voltage: the voltage drop, or electrical difference, between two given points.
342 Appendices
Grid exit point (GXP): a point where Orion’s network is connected to Transpower’s transmission network.
Harmonics (wave form distortion): changes an ac voltage waveform from sinusoidal to complex and can be caused by
network equipment and equipment owned by consumers including electric motors or computer equipment.
High voltage (HV): voltage exceeding 1,000 volts (1kV), in Orion’s case generally 11kV, 33kV or 66kV.
ICP: installation control point, a uniquely numbered point on our network where a consumer(s) is connected.
Inductance: is the property of a conductor by which current flowing through it creates a voltage (electromotive force)
in both the conductor itself (self-inductance) and in any nearby conductors.
Insulator: supports live conductors and is made from material which does not allow electricity to flow through it.
Interrupted N-1: a network is said to have ‘Interrupted N-1’ security or capability if following the failure of ‘one’ overhead
line, cable or transformer the network can be switched to restore electricity supply to customers.
Interrupted N-2: a network is said to have ‘Interrupted N-2’ security or capability if following the failure of ‘two’ overhead
line, cable or transformer the network can be switched to restore electricity supply to customers.
Jaguar: an aerial aluminium conductor with steel reinforcing (ACSR) and a cross sectional area of 207mm 2.
kVA: the kVA, or Kilovolt-ampere, output rating designates the output which a transformer can deliver for a specified
time at rated secondary voltage and rated frequency.
Legacy assets: assets installed to meet appropriate standards of the time, but are not compliant with current day
safety standards.
Lifelines project: an engineering study into the effects of a natural disaster on Christchurch city undertaken in the
mid 1990s. (see section 6.6 - natural disaster)
Line circuit breaker (LCB): a circuit breaker mounted on an overhead line pole which quickly cuts off power after a
fault so no permanent damage is caused to any equipment. It switches power back on after a few seconds and, if the
cause of the fault has gone, (e.g. a branch has blown off a line) then the power will stay on. If the offending item still
exists then power will be cut again. This can happen up to three times before power will stay off until the fault
repaired. Sometimes an LCB is known as a ‘recloser’.
Low voltage (LV): a voltage not exceeding 1,000 volts, generally 230 or 400 volts.
Maximum demand: the maximum demand for electricity, at any one time, during the course of a year.
Mink: an aerial aluminium conductor with steel reinforcing (ACSR) and a cross sectional area of 62mm 2.
MOCHED: major outage causing huge economic damage.
N: a network is said to have ‘N’ security or capability if the network cannot deliver electricity after the failure of ‘one’
overhead line, cable or transformer.
N-1: a network is said to have ‘N-1’ security or capability if the network continues to deliver electricity after the failure of
‘one’ overhead line, cable or transformer.
N-2: a network is said to have ‘N-2’ security or capability if the network continues to deliver electricity after the failure of
‘two’ overhead lines, cables or transformers.
Namu: an aerial aluminium conductor (AAC) with a cross sectional area of 25mm2.
Network deliveries: total energy supplied to our network through Transpower’s grid exit points, usually measured as
energy supplied over the course of a year.
Network substations: are part of Orion’s primary 11kV network all within the Christchurch urban area.
Ohm: a measure of the opposition to electrical flow, measured in ohms.
ORDC: optimised depreciated replacement cost, prepared in accordance with New Zealand International Financial
Reporting Standards (NZ IFRS) under International Accounting Standard NZ IAS 16 - Property, Plant and Equipment
as at 31 March 2007
Outage: an interruption to electricity supply.
Appendices 343
PCB: Polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) were used as dielectric fluids in transformers and capacitors, coolants,
lubricants, stabilizing additives in flexible PVC coatings of electrical wiring and electronic components. PCB
production was banned in the 1970s due to the high toxicity of most PCB congeners and mixtures. PCBs are classified
as persistent organic pollutants which bio-accumulate in animals.
Proven voltage complaint: a complaint from a consumer concerning a disturbance to the voltage of their supply
which has proven to be caused by the network company.
Rango: an aerial aluminium conductor (AAC) with a cross sectional area of 50mm 2.
Ripple control system: a system used to control the electrical load on the network by, for example, switching
domestic water heaters, or by signaling large users of a high price period. Also used to control streetlights.
RTU: Remote terminal unit. Part of the SCADA system usually installed at the remote substation.
SAIDI: System Average Interruption Duration Index; an international index which measures the average duration of
interruptions to supply that a consumer experiences in a given period.
SAIFI: System Average Interruption Frequency Index; an international index which measures the average number of
interruptions that a consumer experiences in a given period.
SCADA: System Control and Data Acquisition. See section 4.22.

Sparrow: an aerial aluminium conductor with steel reinforcing (ACSR) and a cross sectional area of 34mm 2.
Squirrel: an aerial aluminium conductor with steel reinforcing (ACSR) and a cross sectional area of 20mm 2.
Transformer: a device that changes voltage up to a higher voltage or down to a lower voltage.
Transpower: the state owned enterprise that operates New Zealand’s transmission network. Transpower delivers
electricity from generators to grid exit points (GXPs) on distribution networks throughout the country.
Voltage: electric pressure; the force which causes current to flow through an electrical conductor.
Voltage drop: is the reduction in voltage in an electrical circuit between the source and load.
Voltage regulator: an electrical device that keeps the voltage at which electricity is supplied to consumers at a
constant level, regardless of load fluctuations.
Weke: an aerial aluminium conductor (AAC) with a cross sectional area of 100mm 2.
Wolf: an aerial aluminium conductor with steel reinforcing (ACSR) and a cross sectional area of 155mm 2.
XLPE cable: cross linked polyethylene insulated cable.
Zone substation: a major substation where either; voltage is transformed from 66 or 33kV to 11kV, two or more
incoming 11kV feeders from a grid exit point are redistributed or a ripple injection plant is installed.
Orion New Zealand Ltd
565 Wairakei Road
PO Box 13896
Christchurch 8141
New Zealand
Phone +64 3 363 9898
Email info@oriongroup.co.nz
Website oriongroup.co.nz
Twitter twitter.com/OrionNZ
This plan is compiled by Orion’s Infrastructure team and has been approved
by Orion’s board as at March 2014.
© Copyright Orion NZ Ltd. 2014

This document is entitled to the full protection given by the Copyright Act 1994
to the holders of the copyright. Reproduction of any substantial passage from
this document is a breach of the copyright. This copyright extends to all forms
of photocopying and any storing of material in any kind of information retrieval
system. All applications for reproduction in any form should be made to Orion.
Document: NW70.60.01
oriongroup.co.nz

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Asset

Key issues discussed in the plan include:

4 Lifecycle asset management 75

5 Network development 177

6 Risk management 249

8 Evaluation of performance 287

Figure Title Page Figure Title Page

Table Title Page Table Title Page

1.2 Service levels 16

1.3 Lifecycle asset management 18

1.4 Network development 20

1.5 Risk management 25

1.6 Financial forecasts 27

List of figures and tables in this section

1-3a Orion’s network area 18 1-6a Summary of forecast network expenditure 27

8-5a Personal safety – performance results 32

1.1 Background and objectives

1.1.2 Business plans and goals

Figure 2-2a Interaction of plans and processes

Shareholders consulted Statement of intent

Business plan Financial forecasts 10 year network AMP

1.1.4 Management responsibilities

Figure 1-1b Asset management structure

Orion board of directors

Corporate Infrastructure Commercial Information Human Communications

Consultants and contractors

Note: staff numbers include trainees, part-timers and temps.

Differences between our forecast and our actual outcomes

1.1.6 Asset management drivers

1.1.7 Asset management process

Construction standards and working practices

Introduction of new equipment types

1.1.8 Systems and information

1. Microsoft office network 13. interruption statistics

1.1.9 Development of systems and processes

Document management system

Condition based risk management model

1.2 Service levels

1.2.2 Consumer consultation

1.2.3 Service level measures

1.2.4 Service level targets

Table 3-4a Service descriptions , targets and measures for FY15

Network Unplanned interruptions restored > 60% % of total number of unplanned

Safety of public Zero Number of accidents involving members of Accident/incident reports.

Capacity utilisation ratio No target set– Maximum demand on network divided by

Load factor No target set– Average load on network divided by the

Losses No target set– The % of energy lost between the points of

1.3 Lifecycle asset management

Figure 1-3a Orion’s network area

Table 1-3a Orion’s electricity network asset quantities

Category Description 31 March 2013

Subtransmission lines/cables (km) 66kV and 33kV 580

Distribution lines/cables (km) 11kV 5,587

Urban network description

Rural network description

1.3.2 Network justification

1.3.3 Asset management approach

1.4 Network development

1.4.2 Network architecture

1.4.3 Planning criteria

1.4.4 Energy, demand and growth

Energy throughput (GWh)

Maximum demand (MW)

Figure 5-4b Overall maximum demand trends on the Orion network